Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 24STCP02891, Date: 2025-02-04 Tentative Ruling

Cerise Castle v. County of Los Angeles,

24STCP02891

Tentative decision on motions for leave to intervene: granted

Proposed Intervenors Professional Peace Officers Association (“PPOA”) and Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (“ALADS”) separately move for leave to intervene in Petitioner Cerise Castle’s (“Castle”) action against Respondent County of Los Angeles (“the County”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, Castle’s opposition and the County’s non-opposition, and ALADS’ reply (no reply was filed by PPOA) and renders the following tentative decision.

On September 9, 2024, Petitioner Castle filed the Petition against the County, alleging a traditional mandamus cause of action for violation of the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) and the California Constitution. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Castle is a Los Angeles reporter who reports extensively on law enforcement in the County of Los Angles, focusing on the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”). Pet., ¶5.

On April 10, 2023, Castle submitted a CAPR request to LASD seeking “copies of photos and names of all sworn officers, excluding those in undercover assignments.” Pet., ¶14, Ex. A.

On February 7, 2024, LASD sent a response denying Castle’s request for photographs of its deputies. Pet., ¶16, Ex. B. LASD provided only seven photographs: one photograph of Sheriff Robert G. Luna and six photographs of his undersheriff and assistant sheriffs. Pet., ¶16. LASD refused to disclose photographs of its approximately 9,000 other sworn personnel on the grounds that the photographs are “not public records within the meaning of the CPRA,” citing Government Code § 7920.530(a). Pet., ¶16. LASD stated that, even if the photographs were public records under the CPRA, they are exempt from disclosure and would not be produced “as any public interest served by their disclosure would be clearly outweighed by the public interest served by their nondisclosure” under the CPRA’s catch-all provision in Government Code section 7922.00. Pet., ¶16.

On March 8, 2024, LASD send Castle a second response, this time producing approximately 8,500 names of sworn personnel, redacting several names who deputies who apparently work in undercover assignments. Pet., ¶18, Ex. C.

Petitioner Castle prays for a writ of mandate compelling the County to disclose the requested photographs. She also seeks attorney fees and costs. Prayer at ¶¶ 1,4.

A proof of service on file shows that Castle served the County with the Summons and Petition on September 17, 2024.

On January 22, 2025, Castle filed an opposition addressing both the PPOA and ALADS motions for leave to intervene.

Mandatory intervention is required if the application is timely and the person seeking intervention either has a statutory right to intervene or (a) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and (b) is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that interest, unless (c) that person’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. CCP §387(d)(1).

Permissive intervention is available upon timely motion to any non-party who has an interest in the matter in litigation, or an interest in the success of either party, or against both parties. CCP §387(d)(2). This section is construed liberally in favor of intervention. Simpson Redwood Co. v. State of California, (1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1200. The court has discretion to permit intervention when a party has a direct, not consequential, interest in the matter in litigation. Id. at 1200; Kobernick v. Shaw, (1977) 70 Cal. App. 3d 914, 918. In addition to a direct interest, intervention must not enlarge the issues raised by original parties and not tread on the rights of the original parties to conduct their own lawsuit. See Kuperstein v. Superior Court, (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 598, 600. The reasons for intervention must outweigh any opposition. Truck Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court, (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 342, 346.

If intervention is granted, the intervenor shall separately file a complaint-in-intervention, answer-in-intervention, or both and serve all parties. CCP §387(e).

ALADS is a recognized employee organization as defined in Government Code section 3500, et seq. representing sworn non-management peace officers employed by LASD and the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office (“District Attorney”) with regard to all matters concerning wages, hours and working conditions. Hsieh Decl., ¶3.

Employment relations between the County and ALADS are governed by the MeyersMilias-Brown Act (“MMBA”) (Government Code section 3500 et seq.). The County has adopted the Employee Relations Ordinance (“ERO”), which seeks generally “to provide for the orderly, systematic and coordinated administration of all matters involving employee relations.” ERO §5.04.050. To that effect, the ERO created the Employment Relations Commission (“ERCOM”), which is tasked generally with implementing and administering the ERO. (Sec. 5.04.100(A).) Charges alleging that the County violated the ERO (or applicable rules and regulations) are submitted to ERCOM, and ERCOM adjudicates such charges, and has the authority to direct the County to take corrective action, which is binding on the County. ERO § 5.04.240(D) and (E). ALADS Mot at 10-11.

Petitioner seeks the photographs of LASD personnel “who are not working in undercover assignments”. Pet., ¶1. The majority of these individuals are members of ALADS and/or the bargaining group which ALADS represents.

As Castle alleges, LASD “has created a website to provide the public with deputy names and internal affairs records of deputy shootings, use of force, sustained disciplinary findings of dishonesty, sustained disciplinary findings of sexual assault, and other records of discipline imposed on individual deputies.” Pet., ¶8.

If there is a searchable database of all pictures of deputy sheriffs—one that can be utilized to identify individuals remotely through the use of a cellphone—no current deputy will ever be able to engage in undercover work in the future because his or her safety will be invariably compromised by existing facial recognition technology. Ross Decl., Ex. A. Facial recognition technology is known as a “biometric data” technological tool and has sufficiently advanced in recent years to be generally available for private use by individual and entity consumers. Id. The technology is capable of utilizing collected and stored photographs for immediate real-time identification of an individual. Id., pp. 18-19. The implications for this advancing technology has not been lost on law enforcement, which seeks to develop the means to identify individuals in real-time encountered on the street through use of an officer’s body-worn camera. Id.

Public interest group Stop LAPD Spying Coalition created a website, Watch the Watchers, which includes headshots of all LAPD officers, including those who previously worked undercover or could in the future, which specifically states: “This website is intended as a tool to empower community members engaged in copwatch and other countersurveillance practices. You can use it to identify officers who are causing harm in your community. The website’s ease of use also makes it a political statement, flipping the direction of surveillance against the state’s agents. Police have vast information about all of us at their fingertips, yet they move in secrecy.” Ross Decl., Ex. B, p. 1.

PPOA does not submit any supporting declarations and instead relies on allegations in Castle’s Petition. The following “facts” are taken from the body of PPOA’s motion.

PPOA is a recognized employee organization representing sworn peace officers and various non-sworn civilian employees employed by LASD, the District Attorney, and the County Coroner’s Office regarding all matters concerning wages, hours and working conditions. Mot. at 2.

PPOA seeks to intervene in this action filed by Castle on behalf of all of its represented sworn peace officer members as Petitioner’s action seeks disclosure of “copies of photos and names of all sworn officers, excluding those in undercover assignments.” Petition, ¶14.

PPOA moves to intervene to ensure that, if the Petition is granted, Respondent complies with the CPRA in a manner that does not violate its members’ rights under the California Constitution, the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (“POBR”), or any other relevant statutory authority.

Movants ALADS and PPOA separately seeks leave to intervene in this case. The County does not oppose, but Petitioner Castle does.

There is no statutory time limit for filing a motion to intervene. Noya v. A.W. Coulter Trucking, (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 838, 842. Rather, it is the general rule that a right to intervene should be asserted within a reasonable time and that the intervener must not be guilty of an unreasonable delay after knowledge of the suit. Allen v. California Water & Tel. Co., (1947) 31 Cal.2d 104, 108. Intervention is timely unless any party opposing intervention can show prejudice from any delay attributable to the filing of a motion to intervene. Truck Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court, (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 342, 351 (motion to intervene filed in lawsuit pending for four years was timely because real parties had shown no prejudice other than being required to prove their case.)

As PPOA points out, the Petition was filed on September 9, 2024 and no trial date has been set. PPOA Mot. at 4. The motions are timely.

a. Interest in the Property or Transaction That Is the Subject of the Litigation

For mandatory intervention, a proposed intervenor must have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action. CCP §387(d)(1).

ALADS argues that it has a direct interest in the privacy rights of its members in their photographs, and it has associational standing to protect that interest. It is well-settled that “[a]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.: Board of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1515, 1522 (citation omitted). Accordingly, a recognized employee organization has standing to sue in its own name to enforce the employment rights of its members. California School Employees’ Association v. Willits Unified School District, (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 776, 780. ALADS Mot. at 13.

According to ALADS, the privacy rights of deputies are grounded in the California Constitution, which explicitly recognizes the privacy rights possessed by peace officers in their personnel files. The key issue is how the designation of all photographs of deputies, including those who have previously worked in undercover assignments and those who might work in those assignments in the future, could impact their safety and ability to obtain advanced assignments in the future. If the court were to determine that all deputy photographs are public records, any individual could create a database that would put the lives of past and future undercover deputies at risk. ALADS Mot. at 13. See also PPOA Mot. at 5-6.

Petitioner Castle responds that neither Movants nor their individual members have standing to sue the County to block disclosure. Public employees only have standing to file a reverse-CPRA action to prevent disclosure if the government entity has agreed to produce its records in response to a CPRA request without any litigation. “The reverse-CPRA action is necessary only when the public agency agrees to provide the requested records without judicial intervention.” Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District, (“Marken”) (2012) 202 Cal. App. 4th 1250, 1267 n.13. “If the agency initially refuses to disclose information sought by the CPRA request and the requesting party seeks a writ of mandate in the superior court to compel disclosure pursuant to section 6258, a person potentially affected by the disclosure is entitled to intervene in the proceeding as a real party in interest.” Id. (citations omitted).

Castle argues that neither Marken nor the other cases cited by ALADS granted mandatory intervention. Because neither Movants nor their members have standing to bring suit against the County to block disclosure of deputy photographs where the County has declined to disclose, Movants have not established intervention as a matter of right. Opp. at 4.

Castle confuses standing with direct interest. The unions’ members clearly have a direct interest in disclosure of their photographs and Movants have an associational right to protect that direct interest. ALADS is correct that Marken’s statement that a person potentially affected by the disclosure is entitled to intervene in a reverse-CPRA action is in fact a reference to mandatory intervention. ALADS Reply at 5-6. Movants have a direct interest in the disclosure of their members’ photographs.

b. Whether the Disposition of the Matter May Affect Proposed Intervenors’ Interests

If a proposed intervenor claims an interest in the subject of an action, it must then show that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest. CCP §387(d)(1)(2).

It is undisputed that disclosure of the photographs may affect the interests of Movants’ members, and their own interests by association. See PPOA Mot. at 7; ALADS Mot. at 14-16.

c. Whether Proposed Intervenors’ Interests Are Adequately Protected by Existing Parties

An interest in the litigation does not entitle a party to intervention if that party’s interests are adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties. CCP §387(d)(1)(2).

ALADS argues that it is not clear that the County will always protect the privacy rights of ALADS’s deputies, even though it has so far resisted the production of the photographs. The County may decide to settle the litigation. Regardless, ALADS is better situated to assert the privacy interests of its members. ALADS Mot. at 17.

ALADS adds that the County also cannot assert or protect ALADS’ right to be involved in discussions and any settlement that affects the terms and conditions of its members. See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles, (Nov. 20, 2024) ___Cal.App.5th__, 2024 Cal. App. LEXIS 738 at *12. The effects of production in this case regarding the future safety of ALADS’s members— both those who anticipate being involved in undercover work in the future and those who do not—and the effective operation of LASD are issues within the scope of collective bargaining. Indeed, if Castle prevails in this lawsuit, the fact that photographs of all deputies would be public records would be a change in the terms and conditions of employment because the County did not consider the photographs to be public records when these deputies began employment. Federal courts have acknowledged the right of peace officer collective bargaining associations to intervene to protect state labor law rights. See Los Angeles Police Protective League v. United States, (2002) 288 F.3d 391, 398-400. ALADS Mot. at 17-18. See also PPOA Mot. at 7-8.

Castle argues that Movants have not shown that their interest is not adequately represented by the County. The County cited the same statutory and constitutional reasons in its denial letter to Castle that were cited by Movants in their proposed Answers. Movants’ claimed interest in protecting their labor contracts and their members’ rights under the Peace Officers Bill of Rights (“POBR”) cannot compel an outcome of this CPRA case. Arguments about these issues would expand the litigation and burden Castle with the task of responding to issues irrelevant to the CPRA. Government agencies cannot sign employee labor agreements to exempt themselves from the mandates of the CPRA. If Movants want to sue the County for allegedly violating its labor contracts, they should be required to do so in separate litigation. Opp. at 4-5.

ALADS replies that Castle its labor interests would not enlarge the issues of the litigation and Castle would not be burdened with responding to these issues. The labor issues would not be briefed for trial; they would only require that ALADS be involved in any settlement discussions between Castle and the County regarding release of the photographs. The scope of the County’s meet and confer obligations would be an issue between the County and ALADS, if such a dispute were ever to arise. ALADS Reply at 6-7.

PPOA also argues that it does not seek to enlarge the issues in this litigation and solely seek intervention. PPOA is not seeking leave to file a Complaint-in-Intervention or Cross-Complaint and only seeks permission to file an Answer-in-Intervention. PPOA will not assert any significantly new claims or legal theories not already identified in the County’s Answer. PPOA Mot. at 8-9.

The court accepts these representations about scope of the case. While the County is currently asserting the same defenses as Movants would, that position could change. Movants are entitled to protect their members privacy interests without concern that the County will settle around those interests.

The motions for mandatory intervention[1] are granted, but ALADS and PPOA will be limited to a joint trial brief of ten pages that does not raise any labor issues.

[1] The court would have granted permissive intervention if mandatory intervention was not required.