Judge: James C. Chalfant, Case: 24STLC02513, Date: 2024-08-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STLC02513 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: 85
Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Movsesyan et
al.;
24STLC02513
Tentative decision on application for
writ of possession: denied unless proof
of assignment by hearing
Plaintiff Santander Consumer USA Inc., dba Chrysler Capital
(“Santander”), seeks a writ of possession Defendant Khachatur Khachatryan
(“Khachatryan”), dba K2K Body Shop (“K2K”), to recover a 2021 Dodge Ram 1500,
Serial No. 1C6RREJT0MN501473 (“Vehicle”).
The court has read and considered the moving papers (no
opposition was filed) and renders the following tentative decision.
A. Statement of
the Case
1. Complaint
On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff Santander filed the Complaint
against Defendants Robert Movsesyan (“Movsesyan”), Khachatryan, and the
California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) for (1) claim and delivery,
(2) conversion, (3) quiet title, and (4) declaratory relief. The Complaint alleges in pertinent part as
follows.
On or about December 30, 2020, Defendant Movsesyan with
non-party Rydell Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram (“Rydell Chrysler”) entered into a
written Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement (“Lease”). Compl., Ex. A. Movsesyan
agreed to pay Rydell Chrysler $556.87 monthly on or around the 29th day of each
month until June 29, 2024. Ibid.
Rydell Chrysler assigned the lease to Santander. Compl., ¶9.
As of January 21, 2021, Santander appears as owner, lessor, and lienholder on
the Vehicle’s title. Compl., Ex. B.
On or about November 29, 2021, Movsesyan defaulted under the
terms of the Lease by failing to make the required monthly payments. Compl., ¶11.
When Santander filed its Complaint, Movsesyan still owed it $44,250.18 on the
Lease. Ibid.
Movsesyan also defaulted on the Lease by abandoning the
Vehicle on private property, whereupon it was transferred to K2K for repair
and/or storage. Compl., ¶13, Ex. C. Santander confirmed before filing that K2K
has possession of the Vehicle. Compl., ¶15. Movsesyan has accrued repair and
storage fees in excess of $29,200, owed to K2K. Compl., ¶13.
K2K applied to the DMV for a lien sale. Compl., ¶14, Ex. C.
Santander opposes the sale. Compl., ¶ 14. The Lien Sale Notice stated that K2K intended
to conduct a lien sale for the following charges: repairs ($7,560), accrued
storage costs ($1,800), and storage costs of $200 daily beginning January 23,
2024. Compl., Ex. C.
Santander attempted to negotiate the release of the Vehicle by
K2K before filing its Complaint, but was unsuccessful. Compl., ¶16.
Santander seeks, inter alia, return and possession of the Vehicle, the sum of at least
$24,300.00 in compensatory damages, a declaration that Santander is the legal
owner of the Vehicle, interest, fees, costs, and other just and proper relief.
Compl., Prayer.
2. Course of Proceedings
On April 25, 2024, Santander filed proof of service of the
Complaint and related documents on the DMV.
On May 22, 2024, the court approved a stipulation by Santander
and the DMV excusing the DMV from further proceedings in this case.
On May 23, 2024, Santander filed proof of service of the
Complaint, Application, and supporting documents, by personal service, on
Khachatryan, individually and dba K2K.
B. Applicable Law
A writ of possession is issued as a provisional remedy in a
cause of action for claim and delivery, also known as replevin. See
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Schectman, (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1279,
1288. As a provisional remedy, the right
to possession is only temporary, and title and the right to possess are
determined in the final judgment.
A
writ of possession is available in any pending action. It also is available where an action has been
stayed pending arbitration, so long as the arbitration award may be ineffectual
without provisional relief. See CCP §1281.7.
1. Procedure
Upon
the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, a plaintiff may apply
for an order for a writ of possession.
Unlike attachment, where Judicial Council forms are optional, the
parties must use the mandatory approved Judicial Council forms in a claim and
delivery proceeding. (Judicial Council
Forms CD-100 et seq.).
A
plaintiff must make a written application for a writ of possession. CCP §512.010(a), (b); (Mandatory Form
CD-100); CCP §512.010(a). A verified
complaint alone is insufficient. 6
Witkin, California Procedure, (5th ed. 2008) §255, p.203. The application may be supported by
declarations and/or a verified complaint.
CCP §516.030. The declarations or
complaint must set forth admissible evidence except where expressly permitted
to be shown on information and belief. Id.
The
application must be executed under oath and include: (1) A showing of the basis
of the plaintiff's claim and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of
the property claimed. If the plaintiff's
claim is based on a written instrument, a copy of it must be attached; (2) A
showing that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, how the
defendant came into possession of it, and, the reasons for the detention based
on the plaintiff’s best knowledge, information, and belief; (3) A specific description
of the property and statement of its value; (4) The location of the property
according to the plaintiff’s best knowledge, information, and belief. If the property, or some part of it, is
within a private place which may have to be entered to take possession, a
showing of probable cause to believe that the property is located there; and
(5) A statement that the property has not been taken for (a) a tax, assessment,
or fine, pursuant to a statute, or (b) an execution against the plaintiff’s
property. Alternatively, a statement
that if the property was seized for one of these purposes, it is by statute
exempt from such seizure. CCP
§512.010(b).
2. The Hearing
Before
noticing a hearing, the plaintiff must serve the defendant with all of the
following: (1) A copy of the summons and complaint; (2) A Notice of Application
and Hearing; and (3) A copy of the application and any supporting declaration. CCP §512.030(a). If the defendant has not appeared in the
action, service must be made in the same manner as service of summons and
complaint. CCP §512.030(b).
Each
party shall file with the court and serve upon the other party any declarations
and points and authorities intended to be relied upon at the hearing. CCP §512.050.
At the hearing, the court decides the merits of the application based on
the pleadings and declarations. Id. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may
receive and consider additional evidence and authority presented at the hearing
or may continue the hearing for the production of such additional evidence,
oral or documentary, or the filing of other affidavits or points and
authorities. Id.
The
court may order issuance of a writ of possession if both of the following are
found: (1) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the
plaintiff’s claim to possession of the property; and (2) The undertaking
requirements of CCP section 515.010 are satisfied. CCP §512.060(a). “A claim has ‘probable validity’ where it is
more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the
defendant on that claim.” CCP
§511.090. This requires that the
plaintiff establish a prima facie case; the writ shall not issue if the
defendant shows a reasonable probability of a successful defense to the claim
and delivery cause of action. Witkin,
California Procedure, (5th ed. 2008) §261, p.208. A defendant’s claim of defect in the property
is not a defense to the plaintiff’s right to possess it. RCA Service Co. v. Superior Court,
(1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 1, 3.
No
writ directing the levying officer to enter a private place to take possession
of any property may be issued unless the plaintiff has established that there
is probable cause to believe that the property is located there. CCP §512.060(b).
The
successful plaintiff may obtain a preliminary injunction containing the same
provisions as a TRO that remains in effect until the property is seized by the
levying officer.[1] CCP §513.010(c).
The
court may also issue a “turnover order” directing the defendant to transfer
possession of the property to the plaintiff (See Mandatory Form CD-120).
The order must notify the defendant that failure to comply may subject
him or her to contempt of court. CCP
§512.070. The turnover remedy is not
issued in lieu of a writ, but in conjunction with it to provide the plaintiff
with a less expensive means of obtaining possession. See
Edwards v Superior Court, (“Edwards”) (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 173,
178.
3. The Plaintiff’s Undertaking
Generally,
the court cannot issue an order for a writ of possession until the plaintiff
has filed an undertaking with the court (Mandatory Form CD-140 for personal
sureties). CCP §515.010(a). The undertaking shall provide that the
sureties are bound to the defendant for the return of the property to the
defendant, if return of the property is ordered, and for the payment to the
defendant of any sum recovered against the plaintiff. Id.
The undertaking shall be in an amount not less than twice the value of
the defendant's interest in the property or in a greater amount. Id.
The value of the defendant's interest in the property is determined by
the market value of the property less the amount due and owing on any
conditional sales contract or security agreement and all liens and encumbrances
on the property, and any other factors necessary to determine the defendant’s
interest in the property. Id.
However,
where the defendant has no interest in the property, the court must waive the requirement
of the plaintiff’s undertaking and include in the order for issuance of the
writ the amount of the defendant’s undertaking sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of CCP section 515.020(b). CCP
§515.010(b).
C. Statement of Facts
On or about December 30, 2020, non-party Rydell Chrysler and
Defendant Movsesyan entered into a Lease for the Vehicle. Vargas Decl., Ex. A. Movsesyan
agreed to pay Rydell Chrylser $556.87 monthly on or around the 29th day of each
month until June 29, 2024. Ibid. Rydell Chrysler later assigned the
lease to Plaintiff Santander. Vargas Decl., ¶7.
On or about November 29, 2021, Movsesyan defaulted under the
terms of the Lease by failing to make the required monthly payments. Vargas
Decl., ¶ 8. Subsequently, Movsesyan abandoned the Vehicle on private property. Vargas
Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. C. Defendant K2K took possession of the Vehicle after
Movsesyan abandoned it. Ibid.
K2K applied to the DMV for a lien sale. Vargas Decl., ¶ 11,
Ex. C. K2K’s Notice of Lien Sale indicates K2K claims a lien against the
Vehicle for the following charges: repairs ($7,560), accrued storage costs
($1,800), and daily storage costs of $200 beginning January 23, 2024. Vargas
Decl., Ex. C.
Prior to filing this action, Santander and its counsel
attempted to negotiate K2K’s release of the Vehicle by offering the maximum
statutory obligation under Civil Code section 3068. Vargas Decl., ¶13, Ex. D.
K2K refused Santander’s offer and has failed to release the Vehicle. Vargas
Decl., ¶¶ 13, 15.
K2K is located at 9859 San Fernando Rd. #1, Pacoima, CA,
91331, and Santander is informed and believes the Vehicle is at that location. Vargas
Decl., ¶18.
The N.A.D.A. Auto Market Report for April 2024 values the
Vehicle at $24,300 wholesale or $30,800 retail. Vargas Decl., ¶ 14, Ex. E.
Defendant K2K asserts an interest in the vehicle of $9,360,
plus $200.00 daily beginning January 23, 2024. Vargas Decl., Ex. C.
D. Analysis
Plaintiff
Santander applies for a writ of possession for the Vehicle against Defendant
Khachatryan, dba KWK.
1.
Standing
Santander claims that it holds the legal interest to the
Vehicle by assignment. It fails to show
such an assignment. The Lease for the
Vehicle was between non-party Rydell Chrysler and Defendant Movsesyan. Vargas
Decl., Ex. A. The Lease shows that
Rydell Chrysler assigned the Lease to CCAP Auto Lease Ltd. Ex. A.
The Certificate of Title also shows CCAP Auto Lease Ltd as the
lessor. Ex. B. While Sandander’s declaration claims assignment
to it (Vargas Decl., ¶7), there is no supporting documentation.
The supporting declaration for a writ of possession must be
set forth with particularity. CCP §516.030. This means that the plaintiff must show
evidentiary facts rather than the ultimate facts commonly found in pleadings. A
recitation of conclusions without a foundation of evidentiary facts is
insufficient. See Rodes v. Shannon,
(1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 743, 749 (declaration containing conclusions inadequate
for summary judgment); Schessler v. Keck, (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 663, 669
(same).
Santander has not shown a legal interest in the Vehicle and
the application must be denied. If, arguendo,
Santander shows its standing to be plaintiff before the hearing, the following
analysis applies.
2.
Probable Validity of the Claim
Santander presents evidence that non-party Rydell Chrysler
and Defendant Movsesyan entered into a Lease for the Vehicle. Vargas Decl., Ex.
A. On or about November 29, 2021, Movsesyan defaulted under the terms of the
Lease by failing to make the required monthly payments. Vargas Decl., ¶ 8.
Subsequently, Movsesyan abandoned the Vehicle on private property. Vargas
Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. C. Defendant K2K took possession of the Vehicle after
Movsesyan abandoned it. Ibid.
A
person performing repairs has a lien on a vehicle for the services and for
storage subject to limitations. Civil
Code §3068(a). The lien arises after a
written statement for charges is given to the vehicle’s registered owner or 15
days after the work or services are completed.
Ibid.
A
lien in excess of $1500 for work performed, and in excess of $1025 for any
storage of the vehicle, is invalid unless written consent of the vehicle’s
legal owner or lessor was obtained before the work was performed or the storage
occurred. Civil Code §3068(c)(1). The term “legal owner” is defined as a person
holding a security interest in a vehicle which is subject to the Uniform
Commercial Code. Civil Code §3067;
Vehicle Code §370. The lien shall be
extinguished if the vehicle’s legal owner or lessor tenders, by cashier’s check
or cash, the amount for storage, safekeeping, or parking space rental to which
the lienholder is entitled under Civil Code section 3068(c).
The
lien is extinguished unless the lienholder either applies to the DMV for an
authorization to conduct the sale or files a court action within 30 days after
the lien arises. Civil Code
§3068(b)(1)(A). The lienholder shall
apply to the DMV for authorization to conduct a liens sale for any vehicle with
a value more than $4000. Civil Code
§3071(a). For a vehicle valued at $4000
or less, the lienholder shall apply to the DMV for the names and addresses of
the registered and legal owners and notify them of a pending lien sale. Civil Code §3071(a), (b). If the DMV receives a timely Declaration of
Opposition form, it shall notify the lienholder within 16 days of receipt of
the form that a lien sale shall not be conducted unless the lienholder files an
action in court within 30 days of the DMV’s notice. Civil Code §3071(d). Any lien sale shall be void if the lienholder
does not comply with this requirement.
Civil Code §3071(l).
Khachatryan and K2K have the Vehicle. K2K applied to the DMV
for a lien sale. Vargas Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. C. K2K’s Notice of Lien Sale claims a
lien against the Vehicle for the following charges: repairs ($7,560), accrued
storage costs ($1,800), and daily storage costs of $200 beginning January 23,
2024. Vargas Decl., Ex. C.
Prior to filing this
action, Santander and its counsel attempted to negotiate K2K’s release of the
Vehicle by offering the maximum statutory obligation under Civil Code section
3068. Vargas Decl., ¶13, Ex. D. K2K refused Santander’s offer and has failed to
release the Vehicle. Vargas Decl., ¶¶ 13, 15.
If Santander holds a security interest in the Vehicle as
demonstrated by assignment, it would be a legal owner of the Vehicle. Santander never
authorized or consented to these charges before they were incurred as required
by Civil Code section 3068(c)(1). Santander
has offered the statutory maximum repair and storage charges totaling $2750 but
Defendants have not accepted. Lawter
Decl., ¶13, Ex. D. Defendants’ lien is
therefore void. Civil Code
§3068(c); Universal CIT Credit Corp. v. Rater, (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d
493, 495.
Defendants Khachatryan and
K2K have no legal interest in the Vehicle and no
undertaking is required. CCP
§515.010(b).
K2K is located at 9859 San Fernando Rd. #1, Pacoima, CA,
91331, and Santander is informed and believes the Vehicle is at that location. Vargas
Decl., ¶18.
E.
Conclusion
The
application for a writ of possession is denied unless Santander demonstrates an
assignment through documentation presented by the hearing. If so, a writ of possession will issue and a levying officer may enter K2K’s commercial address at
9859 San Fernando Rd. #1, Pacoima, CA, 91331, to seek
possession of the Vehicle. Santander has
not submitted an order for writ of possession and must do so in two court days
or it will be waived.