Judge James C. Chalfant, Case Number: 25STCV02722, Date: 2025-05-15 Tentative Ruling

Defendant Guy Elbaz (“Elbaz”) applies for an order to quash the writ of possession granted to Plaintiffs Passion Boys, Inc. (“Passion Boys”) and JS Capital Ventures, Inc. (“JS”).

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

A. Statement of the Case

1. Complaint

Plaintiffs Passion Boys and JS commenced this action against Defendants Elbaz, Vega GE Holdings, LLC (“Vega”), Sun-Light Medical, LLC (“Sun-Light”), and Manshoory ESMS, LLC (“Manshoory”) on January 31, 2025, alleging causes of action for two counts of breach of contract, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, conversion, violation of Penal Code section 496A, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, interference with business advantage, negligence, wrongful recovery of possession/wrongful lockout,; and declaratory relief.

On March 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), the operative pleading in this action, which added causes of action for breach of implied contract and claim and delivery. The FAC alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Plaintiffs operate a TCH oil manufacturing business. FAC, ¶12. Plaintiffs sought a location with appropriate licensure (“Cannabis License”) to operate the Business. FAC, ¶12. Plaintiffs encountered Elbaz, who claimed to be the landlord (or a representative thereof) owning such a location. FAC, ¶12.

On September 16, 2024, Plaintiffs met with Elbaz, who represented himself as agent for all Defendants, and represented that Defendants were owners of the 1616 S Los Angeles St, Los Angeles, CA 90025 (“Property”) and held a Cannabis License. FAC, ¶13.

Plaintiffs and Defendants reached an agreement (“Agreement”) wherein Plaintiffs leased the Property and use of the Cannabis License for $9,000 monthly. FAC, ¶14, Ex. A. The Agreement provided that Defendant Vega was “the owner and license holder” and would “maintain all relevant state and local licenses for the operation of the Type 6 non-volatile manufacturing facility”. FAC, ¶14, Ex. A.

Plaintiffs executed the Agreement on or about October 1, 2024, and Defendants provided Plaintiffs access to the Property. FAC, ¶15. Plaintiffs began moving equipment (“Equipment”) into the Property and incurring costs to prepare the Property for operations. FAC, ¶15.

From October through November 2024, Plaintiffs invested in facility upgrades. FAC, ¶16. Plaintiffs repeatedly requested Defendants to sign the Agreement, but Defendants did not do so. FAC, ¶16.

Defendants directed Plaintiffs to pay rent to Defendant Manshoory, despite the fact that Vega owned the Property. FAC, ¶16. Manshoory, with full knowledge of Plaintiff’s activities, accepted the rental payments and did not reject, question, or return them. FAC, ¶16.

In the first month of operations, Plaintiffs’ business made sales over $500,000. FAC, ¶17. Plaintiff informed Defendants, and Elbaz requested to become a business partner. FAC, ¶17. Plaintiffs rejected his proposals. FAC, ¶17. Defendants then demanded to renegotiate the terms of the Agreement and threatened to lock Plaintiffs out of the Property if they refused to give Defendants a 50% ownership interest in the business. FAC, ¶18.

On January 10, 2025, at 4:00 a.m., Defendants changed the locks on the warehouse containing the Equipment and from which Plaintiffs operated their business. FAC, ¶19. Plaintiffs were current on all payments of rents and expenses and were not otherwise in default. FAC, ¶19. Defendants demanded Plaintiffs pay over $100,000 for the return of the Equipment, claiming that amount was owed. FAC, ¶20.

Because Plaintiffs were suffering damages of approximately $500,000 in monthly lost sales, Plaintiffs paid Defendants $35,000 to recover access. FAC, ¶¶ 21, 30. Even after Plaintiffs paid, Defendants refused to grant Plaintiffs access to the Property or the Equipment, falsely claiming additional amounts were owed. FAC, ¶21.

Defendants attempted to poach Plaintiffs’ employees to operate the seized Equipment. FAC, ¶22. Defendants also falsely reported to the police that armed intruders were attempting to break into their Property, when in fact Plaintiffs were seeking to retrieve the Equipment. FAC, ¶24.

Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants conspired to misrepresent and conceal material facts to solicit Plaintiffs to bring in the Equipment and improve the Property, so that Defendants could convert it to their own use. FAC at 10. Plaintiffs further allege that all Defendants participated in and/or aided and abetted Elbaz in committing misrepresentation and concealment of material facts, conversion, extortion, and/or breach of the Agreement. FAC at 10.

Plaintiffs have suffered at least $1,950,000 in damages from Defendants’ conduct. FAC, ¶¶ 31, 37, 39.

2. Course of Proceedings

According to proofs of service on file: (a) Defendant Elbaz was served with the Summons and Complaint on February 12, 2025; (b) Defendant Vega was served with the Summons and Complaint on February 7, 2025; and (c) Defendant Manshoory was served with the Summons and Complaint on February 17, 2025.

On March 27, 2025, this court granted Plaintiffs’ ex parte application for writ of possession and temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in aid of the writ that would expire on April 15, 2025.

On April 29, 2025, the Los Angeles County Sheriff, as levying officer, filed a return that the Equipment had been levied upon and taken into custody on April 28, 2025.

B. Applicable Law

Where a plaintiff obtains an ex parte writ of possession, any defendant whose property has been taken may apply for an order that the writ be quashed and any property levied upon pursuant to the writ be released. CCP §512.020(b).

"The defendant may object to the plaintiffs undertaking [for a writ of possession] not later than 10 days after levy of the writ of possession. The defendant shall mail notice of objection to the levying officer." CCP §515.030(a). The application shall be made by noticed motion and the requirements of affidavit and briefing in CCP section 515.050 shall apply. Id.

The court’s March 27, 2025 minute order reflects that the court granted the Plaintiffs’ application for writ of possession and TRO. Meyers Decl., ¶2, Ex. 1. The court ordered that the TRO would expire on April 15, 2025. Meyers Decl., Ex. 1. No bond was required from Plaintiffs, and the redelivery bond was set at $584,000. Meyers Decl., ¶4, Ex. 1. The minute order does not indicate that Elbaz has no ownership interest in the Equipment. Meyers Decl., ¶3.

A UCC Financing Statement (UCC 1) filed March 10, 2025, shows that the listed collateral secures creditor Elbaz for debtors Vega, JS, and Passion Boys. Meyers Decl., ¶5, Ex. 2. The UCC 1 form demonstrates Elbaz has an ownership interest in the Equipment. Meyers Decl., ¶6.

Michael Y. Lavaee, Esq. (“Lavaee”) is counsel for Plaintiffs Passion Boys and JS. Lavaee Decl., ¶1. On March 4, 2025, after learning Plaintiffs’ Equipment was for sale, Lavaee emailed Tom Milks, agent of Greenlife Business Group with whom Plaintiffs were in contact regarding the sale listing. Lavaee Decl., ¶2. Lavaee sent Mr. Milks a copy of the Complaint. Lavaee Decl., ¶2. Counsel for Greenlife Business Group, Gordon Sattro, Esq., contacted Lavaee and confirmed that Elbaz and Sun-Light were attempting to sell the Cannabis License and the Equipment for $499,000. Lavaee Decl., ¶2; Shokri Decl., Ex. P.

On March 11, 2025, in connection with Plaintiff’s initial attempt to seek a writ of possession, Lavaee was served with an objection. Lavaee Decl., ¶3, Ex. AA. The objection admitted that the four-month old Equipment is now “damaged and not functioning”. Lavaee Decl., ¶4, Ex. AA.

On March 19, 2025, Lavaee was served with an objection to theex parte application for writ of attachment filed on March 19, 2025. Lavaee Decl., ¶5, Ex. FF. This objection contained an altered version of a receipt drafted by Josh Nutter (“Nutter”). Lavaee Decl., ¶6, Ex. FF; Nutter Decl., Ex. FF. The altered receipt is dated for January 3, 2025, while Nutter’s receipt actually was was dated February 3, 2025. Lavaee Decl., ¶7.

Josh Shokri (“Shokri”) is president of Passion Boys and JS. Shokri Decl., ¶1. Plaintiffs’ business is processing THC oil for resale. Shokri Decl., ¶12. In connection with the business, Plaintiffs purchased the Equipment from two sellers, NAC TRS LLC and Ethan Au (“Au”) at a total retail value of $584,000. Shokri Decl., ¶2, Ex. A.

Plaintiffs made partial payments for the Equipment on September 25, 2024, October 3, October 25, November 25, and December 25, 2024. Shokri Decl., ¶3, Ex. A. Plaintiffs currently owe a $69,550 balance on the Equipment. Shokri Decl., ¶3. Shokri assigned any personal rights in the Equipment to Passion Boys and JS. Shokri Decl., ¶3. Defendants claim no ownership interest in the Equipment but refuse to turn over the Equipment because they claim to be owed money. Shokri Decl., ¶3.

Elbaz has lately claimed to be the partner of Shokri or Plaintiffs, but he is not and has never been. Shokri Decl., ¶3. No Defendant has any ownership interest or other claim to the Equipment. Nor did they purchase or provide funds for the purchase of the Equipment. Shokri Decl., ¶3.

Plaintiffs require a Cannabis License to conduct their business, and so sought a location that had a Cannabis License. Shokri Decl., ¶4. Elbaz’s counsel, Zach Farbod, Esq. (“Farbod”), introduced Elbaz to Shokri. Shokri Decl., ¶4, Ex. B.

On September 16, 2024, Elbaz represented that he was the landlord of the Property holding a Cannabis License, or an agent thereof. Shokri Decl., ¶¶ 4-5. Elbaz and Shokri agreed to the terms of the Agreement, drafted by Farbod, for Plaintiffs to rent and use the Property for their business. Shokri Decl., ¶5. The Agreement that provided Plaintiffs would lease the Property from Vega for $9,000 monthly. Shokri Decl., ¶6. The Agreement also provided that Vega, as owner and Cannabis License holder, would maintain all relevant state and local licenses for the operation of the Type 6 non-volatile manufacturing facility. Shokri Decl., ¶6. Plaintiffs returned the Agreement to Defendants, but Vega did not execute it despite requests. Shokri Decl., ¶9.

Unbeknownst to Shokri, the Property is owned by Manshoory and the Cannabis License belonged to Sun-Light. Shokri Decl., ¶6.

On or about October 1, 2024, Shokri executed the Agreement on behalf of Plaintiffs and from October through November 2024 prepared the Property for the operation of the Business. Shokri Decl., ¶9. All Equipment was moved onto the Property by mid-October, 2024. Shokri Decl., ¶10.

After Plaintiffs signed the Agreement, Defendants directed Plaintiffs make rent payments to Manshoory. Shokri Decl., ¶10, Ex. I. This was the first Plaintiffs learned of Manshoory. Shokri Decl., ¶10. Plaintiffs paid rent to Manshoory as directed. Shokri Decl., ¶11. From October 2024 to January 2025, Shokri made at least 4 wire rental payments to Manshoory in excess of the rent owed under the Agreement. Shokri Decl., ¶12. Rent for those fourth months under the Agreement was $36,000, and the wire payments totaled $40,800. Shokri Decl., ¶12, Ex. J. At no time did Manshoory question or return any payments, but rather it demanded rental payments at the beginning of each month. Shokri Decl., ¶13.

Business sales for the first month exceeded $500,000. Shokri Decl., ¶14. Once Elbaz learned of Plaintiffs’ sales numbers, Elbaz requested to be a partner, but Shokri declined. Shokri Decl., ¶14. Subsequently, Elbaz threatened to evict Plaintiffs unless they agreed to share 50% of profits on a monthly basis, but Shokri again refused. Shokri Decl., ¶15.

On January 10, 2025 around 4:00 a.m., Defendants changed the locks to the Property. Shokri Decl., ¶16. As a result, Plaintiffs could not and cannot access the Equipment or operate the business. Shokri Decl., ¶17.

Defendants never issued a notice of default or breach. Shokri Decl., ¶17. Defendants never served Shokri or Plaintiffs an unlawful detainer action or notice of abandonment of the Equipment. Shokri Decl., ¶17.

Defendants have attempted to operate the business using the Equipment, including by attempting to convince Plaintiffs’ employees to work for them. Shokri Decl., ¶22. Defendants’ use of the Equipment depreciates its value and useful life. Shokri Decl., ¶22. Defendants are currently actively attempting to sell the Equipment and their Cannabis License for $499,000. Shokri Decl., ¶¶ 23-26, Exs. O-Q.

On March 3, 2025, an associate of Elbaz, Michael Toth, contacted Shokri and offered to help Shokri retrieve the Equipment. Shokri Decl., ¶27. Michael Toth stated there was no point in trying to sue Elbaz because he runs a cash business and could pretend to have no money to pay a judgment. Shokri Decl., ¶27, Ex. R.

Ethan Au (“Au”) is the owner and seller of equipment. Au Decl., ¶2. On or about September 25, 2024, Plaintiffs picked up the equipment which they purchased from Au (“Au Equipment”) that day. Au Decl., ¶3, Ex. V. Au has updated his invoice to reflect payments received from Plaintiffs on September 25, October 25, November 25, and December 25 of 2024. Au Decl., ¶4, Ex. V. The invoice continues to reflect the date of sale as September 25, 2024. Au Decl., ¶4. This is Au’s ordinary invoicing practice. Au Decl., ¶4.

Au visited the Property at least a dozen times and spoke with Elbaz several times during those visits. Au Decl., ¶5. During those visits, Au also saw the Au Equipment at the Property. Au Decl., ¶6. On multiple occasions, Au and Elbaz discussed the fact that Au had sold Plaintiffs the Au Equipment. Au Decl., ¶6. Au also observed other equipment at the Property, not purchased from him. Au Decl., ¶7. Elbaz stated during conversations that he understood both the Au Equipment and the other equipment were owned by Plaintiffs. Au Decl., ¶7. Elbaz never claimed to own any equipment on the Property. Au Decl., ¶7.

In January of 2025, Au learned Plaintiff was locked out of the Property, and therefore Plaintiffs could not access their Equipment. Au Decl., ¶8. In February of 2025, Au called Elbaz to discuss the lock-out and requested to retrieve the Au Equipment. Au Decl., ¶9. Elbaz agreed to allow Au to pick up the Au Equipment but wanted to send the “original invoices” so he could determine which equipment was Au Equipment. Au Decl., ¶9. At no point in this discussion did Elbaz claim ownership of the Au Equipment or the Other Equipment. Au Decl., ¶9.

Given the filing of this action, Elbaz said he would consult his attorney to see what documents should be signed for the release of the Au Equipment. Au Decl., ¶10. On February 25, 2025, Au texted Elbaz to follow up regarding picking up the Au Equipment. Au Decl., ¶11. Elbaz requested a list of the equipment, which Au provided. Au Decl., ¶11. Au also asked for an email address to send copies of the invoices. Au Decl., ¶11, Ex. W.

On March 1, 2025, Au sent Elbaz electronic mail confirming their conversations and agreement. Au Decl., ¶12, Ex. X. Elbaz did not respond or confirm. However, on March 3, 2025, Elbaz sent a text with a picture of a piece of Au Equipment stating, “I understand you don’t want your equipment anymore?” Au Decl., ¶13, Ex. Y. Given that Elbaz refused to put anything in writing, Au stopped engaging with Elbaz and did not provide copies of the original invoices. Au Decl., ¶14.

Tineo is employed by Plaintiffs to make oil. Tineo Decl., ¶3. On Friday, January 10, 2025 at 5:20 a.m., Tineo arrived at the Property for his shift. Tineo Decl., ¶2. Upon arrival, Tineo discovered the door locked, and that his keys would no longer unlock the doors. Tineo Decl., ¶4. The locked door also bore a new “DO NOT ENTER” sign. Tineo Decl., ¶5.

Tineo took a picture of the door and sign, which he texted to Shokri to document that Tineo could not begin his shift. Tineo Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Shokri Decl., Ex. K.

Kameron Walker (“Walker”) owns and operates a warehouse. Walker Decl., ¶2. At the warehouse, Walker stored equipment, including equipment for a friend and associate, Conner. Walker Decl., ¶2. Walker stored for Conner (a) a Centrifuge Extractor (150 LB) paired with a 1000-Gallon Jacketed Tank and a 1000-Gallon Tincture Holding Tank (collectively, “Centrifuge and Holding Tanks”). Walker Decl., ¶2.

In September of 2024, Conner informed Walker that he (Conner) would come to the warehouse with a potential buyer for the Centrifuge and Holding Tanks. Walker Decl., ¶3. Conner then came to the warehouse with Shokri, the interested potential buyer. Walker Decl., ¶3.

On or about September 25, 2024, Shokri requested that Walker release the Centrifuge and Holding Tanks for delivery to the Property. Walker Decl., ¶4. After confirming with Conner, Walker agreed and coordinated pick up of the Centrifuge and Holding Tanks for transport to the Property. Walker Decl., ¶4.

In March of 2025, Walker was contacted by Conner, who had been contacted by Elbaz. Walker Decl., ¶. Elbaz requested the invoice for the Centrifuge and Holding Tanks, claiming that Elbaz was locked out of the Property and needed the invoice for proof in a lawsuit. Walker Decl., ¶5. Elbaz stated that he would use the invoice to secure possession of the Centrifuge and Holding Tanks, and then transfer them to Conner. Walker Decl., ¶5. Because Conner was still owed approximately $10,000 from the sale of the Centrifuge and Holding Tanks, Conner wanted to cooperate. Walker Decl., ¶5.

Josh Nutter (“Nutter”) claims no ownership interest in the Equipment. Nutter Decl., ¶2.

On January 10, 2025, after Elbaz locked Nutter out, Elbaz texted Nutter claiming that his equipment was safe, but he was forced to change the locks on the Property because “the security camera company got an order not to let anyone in he left me with no choice.” Nutter Decl., ¶3, x. DD.

On February 3, 2025, Nutter went to the Property to pick up personal equipment he had been unable to pick up because of the lock change. Nutter Decl., ¶4. While inside, Nutter observed most or all of the Equipment still on the Property. Nutter Decl., ¶4. Elbaz insisted Nutter draft a receipt for the returned property, so Nutter itemized the personal property he was taking on a paper, recorded the date, and signed the receipt. Nutter Decl., ¶5. He then provided the receipt to Elbaz. Nutter Decl., ¶5.

On March 19, 2025, Nutter received Elbaz’s declaration in support of the objection to theex parte application for writ of possession filed the same date. Nutter Decl., ¶6. That declaration included, attached as Exhibit A, an allegedly true and correct copy of Nutter’s receipt but the date on the receipt had been altered from February 3 to January 3, 2025. Nutter Decl., ¶6, Ex. EE.

Defendant Elbaz applies for an order that Plaintiffs’ ex parte writ of possession be quashed, and that any property levied upon pursuant to the writ be released. CCP §512.020(b).

As Plaintiffs’ evidence shows, the court granted the March 27, 2025 ex parte writ of possession for the following reasons. Plaintiffs manufacture THC oil. Plaintiffs’ assignor, Shiroki, bought the Equipment from two sellers for $584,000. Shiroki made partial payments from October through December 2024 and currently owes $69,000.

To process the THC oil, Ps need a certain license and looked for a suitable location. D Elbaz represented that he was landlord's agent with a location at the Property that had the license. On Sept. 16, 2024, the parties agreed to the terms of the Agreement (the lease) drafted by Elbaz' attorney. The lease provides for Plaintiffs to pay Vega rent for the Property and use of the Cannabis license for $9,000 per month. Unknown to Shokri, Vega did not own the Property or the Cannabis License. Manshoory owns the Property and Sun-Light owns the Cannabis License.

Shiroki signed the Agreement, but Vega never did. From October to November 2024, Plaintiffs invested in facility upgrades. Elbaz directed Plaintiffs to pay rent to Manshoory, which Shiroki did. He paid four rental payments totaling $40,800, which was more than the $36.000 in rent owed.

Plaintiffs’ business opened and sold $500,000 in product in the first month. Elbaz then wanted to be a partner, which Shiroki rejected. Elbaz threatened to evict if Plaintiffs did not agree to give him 50% of profits. Again, Shiroki refused. On January 10, 2025, Plaintiffs were locked out. Plaintiffs demanded access to their Equipment which Elbaz offered to release for $100,000. Plaintiffs paid $35,000 to get access but Ds still did not provide access. Instead, they demanded an additional $70,000 for unpaid utilities.

Defendants Elbaz and Sun-Light (Elbaz is its manager) are marketing the Equipment for sale for $490,000. Manshoory admits it has no legal interest in the Equipment and it rented the property to its tenant Elbaz. Elbaz has admitted he only is holding the Equipment because he is owed money. Sun-Light is owned by Elbaz and three individual Manshoorys.

Defendants objected that Plaintiff JS has been suspended by the Franchise Tax Board and not revived. Revenue & Taxation Code §§ 23301, 19719. But it now has.

Defendants objected that Elbaz has filed a claim of exemption for use of the Equipment, that he and Plaintiffs were partners, that the Equipment was pledged as collateral to secure rent, not all the Equipment belongs to Plaintiffs, and that a bond is required.

Elbaz specifically claimed he had a partnership with Shokri until latter refused to pay expenses for trash, electricity, and garbage. He has videos of their agreement. Where are they? The parties also agreed the Equipment would be collateral for utilities. Yet, he provided no documentation and pledging the Equipment as collateral would be inconsistent with a partnership. These claims lacked support.

Elbaz claimed he has received competing claims for some of the Equipment from Messrs. Nutter, Conner, and Au. Yet, declarations from all three show that none claim the Equipment. Nutter disavows any interest in the Equipment and has picked up his personal property. Au says he sold equipment to Plaintiffs and supports their possession. Conner's agent says Conner sold a centrifuge and holding tanks to Shokri and is still owed $10,000, which is why he sought to pick it up. Plaintiffs are entitled to possess.

The order for an ex parte writ of possession was granted. No bond was required because Defendants have no legal interest in the Equipment CCP §515.010(b). A redelivery bond was set at $584,000. The TRO would dissolve on April 15, 2025.

Defendant Elbaz makes a series of arguments to quash the writ, none of which are tenable.

First, Elbaz argues that the court did not find that he was not an owner of the Equipment and failed to order an undertaking. He attaches a UCC-1 to show he has a secured interest in the Equipment. Mem. at 2-3.

Elbaz is incorrect. The court found that he has no ownership interest in the Equipment. Although that finding is not in the minute order, it is nonetheless true. Moreover, the fact that the court ordered no undertaking for Plaintiffs and a redelivery bond for Elbaz of $584,000 shows an implied finding that he has no ownership interest. Elbaz’s UCC-1, which was not presented at the ex parte hearing, shows only that Elbaz claims a security interest in Plaintiffs’ property. As Plaintiffs argue (Opp. at 5), a UCC-1 does not show ownership or even a right to possess. It only shows a claim of a security interest. Elbaz still has not shown any ownership of the Equipment.

Second, Elbaz argues that a TRO can be modified or dissolved where there is a material change in facts. CCP §533. That material change is the UCC-1. Mem. at 4. Elbaz also argues that Plaintiffs did not vile a verified complaint and serve it two days before the hearing, and the court failed to give him a mandatory continuance to oppose the application for a preliminary injunction under CCP section 527. Mem. at 6-7.

Elbaz is mistaking a writ of possession for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs are not required to submit a verified complaint if they rely on declarations, and no preliminary injunction was sought or issued. Moreover, the TRO issued in support of the writ of possession has expired and any claim concerning it is moot.

Third, Elbaz argues that he and Defendants Manshoory and Sun-Light are partners for use of the Cannabis License. Since the Agreement fails as a lease, the only logical result is that the use of the Cannabis License makes Elbaz and Plaintiffs partners. Elbaz cites Corp. Code section 15518 to the effect that an interest in a limited partnership is personal property that cannot be subject to judgment. Further, Vega is not authorized to do business in California and could not enter into the Agreement. Mem. at 5-6; Reply at 4.

These arguments are a series of non-sequiturs. There is no evidence of a partnership and, as Plaintiffs argue (Opp. at 5), Elbaz contends the partnership ended in January 2025. Elbaz’s reliance on the rights of a limited partner have nothing to do with Plaintiffs’ right to possess the Equipment. Elbaz also has taken inconsistent positions on whether there was a lease. See Opp. at 6.

Fourth, Elbaz argues that the court does not have jurisdiction over Vega, which is a Delaware company. Mem. at 6. The court does not need jurisdiction over Vega to issue a writ of possession for equipment located in California; it has jurisdiction over the Equipment. Elbaz cannot argue Vega’s rights anyway.

Fifth, Elbaz argues that the officers of Defendants were not given notice of the TRO request under CCP section 531. Mem. at 8. CCP section 531 governs an injunction to suspend the business of a corporation and has no application.

Sixth, Elbaz argues that service upon counsel does not meet the requirements of CCP section 512.030 which requires personal service where a defendant has not appeared. Mem. at 8; Reply at 5.

Elbaz is the only Defendant who has moved to quash, and he can only raise his own rights, not those of other Defendants. In any event, he misreads CCP section 512.030, which applies to a noticed hearing, not an ex parte writ of possession. CCP section 512.020 applies, and it requires service of summons and complaint, moving papers, and a notice informing the defendant of his rights after the ex parte hearing. On March 25, 2025, Plaintiffs served all Defendants through their counsel with a Notice of Rights complying with CCP section 512.020. All Defendants had been served or appeared by that date. Proofs of service on file show that all Defendants except Sun-Light were served with the Summons and Complaint in February 2025. A motion to dismiss/abate was filed for “Defendants” on March 12, 2025, which may constitute a general appearance for Sun-Light. Even if it did not, Sun-Light filed a substitution of attorney on April 21, 2025, which is a general appearance.[2]

In reply, Elbaz acknowledges that the levying officer took the Equipment and argues that items appurtenant to the Property were taken and the description of the Equipment was inadequate. Reply at 1, 3. The writ also fails to provide actual value of specific items. Reply at 3-4. These issues were not in Elbaz’ moving papers and have not been considered. Regency, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at 1333.

In reply, Elbaz also argues that Plaintiffs failed to show imminent danger of loss or substantial impairment to the Equipment. Reply at 4. Plaintiffs’ evidence of damage to and proposed sale of the Equipment was substantially unrebutted and supported ex parte relief.

[1] Plaintiffs request judicially notice seven exhibits: (1) an objection to order for writ of possession by Defendants Elbaz, Vega, and Sun-Light, filed on March 27, 2025 (RJN Ex. 1); (2) Plaintiffs’ Notice of Ruling, filed on March 27, 2025 (RJN Ex. 2); (3) the ex parte order for writ of possession issued on March 27, 2025(RJN Ex. 3); (4) an objection to order for writ of possession by Defendants Elbaz, Vega, and Sun-Light, filed on March 11, 2025 (RJN Ex. 4); (5) a motion to dismiss/abate action, filed by “Defendants” on March 12, 2025 (RJN Ex. 5); (6) a proof of service for Vega, filed on February 14, 2025(RJN Ex. 6); and (7) proofs of service of documents served in connection with Plaintiffs’ ex parte application (RJN Ex. 7). The requests are denied; the court can always review documents on file in the pending case.

[2] In reply, Elbaz adds that the other Defendants did not receive proper notice of theex parte hearing. Reply at 5. This is a new issue not raised in the moving papers. New evidence/issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly presented to a trial court and may be disregarded. Regency Outdoor Advertising v. Carolina Lances, Inc., (“Regency”) (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1333. It also improperly purports to raise the rights of other parties.