Judge: James C. Chalfant, Case: 24STCP03365, Date: 2025-05-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCP03365    Hearing Date: May 29, 2025    Dept: 85

Petitioner Michele Shizuko Kito (“Kito”) seeks a writ of mandate ordering Respondent Regents of the University of California (“Regents”) to disclose records requested under the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

A. Statement of the Case

On October 18, 2024, Hathaway Parker, Inc. filed the Petition against Respondent Regents seeking a writ of mandate ordering Regents disclose records requested under CPRA.  On December 1, 2024, the Petition was amended to name Kito as Petitioner.  The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

On May 27, 2024, a member of the public, identified in the amending document as Kito, made a request (“Request”) for a copy of security video footage of the access road behind the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) softball stadium recorded from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on May 24, 2024 (“Records”).  Pet., ¶12, Ex. 1.  Kito also requested that UCLA retain the footage during the pendency of the Request process if UCLA would not produce the Records.  Pet., ¶13. Ex. 1.

On May 27, 2024, the UCLA Information Practices Office (“IP Office”) sent a letter acknowledging receipt of the Request, assigning the case number PRR # 24-3640, and notifying Kito that UCLA would identify, review, and release all responsive records.  Pet., ¶14. Ex. 2.

On June 6, 2024, the IP Office confirmed that it was still working to respond to the Request, stating that it needed to search for and collect the Records from field facilities or other separate establishments.  Pet., ¶15, Ex. 2.  The IP Office stated it would respond to the Request by close of business on June 21, 2024.  Pet., ¶15, Ex. 2.

On June 21, 2024, the IP Office sent a letter stating a new estimated date for the Records to be available as July 19, 2024.  Pet., ¶16, Ex. 2.  On July 23, 2024, the IP Office informed Kito that, upon closer review, the Records were exempt from disclosure and would not be produced, citing Government Code sections 7923.600-7923.625.  Pet., ¶17, Ex. 2.

Regents are a public agency.  Pet., ¶24.  The Records concern the conduct of Regents’ business as a public university.  Pet., ¶25.  The Records are prepared, owned, used, or retained by Regents.  Pet., ¶26.  The Records are not exempt from mandatory disclosure and there is no law enforcement investigation related to the Records, which is a video recording made in a public area.  Pet., ¶¶ 28-29.

Kito seeks an alternative writ of mandate ordering Regents to disclose the Records or show cause why the Records should not be disclosed.  Prayer, ¶1.  Kito also seeks a peremptory writ of mandate ordering Regents to disclose the Records in response to her Request.  Prayer, ¶2.  Finally, Kito seeks attorney fees, costs of suit, and such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.  Prayer, ¶¶ 3-5.

2. Course of Proceedings

Proof of service on file shows Regents were served with the Summons and Petition on October 22, 2024 by substituted service.

            On December 18, 2024, the Petition was amended to name Kito as Petitioner.

B. Governing Law 

            1. The California Constitution

            The People have the constitutional right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.  Cal. Const. Art. 1 §3(b)(1).  A statute, court rule, or other authority shall be broadly construed if it furthers the People's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access.  Cal. Const. Art. 1 §3(b)(2).  If a statute, court rule, or other authority adopted after the effective date of this subdivision of the constitution limits the right of access, it shall be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.  Cal. Const. Art. 1 §3(b)(2). 

            2. The CPRA

The CPRA, located at Government Code (“Govt. Code”)[1] section 7920 et seq. (formerly 6250 et seq.)[2], was enacted in 1968 to safeguard the accountability of government to the public.  San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 771-72.  Section 7921 declares that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.”  The CPRA’s purpose is to increase freedom of information by giving the public access to information in the possession of public agencies. CBS. Inc. v. Block, (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 651. The CPRA was intended to safeguard the accountability of government to the public, and it makes public access to governmental records a fundamental right of citizenship. Wilson v. Superior Court, (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1141. This requires maximum disclosure of the conduct of government operations.  California State University Fresno Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court, (“California State University”), (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 810, 823.

The CPRA makes clear that “every person” has a right to inspect any public record. §7922.525(a) (former §6253(a)). The term “public record” is broadly defined to include “any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the people’s business prepared, owned, used or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. §7920.530 (former §6252(e)).

The right to inspect is subject to certain exemptions, which are narrowly construed. California State University, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at 831. The pertinent exemptions for this case are found in sections 7923.600 (former §6254(f)) and 7922.000 (former §62552(a)).

Upon receiving a request for a copy of public records, the agency shall determine within ten days whether the request seeks public records in the possession of the agency that are subject to disclosure, though that deadline may be extended up to 14 days for “unusual circumstances.” (§7922.535(a), (b)) (former §6253(c)).  If the agency determines that the request for records is denied in whole or in part, the agency must respond in writing and justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the record is exempt or that the facts of the case the public interest served by not disclosing clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.  §§ 7922.540, 7922.000 (former §6255(a)).[3]

If the agency determines that the requested records are subject to disclosure, it shall make the records promptly available upon payment of fees for direct costs of duplication or a statutory fee if applicable.  §7911.530.  There is no deadline expressed in a number of days for producing the records.  Rather, section 7911.530 says the agency “shall make the records promptly available.” Section 7922.500 (former §6253(d)) provides that nothing in the CPRA “shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public records.”

“Records requests . . . inevitably impose some burden on government agencies. An agency is obliged to comply so long as the record can be located with reasonable effort.”  California First Amendment Coalition v. Superior Court, (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 165-66.  “Reasonable efforts do not require that agencies undertake extraordinarily extensive or intrusive searches, however. [Citation.] In general, the scope of an agency’s search for public records ‘need only be reasonably calculated to locate responsive documents.’” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 627. The “CPRA does not prescribe specific methods of searching for those documents. Agencies may develop their own internal policies for conducting searches but some general principles have emerged.  Once an agency receives a CPRA request, it must ‘communicate the scope of the information requested to the custodians of its records,’ although it need not use the precise language of the request. [Citation.].” Ibid.

3. Section 7923.600

Section 7923.600(a) (former §6254(f)) exempts from disclosure “[r]ecords of complaints to, or investigations conducted by any state or local police agency….[and] investigatory …files complied by any…local agency for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing purposes….”  This provision protects both records of investigation and investigatory files.  Williams v. Superior Court, (“Williams”) (1993) 5 Cal.4^th 337, 341. The exemption protects witnesses, victims, and investigators, secures evidence and investigative techniques, encourages candor, recognizes the rawness and sensitivity of information in criminal investigations, and effectively makes such investigations possible.  Dixon v. Superior Court, (“Dixon”) (2009) 170 Cal.App.4^th 1271, 1276 (coroner and autopsy reports in investigative file are exempt).[4]

a. Investigatory Files

The exemption for investigatory files serves an important purpose and is broad in nature.  Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 349, 356.  Even though a document does not on its face purport to be an investigatory record, it may have extraordinary significance to the investigation warranting exemption.  Id.  Instead of adopting the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) case-by-case approach with specific criteria to determine the exemption, the Legislature provided for the complete exemption of such files, with disclosure of information derived from the records.  Id. at 350, 353 (criminal investigatory file of two deputy sheriffs). 

Information in a file is investigatory material only when the prospect of enforcement proceedings becomes “concrete and definite”.  Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 355 (citing Uribe v. Howie, (“Uribe”) (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 194).  The investigatory file exemption does not terminate when the investigation ends; documents properly in the file remain exempt.  Rackauckas v. Superior Court, (“Rackauckas”) (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 169, 174.

The California Supreme Court addressed the distinction between former section 6254(f)’s investigatory file and records of investigation exemptions in Haynie v. Superior Court, (“Haynie”) (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1061.  Plaintiff Haynie, a black male, was stopped by LASD, handcuffed, and questioned without charges filed based on a citizen complaint.  Id.  Haynie filed a tort claim and separately sought and writings concerning the incident.  Id.  LASD invoked section 6254(f) and refused to comply.  Id. 

The Supreme Court noted that case law had held that section 6254(f)’s exemption for investigatory files applies only when the prospect of enforcement is concrete and definite.  Once this is shown, and that a record was created for the purpose of investigation, Haynie rejected any requirement that the agency show a valid need to withhold records, such as evidence that the disclosure would endanger a witness or the investigation itself.  Id. at 1071.  Haynie cautioned that this does not mean that everything law enforcement does is shielded from disclosure.  Officers have citizen contacts for purposes of crime prevention and public safety that are unrelated to either civil or criminal investigations, and records are exempt under section 6254(f)’s protection of records of investigation only for investigations taken for purposes of whether a violation of law has or may occur.  Id. at 1071.

Not every file is an investigatory file for purposes of section 7923.600(a).  The law does not provide that a public agency may shield a record from public disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labeled “investigatory.”  Uribe supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 212-13 (routine farmer reports of pesticide spraying were not investigatory files for licensing purposes).  So, if a document in the investigatory file is publicly filed in a court, it is not exempt under section 7923.600(a).  See Weaver v. Superior Court, (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 746, 751 ("Because they were publicly filed, the charging documents Weaver seeks are not investigatory files exempt from disclosure under the CPRA.").  Furthermore, it is the nature of a document, and not where it is kept, that is the basis for whether it is exempt from disclosure under the investigatory file exemption. See Comm'n on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court, (“POST”) (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 278, 291 (analogizing personnel files to investigatory files and citing Williams, supra, 5 Ca1.4th at 355, for the proposition that 'the law does not provide... that a public agency may shield a record from public disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labelled "investigatory”'.)

In sum, a file is investigatory only if the prospect of law enforcement is “definite and concrete” and the record properly belongs in the file because it relates to the investigation.  Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, (“Copley”) (2006) 39 Cal.4^th 1272, 1293.

b. Records of Investigation

In contrast to investigatory files, the Haynie court concluded that the concrete and definite prospect of enforcement standard only applies to section 6254(f)’s exemption for investigatory files, and “records of investigation” are exempt on their face whether or not they are included in an investigatory file.  Haynie, supra¸ 26 Cal.4th at 1068-69 (citing Uribe, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 213 and Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4^th at 356).  Any interpretation that limited records of investigations only to those where the likelihood of enforcement has ripened would expose the public to “the very sensitive investigative stages of determining whether a crime has been committed or who has committed it.” Id. at 1070.  Documents independently exempt -- Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 654 (records of complaints), American Civil Liberties Union v. Deukmejian, (1982) 32 Cal.3d 440, 449 (intelligence information) – have been held not to be part of the concrete and definite investigatory file requirement, and no less is true for investigatory records.  Id.

These records of investigation do not lose their exempt status based on the prospect of enforcement.  Law enforcement officers may not know whether a crime has been committed when they undertake an investigation, and the results may be inconclusive.  For example, a fire may be suspicious but found to be accidental after investigation.  Id. at 1070.  Even reports from routine investigations such as the traffic stop involving Haynie are protected.  Id. at 1070-71. 

The California Supreme Court subsequently emphasized that Haynie‘s statement that “records of investigation exempted under section 6254(f) encompass only those investigations undertaken for the purpose of determining whether a violation of law may occur or has occurred.  If a violation or potential violation is detected, the exemption also extends to records of investigations conducted for the purpose of uncovering information surrounding the commission of the violation and its agency.”  American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California v. Superior Court, (“ACLU”) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1032, 1040.  The ACLU court then held that LAPD’s records from scanning license plates to look for stolen cars through automated license plate reader technology were not records of investigation because they were not part of targeted inquiry into particular crime.  Id. at 1042.

4. Enforcement

A claim to compel compliance with a CPRA public records request may proceed through either mandamus or declaratory relief.  §7923.000. Because the petitioner may proceed through either mandamus or declaratory relief, the trial court independently decides whether disclosure is required.  See City of San Jose v. Superior Court, (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1018 (appellate court independently reviews trial court CPRA decision).  No administrative record is required, and the parties must submit admissible evidence.

Mandamus is available to compel compliance with the CPRA.  §§ 6258, 6259.  A petition for mandamus under the CPRA is a “special statutory proceeding” similar to, but different from, mandamus and “falls within the definition of a “special proceeding of a civil nature.”  City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, (2017) 9 Cal.App.5^th 272, 285.  This statutory mandamus is not the equivalent of ordinary mandamus, and the remedy may not be denied because of other adequate remedy at law.  Wilder v. Superior Court, (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 77, 82-83. 

            A traditional writ of mandate under CCP section 1085 is the method of compelling the performance of a legal, ministerial duty.  Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona, (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-84.  Generally, mandamus will lie when (1) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy, (2) the respondent has a duty to perform, and (3) the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance.  Id. at 584 (internal citations omitted). 

Section 7923.000 authorizes a mandamus writ only when “public records are being improperly withheld from a member of the public”.  The CPRA remedy is available only to a person who is seeking disclosure of public records and only where the public entity is allegedly improperly withholding those records.  County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, 126.  If the court finds that the public official’s decision to refuse disclosure is not justified, the court shall order the public official to make the record public.  §7923.110(a).  “The CPRA provides no judicial remedy for any other purpose or entity or a remedy that may be utilized for any purpose other than to determine whether a particular record or class of records must be disclosed.”  Id. at 127 (emphasis in original).

If the requestor prevails in such litigation, the court shall award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, to be paid by the public agency at issue.  §7923.115(a).  If the case was clearly frivolous, the court shall award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the public agency.  §7923.115(b).

            C. Statement of Facts

            1. Kito’s Evidence

On May 27, 2024, Kito made the Request, seeking “video footage from the video camera located on Bellagio Drive, across the street from the access road behind the softball stadium between the hours of 6 pm and 9 pm on Friday, May 24, 2024 (see attached street view with the location of the video camera of interest)” and further asking that the footage be preserved during the Request process.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 1.

On May 29, 2024, UCLA’s IP Office responded by acknowledging receipt of the Request, assigning the matter case number PRR # 24-3640, and informing Kito that within ten days it would determine whether the Records are publicly disclosable, and, if so, an estimated date the records would be made available.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 2.

On June 6, 2024, the IP Office stated that it needed additional time to respond because of “The need to search for and collect the requested ecords from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request”, indicating that it would respond by June 21, 2024.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 2.

On June 21, 2024, the IP Office stated that it continued to work on the Request, and provided July 19, 2024 as the estimated date that any responsive records would be made available.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 2.

On July 23, 2024, the IP Office informed Kito that the Records are exempt from disclosure and would not be produced.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 2.  The IP Office cited sections 7923.600-7923.625, exempting “disclosure of records of complaints to, or investigations conducted by . . . any state or local police agency, or any investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local agency for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing purposes.”  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 2.  The IP Office state that the Records relate to an investigatory file of a law enforcement agency.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 2. 

On September 25, 2024, Hathaway responded.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 3.  Hathaway noted that the IP Office stated that responsive records would be available on July 19, 2024, but no records were provided.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 3.  Hathaway stated that on July 22, 2024, the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office (“City Attorney”) informed UCLA that it had rejected criminal charges based on the private arrest and the matter was closed.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 3.  Yet, the IP Office denied the Request the next day.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 3.  Hathaway requested the records which should have been provided on July 19, 2024.  Hathaway Decl., Ex. 3

            2. Regents’ Evidence

Scott Scheffler (“Scheffler”) is the Interim Chief of Police of UCLA (“UCLAPD”).  Scheffler Decl., ¶1.  On May 24, 2024, a UCLA student (“Student”)  was arrested on the UCLA campus outside the Stadium.  Scheffler Decl., ¶2.  UCLAPD received a report that the Student had pushed a security guard to the ground because the security guard had refused the Student entry to the Stadium without a ticket.  Scheffler Decl., ¶2.  Two other security guards detained the Student until UCLAPD arrived, at which point UCLAPD took witness statements and arrested the Student for simple battery.  Scheffler Decl., ¶2.

UCLAPD assessed the evidence and presented the matter to the City Attorney for possible prosecution on May 28, 2024.  Scheffler Decl., ¶3.  UCLAPD obtained evidence, including security camera footage of the ticket area outside the Stadium.  Scheffler Decl., ¶4.  This security camera footage is the only record responsive to the Request.  Scheffler Decl., ¶4.  It depicts the Student prior to the incident and certain related incidents, but not the incident itself.  Scheffler Decl., ¶4.  The footage is part of UCLAPD’s investigatory file because it speaks to and corroborates witness testimony.  Scheffler Decl., ¶4.

The City Attorney declined to prosecute the Student.  Scheffler Decl., ¶5.  UCLAPD maintains its investigatory file because, among other reasons, it may be relevant to future incidents involving the Student.  Scheffler Decl., ¶5.

UCLAPD maintains a general policy of asserting the investigatory records exemption in response to CPRA requests because disclosing investigatory files could hinder UCLAPD’s ability to investigate incidents and reports of crimes, could permit unfair publicity of criminal suspects and victims, could present opportunities to corrupt evidence or influence witnesses, and could have other negative impacts.  Scheffler Decl., ¶6.

            E. Analysis

            Petitioner Kito seeks a writ of mandate directing Regents to provide a produce the records requested in accordance with CPRA.  Pet. Op. Br. at 5.

1. Prompt Response

If the agency determines that the requested records are subject to disclosure, it shall make the records promptly available upon payment of fees for direct costs of duplication or a statutory fee if applicable.  §7911.530.  There is no deadline expressed in a number of days for producing the records.  Rather, section 7911.530 says the agency “shall make the records promptly available.” Section 7922.500 provides that nothing in the CPRA “shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public records.”

Kito argues Regents failed to respond within the required timeline and have produced no responsive records to date.  Such delay and obstruction undermine the CPRA’s purpose of ensuring timely access to information.  Committee to Support Recall of Gascón v. Logan, (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 352, 369 (noting that these laws were “proposed out of concern that [some] public officials are frustrating the intent of the laws for disclosure”).  Pet. Op. Br. at 8.

Whether Regents timely complied with section 7922.530 is not an issue subject to a judicial remedy.  The “CPRA provides no judicial remedy for any other purpose or entity or a remedy that may be utilized for any purpose other than to determine whether a particular record or class of records must be disclosed.”  County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 119 at 127 (emphasis in original).

2. Investigatory Files Exemption[5]

Regents rely on section 7923.600(a)’s investigatory file exemption.   Regents contend that California law is clear that this exemption applies not only to records created by law enforcement entities during the course of their investigation but rather any record relating to and considered in connection with an investigation even if not created as part of the investigation.  Such records become subject to this exemption once they relate to and are considered in connection with an investigation where the “prospect of enforcement proceedings is concrete and definite.”  See Office of Inspector General v. Super. Ct., (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 695, 709.  “Once an investigation has come into being . . . materials that relate to the investigation . . . remain subject to the terms of the statute.”  Williams, supra, 5 Cal. 4th at 362.  Opp. at 4-5.

Regents argue that the recording sought by Kito relates to UCLAPD’s investigation of an alleged battery and was considered by UCLAPD in connection with its evaluation of the incident and its decision to refer John Doe to the City Attorney for prosecution.  Scheffler Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.  The video recording remains part of UCLAPD’s investigatory file with respect to its May 24, 2024 arrest of John Doe.  Id. at ¶4.  It therefore falls squarely with section 7923.600(a)’s exemption for investigatory files compiled by a state or local police agency.  Opp. at 5.

That the City Attorney declined to prosecute John Doe is immaterial.  Williams made clear that the exemption for investigatory files is triggered where the prospects of enforcement are “concrete and definite” “at the time a file is created.”  5 Cal. 4th at 359.  That UCLAPD referred the matter for prosecution demonstrates a sufficient likelihood of enforcement—and that UCLAPD is not attempting to shield release of the videos for any improper purpose.  Nor is there any reasonable argument that the investigatory files exemption somehow expired when the City Attorney declined to prosecute.  Again, Williams held that the investigatory files exemption “does not terminate with the conclusion of the investigation.” 5 Cal. 4th at 361 62.  Opp. at 5.

Regents have created a strawman.  It is true that a file is investigatory if the prospect of law enforcement is “definite and concrete” and the record properly belongs in the file because it relates to the investigation.  Copley, supra, 39 Cal.4^th at 1293.  But Kito did not ask for a UCLAPD file; she asked UCLA for certain video footage.  Kito dealt with UCLA’s IP Office and had no contact with UCLAPD.  As Kito argues, the requested video footage was not taken as part of any law enforcement targeted inquiry but was routinely recorded by a UCLA campus security camera that covers the public areas outside the UCLA Easton Stadium.  The fact that UCLAPD (a separate agency from UCLA) may have obtained a copy of the video footage in a now-closed investigation does not excuse the IP Office from producing the requested video footage.  Reply at 4.

The law does not provide that a public agency may shield a record from public disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labeled “investigatory.”  Uribe supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at 212-13 (routine farmer reports of pesticide spraying were not investigatory files for licensing purposes).  Furthermore, it is the nature of a document, and not where it is kept, that is the basis for whether it is exempt from disclosure under the investigatory file exemption. See POST, supra, 42 Cal. 4th at 291 (analogizing personnel files to investigatory files and citing Williams, supra, 5 Ca1.4th at 355 for the proposition that 'the law does not provide... that a public agency may shield a record from public disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labelled "investigatory”'.)  The requested Records are routine campus security footage and, while UCLAPD may argue that it has included the Records as part of its investigatory file, this does not shield the Records from disclosure by UCLA.[6]

3. Balancing of Public Interests Exemption

The agency may justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the public interest served by not disclosing clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.  §7922.000.  Section 7922.000 is the CPRA’s catch-all provision and “contemplates a case-by-case balancing process, with the burden of proof on the proponent of nondisclosure to demonstrate a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality.”  Michaelis v. Superior Court, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 1071.  The court must balance the public interest in disclosure against the privacy interests, evaluating the weight of the public interest by the gravity of the public tasks sought to be illuminated and the directness with which the disclosure will illuminate those tasks.  See Humane Society of the United States v. Superior Court, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at 1267-68.

Regents argue that section 7922.000’s balancing works in its favor because the compelled release of the recording would significantly harm the public interest while providing minimal, if any, benefit to the public.  Opp. at 6.  The non-disclosure of investigatory files “serves an important purpose.”  Williams, supra, 5 Cal. 4th at 356. Courts have further recognized that there is “a strong government interest in preventing and prosecuting criminal activity.”  Rackauckas v. Super. Ct., (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 169, 173.  The investigatory files exemption furthers that interest because it “protects witnesses, victims, and investigators, secures evidence and investigative techniques, encourages candor, [and] recognizes the rawness and sensitivity of information in criminal investigations.”  Dixon, supra, 170 Cal. App. 4th at 1276.  Furthermore, “[p]olice investigations contain a vast amount of raw [] data” and exposure of that data “could prove ruinous to personal reputations, careers, or relationships if released to the general public.”  Id.  Opp. at 7.

Regents contend that the public interest in the disclosure of the video sought by Kito is minimal.  Her contention is that John Doe needs the video to defend himself in disciplinary proceedings but John Doe’s access to evidence is a private, not a public, interest.  The video also does not reflect John Doe’s physical altercation with the security guard and thus is not critical to his defense.  While John Doe is entitled to due process consistent with UCLA policy, he is not a party to this proceeding and has access to other recourse should he contend that his rights were infringed.  Opp. at 6-7.

Regent’s argument is a partial rehash of its investigatory file argument.  Regents provide no identified public interest in failing to disclose standard UCLA campus security video footage.  As Kito replies (Reply at 6), the placement of the camera, which is publicly visible, covers a public area, presumably records the area 24 hours a day, is useful to the Easton Stadium facility management for crowd control, and is not “part of a targeted inquiry into any particular crime or crimes.”  See ACLU, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 1042.  The public interest in keeping the video footage secret is minimal.

The public interest in favor of disclosing the video footage is the public’s interest in the fair adjudication of student disciplinary matters.  See Doe v. Regents of University of California (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 44, 57 (“The accused must be permitted to see the evidence against him. Need we say more?”).  This interest is not insignificant.  Regents have the burden of proof in the balancing of public interests and have not met this burden. 

F. Conclusion

The Petition is granted.  Within the next 30 days, Regents shall produce the security video footage of the access road behind the University of California, Los Angeles softball stadium recorded 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on May 24, 2024.   Kito is entitled to her court costs and reasonable attorney fees.  §7923.115(a).  The parties are ordered to meet and confer on the amount of reasonable fees and Kito may move for an award if no agreement is reached.