Judge: James C. Chalfant, Case: 24STCV02242, Date: 2024-03-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV02242 Hearing Date: March 26, 2024 Dept: 85
ML Genesee Holdings,
LLC v. Selene Finance, LP et. al, 24STCV02242
Tentative decision on application for preliminary injunction: granted
Plaintiff ML Genesee Holdings, LLC (“Genesee”) applies for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants Selene Finance LP, a Delaware
limited partnership (“Selene”), Clear Recon Corp., (“Recon”), and U.S. Bank
Trust National Association (“Bank”), solely as owner trustee for RCF 2
Acquisition Trust (“RCF 2”), from foreclosing on Genesee’s eight-unit apartment
building of property located at 441 West Santa Cruz Street, Los Angeles,
California 90731 (“Property”).
The
court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and
renders the following tentative decision.
A.
Statement of the Case
1.
Complaint
Plaintiff
Genesee filed the Complaint on January 29, 2024, alleging causes of action for
(1) breach of contract (specific performance); and (2) declaratory injunctive relief.
The Complaint alleges in pertinent part
as follows.
On
September 13, 2019, Genesee obtained a $1,395,000 loan (“Loan”) from
Sharestates Investments, LLC (“Sharestates”) to refinance the Property. In exchange for the loan, Genesee executed a Promissory
Note, Loan and Security Agreement (“Loan Agreement”), and Deed of Trust (“DOT”).
The DOT was recorded against the Property
to secure repayment of the Loan.
Defendant Selene is the servicer of the Loan, Defendant Recon
is the foreclosure trustee of the DOT, and Defendant Bank is the Owner Trustee
for RCF 2, the beneficiary of the Loan and DOT.
On
or about July 12, 2023, Recon recorded a Notice of Default (“NOD”) for the Loan.
Genesee began negotiations with Selene for
a loan modification to cure the default and prevent foreclosure on the
Property. On August 10, 2023, Genesee
submitted a loan modification application to Selene. After Genesee submitted the request documents,
Selene approved Genesee for a Trial Modification Plan (“TMP”).
Genesee signed and returned the TMP to
Selene on August 24, 2023. The TMP
provided that if Genesee made three payments each of $8,152.60 on the first of
September, October, and November 2023, Selene would offer Genesee a permanent
loan modification. Under this
modification, the principal balance of $1,311,906.14 would incur interest at 7%,
with monthly payments of $8,152.60, starting on December 1, 2023.
As part of the TMP, Selene required Genesee to sign an
Authorization Agreement for Preauthorized Payments (“Preauthorization Payment Agreement”).
Genesee signed and returned the Preauthorization
Payment Agreement to Selene along with the TMP on August 24, 2023.
Selene
orally represented to Genesee that by signing the Preauthorization Payment Agreement,
all the required TMMP payments would be covered by ACH Debits. This would make Genesee eligible for the
permanent loan modification offer. However, Selene did not include an
authorization for the September 2023 payment in the Preauthorization Payment Agreement;
only the payments for October and November 2023 were included. This modified the Preauthorization Payment Agreement
so that it no longer included the September 2023 payment.
Due
to Selene’s oral assurances that the Preauthorization Payment Agreement
included all three initial payments required by the TMP, Genesee was in
compliance with the TMP upon signing it.
On November 15, 2023, Michael Lerner (“Lerner”), Genesee’s Managing
Member, telephonically contacted Selene to inquire as to the status of the
permanent loan modification. A Selene
representative told Lerner that Selene had cancelled the TMP, and thus the
offer for permanent loan modification, due to Genesee’s failure to make the September
2023 payment. In response, Lerner immediately offered to make the missed
payment. The representative responded
that the TMP had been cancelled and Selene would not accept the payment. Genesee also learned that on November 11, 2023
Recon had recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale (“NOS”) which scheduled a
foreclosure sale of the Property for February 8, 2024.
Genesee
seeks (1) specific performance of the TMP compelling Defendants to provide the
permanent loan modification, (2) a judicial declaration that the TMP is valid
and enforceable, and that the Defendants must honor it by providing the permanent
loan modification; (3) a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining
foreclosure of the Property; and (4) costs of suit.
2. Course of Proceedings
On
February 2, 2024, Judge Curtis Kin granted Genesee’s ex parte
application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining Defendants from
foreclosing upon the Property and issued an order to show cause (“OSC”) for
February 22, 2024 at 9:30 a.m.
On
February 5, 2024, Genesee personally served Defendants Recon and Bank with the
Complaint and Summons.
On
February 7, 2024, Genesee personally served Defendant Selene with the Complaint
and Summons.
After
the parties stipulated to continue the February 22 OSC hearing, the court
continued it to the instant date.
B.
Applicable Law
An
injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular
act; it may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a
judge thereof; and when granted by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of
the court. Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”)
§525. An injunction may be more
completely defined as a writ or order commanding a person either to perform or
to refrain from performing a particular act.
See Comfort v. Comfort, (1941) 17 Cal.2d 736, 741. McDowell
v. Watson, (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1160.[1] It is an equitable remedy available generally
in the protection or to prevent the invasion of a legal right. Meridian, Ltd. v. City and County of San
Francisco, et al., (1939) 13 Cal.2d 424.
The
purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo
pending final resolution upon a trial. See
Scaringe v. J.C.C. Enterprises, Inc., (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1536. Grothe
v. Cortlandt Corp., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316; Major v. Miraverde
Homeowners Assn., (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623. The status quo has been defined to
mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending
controversy. Voorhies v. Greene
(1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 989, 995, quoting United Railroads v. Superior Court,
(1916) 172 Cal. 80, 87. 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp.,
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.
A
preliminary injunction is issued after hearing on a noticed motion. The complaint normally must plead injunctive
relief. CCP §526(a)(1)-(2).[2] Preliminary injunctive relief requires the
use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds
for relief. See e.g. Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green, (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150. Injunctive relief may be granted based
on a verified complaint only if it contains sufficient evidentiary, not
ultimate, facts. See CCP
§527(a). For this reason, a pleading
alone rarely suffices. Weil & Brown,
California Procedure Before Trial, 9:579, 9(ll)-21 (The Rutter Group
2007). The burden of proof is on the
plaintiff as moving party. O’Connell
v. Superior Court, (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.
A
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show the absence of an adequate
damages remedy at law. CCP §526(4); Thayer
Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors, (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 307; Department
of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565. The concept of
“inadequacy of the legal remedy” or “inadequacy of damages” dates from the time
of the early courts of chancery, the idea being that an injunction is an
unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the
remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured
plaintiff. Department of Fish &
Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554,
1565.
In
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court
considers two factors: (1) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the merits at trial (CCP §526(a)(1)), and (2) a balancing of the
“irreparable harm” that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is
denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the
court grants a preliminary injunction.
CCP §526(a)(2); 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp.,
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402; Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v.
Schectman, (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1283; Davenport v. Blue Cross of
California, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 446; Abrams v. St. Johns Hospital,
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628, 636. Thus, a
preliminary injunction may not issue without some showing of potential
entitlement to such relief. Doe v.
Wilson, (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 296, 304.
The decision to grant a preliminary injunction generally lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. Thornton v.
Carlson, (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1255.
A
preliminary injunction ordinarily cannot take effect unless and until the
plaintiff provides an undertaking for damages which the enjoined defendant may
sustain by reason of the injunction if the court finally decides that the
plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction.
See CCP §529(a); City of South San Francisco v. Cypress Lawn
Cemetery Assn., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920.
C.
Statement of Facts[3]
1.
Genesee’s Evidence
Genesee
purchased the Property in September 2018 and subsequently invested $339,000 to heavily
refurbish it. Lerner Decl., ¶3. On September 13, 2019, Plaintiff obtained a $1,395,000
Loan from Sharestates to refinance the Property. Lerner Decl., ¶3. In exchange for the Loan, Genesee executed the
Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, and DOT.
Lerner Decl., ¶3; RJN Ex. 1. The DOT
was recorded against the Property to secure repayment of the Loan. Lerner Decl., ¶3; RJN Ex. 1.
In
March 2020, after the COVID-19 pandemic began, six of eight tenants at the
Property stopped paying rent. Lerner
Decl., ¶4. Because of the moratorium, Genesee
was unable to evict the tenants. Lerner
Decl., ¶4. Consequently, in June 2021, Genesee
was unable to make payments on the Loan. Lerner Decl., ¶4. On or about July 12, 2023, Recon recorded an
NOD for default on the Loan. RJN Ex. 2.
By
August 2023, after Genesee was able to evict non-paying tenants and replace
their leases, the Property had six paying tenants. Lerner Decl., ¶5. This put Genesee in a position to resume
making payments on the Loan but not to pay the missed payments accumulated
during the pandemic. Lerner Decl., ¶5. Thus,
Genesee began negotiations with Selene, now the loan servicer, for loan
modifications to cure the default and prevent foreclosure of the Property. Lerner Decl., ¶6.
a.
The TMP
On
August 10, 2023, Genesee submitted a loan modification application to Selene,
along with the requested documents. Lerner
Decl., ¶6. On August 24, 2023, Selene
approved Genesee for a TMP. Lerner Decl.,
¶7, Ex. A. The TMP provided that if Genesee
made three payments of $8,152.60 on the first of September, October, and
November 2023, Selene would offer Genesee a permanent loan modification. Lerner Decl., ¶8, Ex. A. The loan modification would provide that the
principal balance of $1,311,906.14 would incur interest at 7%, with monthly
payments of $8,152.60, starting on December 1, 2023. Lerner Decl., ¶8, Ex. A. Genesee signed and returned the TMP to
Selene. Lerner Decl., ¶6, Ex. A.
The
TMP provided the first trial payment must be made with certified funds. Ex. A.
This could be via money order, certified bank check, or Money Gram
payment using code “6440.” Ex. A.
As
part of the TMP, Selene required Genesee to execute a Preauthorization
Agreement. Lerner Decl., ¶7, Ex. B. Selene orally represented to Genesee that, by
signing the Preauthorization Agreement, all the required TMP payments would be
covered by the ACH Debits. Lerner Decl.,
¶9.
The Preauthorization Agreement further stated that Selene
would be “fully protected in complying” with its terms. Lerner Decl., Ex. B. The Preauthorization Agreement did not
include an authorization for the September 2023 payment; only the payments for
October and November 2023 were included. Ex. B.
Pursuant to the Preauthorization Agreement, Selene executed
debits in the amounts of $8,152.60 each on October 3 and November 3, 2023. Lerner Decl., ¶10, Ex. C.
On
November 15, 2023, Genesee’s Managing Member Michael Lerner (“Lerner”) telephonically
contacted Selene to inquire as to the status of the permanent loan
modification. Lerner Decl., ¶11. A Selene representative told Lerner that
Selene had cancelled the TMP -- and thus the offer for permanent loan
modification -- due to Genesee’s failure to make the initial September 2023
payment. Lerner Decl., ¶11. Lerner had no prior notice that Genesee had
missed a payment, and he had believed until this point that the Preauthorization
Agreement included all required payments.
Lerner Decl., ¶11.
Lerner
immediately offered to make the missed payment.
Lerner Decl., ¶11. The
representative responded that Selene would not accept such payment since the
TMP had been cancelled. Lerner Decl.,
¶11. Selene told Lerner that Genesee
could reapply for the loan modification.
Lerner Decl., ¶11.
b.
Second Loan Modification Application
Genesee
submitted a new loan modification packet to Selene on November 30, 2023. Lerner Decl., ¶12.
On
December 27, 2023, Genesee received a December 15, 2023 letter from Selene requesting
one additional document to finish processing the modification application. Lerner Decl., ¶13, Ex. D. This document was a tenant lease agreement because
the version Selene possessed had expired.
Lerner Decl., ¶13, Ex. D. The letter
said Genesee should submit the document by December 28, 2023. Lerner Decl. ¶13, Ex D. Genesee emailed Selene a copy of the lease on
December 27, the same day it received the letter. Lerner Decl., ¶14; Montes Decl., ¶2, Ex. E.
By
January 4, 2024, Genesee had not heard from Selene as to the status of this
second loan modification application. Lerner
Decl., ¶15. Genesee’s counsel, John
Shelley, Esq. (“Shelley”), contacted Recon’s counsel to request a 90-day
postponement of the foreclosure sale scheduled for February 8, 2024. Lerner Decl., ¶15; Shelley Decl., ¶2, Ex. F.
On
January 12, 2024, Shelley received a message from Recon’s legal counsel, Jordan
Rabago, Esq. (“Rabago”). Shelley Decl.
¶4, Ex. H. Rabago said that Recon had
responded that Genesee did not qualify for loan modification and that Recon had
denied the loan modification in December 2023. Shelley Decl. ¶4, Ex. H. Genesee had been sent a termination letter on December
20, 2023. Recon therefore intended to
proceed on the sale date set for February 8, 2024. Shelley Decl. ¶4, Ex. H.
Shelley
asked for a copy of the letter purportedly sent to Genesee on December 20,
2023. Shelley Decl. ¶5, Ex. I. Rodrigo emailed a copy on January 18. Shelley Decl., ¶6. This letter stated that Selene was unable to
approve the loan modification request because Genesee had failed to timely
provide the financial workout package and supporting documentation. Shelley Decl. ¶6, Ex. J.
On
January 19, 2024, Shelley told Rodrigo that Genesee did not receive the
December 20 letter, but the letter was in error anyway because Genesee did
timely submit the requested document on December 27, 2023. Shelley Decl. ¶7, Ex. K. Shelley therefore reiterated Genesee’s request
for a 90-day postponement of the trustee sale.
Shelley Decl., ¶7, Ex. K. He also
requested that its application for a loan modification be reopened. Shelley Decl., ¶7, Ex. K.
On
January 22, 2024, Rodrigo agreed to forward the documents to his client, inquire
again about the status of the loan modification application, and reiterate Genesee’s
request to postpone the February 8, 2024 foreclosure sale. Shelley Decl. ¶8, Ex. L. On January 25, Rabago emailed Shelley that Selene
had denied the postponement request and reconsideration for loss mitigation
because the borrowers were already denied loss mitigation. Shelley Decl., ¶9, Ex M. Selene intended to move forward with the February
8 sale date. Shelley Decl., ¶9, Ex. M.
2.
Defendants’ Evidence
On
approximately September 13, 2019, Genesee refinanced the Property with a
commercial Loan from Sharestates in the amount of $1,395,000. Harvey Decl., ¶¶ 3-4, 7, Exs. A-B. The DOT was recorded to secure the Loan. Harvey Decl., Ex. B.
On
July 29, 2021, Sharestates assigned the beneficial interest under the DOT to
Bank as Trustee for GIFM Holdings Trust.
Harvey Decl., ¶8, Ex. C. The Assignment
was recorded on August 12, 2021. Harvey
Decl., ¶8, Ex. C; RJN Ex. B.
On September 6, 2022, Selene began servicing the loan. Harvey Decl., ¶11.
On
December 16, 2022, Bank assigned the beneficial interest under the DOT to Pretium
Mortgage Credit Partners I Loan Acquisition, LP (“Pretium”). Harvey Decl., ¶9, Ex. D. The Assignment was recorded on December 22,
2022. Harvey Decl., ¶9, Ex. D; RJN Ex. C. On May 18, 2023, Pretium assigned this
interest to Bank as Trustee for RCF 2.
Harvey Decl., ¶10, Ex. E. The assignment
was recorded on June 6, 2023. Harvey
Decl., ¶10, Ex. E; RJN Ex. D.
On
June 20, 2023, Selene acting as Bank’s attorney in fact substituted Recon as
trustee under the DOT via Substitution of Trustee, recorded July 12, 2023. Harvey Decl., ¶12, Ex. F; RJN Ex. E.
a.
Default
The
August 2021 monthly payment is currently outstanding. Harvey Decl., ¶15. On May 13, 2022, the prior mortgage servicer
sent Genesee a Repayment Plan for the Loan.
Harvey Decl., ¶16, Ex. H. Under
this plan, Genesee would make 12 monthly payments of $16,042.50 from June 17,
2022 through May 17, 2023, plus a balloon payment of $138,563.68 due on June
17, 2022. Harvey Decl. ¶16, Ex. H.
The Repayment Plan was terminated after Genesee failed to
make the payment due on February 17, 2023. Harvey Decl., ¶17.
On
July 12, 2023, Recon recorded an NOD asserting an outstanding Loan balance of $277,780.89. Harvey Decl., ¶¶ 13-14, Ex. G; RJN Ex. F. The NOD asserted that Genesee initially
defaulted for failure to make the payment due on April 1, 2020. Harvey Decl., ¶14., Ex. G; RJN Ex. F.
b. The TMP
On
August 15, 2023, Selene sent Genesee the TMP requiring three payments of
$8,152.60 by the first of September, October, and November 2023. Harvey Decl., ¶18, Ex. I. The TMP provided that the first trial payment must
be made using certified funds via money order, certified bank check, or Money
Gram payment using code “6440.” Harvey
Decl., ¶20, Ex. I. The TMP also provided
that if Genesee failed to comply with the terms thereof, it would constitute a
default and the TMP may be void. Harvey
Decl., ¶18, Ex. I.
The TMP included the Preauthorization Payment Agreement for
the second and third payments. Harvey
Decl., Ex. I. The cover letter explained
that the Preauthorization Payment Agreement is Genesee’s agreement to establish
automatic monthly transfers from its bank account on the dates and amounts
shown. Ex. I. The amounts shown are payments on October 1
and November 1, 2023 in the amount of $8,152.60. Ex. I.
The Preauthorization Payment Agreement stated that the authorization
would remain in full force and effect until Selene receives written notice from
Genesee of its termination and that, until then, Selene “shall be fully protected in complying with the terms
of our agreement.” Ex. I.
On
August 22, 2023, Selene responded to Genesee’s August 16 inquiry about the Loan. Harvey Decl., ¶19, Ex. J. Selene reiterated the TMP’s three payments
from September 1 through November 1, 2023.
Ex. J. Selene explained that if
Genesee successfully completed the TMP, the account may be reviewed for
permanent loan modification. Ex. J.
Genesee
did not submit the first trial payment in certified funds. Harvey Decl., ¶21. Instead, it made the payment by overnight
draft from its bank account, which the bank returned for non-sufficient funds. Harvey Decl., ¶21. The TMP was terminated on October 2, 2023 for
Genesee’s failure to make the first payment. Harvey Decl., ¶22.
c.
Second Loan Modification Application
In
October 2023, after the termination of the TMP, Genesee submitted a partial
application for loss mitigation. Harvey
Decl., ¶23.
On
November 14, 2023, Recon recorded the NOS for the Property, scheduled for
February 8, 2024. Harvey Decl., ¶24, Ex.
K; RJN Ex. G.
On
November 29, Selene advised Genesee that its mitigation application was
incomplete. Harvey Decl., ¶25, Ex. L. Genesee had until December 28, 2023 to submit
the missing documents, including any lease for the Property if applicable. Harvey Decl., ¶25, Ex. L. Between December 6 and 14, Lerner emailed
Selene some of the missing documents.
Harvey Decl., ¶26.
On December 19, 2023, Selene inadvertently issued a letter denying
Genesee’s loan modification application for failure to provide a complete
application and supporting documentation.
Harvey Decl., ¶27, Ex. M.
On
December 26, 2023, Lerner informed Selene that the rental agreement for
Genesee’s tenant had expired and tenancy was now month-to-month. Harvey Decl., ¶28. Selene then began an extensive review of the
Loan for loss mitigation alternatives.
Harvey Decl., ¶29. It determined
that the Loan was ineligible for modification because it was commercial, not
residential. Harvey Decl., ¶29.
On March 8, 2024, Selene sent
a denial letter to Shelly explaining that the Loan was ineligible for a loan
modification because it was commercial. Harvey
Decl., ¶29, Ex. N; Benbow Decl., ¶3, Ex. A.
As
of January 8, 2024, the amount required to bring the Loan current was
approximately $998,152.06. Harvey Decl.,
¶32, Ex. Q. As of March 1, 2024, the
monthly payment for the Loan is $32,459.34. Harvey Decl., ¶29, Ex. P. Selene currently pays Plaintiff’s property taxes
on the Property. Harvey Decl., ¶30, Ex.
O.
3.
Reply Evidence
a.
Defendant’s Failure to Act in Good Faith
On
February 9, 2024, after the court had issued the TRO, Defendant’s counsel Jillian
Benbow, Esq. (“Benbow”) called Shelley. Shelley
Reply Decl., ¶2. Benbow asked if Genesee
would agree to stipulate to a continuance of the hearing on the OSC so the
parties could work out the permanent loan modification. Shelley Reply Decl., ¶2. Because the loan modification was what Genesee
sought, Shelley agreed. Shelley Reply
Decl., ¶2.
Later
that day, Benbow sent Shelley a proposed stipulation. Shelley Reply Decl., ¶3, Ex. A. One of the recitals was that the parties had begun
discussions to try to resolve this matter without further court
intervention. Shelley Reply Decl., ¶3,
Ex. A. Another said the parties were
continuing the OSC hearing to determine whether a resolution regarding the
Property was possible without further litigation. Shelley Reply Decl., ¶3, Ex. A. Because the terms of the permanent loan
modification were already set forth in the TMP, these recitals led Genesee to
believe this lawsuit was in effect resolved.
Shelley Reply Decl., ¶3.
Despite
these representations, the Defendants never entered discussions to resolve the
case. Shelley Reply Decl., ¶4. On February 14, 2024, Shelley asked Benbow
via email about how to move forward with the loan modification process,
including what additional documents Genesee needed to provide. Shelley Reply Decl. ¶4, Ex. B. Benbow responded that she had asked her
client and would let Shelley know as soon as she had a response. Shelley Reply Decl. ¶4, Ex. B.
On
February 21, 2024, Benbow told Shelley that Defendants had finally obtained the
stipulation and order. Shelley Reply
Decl. ¶5, Ex. C. Benbow had also followed
up with her client to see if Genesee needed to provide anything for the loss
mitigation review. Shelley Reply Decl.
¶5, Ex. C.
Defendants never asked for additional documentation. Shelley Reply Decl. ¶6. On March 8, 2024, the same day the opposition
to this application was due, Benbow told Shelley that after review of Genesee’s
modification application, Selene had concluded it could not offer a
modification for the commercial loan. Shelley
Reply Decl. ¶6, Ex. D. Benbow attached Selene’s
denial letter asserting it could not approve a request for loss mitigation
alternatives because the mortgage was ineligible. Shelley Reply Decl. ¶6, Ex. D.
D.
Analysis
Genesee seeks a
preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from foreclosing on the Property.
1. Probability of Success
Genesee asserts it can
prevail on its breach of contract claim based on equitable estoppel, waiver, or
ambiguity of terms.
a. Equitable Estoppel and Contract
Interpretation
Genesee
argues that Defendants should be equitably estopped from claiming that Genesee
defaulted on the TMP by not making the September 1 payment. Selene told Lerner that, upon signing the
Preauthorization Payment Agreement, all required payments under the TMP would
be covered by ACH debits (debits from Genesee’s account). This is consistent with the Preauthorization
Payment Agreement’s language that “Selene shall be fully protected in complying
with the terms of this agreement.” Genesee
contends that language is consistent with Selene’s oral representation that all
payments were covered by the Preauthorization Payment Agreement’s automatic
debit. App. at 8. Genesee further argues that any disparity
between, or ambiguity in, the TMP and Preauthorization Payment Agreement should
be construed against their drafter, which was Selene. Haris v. Bingham McCutchhen, LLP,
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1406. App.
at 9.[4]
The
court finds no ambiguity in, or inconsistency between, the TMP and the Preauthorization
Payment Agreement. The TMP required three
payments of $8,152.60 by the first of September, October, and November 2023. Harvey Decl., Ex. I. The TMP provided that the first trial payment must
be made using certified funds via money order, certified bank check, or Money
Gram payment using code “6440.” Ex. I. The TMP also provided that if Genesee failed
to comply with its terms, that would constitute a default and the TMP may be
void. Harvey Decl., ¶18, Ex. I.
The Preauthorization Payment Agreement provided for
automatic debit from Genesee’s account for the second and third payments. Harvey Decl., Ex. I. The cover letter explained that the
Preauthorization Payment Agreement was Genesee’s agreement to establish
automatic monthly transfers from its bank account on the dates and amounts
shown. Ex. I. The amounts shown are payments on October 1
and November 1, 2023 in the amount of $8,152.60. Ex. I.
The agreements clearly provide that Genesee was required to
make the first payment by certified funds and the remaining two payments would
be automatically debited from its account.
The Preauthorization Payment Agreement’s language that Selene “shall be
fully protected” plainly means that Selene would not be liable for taking
Genesee’s funds from its account until such time as it received a written
notice from Genesee that such authorization was terminated in writing. Ex. I.
Contrary
to its argument that Selene represented that all payments would be covered by
ACH debits (App. at 4),[5] Genesee
clearly understood that the first payment was not included in the automatic
debit. Genesee tried to make that first payment
by overnight draft from its bank account, but the bank returned it for non-sufficient
funds. Harvey Decl., ¶21.
Moreover, Genesee, and no one else, was obligated to provide
the funds for the three TMP payments.
Genesee’s contention is that it thought Selene would take all three
payments from its account. But Genesee
fails to show that it had sufficient funds in its account on September 1, 2023
to do so. Defendants’ evidence indicates
to the contrary. Selene had every right
to terminate the TMP on October 2, 2023 for Genesee’s failure to make the first
payment. See Harvey Decl., ¶22.
Equitable estoppel applies in circumstances where a party
has induced another into forbearing to act.
Lantzy v. Centex Homes, (2003) 31 Cal.App.4th 363, 383. The elements of estoppel are: (1) the party
to be estopped must be appraised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his
conduct shall be acted upon; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true
state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury. Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles,
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305. Equitable
estoppel does not apply because Selene did not mislead Genesee as to the true
facts about the manner of making the three TMP payments, Genesee was aware of
the true facts, and Genesee did not rely on any statement from Selene to its
detriment.
b. Waiver
Genesee argues that Selene waived its
right to terminate the TMP by accepting the October and November 2023
payments. Genesee’s tender of a late
payment on or about November 15, 2023 should be deemed a cure of any
default. App. at 8.
Waiver
is the intentional relinquishment of a known right after full knowledge of the
facts and depends upon the intention of one party only. Old
Republic Ins. Co. v FSR Brokerage, Inc. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 666,
678. Waiver requires an existing right, benefit, or advantage, actual or
constructive knowledge of the right's existence, and either an actual intention
to relinquish it or conduct so inconsistent with any intent to enforce the
right as to induce a reasonable belief that it has been relinquished. Utility
Audit Co. v City of Los Angeles (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 950, 959.
The waiver of a legal right cannot be established without a clear showing of
intent to give up such right. Id. The burden is on the
party claiming the waiver to prove it by clear and convincing evidence that
does not leave the matter doubtful or uncertain. Id.
After
terminating the TMP on October 2, 2023 for Genesee’s failure to make the first
payment (Harvey Decl., ¶22), Selene received the October and November 2023 automatic
payments. Lerner Decl., ¶10, Ex. C. Genesee did not know that Selene cancelled
the TMP until November 15, 2023. Lerner
Decl., ¶11.
Without citing pertinent law, Defendants argue that Selene
was entitled to accept the two partial payments. Opp. at 7.
Can Selene proceed with the foreclosure sale despite
accepting partial payments of the delinquent amounts noticed in the NOD? Generally, yes. By accepting partial payments after recording
an NOD and promptly demanding the additional amounts required to reinstate, a
lender does not waive its right to complete the foreclosure. Only a full payment of the delinquent amounts
and foreclosure charges reinstates the loan. Sellman v. Crosby, (1937)
20 Cal.App.2d 562, 564 (bank’s acceptance of five months of loan payments
without waiving default).
Despite this law, there are two problems with Defendants’ argument. First, they point to no provision in the TMP,
DOT, Note, or Loan Agreement that authorizes receipt of partial payment. Second, and more important, Selene did not
just passively accept partial payment.
It affirmatively debited Genesee’s account for the October and November
payment. And it did so after terminating
the TMP and without notifying Genesee of the default until Lerner called on
November 15, 2023, the day after the NOS was recorded. Lerner Decl., ¶11. Defendants provide no evidence or discussion
about why this happened.
As
stated, waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right after full knowledge of the facts
and depends upon the intention of one party only. Old Republic
Ins. Co. v FSR Brokerage, Inc., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at 678.
Based on the facts presented, Selene’s affirmative withdrawal of funds from
Genesee’s account in October and November appears to be a waiver of enforcing
Genesee’s timely payment in September.
Genesee’s proffer of the September payment on or about November 15
should have been accepted.
Genessee
has shown a probability of success on its breach of contract claim. This conclusion is based only on a
probability of success and is not a determination that Genesee necessarily will
prevail at trial.
2.
Balance of Hardships
The
second factor which a trial court examines is the interim harm that plaintiff
is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that
the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. Donahue Schriber Realty Group, Inc. v. Nu
Creation Outreach, (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1177. This factor involves consideration of the
inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity
of preserving the status quo. Id.
Genesee
makes a familiar argument that real property is unique and injunction to
prevent its loss is more readily granted.
Upon foreclosure, it will lose the $339,000 expended in making
improvements to the Property. In
contrast, Genesee contends that Defendants are fully protected by their DOT for
the Property. App. at 9.
Defendants
argue that the balance of hardships works in its favor. Genesee’s harm is self-inflicted due to its
default on the Loan. A delay caused by a
preliminary injunction will harm Defendants.
Genesee has not complied with its financial obligations for nearly three
years, it waited four months after the TMP was canceled to seek a TRO, and Selene
will have to advance sums for property taxes and insurance. Opp. at 8.
Genesee replies that it did not delay in seeking a preliminary
injunction because it sought another loan modification and only filed suit and
sought a TRO when it had to do so. Reply
at 6.
While both residential and commercial real property are
considered unique for purposes of irreparable harm (see Civil Code
§3387), damages may adequately compensate property owned for investment
property which has an established value and the foreclosing entity is
solvent. Jessen v. Keystone Savings
& Loan Assn., (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 458. However, where the owner intends to use the
investment property and not simply sell it, money damages may not suffice, and
irreparable harm may justify injunctive relief.
Id.
Genesee is in the latter category of an owner which intends
to keep its property. Therefore, it will
suffer harm from the foreclosure of its unique property. Defendants may have to advance property taxes
and insurance, and they are owed the loan balance, but they do not show these
amounts will exceed the equity in the Property.
Consequently, Defendants appear to be protected and the balance of harms
works in Genesee’s favor.[6]
3.
Undertaking
The purpose of a bond is to cover the defendant’s damages
from an improvidently issued injunction.
CCP §529(a). In setting the bond,
the court must assume that the preliminary injunction was wrongly issued. Abba Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, (“Abba”)
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1, 15. The
attorney’s fees necessary to successfully procure a final decision dissolving
the injunction also are damages that should be included in setting the bond. Id. at 15-16. While Abba reasoned that the
plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing is irrelevant to setting the bond, a more
recent case disagreed, stating that the greater the likelihood of the plaintiff
prevailing, the less likely the preliminary injunction will have been wrongly
issued, and that is a relevant factor for setting the bond. Oiye v. Fox, (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
1036, 1062.
Defendants argue that the bond should secure the Loan due of
$998,152.06. Defendants also ask for
monthly payments of $32,459.34. It is
not clear whether they are asking for both.
In any event, Defendants misunderstand the purpose of a bond, which is
to protect them from damage for an improvidently issued preliminary
injunction. This ordinarily consists of
loss use of funds and the attorney’s fees that will be incurred to set aside
the injunction. While Genesee correctly
states that the court may consider its probability of success in setting the
bond (see Reply at 7), the court does not find that probability to be
strong. Either side may well prevail at
trial.
E.
Conclusion
The application for a preliminary injunction is granted. The court will discuss the matter of a bond
with the parties at the hearing.
[1] The courts look to the
substance of an injunction to determine whether it is prohibitory or
mandatory. Agricultural Labor
Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 709, 713. A mandatory injunction — one that mandates a
party to affirmatively act, carries a heavy burden: “[t]he granting of a
mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases
where the right thereto is clearly established.” Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. v.
Furlotti, (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 187, 1493.
[2] However, a court may issue an
injunction to maintain the status quo without a cause of action in the
complaint. CCP §526(a)(3).
[3] Geneseee requests judicial
notice of (1) the DOT recorded against the Property on September 16, 2019 (RJN
Ex. 1); (2) the NOD recorded for the Property on July 12, 2023 (RJN Ex. 2); and
(3) the NOS recorded for the Property on November 14, 2023 (RJN Ex. 3). The requests are granted. Evid. Code §452(c).
Defendants request judicial notice of (1) the DOT recorded
against the Property on September 16, 2019 (RJN Ex. A); (2) the Corporate
Assignment of DOT recorded on August 12, 2021 (RJN Ex. B); (3) the Corporate
Assignment of DOT recorded on December 22, 2022 (RJN Ex. C); (4) the Assignment
of DOT recorded on June 6, 2023 (RJN Ex. D); (5) the Substitution of Trustee
recorded on July 12, 2023 (RJN Ex. E); (6) the NOD recorded against the
Property on July 12, 2023 (RJN Ex. F); and (7) the NOS recorded for the
Property on November 14, 2023 (RJN Ex. G).
The requests are granted. Evid.
Code §452(c).
[4] Defendants respond that California law
requires tender of the amount due to challenge a foreclosure. Opp. at 5.
Defendants are incorrect. The
tender rule has no application to a circumstance where a plaintiff is seeking
to specifically enforce a contract in which the DOT holder agrees not to
foreclose.
Defendants also
argue that the Homeowners Bill of Rights does not apply to the Loan, and they
were under no obligation to modify Genesee’s commercial loan. Opp. at 6.
True, but Genesee correctly notes that Defendants did so. Reply at 5.
[5] Defendants
deny that Selene made an oral amendment and object to the assertion that it did
as hearsay and lacking foundation. Opp.
at 7. Genesee replies that the statement
is a party admission. Reply at 6. This might
be true if Genesee provided foundation evidence about who, when, and where the
representation was made. It did not do
so.
Defendants also
argue that the statute of frauds prevents oral modification of the TMP. An agreement for the sale of property must be
in writing and signed by the party to be charged. Civil Code §1624. An unsigned oral modification to a loan
agreement is unenforceable due to the statute of frauds. Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan
Trust 2002-2, (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 544, 553. Opp. at 7.
Genesee does not reply, but there are many exceptions to the statute of
frauds, including that the agreement will be performed within a year. See Civil Code §16524(a)(1). The TMP was intended by the parties to be
fully performed in less than a year. The
court need not address whether Genesee’s alleged oral modification of the TMP
violated the statute of frauds.
[6] Given the ruling, the
court need not address Genesee’s argument about bad faith in stipulating to
continue the OSC for the parties to negotiate a resolution. Reply at 2-3.