Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 25STCP01557, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Valentin Amezquita (“Amezquita”) seeks traditional mandamus compelling Respondents Eduardo Sarmiento (“Sarmiento”) in his official capacity as City Clerk/Elections Official of the City of Huntington Park (“City”), and Jonathan Sanabria (“Sanabria”), Arturo Flores (“Flores”), Karina Macias (“Macias”), and Eduardo Martinez (“Martinez”), in their official capacities as City of Huntington Park Councilmembers (collectively, “City”), to hold a special election.

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following decision.

On April 28, 2025, Amezquita filed the Petition for writ of mandate against Respondents Sarmiento, Sanabria, Flores, Macias, and Martinez. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

On February 18, 2025, the City declared a City Councilmember seat vacant. Pet., ¶9. At a video-recorded City Council meeting, an official City letter dated February 18, 2025 was presented stating that the City Councilmember seat had been vacated with “immediate effect.” Pet., ¶9, Ex. 1.

The agenda for the next City Council meeting on February 24, 2025 noted that the City Council would consider filling the vacant Councilmember position. Pet., ¶10. An accompanying staff report stated that the seat of City Councilmember Esmerelda Castillo (“Castillo”) was deemed vacant on February 18, 2025, giving the City the option to fill the vacancy by appointment or by calling a special election within 60 days, the last day being April 21, 2025. Pet., ¶¶ 10-11, Ex. 2. The minutes of the meeting confirmed the April 21, 2025 deadline. Pet., ¶12, Ex. 3.

Despite knowing the April 21, 2025 deadline, the City Council filled the vacant seat on April 23, 2025 by appointing and swearing in Real Party-in-Interest Nancy C. Martiz (“Martiz”). Pet., ¶¶ 13-14, Exs. 4-5.

If the City is not compelled to call for a special election, voters (including Amezquita) will be irreparably harmed by inability to run as candidates and by disenfranchisement. Pet., ¶29. Amezquita has no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law. Pet., ¶30. Amezquita intends to run as a candidate in a special election. Pet., ¶8.

Amezquita seeks alternative and peremptory writs of mandate ordering the City to vacate the appointment of Martiz as ultra vires and to conduct a special election to fill the vacancy, as well as costs, attorney fees, and such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

Proof of service on file shows that Petitioner Amezquita served Respondent Macias with the Petition and Summons on May 5, 2025 by personal service.

Proof of service on file shows Petitioner Amezquita served Respondents Sarmiento, Sanabria, Flores, and Marinez, and Real Party Martiz by electronic service to Eric P. Markus, Esq. (“Markus”), counsel for all Respondents and Real Party Martiz. On May 6, 2025, Markus signed an acknowledgement of receipt, also on file.

On May 5, 2025, the court heard Amezquita’s ex parte application for issuance of alternative and/or peremptory writ of mandate. The court granted the application in part and set a hearing on the Petition’s claim to compel a special election only, declining to vacate the appointment of Martiz because it is governed by quo warranto.

A party may seek to set aside an agency decision by petitioning for either a writ of administrative mandamus (CCP §1094.5) or of traditional mandamus. CCP §1085. A petition for traditional mandamus is appropriate in all actions “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station....” CCP §1085.

A traditional writ of mandate under CCP section 1085 is the method of compelling the performance of a legal, ministerial duty. Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona, (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-84. Generally, mandamus will lie when (1) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy, (2) the respondent has a duty to perform, and (3) the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance. Id. at 584 (internal citations omitted).

No administrative record is required for traditional mandamus to compel performance of a ministerial duty.

A February 18, 2025 letter from City Manager Ricardo Reyes (“Reyes”) to Castillo was presented at the February 18, 2025 City Council meeting. Robles Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. The letter states that it constitutes the City’s official notice to Castillo that her seat on the City Council is vacated with immediate effect because she lacked residency in the City. Robles Decl. Ex. 1.

The City Council’s February 18, 2025 meeting minutes note that Castillo’s Councilmember seat was terminated in a closed session in her absence. Robles Decl., ¶7, Ex. 6.

The City Council’s February 24, 2025 meeting agenda includes an agenda item to adopt a resolution filling the vacancy of Castillo’s office by special election or appointment. Robles Decl., ¶3, Ex. 2. A memorandum to the City Council and Mayor signed by City Manager Reyes and City Clerk Sarmiento and attached to the agenda noted that Castillo’s position was deemed vacant on February 18, 2025 because she did not reside in the City. The memorandum noted that the 60-day deadline to fill the vacancy would run on April 21, 2025. Robles Decl., Ex. 2.

The February 24, 2025 City Council meeting minutes include a staff report confirming that the Castillo’s position was deemed vacant on February 18, 2025. Robles Decl., ¶4, Ex. 3. The staff report and a motion by Councilmember Sanabria confirmed the 60-day deadline to fill the vacant seat as April 21, 2025. Robles Decl., Ex. 3.

The City Council’s April 23, 2025 special meeting agenda includes an agenda item for the City receive presentations from applicants seeking appointment to the vacant City Council seat, discuss or question the applicants, and consider making an appointment to the vacant seat. Robles Decl., ¶5, Ex. 4.

A City press release dated April 25, 2025 (misdated as February 19, 2025) notes that the City Council appointed Martiz to fill the vacant Councilmember seat and that she was sworn in on April 23, 2025. Robles Decl., ¶6, Ex. 5.

Petitioner Amezquita is a longtime resident of the City, a taxpayer, and elector/registered voter in the City. Amezquita Decl., ¶2. He is a former Councilmember and intends to run in the special election when it is scheduled. Amezquita Decl., ¶3.

Amezquita attended the April 23, 2025 City Council meeting at which Martiz was appointed to the vacancy despite multiple prior public statements, City documents, and staff reports that the statutory deadline to make such an appointment was April 21, 2025. Amezquita Decl., ¶4.

At a break during the April 23, 2025 meeting, Amezquita asked the City Attorney about the deadline, and the City Attorney said the court could or would likely give deference to the City’s position as a local government entity to proceed with the proposed appointment. Amezquita Decl., ¶5.

City Clerk Sarmiento serves as the Election Official responsible for all elections occurring in the City.[2] Sarmiento Decl., ¶1. Sarmiento facilitated a process developed by the City Council to appoint a successor to Castillo’s vacant seat, including the creation of a written Application for Service on City Council. Sarmiento Decl., ¶2.

The City received several applications, including one from Amezquita. Sarmiento Decl., ¶3, Ex. A. Applicants were also invited to make oral presentations to the City Council on April 23, 2025, which Amezquita did. Sarmiento Decl., ¶4, Ex. B.

Amezquita’s counsel participated in a conference call in Castillo with opposing counsel and Judge Meiers wherein Judge Meiers suggested a contingency plan to mitigate potential financial burden on the City if a special election was necessary. Robles Decl., ¶2. Judge Meiers proposed designating, effectively, a contingent appointee for the vacancy. Robles Decl., ¶3. City counsel neither accepted the proposal nor offered any alternatives. Robles Decl., ¶3.

Amezquita’s’ counsel believes Judge Meiers would have granted a request for an agreement tolling the deadline in Government Code section 36512(b), and Amezquita’s counsel would have stipulated to such an agreement. Robles Decl., ¶4.

Petitioner Amezquita seeks mandamus[3] to compel the City to hold a special election pursuant to Government Code section 36512(b).[4]

“If, during his or her term of office…a Councilmember moves his or her place of residence outside of the City or ceases to be an elector of the City, he or her office shall immediately become vacant.” Huntington Park Municipal Code (“HPMC”) §2-9.02(a)

“If, during his or term of office, he or she moves his or her place of residence outside of the city limits or ceases to be an elector of the city, his or her office shall immediately become vacant.” §36502(a).

“If a vacancy occurs in an elective office [ …], the council shall, within 60 days from the commencement of the vacancy, either fill the vacancy by appointment or call a special election to fill the vacancy.” §36512(b).

If the council fills the vacancy by appointment, and if the vacancy occurs “in the first half of a term of office and at least 130 days prior to the next general municipal election,” the person appointed shall “hold office until the next general municipal election that is scheduled 130 or more days after the date the council is notified of the vacancy.” §36512(b)(2)(A).

The parties dispute the proper interpretation of section 36512(b). The rules of statutory interpretation are well known. In construing a statute, a court must ascertain the intent of the legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 724. The court first looks to the language of the statute, attempting to give effect to the usual, ordinary import of the language and seeking to avoid making any language mere surplusage. Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., (1989) 48 Cal 3d 711, 724. Significance, if possible, is attributed to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose. Orange County Employees Assn. v. County of Orange, (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 833, 841. The statutory language must be harmonized with provisions relating to the same subject matter to the extent possible. Id.

“’The statute's words generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent; if they are clear and unambiguous, ‘[t]here is no need for judicial construction and a court may not indulge in it. [Citation.]’” MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration, (“MCI”) (2018) 28 Cal. App. 5th 635, 643. “If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs.” Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190. “When statutory language is unambiguous, we must follow its plain meaning ‘“‘whatever may be thought of the wisdom, expediency, or policy of the act, even if it appears probable that a different object was in the mind of the legislature.’”’ In re D.B., (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 948 (citations omitted).

If a statute is ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court may resort to extrinsic aids, including principles of construction and legislative history. MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc., (“MacIsaac”) (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082 (quoting Riverview Fire Protection Dist. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1126). The judiciary’s role in determining the meaning of a statute “‘“is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted….We may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.’ [Citation.]” People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1008 (citations omitted).

Where ambiguity still remains, the court should consider “reason, practicality, and common sense.” MacIsaac, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at 1084. This requires consideration of the statute’s purpose, the evils to be remedied, public policy, and contemporaneous administrative construction. MCI, supra, 28 Cal.App.5^th at 643. The enactment must be given a reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intent of the lawmakers, practical rather than technical in nature, and which, when applied, will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity. Lungren v. Deukmejian, (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735.

The threshold issue is the determination of “the commencement of the vacancy” for purposes of section 36512(b)’s 60-day deadline.

The City argues that the City Council decides when the vacancy commences. Amezquita’s contention that the vacancy in Castillo’s former office occurred on February 18, 2025 is wrong. While the City Manager may have determined that Castillo’s office was vacant as of February 18, 2025, the City Council did not declare a vacancy until February 24, 2025, when it approved and adopted Resolution No. 2025-06. Resp. RJN Ex. 1. As set forth therein, “the City Council of the City of Huntington Park now deems the seat held by Councilmember Esmeralda Castillo to be vacant[.]” Resp. RJN Ex 1 (emphasis added). 60 days from February 24, 2025 is April 25, 2025. Accordingly, the City Council’s April 23, 2025 appointment of Councilmember Martiz was timely. Opp. at 12.

Amezquita argues that section 36512(b) expressly states that the clock starts “from the commencement of the vacancy,” not when the City Council decides to agendize and approve the vacancy. Reply at 2.

This is not a straightforward issue. Amezquita is correct that the plain language of section 36512(b) indicates that the 60-day clock from the date of the vacancy, not the date of the City Council’s determination of vacancy. However, an office cannot be vacant until the City Council declares it to be vacant. Any other interpretation would be impossible to enforce. For example, an officeholder such as Castillo could violate the City’s residency requirements and live outside the City for years. Would that person’s office be vacant from the date of illicit residence even if the City Council was unaware of it? The answer is plainly negative. An office is not vacant, and the City Council’s 60-day deadline to fill the vacancy does not begin, until the City Council finds the office to be vacant.

Given the requirement of a City Council finding, Amezquita argues that the staff report presented for Resolution 2025-06 undermines the City’s argument: (1) “On February 18, 2025, the position held by Esmeralda Castillo was deemed vacant following an investigation [of a September 2024 complaint that Castillo was not a City resident]”; (2) “The 60-day deadline would run on April 21, 2025”; (3) Since the vacancy was effective February 18, 2025, and if the City Council opts to fill the vacancy by appointment, it must be made by April 21, 2025”. Pet. RJN Ex. 2. Reply at 3.

The City’s attorney in this case is also the City’s counsel in Castillo, and that attorney directly contradicted in Castillo the City’s current argument that the City Council determination was not made until February 24, 2025. In a supplemental opposition to Castillo’s renewed ex parte application for a TRO, the City’s counsel argued that “[t]he deadline to appoint a new member in this case is April 21, 2025” and that a stay by Judge Meiers would “in effect prevent the City Council from timely appointing a new member and potentially trigger a special election, which the City has determined will cost upwards of $500,000.00”. Pet. RJN Ex. 7. Amequita argues that the City should be bound by its attorney’s statements. “The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general considerations of the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. Judicial estoppel is intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts. It seems patently wrong to allow a person to abuse the judicial process by first advocating one position, and later, if it becomes beneficial, to assert the opposite.” Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, (1997) 60 Cal.App.4^th 171, 181. Reply at 4.

The court agrees. In addition to Amezquita’s citations, a memorandum to the City Council and Mayor signed by City Manager Reyes and City Clerk Sarmiento and attached to the February 24, 2025 City Council meeting agenda noted that Castillo’s position was deemed vacant on February 18, 2025 because she did not reside in the City. Robles Decl., Ex. 2.

More important, however, the City Council -- not just the City staff and the City’s attorney -- considered the office to be vacant as of February 18, 2025. The City Council’s February 18, 2025 meeting minutes note that Castillo’s Councilmember seat was terminated in a closed session in her absence. Robles Decl., ¶7, Ex. 6. This statement is sufficient. While the City Council determines the vacancy, there is no requirement in section 36512(b) for a formal resolution to that effect. The City Council’s termination of Castillo’s seat is its determination of a vacancy under section 36512(b).

In sum, Castillo’s seat was determined by the City Council to be vacant on February 18, 2025 and section 36512(b)’s 60-day period to fill the vacancy began on that date. The deadline, therefore, was April 21, 2025.

Consistent with the 60-day deadline, the City Council’s February 24, 2025 Resolution sought to appoint a successor to Castillo’s former office no later than April 21, 2025. Resp. RJN Ex. 1.

On February 24, 2025, Castillo filed her complaint in Castillo against the City, the City Manager, and three Councilmembers seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for the validity of the City Council’s vacancy determination. Resp. RJN Ex. 2. On March 14, 2025, Castillo applied ex parte for a TRO enjoining the Castillo defendants from (1) preventing her from serving as Councilmember and (2) filling the vacancy in her former office. Resp. RJN Ex. 3.

The ex parte application was heard on March 20, 2025 in Department 82, the Hon. Stephen I. Goorvitch presiding. Following the hearing, Judge Goorvitch issued an order denying the application, including on the ground that “there is a genuine question whether this court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by [Castillo] because she did not sue in quo warranto.” Resp. RJN Ex. 3, p. 2. Judge Goorvitch denied the ex parte application “without prejudice to Plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction from the home court (Department 12) if that court determines in ruling on any demurrer that Plaintiff is not required to proceed in quo warranto...” (Id., p. 3, italics added.)

Castillo renewed her ex parte application on March 24, 2025 in Department 12. Judge Meiers issued a temporary stay enjoining the City from, inter alia, (a) doing anything to advance the April 21, 2025 deadline for appointment and (b) doing anything to fill the vacancy, even temporarily. Resp. RJN Ex. 4. Judge Meiers expanded these restrictions in an April 4, 2025 TRO that enjoined the City from “taking further action or actions to fill the plaintiff’s seat, whether deemed to be vacated or not[,]” including any act designed to recruit or appoint a replacement. Resp. RJN Ex. 5, pp. 11-12.

The City appealed Judge Meiers’ TRO on April 11, 2025. Resp. RJN Ex. 6. On or about April 16, 2025, the City filed a petition for writ of supersedeas seeking an emergency stay of Judge Meiers’ TRO “because the trial court’s order prohibits the City Council from filling the vacancy in Castillo’s office by appointment or calling a special election within the 60-day period specified in Government Code, section 36512(b).” Resp. RJN Ex. 7.

On April 21, 2025, the Court of Appeal issued a temporary stay order as follows:

“Enforcement of the April 4, 2025 temporary restraining order enjoining appellants from taking further action to fill respondent’s seat in Los Angeles Superior Court case no. 25STCV05179, entitled Esmeralda Castillo v. City of Huntington Park, et al., is hereby stayed pending resolution of the above petition or further order of this Court.” Resp. RJN Ex. 8.

Upon receipt of the temporary stay order, the City’s Mayor called a special meeting of the City Council for April 23, 2025 to appoint a successor to Castillo’s former office. Resp. RJN Ex. 9.

On April 22, 2025, Castillo filed an ex parte application in Castillo seeking an order requiring the City Council to call a special election. Resp. RJN Ex. 10. Judge Meiers denied Castillo’s ex parte application on April 23, 2025. Resp. RJN Ex. 11.

On April 23, 2025, the City Council appointed Martiz to fill the vacancy in Castillo’s former office. Resp. RJN Ex. 12. Pursuant to section 36512(b)(2), Councilmember Martiz will hold her office until the City’s next general municipal election on March 3, 2026, and thereafter “until the person who is elected at that election to fill the vacancy has been qualified.” See HPMC §2-9.01 (“The date of the City’s General Municipal Election shall be conducted on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of even-numbered years, beginning March, 2020.”).

The court concludes that Martiz’s appointment was timely. The date of April 21, 2025 passed before Martiz was appointed on April 23, 2025, but the 60-day deadline in section 36512(b) did not because it was tolled as a matter of law.[5] The City Council intended to fill the vacancy before April 21, 2025, but it was prevented from doing so by Judge Meiers’ stay of March 24 and TRO of April 4, 2025. The injunction lasted until the appellate court’s stay of Judge Meiers’ TRO on April 21, 2025. Thus, the City was prevented by court order from filling the vacancy for a period of 28 days. This 28-day period tolls the 60-day deadline of section 36512(b).

Admittedly, the court is unaware of any case law concerning tolling of a statutory deadline for a public agency to act but there is a parallel in the doctrine of equitable tolling. A statute of limitations is equitably tolled while a party with multiple available remedies pursues one in a timely manner. E.g. McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist., (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 100, 102. The three elements required to show equitable tolling are: (1) timely notice to the defendant in filing the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to defendant in gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; and, (3) good faith and reasonable conduct by the plaintiff in filing the second claim. Collier v. City of Pasadena, (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917, 924.

Obviously, equitable tolling has no direct application to the tolling of a city’s ministerial obligation, yet the equitable principles are the same. Nonetheless, the analogy is apt. The City fully intended to act by April 21 and was only prevented from doing so by court order. The City acted in good faith, all parties were aware of the stay, and no prejudice resulted from the two-day delay. It is only fair that the 60-day clock in section 36512(b) stopped during the period of stay/TRO.

Amezquita replies that the City Council had more than four weeks after February 18, 2025 and before Judge Meiers’ stay to make an appointment but did not do so. When the stay was lifted on the morning of April 22, 2025, the City Council could have added an item to the agenda as a subsequent need item or emergency request, but it did not try to do so. Finally, the City’s experienced attorneys could have and should have immediately requested a tolling of the 60 days statutory period during Judge Meiers’ stay/TRO, so that those days would not count toward the 60-day period in section 36512(b), but again failed to do so. Reply at 5-6.

These arguments do not affect the tolling as a matter of law. The City Council was not required to act during the 60-day period before the stay was imposed. The City Council perhaps could have acted on an emergent basis on April 22, 2025, but there was an ex parte application in Castillo on that date and Judge Meiers did not rule until April 23, 2025. Resp. RJN Exs. 10, 11. In any event, this prospect does not affect tolling as a matter of law, and there was no need to ask Judge Meiers for a ruling on such tolling.[6]

Because 28 days of the 60-day period were tolled, the appointment of Martiz was timely under section 36512(b).

3. Even the City Council’s Action Were Untimely, the Proper Interpretation of Section 36512(b) Does Not Require a Special Election by Default and Section 36512(b) Is Only Directory in Nature

As stated, section 36512(b) provides: “If a vacancy occurs in an elective office [ …], the council shall, within 60 days from the commencement of the vacancy, either fill the vacancy by appointment or call a special election to fill the vacancy.” §36512(b).

Amezquita argues that the City Council failed to timely “fill the vacancy by appointment” within the statutorily prescribed period of 60 days from February 18, 2025, or by April 21, 2025, and the “call[ing] a special election to fill the vacancy” is the only operative alternative available.

Amezquita contends that, since section 36512(b) is written in the alternative, its plain language mandates that if the chosen alternative of an appointment to fill the vacancy is not made within the 60-day deadline, the only other alternative to become operative -- namely “filling the vacancy by special election.” The City’s knowing and intentional failure to proceed under the only other available alternative after the appointment period lapses is a direct violation of the basic statutory construction of section 36512(b). If there is no special election to fill the vacancy, the words of section 36512(b) become inconsequential and worthless, and would be pure surplusage, which must be avoided. See People v. Valencia, (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357. Given the plain and unambiguous language of section 36512(b), the court must command the City to call a special election to fill the vacancy. Pet. Op. Br. at 6, 7, 8; Reply at 4-5.[7]

Amezquita misreads the plain language of section 36512(b). As the City argues (Opp. at 13), section 36512(b) requires the City either to fill the vacancy by appointment or to call a special election to fill the vacancy by the 60-day deadline. Section 36512(b) does not create a default by which, if a city council fails to appoint a councilmember by the deadline, it must adopt the alternative of a special election. Nothing in the plain language so states.

In this case, section 36512(b) required the City Council to appoint a Councilmember or call for a special election by April 21, 2025. The City correctly asks what are the legal consequences for the City Council to miss the 60-day deadline to fill the vacancy in Castillo’s seat by an appointment or by calling a special election? The answer is that the City would be exposed to a mandamus action to compel the City Council to satisfy its obligation to fill the vacancy by appointing or calling an election. In other words, the only legal remedy is to compel the City Council to make an election between the two means of filling the vacancy. It is not to require an election by default. Since the City Council has filled the vacancy, there is no mandamus remedy available.

Coupled with this legal consequence is the fact that section 36512(b)’s deadline is only directory. A statute’s mandatory language “shall” may in fact be only directory. The “mandatory” or “directory” designation denotes “whether the failure to comply with a particular procedural step will or will not have the effect of invalidating the governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates.” City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez, (“Gonzalez”) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 923. Courts make this designation by ascertaining the legislative intent. Id. at 924. Courts should “look to the procedure’s purpose or function. If the procedure is essential to promote the statutory design, it is ‘mandatory’ and noncompliance has an invalidating effect. If not, it is directory.” Id. Where “‘the consequences of not obeying [a statutory procedure] in every particular are not prescribed, the courts must judicially determine them.’” Cox v. Cal. Highway Patrol, (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1587. “In California, it is not uncommon for obligatory statutory provisions to be accorded only directory effect.” Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 924.

Section 36512(b) is silent regarding the consequences of appointment outside of the 60-day deadline. The obvious purpose of the deadline, however, is to ensure that vacancies in elected office are filled promptly, thereby maintaining the continuity and functionality of the local governments. There is a legislative “policy against having a vacancy in public office – having a gap between successive officer holders.” People ex rel. Schlesinger v. Sachs, (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 800, 818.

The City Council’s two-day untimely appointment of Councilmember Martiz was made in furtherance of the legislative policy underpinning the 60-day deadline. The City Council’s actions were taken to ensure the “gap” between office holders was as narrow as possible. The City Council tried to fill the vacancy in accordance with the procedure reflected in Resolution 2025-06 -- i.e., no later than April 21, 2025 – but was enjoined from doing so. See Resp. RJN Ex. 1. The 60 days are not essential to promote section 36512(b)’s statutory design, and the deadline is directory in nature.” Cf. Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 925 (substantial compliance doctrine applies to statutory requirement that order to abate be posted on the affected property and mailed to affected residential units).

Amezquita disagrees, arguing that section 36512(b) is obviously mandatory. Reply at 8. The City Council’s obligation is mandatory only in the sense that it must elect one of the two alternatives -- appointment or special election -- within the 60-day period. The directory nature of the 60-day deadline, however, means that the City Council’s failure can be remedied by mandamus to compel the City Council to choose an alternative. There is no other remedy available. [8]

The Petition is denied. Castillo’s seat was determined by the City Council to be vacant on February 18, 2025 and the 60-day deadline to fill the vacancy began on that date. Because the 28 days between Judge Meiers’ March 24 stay and the April 21, 2025 appellate court’s stay of Judge Meiers’ TRO were tolled as a matter of law, the appointment of Martiz was timely under section 36512(b). Even if the appointment was not timely, section 36512(b)’s alternative of a call for an election is not a default, the 60-day deadline is directory in nature, and the only remedy available for a city council’s failure to choose an alternative is mandamus to compel that choice. The City Council has chosen by appointing Martiz.

The City’s counsel is ordered to prepare a proposed judgment, serve it on Petitioner Amezquita’s counsel for approval as to form, wait ten days after service for any objections, meet and confer if there are objections, and then submit the proposed judgment along with a declaration stating the existence/non-existence of any unresolved objections. An OSC re: judgment is set for July 3, 2025 at 9:30 a.m.

[1] Petitioner Amezquita requests judicial notice of the following exhibits: (1) a February 18, 2025 letter presented at the City Council meeting the same day (Pet. RJN Ex. 1); (2) the February 24, 2025 City Council agenda and supporting materials (Pet. RJN Ex. 2); (3) the February 24, 2025 City Council minutes (Pet. RJN Ex. 3); (4) the April 23, 2025 City Council minutes (Pet. RJN Ex. 4); (5) an April 25, 2025 City press release (Pet. RJN Ex. 5); and (6) the February 18, 2025 City Council minutes (Pet. RJN Ex. 6). Each of these exhibits is also offered as an exhibit to the Robles declaration.

The requests to judicially notice Pet. RJN Exs. 2, 3, 4 and 6 are granted. Evid. Code. §452(b). The request for judicial notice of a letter (Pet. RJN Ex. 1) is denied. The City press release (Pet. RJN Ex. 5) could be judicially noticed for its existence, but Amezquita offers it for the truth of its contents and therefore the request is denied.

The City requests judicial notice of the following exhibits: (1) City Council Resolution No. 2025-6 (Resp. RJN Ex. 1); (2) the complaint dated February 24, 2025 in Esmerelda Castillo v. City of Huntington Park, et al. (“Castillo”), LASC No. 25STCV05179 (Resp. RJN Ex. 2); (3) a March 20, 2025 minute order in Castillo (Resp. RJN Ex. 3); (4) a March 25, 2025 minute order in Castillo (Resp. RJN Ex. 4); (5) an April 4, 2025 minute order in Castillo (Resp. RJN Ex. 5); (6) an April 11, 2025 notice of appeal in Castillo (Resp. RJN Ex. 6); (7) an April 18, 2025 amended petition for writ of supersedeas in Esmerelda Castillo v. City of Huntington Park, et al. (“Castillo Appeal”), Court of Appeal Case No. B345510 (Resp. RJN Ex. 7); (8) an April 21, 2025 temporary stay order in the Castillo Appeal (Resp. RJN Ex. 8); an April 21, 2025 City Council agenda (Resp. RJN Ex. 9); (10) an April 22, 2025 ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and order to show cause (“OSC”) in Castillo (Resp. RJN Ex. 10); (11) an April 23, 2025 minute order in Castillo (Resp. RJN Ex. 11); (12) minutes from the April 24, 2025 City Council meeting (Resp. RJN Ex. 12); (13) County election results showing that Castillo was elected to the City Council on or about March 4, 2024 (Resp. RJN Ex. 13); and (14) a May 5, 2025 order in Castillo (Resp. RJN Ex. 14). The requests are granted. Evid. Code §452(b), (c), (d).

In reply, Amezquita requests judicial notice of the following exhibits: (1) a letter dated February 18, 2025 (Reply RJN Ex. 1); (2) the February 24, 2025 City Council agenda and supporting materials (Reply RJN Ex. 2); (3) the February 24, 2025 City Council minutes (Reply RJN Ex. 3); (4) the April 23, 2025 City Council Agenda (Reply RJN Ex. 4); (5) a City press release (Reply RJN Ex. 5); (6) the February 18, 2025 City Council minutes (Reply RJN Ex. 6); (7) a supplemental brief in opposition to Castillo’s renewed ex parte application for a TRO in Castillo (Reply RJN Ex. 7); (8) the fact of opposing counsel’s intimate experience with the Brown Act; (9) an April 15, 2025 minute order in Castillo (Reply RJN Ex. 9); (10) a March 24, 2025 minute order in Castillo (Reply RJN Ex. 10); and (11) a California League of Cities publication “Filling Vacancies & Cancelling City Council Elections” (Reply RJN Ex. 11).

Reply RJN Exs. 1-6 are identical to Pet. RJN Exs. 1-6 and need not be further addressed. The requests for judicial notice of Reply RJN Exs. 7, 9, and 10 are granted. Evid. Code §452(d). The requests for Reply RJN Exs. 5, 8, and 11 are denied. With respect to Reply RJN Ex. 11, Amezquita does not show that the California League of Cities publication is an official act of an agency. Nor does he show that it contains facts or propositions subject capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonable indisputable accuracy.

[2] Sarmiento states he is not a party to the instant matter (Sarmiento Decl., ¶1), but he is named as a Respondent in the Petition.

[3] The Petition also seeks removal of Real Party Martiz from her appointed City Council position, but the court already has ruled that is not within the scope of mandamus and requires quo warranto.

For mandamus, Amezquita argues that he has a beneficial interest as an elector in ensuring that the elected Councilmembers fulfill their statutorily-mandated duties. Beyond that, he is a former office holder who seeks to regain office as Councilmember and therefore has a special interest in compelling Respondents to call a special election, so that he may exercise his right to seek and run for public office. Amezquita Decl., ¶3. Until the City Council calls an election, he is unable to pull the papers from the City Clerk to qualify himself as a City Council candidate in the election to be held. Pet. Op. Br. at 5. Respondents do not contest Amezquita’s mandamus standing.

[4] All further statutory references are to the Government Code.

[5] The City calls this avoidance of an impossibility or impracticability. Opp. at 15-16.

[6] Amezquita also argues that on April 15, 2025, the week before the deadline, Judge Meiers suggested in a conference call a contingency plan to mitigate the possible special election and its expense. Judge Meiers proposed the designation of a contingent appointee to the vacancy. Pet. RJN Ex. 9; Reply Robles Decl, ¶¶ 2-3. In other words, the impossible situation argued by the City was self-induced. Reply at 6.

The apparent failure of the City to accept a contingent appointment has no bearing on tolling.

[7] Amezquita relies on a California League of Cities a California League of Cities publication “Filling Vacancies & Cancelling City Council Elections” (Reply RJN Ex. 11) as “the premiere authority on all matters concerning municipal affairs” as stating: “[I]f the council seeks to fill the position by appointment but does not do so within 60 days of the vacancy – the special election must be held[.]” Pet. Op. Br. at 7; Reply at 9. The court has not judicially noticed this exhibit.

[8] The court need not address the City’s additional arguments that (a) there is no vacancy on the City Council to be filled by a special election (Opp. at 9-10), (b) the case is essentially moot because Martiz’s appointment will end on or about March 3, 2026, the same date as any court ordered special election (Opp. at 11-12), and (c) Amezquita waived any claim that the appointment was untimely by participating in the appointment process (Opp. at 16-17).