Judge: James C. Chalfant, Case: 24STCV32422, Date: 2025-02-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV32422 Hearing Date: February 6, 2025 Dept: 85
Martinez v. Gonzalez, et al.,
24STCV32422
Tentative decision on application
for preliminary injunction: conditionally granted
Plaintiff Rosalva Martinez (“Martinez”) seeks a preliminary
injunction against Defendants Martha Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), Carlos Del Cid
(“Del Cid”), and Nati Ardon (“Ardon”) enjoining Defendants from (1) claiming
any ownership in, (2) conducting any business with, (3) taking any monetary benefit
from, (4) occupying the premises of, and (5) preventing Martinez’ physical
access to, La Poblanita Meat Market.
The court has read and considered the moving papers (no
opposition was filed) and renders the following tentative decision.
A. Statement of
the Case
1. Complaint
On December 9, 2024, Plaintiff Martinez filed the Complaint
against Defendants Del Cid, Ardon, and Gonzalez alleging causes of action for
(1) fraud – promise without intent to perform, (2) civil conspiracy to defraud,
(3) conversion, (4) trespass to land, (5) constrictive trust and/or equitable
lien, (6) money had and received, and (7) temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction, permanent injunction. The Complaint alleges in
pertinent part as follows.
On or about January 28, 2024, Martinez purchased La
Poblanita Meat Market (“Market”), located at 139 W. Arbor Vitae St., Inglewood,
CA 90301, from Martha Martin (“Martin”).
Compl., ¶7. Martinez applied for
her seller’s permit in February 2024, installed Clover machines for payment
processing in the store, and opened her business credit card with Wells
Fargo. Compl., ¶7.
Not long after Martinez began operating the Market, her store
manager, Mr. Cervantez, became very ill.
Compl., ¶8. Because of their
personal relationship, Martinez decided to take care of Mr. Cervantez, and
stayed with him in Las Vegas where he was ultimately hospitalized and seen by a
specialist. Compl., ¶8. Martinez asked Mr. Cervantez’s
brother-in-law, Mr. Neponucemo, to temporarily fill in the store manage
position and take care of the store.
Compl., ¶9.
Plaintiff was able to check how the store was doing through
the Wells Fargo Mobile App because many of the Market’s customers made purchases
through their debit or credit cards.
Compl., ¶10. For cash payments,
Mr. Neponucemo maintained daily records that he would text to Plaintiff. Compl., ¶10.
With Mr. Neponucemo as the Market’s store manager, the Market generated
about $8,000 to $9,000 a month, net income.
Compl., ¶11. During this time, Gonzalez
was the only employee at the Market and worked mainly as a cashier. Compl., ¶12.
Martinez spent five months driving between Los Angeles and
Las Vegas to support Mr. Cervantez.
Compl., ¶13. Whenever Martinez returned
to California, she would visit the Market to check up on it. Compl., ¶13.
On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff received a phone call from Mr.
Neponucemo informing her that he had to return to Mexico and could no longer
work for the Market. Compl., ¶14. Martinez did not have the time to any
necessary arrangements or find a suitable replacement. Compl., ¶14.
With no other options available, Mr. Neponucemo left the store keys with
Gonzalez. Compl., ¶14. Gonzalez assured Martinez that she would take
good care of the Market. Compl.,
¶15.
In July 2024, Mr. Cervantez was finally transferred back to
California and admitted to the Valley Presbytery Hospital. Compl., ¶16.
Around this time, Martinez noticed there were no purchases coming
through the Clover machines and no income entered on the Wells Fargo account
for many weeks. Compl., ¶17. When Plaintiff asked, Gonzalez represented
that things were very slow at the Market and that no one was purchasing things
via debit or credit card. Compl.,
¶18.
By August 2024, there was still no transaction made on the
Clover machines and no income recorded on the Wells Fargo account. Compl., ¶19.
Martinez became suspicious and asked some friends to make purchases at
the Market using their debt or credit cards.
Compl., ¶20. She discovered that Gonzalez
had been asking customers to pay in cash instead of debit or credit cards. Compl., ¶20.
For customers who did not have cash, Gonzalez would send them to the
store next door, have them pay there with debit or credit cards, and receive
cash back. Compl., ¶20.
In October 2024, Martinez decided to take control over her
Market. Compl., ¶21. When she showed up at the Market, Gonzalez refused
to give back the keys, claiming the Market was now hers. Compl., ¶21.
Martinez called the police but Gonzalez presented a seller’s permit that
was different than Martinez’ and told the police she was the owner of the
Market. Compl., ¶22. Martinez later discovered Gonzalez’ seller’s
permit was under Defendant Del Cid’s name and obtained in January 2024. Compl., ¶23.
Martinez also discovered that Gonzalez contacted all the
utility companies to remove Martinez from the account, changed the locks, and
contacted the landlord to add herself and Defendant Del Cid to the lease
agreement and remove Martinez. Compl.,
¶24.
In November 2024, Martinez discovered that Defendant Ardon had
applied for the ABC license as the owner of the Market. Compl., ¶25.
Plaintiff never consented for Ardon to do so. Compl., ¶25.
Defendants have been acting together to take the Market
over. Compl., ¶26. Gonzalez maintains control over the Market
and its income. Compl., ¶67. Despite demand that Gonzalez stop her
wrongful conduct and give the control of the Market back to Martinez, she has
refused to do so. Compl., ¶68.
Plaintiff seeks (1) damages as set forth above according to
proof not less than $50,000, (2) punitive damages, (3) attorney fees, (4)
interest at the legal rate, (5) costs of suit, and (6) such other and further
relief as the court may deem just and proper.
Compl., Prayer at 1-6.
2. Course of Proceedings
On January 17, 2025, the court issued a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) and issued an order to show cause (“OSC”) against
Defendants Martha Gonzalez, Carlos Del Cid, and Nati Ardon.
Proof of service on file show that Defendant Gonzalez was personally
served with the TRO/OSC and moving papers on January 17, 2025 and with the
Summons and Complaint on January 26, 2025.
A proof of service on file shows that Defendant Arden was
personally served with summons and Complaint, but not the TRO/OSC, on January
24, 2025.
Proofs of service on filed shows that Defendant Del Cid was
personally served with summons and Complaint, moving papers, and TRO/OSC, on
February 3, 2025.
B. Applicable Law
An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to
refrain from a particular act; it may be granted by the court in which the
action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted by a judge, it may
be enforced as an order of the court.
CCP §525. An injunction may be
more completely defined as a writ or order commanding a person either to
perform or to refrain from performing a particular act. See Comfort v. Comfort, (1941)
17 Cal.2d 736, 741. McDowell v. Watson, (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1160.[1] It is an equitable remedy available generally
in the protection or to prevent the invasion of a legal right. Meridian, Ltd. v. City and County of San
Francisco, et al., (1939) 13 Cal.2d 424.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo pending final resolution upon a trial.
See Scaringe v. J.C.C. Enterprises, Inc., (1988) 205
Cal.App.3d 1536. Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313,
1316; Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn., (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618,
623. The status quo has been
defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded
the pending controversy. Voorhies v.
Greene (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 989, 995, quoting United Railroads v.
Superior Court, (1916) 172 Cal. 80, 87. 14859 Moorpark
Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp., (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.
A preliminary injunction is issued after hearing on a
noticed motion. The complaint normally
must plead injunctive relief. CCP
§526(a)(1)-(2).[2] Preliminary injunctive relief requires the
use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds
for relief. See e.g. Ancora-Citronelle
Corp. v. Green, (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150. Injunctive relief may be granted based on a
verified complaint only if it contains sufficient evidentiary, not ultimate,
facts. See CCP §527(a). For this reason, a pleading alone rarely
suffices. Weil & Brown, California
Procedure Before Trial, 9:579, 9(ll)-21 (The Rutter Group 2007). The burden of proof is on the plaintiff as
moving party. O’Connell v. Superior
Court, (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.
A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show the absence
of an adequate damages remedy at law.
CCP §526(4); Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors,
(1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 307; Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood
Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565. The concept of “inadequacy of the legal
remedy” or “inadequacy of damages” dates from the time of the early courts of
chancery, the idea being that an injunction is an unusual or extraordinary
equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually
damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff. Department of Fish & Game v.
Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565.
In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction,
the trial court considers two factors: (1) the reasonable probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial (CCP §526(a)(1)), and (2) a
balancing of the “irreparable harm” that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if
the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely
to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. CCP §526(a)(2); 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s
Assn. v. VRT Corp., (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402; Pillsbury, Madison
& Sutro v. Schectman, (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1283; Davenport v.
Blue Cross of California, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 446; Abrams v. St.
Johns Hospital, (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628, 636. Thus, a preliminary injunction may not issue
without some showing of potential entitlement to such relief. Doe v. Wilson, (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th
296, 304. The decision to grant a
preliminary injunction generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Thornton v. Carlson, (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 1249, 1255.
A preliminary injunction ordinarily cannot take effect
unless and until the plaintiff provides an undertaking for damages which the
enjoined defendant may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court finally
decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction. See CCP §529(a); City of South San
Francisco v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Assn., (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920.
C. Statement of Facts
On January 30, 2024,
Martinez and Martha Martin (“Martin”) entered into a Purchase and Sale
Agreement, in which Martinez purchased the Market. Martinez
Decl., ¶2, Ex. A; Martin Decl., ¶2.
On or about February
15, 2024, Martinez entered into a lease agreement with the landlord, 139 W.
Arbor Vitae St., LLC, for a term of February 15, 2024 to February 14,
2026. Martinez Decl., ¶3, Ex. B. On or about the same day, Martinez also
applied and received a seller’s permit under the Market’s name and
address. Martinez Decl., ¶4, Ex. C.
Not long after purchasing the Market, the store manager, Mr.
Cervantez, became very ill. Martinez
Decl., ¶5. Since Martinez had personal
relationship with Mr. Cervantez, she decided to take care of him. Martinez Decl., ¶5. Martinez needed someone else to temporarily
replace Mr. Cervantez. Martinez Decl.,
¶5. Even though Martinez was not at the
Market physically, she was in constant communication with the new manager to
operate the Market. Martinez Decl.,
¶5. Martinez and the new manager would
frequently talk and text for any updates, concerns, or questions. Martinez Decl., ¶5.
In addition, all card payments were posted on Martinez’s
bank app, which she was able to check whenever needed, and Martinez was getting
text messages containing daily records of cash payments. Martinez Decl., ¶5. During this time, the Market was generating
about $8,000 to $9,000 a month, net income.
Martinez Decl., ¶6. Gonzalez was
the only employee at the Market who was mainly working as a cashier. Martinez Decl., ¶7.
Martinez spent the next five months driving between Los
Angeles and Las Vegas where Mr. Cervantez was being treated. Martinez Decl., ¶8. Martinez tried to visit the Market to check
up on it whenever she was in Los Angeles, but she was only able to make a
handful of visits. Martinez Decl.,
¶8.
On or about June 26, 2024, the new manager informed Martinez
that he had to move back to Mexico for family-related reasons. Martinez Decl., ¶9. Because his departure was unexpected, Martinez
did not have the time to find a suitable replacement. Martinez Decl., ¶9. With no other options available, the manager
left the store keys with Gonzalez.
Martinez Decl., ¶9. When Martinez
spoke with Gonzalez, she assured Martinez that she would take good care of the
Market. Martinez Decl., ¶10.
After Gonzalez became the de facto manager of the Market
starting in late June 2024, Martinez noticed there were no card payments coming
through the Clover machines in July.
Martinez Decl., ¶11. Martinez
also realized that there had been no income entered on the Wells Fargo account
for many weeks. Martinez Decl.,
¶11. When Martinez asked Gonzalez about
this, Gonzalez told Martinez that things were very slow at the Market and that
no one was purchasing things via debit or credit card. Martinez Decl., ¶11. At first, Martinez thought it was possible to
have bad month or two and she did not question Gonzalez’s explanation any
further. Martinez Decl., ¶11.
By August, there still were no transaction on the Clover
machines and no income recorded on the Wells Fargo account. Martinez Decl., ¶12. Martinez became suspicious and asked some of her
friends to go in and make purchases at the Market using their debit or credit
cards. Martinez Decl., ¶12. It turns out that Gonzalez had been asking
customers to pay in cash instead of debit or credit cards. Martinez Decl., ¶12. For the customers who did not have cash,
Gonzalez would send them to the store next door, have them pay there with debit
or credit cards, and receive cash back.
Martinez Decl., ¶12. At this
point, Martinez was still attending to Mr. Cervantez almost daily and could not
confront Gonzalez. Martinez Decl., ¶13.
In October 2024, after Mr. Cervantez became more stabilized,
Martinez decided that it was time for her to go back and take control over the
Market. Martinez Decl., ¶14. However, when Martinez showed up to the
Market to inform Gonzalez that she was no longer needed, Gonzalez refused to
return the keys. Martinez Decl.,
¶14. Gonzalez said that she would not
leave “empty-handed” and claimed the Market was now hers. Martinez Decl., ¶14.
Afterwards, Martinez found out that Del Cid obtained a
seller’s permit under the name of La Poblanita Market LLC, and that Gonzalez
has been holding herself out as the owner of the Market under that permit. Martinez Decl., ¶15. Martinez also discovered that Gonzalez had contacted
all the utility companies to remove Martinez accounts and put everything under
her own name. Martinez Decl., ¶15. In addition, Gonzalez and Del Cid contacted
the landlord of the Market and tried to add themselves to the lease and remove Martinez. Martinez Decl., ¶15. Furthermore, in November 2024, Ardon applied
for the ABC license as the owner of the Market.
Martinez Decl., ¶15.
Soon after Martinez’s visit in October 2024, Gonzalez
changed the locks to the Market without Martinez’s permission, effectively
locking Martinez out of her own store.
Martinez Decl., ¶16. On or about
October 15, 2024, Martinez filed a Fictitious Business Name Statement with the
County of Los Angeles under the Market’s full and complete name, “La Poblanita
Meat Market.” Martinez Decl., ¶17, Ex.
D. On or about October 28, 2024, Martinez
requested and obtained a letter from Positive Investments, Inc., the property
manager for 139 W. Arbor Vitae St., Inglewood, CA 90301, which stated that Martinez
is the owner of the Market. Martinez
Decl., ¶18, Ex. E.
On or about November 27, 2024, Martinez applied and obtained
a Retailer’s License under Cigarette and Tobacco Products Licensing Act of 2003
from the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration. Martinez Decl., ¶19, Ex. F.
Since Gonzalez became the de facto manager of the Market
around July 2024, Martinez has not received any profit from the Market due to
Defendants’ misconduct. Martinez Decl.,
¶20. Martinez has no way of accessing her
own Market. Martinez Decl., ¶20. If Defendants are not enjoined, Martinez will
continue to suffer harm. Martinez Decl.,
¶20.
D. Analysis
Plaintiff Martinez
seeks a preliminary injunction against Defendants Gonzalez, Del Cid, and
Ardon to enjoin them from (1) claiming any ownership in, (2) conducting any
business with, (3) taking any monetary benefit from, (4) occupying the premises
of, and (5) preventing Martinez’ physical access to, the Market. No opposition has been filed.
1. Jurisdiction
In issuing the TRO/OSC, the court (Dept. 82) ordered
Martinez to serve all Defendants with summons, Complaint, moving papers, and
TRO/OSC by January 23, 2025.
Proof of service on file show that Defendant Gonzalez was
personally served with the TRO/OSC and moving papers on January 17, 2025 and
untimely served with the Summons and Complaint on January 26, 2025.
A proof of service on file shows that Defendant Arden was
personally served with summons and Complaint, but not the TRO/OSC, on January
24, 2025.
Proofs of service on filed shows that Defendant Del Cid was
untimely personally served with summons and Complaint, moving papers, and
TRO/OSC, on February 3, 2025.
As a result, the court has jurisdiction over Defendant Arden
but he was not served with the TRO/OSC and moving papers. Defendants Gonzalez and Del Cid were untimely
served. If any Defendant appears and
asks for a continuance, it will be granted.
2. Probability of Success
Martinez argues that she is highly likely to succeed on the
merits of her claims. She bought the
Market from the previous owner and has not sold or assigned the ownership
interest to anyone. While she was away on a personal matter, Defendants saw an
opportunity to steal the Market. Defendants have been falsely claiming that the
Market belongs to them, have been running the Market without Martinez’
permission, have been converting and stealing the income generated from the
Market, have been occupying the physical premises of the Market without
Plaintiff’s permission, and have been preventing Plaintiff from physically
accessing the Market by changing the lock. App. at 8.
There is more than enough evidence, such as the purchase and
sales agreement dated January 30, 2024 between Plaintiff and the previous owner
Martha Martin, the declaration of Martha Martin, the lease agreement entered
into on February 15, 2024 with the landlord, and the seller’s permit Plaintiff
received with the start date of February 15, 2024, to prove that Martinez purchased
the Market on January 30, 2024 and should be the right owner. App. at 8.
The court agrees. See
Martinez Decl., Exs. A-C; Martin Decl., ¶2.
3. Balancing of Harms
Defendants’ conduct has harmed Martinez in that they have
been wrongfully converting and stealing her profits. Since June 2024, Martinez has not received
any of the Income generated from the Market.
In October 2024, Defendants changed the locks to the Market, denying her
access. In the absence of an injunction,
Martinez will lose income, her ownership of the Market, and its good will. App. at 8.
If a preliminary injunction is granted, Defendants will
simply be restrained from operating a Market which they do not own.
The balancing of harms works in Martinez’ favor.
E. Conclusion
The preliminary
injunction is granted as to Defendants Gonzalez and Del Cid and their
agents. The application is denied as to
Defendant Arden. If any Defendant
appears and asks for a continuance, it will be granted.
A bond is required
for any preliminary injunction, but the court will require only a modest bond
of $200. No proposed preliminary
injunction has been submitted and Martinez is required to do so in two court
days, or it will be deemed as waived.
[1] The courts look to the substance of an
injunction to determine whether it is prohibitory or mandatory. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v.
Superior Court, (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 709, 713. A mandatory injunction — one that mandates a
party to affirmatively act, carries a heavy burden: “[t]he granting of a
mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases
where the right thereto is clearly established.” Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. v.
Furlotti, (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 187, 1493.
[2] However, a court may issue an injunction to
maintain the status quo without a cause of action in the complaint. CCP §526(a)(3).