Defendant/Respondent The State Bar of California (“State Bar”) moves for a declaration that Petitioner Larion Krayzman (“Krayzman”) is a vexatious litigant, to require him to post security, and for a pre-filing order.   

The court has read and considered the moving papers, response and opposition, reply, and sur-reply, and renders the following tentative decision.  

A. Statement of the Case 

1.  Petition for Writ of Mandate 

Petitioner Krayzman filed the Complaint (“Petition”) on May 23, 2024, alleging causes of action against State Bar and Traci Morgan a/k/a Pablo Mendez (“Morgan”) for (1) writ of mandate, (2) defamation per se, and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows. 

Petitioner Krayzman is not an attorney, nor has he practiced law.  Compl., ¶8.  Petitioner has only ever provided paralegal services.  Compl., ¶8.   

In March 2023, Defendant Morgan made defamatory statements to State Bar and other third parties, claiming that Petitioner was practicing law without a license and was a criminal and a thief.  Compl., ¶6.   

In response to Morgan’s false statements, State Bar launched an investigation of Krayzman.  Compl., ¶7.  State Bar’s investigation was not proper and impartial.  Compl., ¶¶7, 8.  State Bar jumped to a false conclusion and found that Krayzman was practicing law without a license.  Compl., ¶10.  State Bar issued and published on its website a cease-and-desist order against Krazyman.  Compl., ¶10. 

For all causes of action, Petitioner seeks general damages.  Petitioner seeks mandamus and injunctive relief requiring State Bar to withdraw the cease-and-desist order, remove all public information regarding the false and fraudulent cease-and-desist order, and make a statement correcting any prior remarks against Petitioner’s interests.   

2.  Course of Proceedings 

On June 17, 2024, A proof of service filed on June 17, 2024 shows electronic service of an Amendment to the Complaint on Defendant Morgan.   

A Notice of Acknowledgement and Receipt of the Complaint/Petition and Summons is on file executed by Respondent State Bar on June 18, 2024.   

On July 31, 2024, the court denied a Notice of Related Cases seeking to relate this case to 24AVR00957.   

B.  Applicable Law 

A “vexatious litigant” means a person who does any of the following:  

(1) in the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing;  

(2) After a litigation has been finally determined against the person, repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either (i) the validity of the determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined. 

(3) In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.  CCP1 §391(b).  

In any litigation in any court of this state, and at any time until final judgment is entered, a defendant may move the court for an order that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant who should be required to furnish security.  §391.1.  The motion must be supported by a showing that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and there is not a reasonable probability that he will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant.  Id. 

“Litigation” means any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court.  §391(a).  “Manifestly, ‘any civil action or proceeding’ includes any appeal or writ proceeding.  Of course, ‘any state or federal court’ includes the California Court of Appeal.” McColm v. Westwood Park Ass'n, (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1216; Fink v. Shemtov (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1170.   

For purposes of section 391(b)(1), a final determination adverse to the plaintiff includes a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.  Tokerud v. Capitolbank Sacramento, (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 775, 779.  “An action which is ultimately dismissed by the plaintiff, with or without prejudice, is nevertheless a burden on the target of the litigation and the judicial system, albeit less of a burden than if the matter had proceeded to trial. A party who repeatedly files baseless actions only to dismiss them is no less vexatious than the party who follows the actions through to completion. The difference is one of degree, not kind.”  Id. at 779.   

For purposes of section 391(b)(1), the statutory seven-year period is measured from the date the motion to have plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant is filed.  Stolz v. Bank of America, (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 217, 220. The fact that the litigation was commenced outside of the seven-year window does not necessarily exclude it from consideration if it was subsequently “prosecuted” or “maintained” by plaintiff in pro per within the window.  Id., at 225.  Nor does it matter if a plaintiff in pro per subsequently substitutes in counsel, so long as plaintiff maintained the action in pro per for some period during the seven-year window.  Id.   

“Security” is defined as “an undertaking to assure payment, to the party for whose benefit the undertaking is required to be furnished, of the party's reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees and not limited to taxable costs, incurred in or in connection with a litigation instituted, caused to be instituted, or maintained or caused to be maintained by a vexatious litigant.”  §391(c). 

Section 391.7 provides an additional means to counter misuse of the court system by vexatious litigants by authorizing the court to issue a prefiling order that prevents a vexatious litigant from filing new litigation pro per without permission of the presiding judge.  Shalant v. Girardi, (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1170.  The presiding judge shall permit the new pro per litigation only if it appears that the litigation has merit and has not been filed for harassment or delay.  The presiding judge may condition the filing of litigation upon furnishing security as provided in section 391.3.  Id. 

The vexatious litigant statutes are intended “to require a person found to be a vexatious litigant to put up security for the reasonable expenses of a defendant who becomes the target of one of these obsessive and persistent litigants whose conduct can cause serious financial results to the unfortunate object of his attack.”  First Western Development Corp. v. Superior Court, (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 860, 867.  “The constant suer becomes a serious problem to others than the defendant he dogs.  By clogging court calendars, he causes real detriment to those who have legitimate controversies to be determined, and to the taxpayers who must provide the courts.”  Taliaferro v. Hoogs, (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 73, 74. 

“The trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant.  Review of the order is accordingly limited and the Court of Appeal will uphold the ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence.  Likewise, a court's decision that a vexatious litigant does not have a reasonable chance of success in the action is based on an evaluative judgment in which the court weighs the evidence. If there is any substantial evidence to support the court's determination, it will be upheld.”  Singh v. Lipworth, (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 828.   

C. Statement of Facts 

On September 12, 2022, Morgan submitted a complaint to State Bar (Case No. 22-NA-11968) regarding Petitioner’s unauthorized practice of law.  Sorensen Decl., ¶2, Ex. A.  In the complaint, Morgan indicated that, on September 3, 2022, she responded to Petitioner’s advertisement on Craigslist.com for “Experienced Civil Litigation Paralegal” services, seeking assistance with drafting a default judgment in a federal civil case.  Sorensen Decl., ¶2, Ex. A.  

Petitioner responded to Morgan’s inquiry the same day, indicating he could review the complaint and draft the default in exchange for an advanced payment of $500.  Sorensen Decl., ¶3.  He also stated he could assist Morgan with enforcing the judgment once entered by the court.  Id. 

Morgan described the work she needed performed, including retracting a lis pendens, preparing a writ to garnish wages and other income, request arrears, add requirements to a default judgment, and other legal work.  Sorensen Decl., ¶4.  Morgan also asked whether she could file a claim with the other party’s insurance, whether she could pursue certain claims in criminal court, and whether she needed to include a statement regarding interest and penalties accruing after judgment.  Sorensen Decl., ¶4. Petitioner provided Morgan advice regarding the default judgment process and interpretation of timelines set forth by the Code of Civil Procedure.  Sorensen Decl., ¶5.  Notably, Petitioner’s communications to Morgan were silent whether he provided paralegal services under the supervision of a lawyer.  Sorensen Decl., ¶5. 

On January 5, 2024, Colie Dillon (“Dillon”), the State Bar investigator assigned to this matter, issued a letter of inquiry to Petitioner outlining the allegations raised against him by Morgan and requesting a response. Sorensen Decl., ¶7.  In the letter, Dillon requested that Petitioner indicate whether he was providing services under the supervision of a lawyer.  Sorensen Decl., ¶7, Ex. B.  

On January 5, 2023, Petitioner responded that Morgan contacted him to assist her with a default judgment, and that she refused to respond any further once he conducted research.   Sorensen Decl., ¶8.  Petitioner also indicated he never provided Morgan with any legal advice and never represented to her that he was an attorney.  Id.  Petitioner’s response tacitly affirmed that he offered to review and draft legal documents on behalf of Morgan.  Id.  Furthermore, Petitioner did not address whether he provided services under the supervision of a lawyer.  Id., Ex. C.  

Over six months later, and in consideration of the evidence gathered during investigation, State Bar concluded that Petitioner had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  Sorensen Decl., ¶9.  On March 27, 2023, State Bar counsel prepared and issued a cease-and-desist letter to Petitioner. Id., Ex. D.  The letter detailed the legal implications of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Business & Professions (“Bus. & Prof.”) Code section 6126, including penalties applicable to violations by paralegals, legal document assistants, and immigration consultants.  Id., Ex. D.  The letter placed Petitioner on notice that State Bar deemed him as having engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and ordered him to immediately cease and desist from such activities.  Id.  The letter noted that should Petitioner continue to violate applicable laws, State Bar “may take additional appropriate action to ensure [Petitioner’s] compliance with these laws and to protect the public.” Id.  

As part of its practice of notifying the public regarding the unauthorized practice of law, State Bar posted notice of the cease-and-desist letter on its website and on social media. Sorensen Decl., ¶10.  The letter itself was not publicly posted.  Id.  Rather, the published notice provides only the name of the respondent, the county in which he/she resides, and the fact that a cease-and-desist letter was sent on a specified date.  Id.   The publication of the notice is meant to serve as a warning that certain services or actions may violate the law and constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Id.   

From this recitation, Petitioner concludes that he does not meet the criteria of five litigations finally determined adversely.  Opp. at 3.  

He is wrong.  As State Bar argues, Petitioner voluntarily dismissed only five of the 11 cases.  RJN Exs. 2, 5, 8, 11, and 17.  The other six cases were dismissed by court order.  RJN Exs. 14, 19, 20, 21, 23, and 26.  Reply at 5.  Moreover, a final determination adverse to the plaintiff includes a voluntary dismissal without prejudice for purposes of CCP section 391(b)(1).  Tokerud v. Capitolbank Sacramento, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at 779.  “An action which is ultimately dismissed by the plaintiff, with or without prejudice, is nevertheless a burden on the target of the litigation and the judicial system, albeit less of a burden than if the matter had proceeded to trial. A party who repeatedly files baseless actions only to dismiss them is no less vexatious than the party who follows the actions through to completion. The difference is one of degree, not kind.”  Id. at 779.  Petitioner’s citation in sur-reply of Holcomb v. U.S. Bank N.A., (2004) 129 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1503, does not support his position that “strategic” voluntary dismissals do not show lack of merit. Sur-Reply at 3.   

Petitioner’s suggestion that Krazyman v. Barnes, Krazyman v. Margo, Krazyman v. Winston, and Krazyman v. Livingston are outside the seven-year period also is incorrect.  For purposes of CCP section 391(b)(1), the statutory seven-year period is measured from the date the motion to have plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant is filed.  The fact that the litigation was commenced outside of the seven-year window does not necessarily exclude it from consideration if it was subsequently prosecuted or maintained by the plaintiff in pro per within the window.  Stolz v. Bank of America, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at 220.  These four cases were.  See Reply at 8-9. 

Finally, Petitioner states that in Krayzman v. Troschichiy, Krazyman v. Barnes, and Krazyman v. Livingston he either received some payment or the case settled.  If this were true, the court would expect the dismissals to be with prejudice.  However, each of the voluntary Requests for Dismissal filed by Petitioner reflect that box 2a on page 2 of the dismissal is checked attesting that Petitioner is “not recovering anything of value by this action.”  RJN Exs. 2, 5, 8, 11 and 17.  Nor do any of the case dockets reflect the filing of a Notice of Settlement as required by California Rule of Court Rule 3.1385.  RJN Exs. 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24 and 26.  These cases count toward the adverse determination rule. 

Petitioner meets the definition of a “vexatious litigant” in section 391(a). 

3. Petitioner Has No Reasonable Probability of Prevailing 

To compel Petitioner to post security, State Bar must show there is no reasonable probability that he will prevail in this case.  §391.1. 

State Bar argues that Petitioner’s tort claims (defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress) against it are barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code §47(b) (“section 47”).  Section 47 bars the tort claims both because the publication of the cease-and-desist notice is privileged as an official act of the State Bar and because it was issued as part of State Board’s investigation, which is an official proceeding.  Mot. at 9. 

First, section 47(a), provides that a publication is privileged if it is made in “the proper discharge of an official duty.” This provision “confers privileged status upon any statement made by a public official in the course of discharging his [or her] official duties.” Maranatha Corrections, LLC v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1087.  “Because a public official’s duty includes the duty to keep the public informed of his or her management of the public business, press releases, press conferences and other public statements by such officials are covered by the ‘official duty’ privilege, although similar statements by private litigants are not covered by the litigation privilege.”  Id. at. 1089.  Mot. at 10. 

Section 47(a) applies because the crux of Petitioner’s complaint is for State Bar’s online publication of notice of the cease-and-desist letter issued to him on March 27, 2023. The State Bar is statutorily charged with investigating unauthorized practice of law, and its publication of the cease-and-desist notice is in furtherance of that statutory charge and its mission to protect the public.  Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6044(b) (authorizing Chief Trial Counsel to investigate unauthorized practice of law), 6001.1 (“[p]rotection of the public” is State Bar’s “highest priority”). The publication was made by State Bar in the course of discharging its official duties, as required to invoke section 47(a)’s privilege.  Mot. at 11. 

Second, the litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47(b) confers a privilege for a “publication or broadcast” made as part of a legislative, judicial, or other “official proceeding authorized by law.” “The litigation privilege is absolute; it applies, if at all, regardless whether the communication was made with malice or the intent to harm.” Kashian v. Harriman, (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913.  The privilege “applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” Silberg v. Anderson, (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.  The privilege extends to “prelitigation communication” (Rubin v. Green, (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1194), including communications “in preparation for the sending of a complaint” to law enforcement (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 783). “[T]he absolute privilege established by section 47(b) serves the important public policy of assuring free access to the courts and other official proceedings.  It is intended to ‘assure utmost freedom of communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing.’” Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360.  Mot. at 11. 

State Bar’s actions taken in connection with its investigation and its publication of the notice regarding the cease-and-desist letter are protected by section 47(b).  “Informal complaints to the State Bar are part of ‘official proceedings’ protected by Civil Code section 47 [subdivision (b)]”, as are “State Bar investigations and hearings,” including actions that are “logically related to the completion of the investigation[.]”  Lebbos v. State Bar, (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 656, 668-69.  Petitioner’s allegations challenging the State Bar’s investigation and its posting of the notice are unquestionably privileged under subdivision (b).  Mot. at 12.5 

The court agrees.  The privilege bars Petitioner’s claims for defamation and infliction of emotional distress. Rosenthal, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at 74.  There is no reasonable probability that Petitioner will prevail.  See Manlin v. Milner, (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1021 (“A plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if the litigation privilege precludes a defendant’s liability on the claims.”). 

State Bar notes that Petitioner’s traditional mandamus claim is premised on the online publication of a “false and fraudulent Cease and Desist Order.”  Compl., ¶12.  State Bar notes that the publication is neither false nor fraudulent because it merely is a notice that a cease-and-desist order has been issued to Petitioner, which is a true fact.  

 In any event, a traditional writ of mandate under CCP section 1085 is the method of compelling the performance of a legal, ministerial duty.  Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona, (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-84.  Generally, mandamus will lie when (1) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy, (2) the respondent has a duty to perform, and (3) the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance.  Id. at 584 (internal citations omitted).  Whether a statute imposes a ministerial duty for which mandamus is available, or a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation.  AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health, (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701. 

A ministerial act is one that is performed by a public officer “without regard to his or her own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of such act.”  Ellena v. Department of Insurance, (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 198, 205.  It is “essentially automatic based on whether certain fixed standards and objective measures have been met.”  Sustainability of Parks, Recycling & Wildlife Legal Defense Fund v. County of Solano Dept. of Resource Mgmt., (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1359.  Petitioner has not, and cannot identify a ministerial duty that State Bar violated in publishing the cease-and-desist notice.   

Where there is no ministerial duty, judicial review is governed by an abuse of discretion standard and limited to an examination whether the agency’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether it did not follow the procedure and give the notices required by law.  Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona, (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-84.   

State Bar acknowledges that mandamus can be used to challenge agency discretionary action as an abuse of discretion, but Petitioner cannot satisfy the abuse of discretion standard of arbitrary and capricious.  Following an investigation—including a review of the investigative file, Morgan’s complaint, correspondence between Morgan and Petitioner and between State Bar and Petitioner, State Bar decided to issue a cease-and-desist letter regarding Petitioner’s unauthorized practice of law.  Sorensen Decl., ¶9.  The conclusion of unauthorized practice of law was based on Petitioner advertising himself as an “experienced civil litigation paralegal,” his offer to review legal documents and prepare a default judgment on behalf of Morgan, and his provision of legal advice regarding the default judgment process to Morgan.  Each of these actions qualifies as unauthorized practice of law. Despite being given the opportunity to do so, Petitioner never stated that he performed these services under the supervision of an attorney.  Accordingly, he cannot reasonably argue that State Bar abused its discretion.  Mot. at 17. 

Petitioner argues that State Bar’s arguments rely on unreliable evidence.  State Bar’s declarant, Tiffany Sorensen, Esq. (“Sorensen”) admits that she did not have personal knowledge and relied on information from other persons.  Sorensen’s investigation did not involve any direct communication with Petitioner, despite his attempts to do so.  Krazyman Decl., ¶3.   

When considering a vexatious litigant motion, the court does not assume the truth of a litigant’s factual allegations and must weigh any material evidence before deciding whether the litigant has a reasonable chance of prevailing.  Golin v. Allenby, (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 616, 635.  The granting a section 391.1 motion does not preclude a trial; it merely requires a plaintiff to post security.  Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP, (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 786.  Section 391.2 expressly states: “No determination made by the court in determining or ruling upon the motion shall be or be deemed to be a determination of any issue in the litigation or of the merits thereof.” 

It is true that Sorensen’s declaration relies on information obtained by Investigator Dillon from third parties but that does not mean it is inadmissible for purposes of this motion,  which is to determine whether Petitioner lacks any reasonable probability of prevailing.  Section 41 disposes of his tort claims and there is no reasonable prospect that posting the notice on State Bar’s website was arbitrary and capricious.   

In this regard, it is the information generated in the investigation that is relevant to the website notice.  Sorensen notes that, as the assigned Deputy Trial Counsel, she supervised Dillon, reviewed the investigation file, including the complaint, correspondence between Petitioner and Morgan, and Petitioner’s response to State Bar’s letter, which was notably absent of information whether he was performing services under the supervision of a lawyer.  Sorensen Decl., ¶¶ 6-9.   This investigative information could be relied upon in making the decision to issue a cease-and-desist letter and publishing the notice on its website.  Petitioner’s admissions show that the decision was not arbitrary and capricious.  See post. 

Petitioner also presents evidence concerning Morgan.  He contends that State Bar’s motion relies heavily on statements from Morgan, who has a proven history of dishonesty and false accusations.  In fact, Morgan is a convicted felon and registered sex offender.  Krazyman Decl., ¶’s 4, 9, Ex. B.  Morgan’s complaint states that Krazyman had a Linkedin provide with the business name “Larry Krazyman Law Offices” and he led her to believe he was an attorney acting as a paralegal.  Krazyman Decl., ¶8.   He never used those words and does not have such a Linkedin page.   Id .  The only thing he did for Morgan was legal research.  He never filed out a form for her.  While he said he could help her enforce a judgment, he only meant assist in getting a lawyer.  Krazyman Decl., ¶8.   Sorensen believed Morgan’s lies without doing appropriate research or investigation.  Id.  Petitioner has 20 years of experience working for law firms which has “gone down the toilet” as a result of Sorensen’s incompetent investigation.  Krazyman Decl., ¶11.  He has applied to over 150 law firm sand has been denied a position due to Sorensen’s negligent investigation. Opp. at 9-11. 

State Bar replies that Petitioner accused Morgan of a history of dishonesty and criminal behavior in his communications with Morgan and State Bar, and Sorensen had this information when she issued the cease-and-desist letter.  The credibility of a witness also is not consequential to the court’s evaluative process under section 391.1.  Reply at 11. 

While Morgan’s credibility, or lack thereof, could affect the court’s evaluation if based solely or principally on her.  But Sorensen issued the cease-and-desist letter because Petitioner offered “’experienced civil litigation services” on Craigslist and never indicated that he was supervised by an attorney, admitted to Morgan in a September 3, 2022 email that he could prepare the default for her, prepare “Default.2.Default Judgment”, and otherwise offered legal advice in subsequent emails.  These actions were the unauthorized practice of law.  Bus. & Prof. Code § 6126(a), 6127.  Sorensen Decl., Ex. D.  None of these actions were dependent on Morgan’s credibility. 

Petitioner has no reasonable prospect of prevailing in this case. 

4. Security and Pre-Filing Order 

State Bar argues that, because Petitioner is a vexatious litigant unlikely to prevail in this litigation, the court should order him to furnish security.  §391.1(a).  The court “shall” order a plaintiff to furnish security for the benefit of the moving defendant before the action can proceed. Id.  The indigence of a vexatious litigant is not a factor in setting the amount of the security.  McColm v. Westwood Park Ass’n, (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1219. If a plaintiff fails to pay security once it is ordered, the action must be dismissed.  §391.4.  Mot. at 18. 

State Bar counsel has spent approximately 30 hours in the preparation of the instant motion at a cost of $11,850, and will incur additional attorney’s fees drafting a reply in and preparing for and attending the hearing.  Jacobs Decl., ¶11; Rollan Decl., ¶4.  Given that Defendants are entitled to attorneys’ fees if they prevail on a vexatious litigant motion (Singh v. Lipworth, (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 40, 47), it is appropriate for the court to consider these costs in fixing the security. If the case proceeds, State Bar anticipates incurring at least $5100 in attorney’s fees in preparing an anti-SLAPP motion—another motion in which attorneys’ fees are recoverable.  §425.16.  Rollan Decl., ¶5.  Petitioner should be required to post security of not less than $6,500 before this case proceeds.  Mot. at 18. 

The court should also enter a pre-filing order that requires Petitioner to seek leave of the presiding judge before filing any new litigation.  Any such prefiling order must be provided to the Judicial Council.  §391.7(a), (f). A pre-filing order is directed at precluding the initiation of a meritless lawsuit and costs associated with defending such litigation.  Bravo v. Ismaj, (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 222.  Mot. at 18. 

The court agrees.  Petitioner shall post a $6500 undertaking and a pre-filing  order will be entered. 

F. Conclusion 

State Bar’s motion to declare Petitioner as a vexatious litigant is granted.  Petitioner is ordered to post a $6500 cash or corporate surety bond within 14 calendar days, and provide evidence to opposing counsel that it has been posted.  Should he fail to do so, State Bar may apply ex parte to dismiss this case.  See §391.4.  A pre-filing order shall also issue and the clerk shall provide a copy to the Judicial Council.  See §391.7(f).