Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 24STCV21251, Date: 2024-10-03 Tentative Ruling

Peter Trifunovich v. Mandeep Sidhu and Premier America Credit Union, 24STCV21251

Tentative decision on application for preliminary injunction: granted in part

Plaintiff Peter Trifunovich (“Trifunovich”) seeks a preliminary injunction against Defendants Mandeep Sidhu (“Sidhu”) and Premier America Credit Union (“Credit Union”) to enjoin them from unlawfully evicting him from, and interfering with his quiet enjoyment of, real property located at 7840 Ventura Canyon Ave., Panorama City, CA 91402 (“Property”), and from entering the Property without providing at least 24-hours’ notice in writing.

The court has read and considered the moving papers and opposition (no reply filed) and renders the following tentative decision.

On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff Trifunovich filed this action against Defendants Siduh and Credit Union, alleging claims for quiet title, breach of fiduciary duty, and declaratory relief. The verified Complaint alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Trifunovich and Sidhu purchased the Property together in 2011. Compl., ¶10. Trifunovich and Sidhu agreed that only Sidhu's name would be on the title and Sidhu would take out the mortgage. Compl., ¶11. The parties also agreed that Trifunovich would make the initial down payment and subsequent mortgage payments as well as occupy and own the Property in fee simple. Compl., ¶11.

Sidhu obtained financing to purchase the Property. Compl., ¶12. Trifunovich is informed and believes that Credit Union is currently the primary lender for the Property and holds a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) on the Property. Compl., ¶13.

Trifunovich provided the funds for the down payment in 2011. Compl., ¶14. Since 2011, Trifunovich has made every mortgage payment until he was prevented from doing so by Credit Union. Compl., ¶14. Since 2011, Trifunovich has paid the property taxes. Compl., ¶14. In or around 2022, Trifunovich became ill and fell behind on the tax payments. Compl., ¶16. Trifunovich currently occupies the Property and has done so since 2011. Compl., ¶15.

On or about August 7, 2024, Trifunovich went to Credit Union to make his mortgage payment and was told that Credit Union would not accept his payment or have any conversation with him about the Property, mortgage, or mortgage payments. Compl., ¶17. On or about August 14, 2024, Sidhu informed Trifunovich that she had made an “executive decision” regarding the Property and he had to vacate the Property by August 21, 2024. Compl., ¶18.

Following this conversation, Trifunovich is informed and believes that Sidhu sold or transferred the Property. Compl., ¶19. Trifunovich seeks to quiet title against claims to the Property by Defendants Sidhu, Credit Union, and any other relevant Doe Defendants. Compl., ¶20.

On September 9, 2024, Trifunovich filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and an order to show cause (“OSC”) restraining Sidhu from (1) engaging in self-help to unlawfully evict Trifunovich or interfering with his quiet enjoyment of the Property, (2) ntering the Property without 24-hour notice, and (3) transferring title to or selling the Property.

The court granted the TRO/OSC in part on September 11, 2024. The TRO/OSC restrained Sidhu from engaging in self-help to unlawfully evict Trifunovich or interfering with his quiet enjoyment of the Property and entering the Property without 24-hour notice. The TRO/OSC did not prevent Sidhu from transferring title to or selling the Property.

An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act; it may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court. CCP §525. An injunction may be more completely defined as a writ or order commanding a person either to perform or to refrain from performing a particular act. See Comfort v. Comfort, (1941) 17 Cal.2d 736, 741. McDowell v. Watson, (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1160.[1] It is an equitable remedy available generally in the protection or to prevent the invasion of a legal right. Meridian, Ltd. v. City and County of San Francisco, et al., (1939) 13 Cal.2d 424.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final resolution upon a trial. See Scaringe v. J.C.C. Enterprises, Inc., (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1536. Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316; Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn., (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623. The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. Voorhies v. Greene (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 989, 995, quoting United Railroads v. Superior Court, (1916) 172 Cal. 80, 87. 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp., (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.

A preliminary injunction is issued after hearing on a noticed motion. The complaint normally must plead injunctive relief. CCP §526(a)(1)-(2).[2] Preliminary injunctive relief requires the use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief. See e.g. Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green, (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150. Injunctive relief may be granted based on a verified complaint only if it contains sufficient evidentiary, not ultimate, facts. See CCP §527(a). For this reason, a pleading alone rarely suffices. Weil & Brown, California Procedure Before Trial, 9:579, 9(ll)-21 (The Rutter Group 2007). The burden of proof is on the plaintiff as moving party. O’Connell v. Superior Court, (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show the absence of an adequate damages remedy at law. CCP §526(4); Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors, (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 307; Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565. The concept of “inadequacy of the legal remedy” or “inadequacy of damages” dates from the time of the early courts of chancery, the idea being that an injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff. Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565.

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two factors: (1) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial (CCP §526(a)(1)), and (2) a balancing of the “irreparable harm” that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. CCP §526(a)(2); 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp., (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402; Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Schectman, (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1283; Davenport v. Blue Cross of California, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 446; Abrams v. St. Johns Hospital, (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628, 636. Thus, a preliminary injunction may not issue without some showing of potential entitlement to such relief. Doe v. Wilson, (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 296, 304. The decision to grant a preliminary injunction generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Thornton v. Carlson, (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1255.

A preliminary injunction ordinarily cannot take effect unless and until the plaintiff provides an undertaking for damages which the enjoined defendant may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction. See CCP §529(a); City of South San Francisco v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Assn., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920.

Trifunovich has continuously occupied the Property for 28 years. Trifunovich Decl., ¶2. It has been his residence, rental property, and place to keep and work on his extensive classic car collection. Trifunovich Decl., ¶2. Trifunovich’s entire life revolves around his car collection which is centered at the Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶2.

Trifunovich is at the Property every day where he manages his car collection, where he tends to his other collections, as well as feeds his cats and waters the plants and trees. Trifunovich Decl., ¶2. Prior to the events of August 18, 2024, Sidhu had been to the Property once in the past 13 years. Trifunovich Decl., ¶2.

In or around 2011, Trifunovich owned several properties. Trifunovich Decl., ¶16. At that time, Sidhu approached Trifunovich to see if he would allow her to put her name on one of his properties so that she could get a tax break. Trifunovich Decl., ¶16. They agreed that they would put her name on the title for the Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶16. Accordingly, they put her name on the title and the mortgage paperwork. Trifunovich Decl., ¶16. They agreed that Trifunovich would make the initial down payment and subsequent mortgage payments and that Trifunovich would occupy and own the Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶16. However, Sidhu’s name would be on the Property and the Mortgage. Trifunovich Decl., ¶16.

That being said, Sidhu would never be responsible to pay for anything related to the Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶16. It was clearly understood that Sidhu’s name would only be on the title and that she would hold title in trust for Trifunovich. Trifunovich Decl., ¶16. Trifunovich provided approximately $58,000 for the down payment in 2011 and has made every mortgage payment (most recently in the amount of $2,100 per month) through August 2024, when Credit Union refused to accept his payment. Trifunovich Decl., ¶16.

The Credit Union employees know Trifunovich well as he has regularly made payments at the branch since the Property was refinanced in 2017. Trifunovich Decl., ¶17. Additionally, the agreement between Sidhu and Trifunovich was reaffirmed in 2017 when the Property was refinanced. Trifunovich Decl., ¶17. The mortgage brokers that worked with them in 2011 and 2017 were aware of the agreement between Sidhu and Trifunovich. Trifunovich Decl., ¶1.

By August of 2024, Sidhu had been frustrated that Trifunovich was in arrears in paying the property taxes on the Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶18. Without any clear warning, Sidhu told Trifunovich that she decided to surrender the deed to the Property to the bank. Trifunovich Decl., ¶18. Trifunovich now believes that to be untrue and that Sidhu partnered with others -- Kevin Eugene Burth (“Burth”), and George Harris (“Harris”) -- to evict Trifunovich and sell the Property, thereby destroying Trifunovich’s livelihood, and stealing approximately $300,000 of Trifunovich’s equity in the Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶18.

Beginning mid-August 2024, Sidhu, Burth, and Harris began a campaign of intimidation and harassment to steal and forcibly evict Trifunovich from the Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶4. On numerous occasions, Sidhu, Burth, and Harris have broken into the Property, broken doors and windows, changed locks, installed surveillance cameras, changed the utilities, yelled at Trifunovich, and threatened to have him arrested by falsely alleging that he is a trespasser on his own Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶4. Photographs depict damage, vandalism and harassment by Defendants. Trifunovich Decl., ¶¶ 7-15, Exs. B-J.

On September 4, 2024, during an incident at the Property where Sidhu tried to have Trifunovich arrested, Sidhu told one of the responding LAPD officers that Trifunovich must be out of the Property by September 9, 2024, due to the Property’s escrow. Trifunovich Decl., ¶5. The LAPD officers informed Trifunovich that Defendants claim that he is a trespasser and that he is not a resident of the Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶¶ 5, 14-15. The first time the officers arrived they detained Trifunovich and placed him in handcuffs as a trespasser. Trifunovich Decl. ¶5. After Trifunovich’s explanation the situation to the officers, they released him and told me that he was a resident and that he should seek a restraining order. Trifunovich Decl. ¶5. The officers also told Trifunovich that they told Defendants they should deal with the matter in court. Trifunovich Decl., ¶5. Further, the officers told Trifunovich that they are unable to do anything about Defendants forcing their way on to his Property, breaking doors, windows, locks and vandalizing the Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶5.

On September 3, 2024, at 3:14 p.m., Burth, who works for or with Sidhu, threatened counsel for Trifunovich with violence in attempt to intimidate him into not going forward with this lawsuit against Sidhu. Trifunovich’s counsel believed Burth’s threats to be credible. Singleton Decl., ¶5.

Trifunovich is 65 years old and because of Defendants campaign of harassment against him, is scared that Defendants will physically harm him and/or force him from the Property. Trifunovich Decl., ¶17. If Trifunovich is forced from his Property of 28 years he will lose his ability to manage his car collection at the Property, which is his primary asset, and his life’s work. Trifunovich Decl., ¶17.

Trifunovich acquired the Property on August 1, 2005, from Alexander Tombros. Sidhu Decl., ¶1, Ex. 1. At the time Sidhu acquired the Property from Trifunovich, he was experiencing financial difficulties. Sidhu Decl., ¶1. Sidhu purchased the Property pursuant to a short sale agreement. Sidhu Decl., ¶1, Ex. 1. Since acquiring the Property on July 15, 2011, Sidhu has been the sole holder of the title to the Property. Sidhu Decl., ¶1.

A DOT in connection with Sidhu’s acquisition of the Property was recorded on July 15, 2011. Sidhu Decl., ¶2, Ex. 3. Sidhu refinanced the Property and a Full Reconveyance was recorded on November 2, 2012. Sidhu Decl., ¶2, Ex. 4.

On September 19, 2023, a Notice of Power to Sell Tax-Defaulted Property was recorded. Sidhu Decl., ¶2.

In July 2024, Sidhu had not been in contact with Trifunovich for several months. Sidhu Decl., ¶4. Sidhu was finally able to contact him and alert Trifunovich to the fact that Sidhu could no longer hold onto the Property. Sidhu Decl., ¶4. Sidhu was unable to keep up with the property taxes and her dreams of opening a facility had evaporated. Sidhu Decl., ¶4. Sidhu explained to Trifunovich that unless she was able to sell the Property, it would likely be foreclosed upon by the lender. Sidhu Decl., ¶4. Sidhu provided Trifunovich with ample notice to remove his personal belongings from the Property. Sidhu Decl., ¶4. As a result, Trifunovich began to remove his cars from the Property. Sidhu Decl., ¶4.

Since Sidhu needed to sell the Property, he explained to Trifunovich that he should refrain from continuing to make the mortgage payments. Sidhu Decl., ¶4. Because Trifunovich is now claiming an ownership interest in the Property, Trifunovich contacted Joseph W. Singleton (“Singleton”), a friend of Trifunovich, who filed the Complaint. Sidhu Decl., ¶4.

Sidhu is currently in escrow to sell the Property. Sidhu Decl., ¶5. The sale cannot be completed because Trifunovich has recorded a lis pendens. Sidhu Decl., ¶5. It is Sidhu’s counsel’s intention to file a motion to expunge the lis pendens. Sidhu Decl., ¶5.

Trifunovich has not resided at the Property for 28 years. The Property is not his residence. Trifunovich resides at a property located in Woodland Hills: 20743 Exhibit Place, Woodland Hills, California 91367. The Property was never leased by its owner, Sidhu, to Trifunovich or anyone else. There are no pets that live at the Property including living cats. Trifunovich has never watered or otherwise cared for plants and trees located at the Property. Sidhu Decl., ¶3a.

Burth is a mortgage broker who was retained by a possible buyer of the Property. Burth has been performing underwriting work in the normal course of his business. Sidhu has no idea who Harris is. In any event, Sidhu had nothing to do with any actions that may have been taken by Burth or Harris. Sidhu Decl., ¶3b.

Sidhu is not trying to steal her own Property. She is the title owner and Trifunovich has no legal right to the Property. Trifunovich is not a lawful tenant at the Property. Sidhu Decl., ¶3c.

Other than changing the utilities, none of Trifunovich’s other representations are true. There is no reason why Sidhu would ever damage her own Property. Sidhu Decl., ¶3d.

Sidhu notified Trifunovich that he had to leave the Property by August 21, 2024 because the Property is in escrow and Sidhu is required to deliver the Property vacant. She called the LAPD when she observed several people on the Property and was afraid to enter out of concern for her personal safety. LAPD officers arrived and spoke separately with Trifunovich. Sidhu’s goal was to have the occupants removed from the Property and not have anyone arrested. Trifunovich was not arrested because he presented the LAPD officers with a fabricated lease agreement with someone named Angelica Miller pretending to be a lawful tenant. Sidhu was sent inappropriate messages by Trifunovich, including that he wanted to kill himself. In no way did she ever do or say anything remotely aggressive. Any possible threat of violence, whether to oneself or others, solely came from Trifunovich. This is another reason Sidhu erred on the side of asking LAPD officers to come to the Property to have the occupants leave. Sidhu Decl., ¶3e.

The only other time that the LAPD was called to the Property by Sidhu occurred when she observed an unidentified vehicle parked in the driveway and she requested that it be towed. Sidhu Decl., ¶3f.

Trifunovich acquired the Property in 2005, which is 19 years ago. If he was a tenant of the prior owner, it is possible that he has been there for 28 years. Sidhu has never engaged in a campaign to harass Trifunovich. Sidhu Decl., ¶3g.

Sidhu was introduced to Trifunovich when the Property was being foreclosed. Sidhu had the opportunity to purchase the Property at a short sale as an investment opportunity. The plan was to acquire the Property and develop it into an assisted living facility or rehabilitation facility. Sidhu acquired the Property to develop it and not to obtain tax deductions. Sidhu Decl., ¶3h.

There was no agreement that Sidhu would be solely on title. There was no agreement regarding the down payment and mortgage payments. Sidhu never agreed to allow Trifunovich to “own” and “occupy” the Property. After Sidhu purchased the Property from Trifunovich, she attempted to convince him to vacate it. He was unwilling to do so. Instead of pursuing an unlawful detainer action at that time, Sidhu allowed Trifunovich to make the mortgage payments in exchange for his items of personal property remaining at the Property until she was in a position to develop it. Sidhu Decl., ¶3i.

When Sidhu purchased the Property from Trifunovich, she borrowed money from both an institutional lender and an additional amount from Trifunovich’s mother. This was Trifunovich’s idea since Sidhu needed a loan to help cover some of the down payment. This was purely a professional, arms-length agreement. The $58,000 referenced by Trifunovich is the approximate amount that Sidhu borrowed from his mother. Sidhu eventually repaid the loan to Trifunovich’s mother when she refinanced the Property in 2012. If Trifunovich actually had $58,000 available to him, why would he have allowed the Property to go into foreclosure? Sidhu Decl., ¶3j.

Sidhu acknowledges that she was in arrears in payment of property taxes. This is the reason why she decided to sell the Property. Sidhu Decl., ¶3k.

Trifunovich’s attempts to frustrate the sale have caused Sidhu to incur substantial debt which would cause him to suffer financial ruin. Sidhu Decl., ¶5. Sidhu has incurred and will continue to incur the following expenses if a preliminary injunction prevented the sale:

(1) Property Tax payments – The Property is currently in arrears in the amount of $49,360.00. The amount of each payment for every six months is $2,199.05. If this case were to linger for a period of 1 ½ years, the total additional arrears would amount to $6,597.15 for a total of $55,957.15. Sidhu Decl., ¶5a.

(2) Monthly Mortgage payments - Sidhu cannot afford to make the monthly mortgage payments of $2,167.00. If this case were to pend for another 1 ½ years, he would have to try to scrap together a total of $39,006. He has doubts as to whether he would be able to make these payments. If Sidhu were unable to keep the mortgage payments current, the lender would likely foreclose on the Property. Sidhu Decl., ¶5b.

(3) Present Status of the Property - The Property is currently in escrow for a sale price of $594,000. Sidhu anticipates that the sales expenses including brokers’ fees will be approximately 7% of the sale price. The balance on the mortgage is $286,525.62. The net to him after the property taxes and mortgage are paid would be $216,534.40. He has been informed that if he is unable to sell the Property at the present time, the buyer will cancel the transaction. Sidhu Decl., ¶5c.

(4) Litigation expenses – Sidhu has been advised that it will cost him at least $125,000 for attorney fees and costs should this matter be tried. Sidhu Decl., ¶5.

Trifunovich’s nephew, Josh Trifunovich (“Josh”), was the mortgage broker for both the original loan and the subsequent refinancing of the Property. Josh Reply Decl., ¶¶ 2- 5. Josh put together all of the paperwork for the short sale mortgage in 2011 and the refinancing in 2017. Josh Reply Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.

In 2011 and 2017, Josh interacted with both Trifunovich and Sidhu where the straw purchaser nature of the Property was discussed. Josh Reply Decl., ¶6. “It was discussed during the meetings that [Sidhu] had good credit and would be able to get a better loan than [Trifunovich] and that she would be the straw purchaser in the short sale. [Trifuovich] would provide the down payment and pay the mortgage on the Property.” Josh Reply Decl., ¶7. It was clear to Josh that Trifunovich would be, and was, the actual owner of the Property with Sidhu holding title for him. Josh Reply Decl., ¶ 8.

Sidhu never paid anything for the Property until she affirmatively prevented Trifunovich from paying the mortgage as had been doing for the past 13 years. Reply Trifunovich Decl., ¶27.

Credit Union has stated that there is no current threat of any foreclosure. Singleton Reply Decl. ¶5, Ex. M. Trifunovich, if given credit for the tax payment, can pay the entire tax arrearage by October 16, 2024. Trifunovich Reply Decl. ¶¶ 30-31.

Plaintiff Trifunovich seeks a preliminary injunction against Defendant Sidhu (Credit Union has been dismissed) enjoining from (1) unlawfully evicting him from, and interfering with his quiet enjoyment of, the Property, and (2) entering the Property without providing at least 24-hours’ notice in writing.

The parties misunderstand the scope of the OSC by presenting considerable evidence on who owns the Property. Sidhu is the legal owner – which has real meaning. However, Trifunovich presents evidence that he is the beneficial owner. Both sides have arguments supporting their positions. Both sides also suffer from problems in their presentation as the other party points out. There also is little supporting documentary evidence, including mortgage payments, property tax payments, and tax return deductions.

The court need not decide who has a probability of success on the ownership issue because it is outside the scope of the OSC. The TRO/OSC was granted in part on September 11, 2024, restraining Sidhu from engaging in self-help to unlawfully evict Trifunovich or interfering with his quiet enjoyment of the Property and from entering the Property without 24-hour notice. The TRO/OSC did not, however, prevent Sidhu from transferring title to or selling the Property. Since Sidhu is not restrained by the TRO from selling the Property, and only is restrained from doing so by the lis pendens, the court need not decide which party probably owns the Property.

Sidhu does not oppose a preliminary injunction restraining her from engaging in self-help to unlawfully evict Trifunovich or interfering with his quiet enjoyment of the Property and entering the Property without 24-hour notice. Opp. at 4. She only argues that she cannot be restrained from lawfully evicting Trifunovich through an unlawful detainer proceeding, which is outside the scope of the OSC. Opp. at 5. The court agrees that lawful eviction is not within the OSC scope.

A preliminary injunction requires a bond. The purpose of a bond is to cover the defendant’s damages from an improvidently issued injunction. CCP §529(a). In setting the bond, the court must assume that the preliminary injunction was wrongly issued. Abba Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, (“Abba”) (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1, 15. The attorney’s fees necessary to successfully procure a final decision dissolving the injunction also are damages that should be included in setting the bond. Id. at 15-16. While Abba reasoned that the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing is irrelevant to setting the bond, a more recent case disagreed, stating that the greater the likelihood of the plaintiff prevailing, the less likely the preliminary injunction will have been wrongly issued, and that is a relevant factor for setting the bond. Oiye v. Fox, (2012) 211 Cal.App.4^th 1036, 1062. As the scope of the preliminary injunction is unopposed, Trifunovich shall be required to post a modest bond of $500.

The application is granted in part. A preliminary injunction shall issue restraining Sidhu from engaging in self-help to unlawfully evict Trifunovich or interfering with his quiet enjoyment of the Property and entering the Property without 24-hour notice. Trifunovich must post a $500 bond within five court days and provide evidence of posting to opposing counsel.

[1] The courts look to the substance of an injunction to determine whether it is prohibitory or mandatory. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 709, 713. A mandatory injunction — one that mandates a party to affirmatively act, carries a heavy burden: “[t]he granting of a mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the right thereto is clearly established.” Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. v. Furlotti, (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 187, 1493.

[2] However, a court may issue an injunction to maintain the status quo without a cause of action in the complaint. CCP §526(a)(3).