Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 24STCV31678, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

Respondent David W. Slayton (“Slayton”), in his official capacity as Executive Officer/Clerk of the Los Angeles Superior Court, demurs to the Complaint filed by Petitioner Frederick Piña (“Piña”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

A. Statement of the Case

On December 2, 2024, Petitioner Piña filed the Complaint against Slayton alleging claims as follows: (1) failure to perform ministerial duty; (2) violation of due process and equal protection; (3) abuse of process; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) breach of mandatory duty; (6) civil conspiracy; and (7) constructive fraud. The Complaint^{^[1]} alleges in pertinent part as follows.

In Frederick Piña v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Case No. 24NNCV03841 in the Burbank Courthouse (“State Farm Case”), Piña submitted multiple Form CIV-100 Requests for Entry of Default Judgement by the Clerk beginning on October 24, 2024. Compl., 2:8-11, 29:3-5. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) failed to respond within the statutorily prescribed period. Compl., 29:6-12. Piña fully complied with the requirements for default judgment. Compl., 29:13-15. Slayton, through agents and deputy clerks at the Burbank Courthouse, refused each submission. Compl., 29:16-21.

Slayton’s refusal is a dereliction of mandatory ministerial duties, as clerks have no discretion regarding the acceptance and processing of complaint filings. Compl., 29:22-25. Slayton’s conduct obstructed Piña’s access to justice, delayed his litigation, and caused harm in the amount $2,895,345,653.66, as well as emotional distress. Compl., 30:1-4. Piña has exhausted all administrative remedies by repeatedly engaging with the Clerk’s Office at the Burbank Courthouse, but Slayton and his agents and deputies have maintained their position. Compl., 30:6-12.

Piña seeks a writ of mandate compelling Slayton to perform his statutory duties. Compl., 12:18-20. Piña also seeks a declaration affirming Slayton’s obligations. Compl., 12:21-23. Finally, Piña seeks an injunction compelling Slayton to process Piña’s Form CIV-100 Request for Entry of Default Judgment form. Compl., 12:24-27.

B. Demurrers

Demurrers are permitted in administrative mandate proceedings. CCP §1109. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleading alone and will be sustained where the pleading is defective on its face.

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer or motion to strike or by motion for judgment on the pleadings. CCP §430.30(a); Coyne v. Krempels, (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257. The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object by demurrer or answer to the pleading. CCP §430.10. A demurrer is timely filed within the 30-day period after service of the complaint. CCP § 430.40; Skrbina v. Fleming Companies, (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364.

A demurrer may be asserted on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading; (b) The person who filed the pleading does not have legal capacity to sue; (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action; (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties; (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (f) The pleading is uncertain (“uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible); (g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct; (h) No certificate was filed as required by CCP §411.35 or (i) by §411.36. CCP §430.10. Accordingly, a demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. CCP §430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan, (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.

The sole issue on demurrer for failure to state a cause of action is whether the facts pleaded, if true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Garcetti v. Superior Court, (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1547; Limandri v. Judkins, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 339. The question of plaintiff’s ability to prove the allegations of the complaint or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47. The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403. Nevertheless, this rule does not apply to allegations expressing mere conclusions of law, or allegations contradicted by the exhibits to the complaint or by matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Vance v. Villa Park Mobilehome Estates, (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 698, 709.

If a demurrer is sustained, the court may grant leave to amend the pleading upon any terms as may be just and shall fix the time within which the amendment or amended pleading shall be filed. CCP §472a(c). However, in response to a demurrer and prior to the case being at issue, a complaint or cross-complaint shall not be amended more than three times, absent an offer to the trial court as to such additional facts to be pleaded that there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured to state a cause of action. CCP §430.41(e)(1).

On December 31, 2024, counsel for Slayton sent Piña detailed correspondence explaining the reasons for the demurrer by mail and electronic mail. Overton Decl., ¶2. Counsel requested Piña contact her by telephone to further discuss, providing her office and cell phone numbers. Overton Decl., ¶2. The same day, Piña sent responsive correspondence. Overton Decl., ¶3. Overton and Piña spoke telephonically on January 2, 2024. Overton Decl., ¶4. No agreement was reached. Overton Decl., ¶5. Slayton has complied with his meet and confer obligation under CCP section 430.41.

Slayton requests the court to judicially notice the following: (1) the docket from the State Farm Case (RJN Ex. A); (2) Piña’s motion to enter State Farm’s default, filed on November 2, 2024 (RJN Ex. B); (3) the State Farm Case trial court’s minute order denying the motion to enter default, dated December 20, 2024 (RJN Ex. C); (4) the State Farm Case trial court’s vexatious litigant pre-filing order against Piña (RJN Ex. D); and (5) the court of appeal docket from Piña’s appeal from the State Farm Case trial judge’s denial of his motion to enter default (RJN Ex. E). The requests are granted. Evid. Code §452(d).

On March 19, 2025, Piña filed (1) an undated declaration concerning his view of defense counsel’s objective and the fraud and corruption in the State Farm Case and (2) a purported affidavit – not made under penalty of perjury of the laws of California as required by CCP section 2015.5 – identifying the purported fraud of State Farm and Slayton’s duty to rectify it by entering default. It is not clear whether Piña filed this evidence in opposition to the demurrer or for some other purpose. In any event, the only evidence that can be considered on demurrer is judicially noticed exhibits and the meet and confer declaration of the moving party. See Vance v. Villa Park Mobilehome Estates, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at 709. The declarations have not been considered.

On April 4, 2025, Piña also filed a request for judicial notice, but it appears to relate to his request for summary judgment, not the instant demurrer.

Slayton demurs to the Complaint on the grounds that (1) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and authority to overrule another judge; (2) the complaint is barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity; (3) the complaint is barred by failure to timely comply with the Government Claims Act; and (4) the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The court must sustain a demurrer where the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. CCP §430.10(a). “‘The principle of ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ relates to the inherent authority of the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it.’ ‘Thus, in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court has no power ‘to hear or determine [the] case.’” Barry v. State Bar of California, (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 324 (internal citations omitted).

Only the courts of appeal and the California Supreme Court may reverse, modify, or affirm an order or judgment of a superior court judge. CCP §43. “A judgment rendered in one department of the superior court is binding on that matter upon all other departments until such time as the judgment is overturned…. Appellate jurisdiction to review, revise, or reverse decisions of the superior courts is vested by our Constitution only in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal.” Ford v. Superior Court, (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 737. Further, “[o]ne department of the superior court cannot enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another department of the superior court….A judgment rendered in one department of the superior court is binding on that matter upon all other departments until such time as the judgment is overturned.” Glade v. Glade, (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1450; Silverman v. Superior Court, (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 145, 151. “Even between superior courts of different counties, having coequal jurisdiction over a matter, the first court of equal dignity to assume and exercise jurisdiction over a matter acquires exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. at 151.

The superior court judge in the State Farm Case issued an order denying Piña’s motion for entry of default. RJN Ex. C. The court of appeal denied Piña’s mandamus petition from the superior court’s denial of the default motion. RJN Ex. D. Slayton is correct (Dem. at 4-5) that this court does not have jurisdiction to reverse or vacate these orders and compel him to enter State Farm’s default in the State Farm Case. The trial judge presiding over the State Farm Case has exclusive jurisdiction over the issues in that case, subject only to appellate review by the court of appeal. This court does not have jurisdiction to issue orders for that case and cannot set aside the order of another superior court judge.

Piña argues that this case is not an impermissible collateral attack on a court order but a mandamus proceeding seeking enforcement of a clear ministerial duty. California courts routinely hear actions against public officials, including the Clerk of the Court, when they refuse to perform non-discretionary statutory duties. Opp. at 3-4. A writ of mandate is available where (1) A public officer has a clear legal duty to act, and (2) The plaintiff has no other adequate remedy at law. CCP §1085. Slayton has a ministerial duty under CCP §§ 585(a) and 262.1 to enter default when a defendant fails to file a responsive pleading. Opp. at 4. His refusal to perform this duty is not protected by judicial discretion, and therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint falls squarely within this Court’s jurisdiction. Additionally, this case involves a fraud upon the court, which overrides procedural defenses under Carney v. Simmonds, (1957) 49 Cal.2d 84, 90. Opp. at 4-5.

Piña is correct that a clerk can be compelled through mandamus to perform a ministerial duty. However, Slayton has no ministerial duty because he cannot override a judge’s ruling (actually, both the trial court and appellate court). Moreover, the State Farm Case is pending, and this court cannot override the trial judge’s even if it had jurisdiction.

Slayton argues that the Complaint alleges that Slayton is liable to Piña for rejecting his requests for entry of default. Because accepting or rejecting documents for filing is an integral part of the judicial process, Slayton is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. “Under the concept of ‘quasi-judicial immunity,’ California courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to persons other than judges if those persons act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” Howard v. Drapkin, (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 852-53. Absolute quasi-judicial immunity also applies to court clerks and other non-judicial officers for purely administrative acts. In re Castillo, (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3d 940. “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity . . . when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 1385. Quasi-judicial immunity applies to the actions of clerks regardless of whether the complaint alleges mistakes or acts in excess of jurisdiction, “even if it results in ‘grave procedural errors.’” Id. Dem. at 5-6.

Piña responds that the California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that ministerial acts of court clerks are not subject to judicial immunity. In Morrison v. Jones, (1979) 68 Cal.2d 464, the court held that court clerks are only immune from liability when acting within their discretionary judicial functions, not when they violate a ministerial duty.^{^[2]} See also Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1167. Furthermore, the judicially enabled fraud in the State Farm Case compels intervention under In re Marriage of Park, 27 Cal.3d 337. Opp. at 5. These arguments do not undermine Slayton’s quasi-judicial immunity for ministerial acts that are part of the judicial process.

Slayton adds that Piña’s Complaint seeks “significant damages”. As a condition precedent to a suit for money or damages against a public entity or public employee, the Government Claims Act requires the timely presentation of a written claim. Govt. Code §§ 911.2, 945.4, 950.2, 950.6. Failure to do so bars the plaintiff from bringing suit. See, e.g., Phillips v. Desert Hospital District, (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 708. Compliance with the Government Claims Act is an element of the cause of action and must be pled and proved. DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990. Piña was required to plead facts demonstrating that he complied with the claim presentation requirements and cannot truthfully do so. Dem. at 7-8.

Piña argues his Complaint primarily seeks mandamus relief compelling Slayton to perform his statutory duty, and the Government Claims Act does not apply to these claims. Opp. at 6. This is true, and the court could consider Piña’s mandamus claim without Government Claims Act compliance.

Finally, Slayton argues that all seven Piña’s causes of action are based on the faulty premise that Slayton and/or the deputy clerks were required to file Piña’s request for entry of default/judgment against State Farm in the State Farm Case. State Farm filed the vexatious litigant motion prior to the time that Piña presented the first request for entry of default. The litigation was stayed, and State Farm was not required to respond to the complaint. CCP §391.6. Thereafter, the trial court declared Piña a vexatious litigant and he was ordered to furnish security. RJN Ex. D. Additionally, the State Farm Case trial judge denied Piña’s motion for entry of default, which the court of appeal upheld. Slayton cannot enter a default in contravention of these orders. Dem. at 8-9.

Piña responds that his allegations include a fraud upon the court which nullifies any judicial order procured by fraud. Slayton’s failure to process Piña’s request aids and abets the corruption in the State Farm Case. Opp. at 7. This argument does not address the procedural facts of a stay and requirement of security, nor does it address the substantive fact that Slayton cannot override a judge’s order. Piña’s remedy, if any, lies with the still ongoing State Farm Case.

Slayton’s demurrer to the Complaint is sustained without leave to amend. An order to show cause re: dismissal is set for May 6, 2025 at 9:30 a.m.

^{^[1]} The Complaint formatting is non-standard, and the court will use page and line numbers for ease of reference.

^{^[2]} There is no such case. Perhaps Piña is referring to Morrison v. Jones, (9^th Cir. 1979) 607 F2d 1279, 1273, but that case expressly held that a clerk’s failure, if any, to perform a ministerial duty which was a part of judicial process is clothed with quasi-judicial immunity.