Judge: James C. Chalfant, Case: 25STCP01178, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCP01178    Hearing Date: June 10, 2025    Dept: 85

Respondent the Honorable Janet E. Hong, Judge of the Superior Court of California (“Judge Hong”) demurs to the Petition filed by Petitioner Kimi Kim (“Kim”). 

The court has read and considered the moving papers and opposition (no reply was filed), and renders the following tentative decision.

A. Statement of the Case

On April 1, 2025, Petitioner Kim filed the Petition against Judge Hong seeking administrative mandamus pursuant to CCP section 1094.5.

On September 8, 2022, Kim’s tenant Laura Velazquez (“Velazquez”) attacked Kim on Kim’s property.  Pet., ¶1.  Kim made a police report, taking photos of her head, arm, and wrist injuries.  Pet., ¶1.  Kim was then licensed as an acupuncture doctor, making $4,000 monthly.  Pet., ¶1.  Because of Kim’s injuries, she could not continue her practice.  Pet., ¶1.

Jacob Woocher (“Woocher”) conspired with Velazquez to attack Kim for monetary gain.  Pet., ¶1.  The police instructed Kim to evict her tenants.  Pet., ¶1, Ex. 1.

On September 16, 2022, Kim, acting pro per because she could not afford an attorney, filed an unlawful detainer (“UD”) case no. 22STUD05643 to evict four trespassers.  Pet., ¶2.  These four trespassers, Norma Aguilar (“Norma”), Toni Aguilar, Jose Aguilar, and Abi Aguilar, were living in Velazquez’s unit (“Unit”) but were not listed in the rental agreement and not lawfully present.  Pet., ¶2, Ex. 2.

On October 1, 2022, Woocher told Norma to begin providing $1,000 money orders as a part of a scheme to defraud Kim and steal over $10,000.  Pet., ¶4, Ex. 3.

On January 18, 2023, Kim’s UD case 22STUD05643 was rejected.  Pet., ¶4.  Kim contacted the court, and the clerk instructed her to correct mistakes or let the case expire.  Pet., ¶4.  Kim did nothing and the case was eventually disposed.  Pet., ¶4, Ex. 4.

On April 21, 2023, Kim filed a new UD case no. 23STUD04469, to evict all people residing in the Unit.  Pet., ¶5.  On May 2, 2023, the police alerted Kim that the Unit residents could easily be evicted for committing violence against a landlord.  Pet., ¶6. 

On May 2, 2023, Kim filed case no. 23STUD04875.  Pet., ¶6.  On June 2, 2023, the court consolidated the three UD cases (“Consolidated Case”).  Pet., ¶7.

On July 27, 2023, Judge Richard Burdge rejected the Consolidated Case, ruling that all defendants were tenants entitled to favorable judgment.  Pet., ¶8.  On July 28, 2023, Woocher submitted a fake, 13-year-old rental agreement purporting to entitle Woocher to attorney fees.  Pet., ¶9, Ex. 6.  On October 20, 2024, Kim verified with the prior owner that there was no lease agreement including an attorney fee provision.  Pet., ¶10, Ex. 7.

Petitioner Kim seeks a peremptory writ of mandate compelling Judge Hong to set aside the judgment for attorney fees made on July 27, 2023, damages totaling $25,000, costs of suit, other damages as the court may see fit, and such other and further relief that the court considers proper.  Pet. at 5.

B. Demurrers

            Demurrers are permitted in administrative mandate proceedings.  CCP §§1108, 1109.  A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleading alone and will be sustained where the pleading is defective on its face. 

            Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer or motion to strike or by motion for judgment on the pleadings.  CCP §430.30(a); Coyne v. Krempels, (1950) The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object by demurrer or answer to the pleading.  CCP §430.10.  A demurrer is timely filed within the 30-day period after service of the complaint.  CCP §430.40; Skrbina v. Fleming Companies, (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364. 

            A demurrer may be asserted on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading; (b) The person who filed the pleading does not have legal capacity to sue; (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action; (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties; (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (f) The pleading is uncertain (“uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible); (g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct; (h) No certificate was filed as required by CCP section 411.35 or (i) by CCP section 411.36.  CCP §430.10.  Accordingly, a demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.  CCP §430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan, (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.  The face of the pleading includes attachments and incorporations by reference (Frantz v. Blackwell, (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94); it does not include inadmissible hearsay.  Day v. Sharp, (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.   

            The sole issue on demurrer for failure to state a cause of action is whether the facts pleaded, if true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief.  Garcetti v. Superior Court, (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1547; Limandri v. Judkins, (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 339.  The question of plaintiff’s ability to prove the allegations of the complaint or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.  Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47.  The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged.  Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403.  Nevertheless, this rule does not apply to allegations expressing mere conclusions of law, or allegations contradicted by the exhibits to the complaint or by matters of which judicial notice may be taken.  Vance v. Villa Park Mobilehome Estates, (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 698, 709. 

            For all demurrers filed after January 1, 2016, the demurring party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.  CCP §430.41(a).  As part of the meet and confer process, the demurring party must identify all of the specific causes of action that it believes are subject to demurrer and provide legal support for the claimed deficiencies.  CCP §430.41(a)(1).  The party who filed the pleading must in turn provide legal support for its position that the pleading is legally sufficient or, in the alternative, how the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer could be amended to cure any legal insufficiency.  Id.  The demurring party is responsible for filing and serving a declaration that the meet and confer requirement has been met.  CCP §430.41(a)(3).

If a demurrer is sustained, the court may grant leave to amend the pleading upon any terms as may be just and shall fix the time within which the amendment or amended pleading shall be filed.  CCP §472a(c).  In response to a demurrer and prior to the case being at issue, a complaint or cross-complaint shall not be amended more than three times, absent an offer to the trial court as to such additional facts to be pleaded that there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured to state a cause of action.  CCP §430.41(e)(1).

D. Analysis

Judge Hong demurs to the Petition^[1] on the grounds that (1) the Petition is barred by absolute judicial immunity; (2) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (3) the Petition is barred by failure to timely comply with the Government Claims Act; and (4) the Petition fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction/Lack of Authority

Kim’s Petition arises from the UD action in which she alleges that attorney fees were wrongfully awarded against her in the amount of $24,562.50. Through this action, Kim requests this court to direct Judge Hong to set aside the wrongful judgment for attorney fees made on July 27, 2023.  Mem. at 5.

Judge Hong argues that the judge presiding over the UD action acquired exclusive jurisdiction over that case.  This court does not have jurisdiction to issue orders in a case over which the court does not preside.  Moreover, the orders issued by the judge presiding over the UD action cannot be set aside or reversed by this court.  Mem. at 4.

Judge Hong is correct. The court must sustain a demurrer where the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. CCP §430. 10(a). “‘The principle of ‘ subject matter jurisdiction’ relates to the inherent authority of the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it.’ ‘Thus, in ‘the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court has no power ‘to hear or determine [the] case.”” Barry v. State Bar of California, (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 324 (internal citations omitted).

Only the courts of appeal and the California Supreme Court may reverse, modify, or affirm an order or judgment of a superior court judge.  CCP §43. “A judgment rendered in one department of the superior court is binding on that matter upon all other departments until such time as the judgment is overturned.... Appellate jurisdiction to review, revise, or reverse decisions of the superior courts is vested by our Constitution only in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal. ” Ford v. Superior Court, (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 737.

Further, “[o]ne department of the superior court cannot enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another department of the superior court....A judgment rendered in one department of the superior court is binding on ‘that matter upon-all other departments until such time as the judgment is overturned.” Glade v. Glade, (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1450; Silverman v. Superior Court, (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 145, 151. “Even between superior courts of different counties, having coequal jurisdiction over a matter, the first court of equal dignity to assume and exercise jurisdiction over a | matter acquires exclusive jurisdiction.”  Id. at 151.

Kim argues that superior courts have personal jurisdiction over persons, businesses, and organizations in California.  General jurisdiction courts have subject matter jurisdiction over any kind of case.  Opp. at 8-9. 

The issue is not personal jurisdiction.  Kim is correct that the court has personal jurisdiction over Judge Hong.  The issue is subject matter jurisdiction.  Kim seeks a peremptory writ of mandate compelling Judge Hong to set aside the judgment for attorney fees totaling $25,000.  The assigned superior court department has exclusive jurisdiction over the judgment.  Regardless, this court cannot overturn the judgment of another superior court judge.  Only an appellate court can do that.  The demurrer must be sustained without leave to amend for this reason.

2. Other Issues

Judge Hong argues absolute judicial immunity bars Kim’s Petition, which arises from the UD action in which she alleges that attorney fees were wrongfully awarded against her in the amount of $24,562.50. Through this action, Kim asks this court to direct Judge Hong to set aside the wrongful and improper judgment for attorney fees made on July 27, 2023.  Mem. at 5.

Judge Hong argues that Kim’s Petition is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, which provides a mechanism for judicial review of an agency’s final administrative order or decision.  Yet, at issue in this case are superior court orders in the underlying UD action, not a final administrative order or decision. Thus, plaintiff’s reliance on CCP section 1094.5 is misplaced. There is no final administrative decision to review.  Mem. at 5.

Judge Hong further contends that the Government Claims Act requires the timely presentation of a written claim for damages.  Govt. Code, §§ 911.2 945.4, 950.2.  The claim must be presented to the public entity within six months of the accrual of the alleged cause of action.  Gov. Code, § 911.2 (a).  The failure to do so bars the plaintiff from bringing suit.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Desert Hospital District, (1989) 49 Cal.3d 69, 708; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 293.  Mem. at 6.

Finally, Judge Hong argues that the Petition does not identify any cause of action. The Petition does not state facts, even liberally construed, sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Judge Hong. The only factual allegations that relate to Judge Hong are that she failed to properly apply the law in the UD action and issued an order granting attorney fees that was erroneous. There is no cause of action which permits a disgruntled litigant to sue a judicial officer for allegedly erroneous orders.  Mem. at 7.

In opposition, Kim replies to some, but not all, of these issues. She asserts the Petition is factually sufficient, and all causes of action are well pleaded completely necessary to seek relief for her damages.  Opp. at 2, 8.  Kim argues that Judge Hong’s immunity is only partial.  She is not immune from allegations of bias, racism, error, negligence, inexperience, failure, greed, and dishonesty, done with conscious disregard of job and causing injury or damage.  Opp. at 2, 9.  Judge Hong has caused injury and damage to Kim and must be held accountable.  Kim seeks to regain access to her property as Judge Hong has intentionally unnecessarily delayed the UD process for more than a year by willfully disobeying the law, obstructing justice and causing damages in excess of $25,000.  Opp. at 2.

The court need not address these issues as it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider them.

E. Conclusion

The demurrer to the Petition is sustained without leave to amend.  An order to show cause re: dismissal is set for June 26, 2025 at 9:30 a.m.