Judge James L. Crandall, Case 21-01217232 2022-08-25 Tentative Ruling

Judge: James L. Crandall, Case: 21-01217232, Date: 2022-08-25 Tentative Ruling

Motion for Attorney Fees:

Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 (c) (1) provides that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.”

“The defendant may recover fees and costs only for the motion to strike, not the entire litigation.” (Christian Research Inst. v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1320.)

“The court tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Id. at 1320-1321.)

“The Legislature, however, did not intend recovery of fees and costs as a windfall. . . .The prevailing party is entitled to a reasonable award . . . consequently, the trial court need not simply award the sum requested. . . To the contrary, ascertaining the fee amount is left to the trial court's sound discretion.” (Id. at 1321.)

“Trial judges are entrusted with this discretionary determination because they are in the best position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in their courts.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095–1096.)

“The moving party has ‘the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.’” (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

RainingDataCorp. v.Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal. App.4th 1363, 1375, states: “The law is clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records.”

Bell v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist. (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 672, 689 states: “blocked-billing entries render it virtually impossible to break down hours on a task-by-task basis between [those that are recoverable] and those that are not.”

“Counsel may not submit a plethora of noncompensable, vague, or block-billed attorney time entries and expect particularized, individual deletions as the only consequence.” Guillory v. Hill, (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 802, 815 (citing Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1329.) When vague, block-billed time entries inflated with noncompensable hours are submitted, a judge is well within his or her discretion to reduce the number of hours requested and deny a lodestar multiplier. Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1328-1329. Counsel “should maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims.” (Guillory v. Hill, supra, at 815. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 437.).)

If the description of work is vaguely described, the court will disallow it. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, (2008) 165 Cal.App. 4th 1315).

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Grp. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.) The court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. (Ingram v. Oroudjian (9th Cir.2011) 647 F.3d 925, 928.)”(Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

Nishiki v. Danko Meredith, APC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 883, 898 provides: “The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom [citation], and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 304; see also PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 997 P.2d 511 [“ ‘The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. [Citation.] The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony’ ”].) “The ‘ “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735.)”

Regarding the amount of hours spent, the Declaration of Dominique N. Westmoreland states: “9. In this matter, I spent at least 45 hours of my own time. However, this figure does not include each and every telephone conference, email, internal meetings conducted, and related activities. All of the work undertaken and performed by me on this case was necessary and reasonable. ¶ 10. Also, the amount requested does not include fees incurred by this firm’s attorneys who billed less than 20 hours for performing work in this action. ¶ 11. My hourly rate is $750. This is a reasonable rate is based on my years of experience as an attorney, my accolades and achievements, experience as a trial lawyer, the results obtained in litigating cases, and my experience in defending against contract and tort claims. ¶ 12. The successful results achieved in this action was by Defendants’ attorney through diligent and tireless efforts. The work performed in obtaining settlement agreement and eventually a significant monetary judgment was reasonable and necessary. All of the time was contemporaneously kept and was billed for legitimate, necessary activities such as: (1) meetings with clients, (2) drafting pleadings and motions, as well as, discovery, (3) attending court proceedings and oral arguments, (4) reviewing extensive documentation and evidence, (5) speaking with witnesses, (6) legal research and (7) drafting stipulations. ¶ 13. I personally drafted the pleadings, discovery requests, motions and stipulations and opposing documents in this action, as well as, I conducted the legal research. I also personally spoke to the clients and witnesses, and communicating with opposing counsel. I deposed witnesses to this action. I negotiated settlement agreements. ¶ 14. I participated in a informal settlement discussions. ¶ 15. Despite the parties binding settlement agreements, Defendants willfully breached the settlement agreements. ¶ 16. The hours set forth does not include a lot of significant time spent reading and reviewing e-mails, making phone calls, drafting internal memoranda, internal meetings, and various administrative tasks associated with this litigation.”

The Motion describes the hours as follows under “Description of Work”: “Lead trial counsel; day-to-day management of the case; research legal issues, draft documents; discovery; communications with clients and opposing counsel.”

It was unclear from the Motion how many hours were spent on the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, which are the only fees recoverable under Christian Research Inst. v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 1315.

The supplemental declaration states that all 45 hours were spent on the motion to strike. This seems at odds with the initial declaration. Furthermore, 16 hours researching the issues in the SLAPP, 15 hours drafting the motion, and 5 hours drafting a declaration (that was a little over a page) is excessive. The Court reduces the time spent on the research by 8 hours, the motion by 2 hours, and the declaration by 3 hours. This is a total reduction of 13 hours.

Thus, the total recoverable hours are 32 hours. The Court also reduces the rate to $500.00.

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ (JJ Zhang, Kevin Heckemeyer and Resmack, Inc.) Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. Defendants are awarded $16,000 in attorneys’ fees because this is what the Court determined was reasonably incurred by Plaintiffs.

Moving party to give notice.

No Future Events