Judge James L. Crandall, Case 21-1230198 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: James L. Crandall, Case: 21-1230198, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Petitioner Minh Sang Tan Le’s motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED.

Legal Standard

“The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is committed to the discretion of the trial court after the court determines (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial, and (2) the relative harms suffered by the parties.” (Pleasant Hill Bayshore Disposal, Inc. v. Chip-It Recycling, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 678, 695.)

The plaintiff has the burden of proof to show “upon a verified complaint, or upon affidavits” all elements necessary to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, (a); O’Connell v. Sup. Ct. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 526(a) provides,

“(a) An injunction may be granted in the following cases:

(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.

(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.

(3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

(4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief.

(5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief.

(6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.

(7) Where the obligation arises from a trust.”

“[I]n order to obtain injunctive relief the plaintiff must ordinarily show that the defendant's wrongful acts threaten to cause irreparable injuries, ones that cannot be adequately compensated in damages.” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352.)

DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 697, 721–722, holds:

“It is common to speak of the need to show threatened irreparable harm as the basis for an injunction. (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2008) Provisional Remedies, § 295, p. 236.) But the concept of irreparable harm means more than harm that cannot be repaired. Irreparable harm includes “ ‘that species of damages, whether great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other.’... [Citation.] ... ‘The argument that there is no “irreparable damage,” would not be so often used by [defendants] if they would take the trouble to observe that the word “irreparable” is a very unhappily chosen one, used in expressing the rule that an injunction may issue to prevent wrongs ... which occasion damages estimable only by conjecture and not by any accurate standard.’ ” (Wind v. Herbert (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 276, 285, 8 Cal.Rptr. 817.) Irreparable harm may be established where there is the fact of an injury, such as that arising from a breach of contract, but where there is an inability to ascertain the amount of damage. In other words, to say that the harm is irreparable is simply another way of saying that pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief or that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount that would afford adequate relief. (Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Helliker (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1167, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 191; Civ.Code, § 3422.)”

Merits

Here, Petitioner seeks a preliminary injunction granting relief including the following:

“1. Order Defendants Immediately restore/refund all his benefit (following paragraph 50 of Second Amended Verified Complaint)

2. Ordering Defendants to suspend:

All activities against the claimants for monetary re-determination benefits that result:

(1) results in a denial to claimants of benefits (including a cancellation of benefits or wage credits or any reduction in whole or in part below the weekly or maximum amount established by his monetary determination) for any week or other period; or

(2) in denies credit for a waiting week; or

(3) applies any disqualification or penalty; or

(4) in determines that he has not satisfied a condition of eligibility, requalification for benefits, or purging a disqualification; or

(5) in determines that an overpayment has been made or orders repayment or recoupment of any sum paid to him; or

(6) in applies a previously determined overpayment, penalty, or order for repayment or recoupment; or

(7) in any other way denies claimant a right to benefits under the CARES Act.” (Notice of Motion, pp. 2-3.)

In support of the motion, Petitioner submits his declaration which states, in summary, that Petitioner is a self-employed independent contractor entitled to benefits between January 2020 and September 2021, and that Respondents deprived Petitioner of benefits under the CARES Act.

In opposition, Respondent California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and Real Party in Interest Employment Development Department (collectively State Parties) contend that injunctive relief is not available because Petitioner’s only recourse is a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. State Parties also contend that Petitioner hasn’t met his burden of demonstrating irreparable harm or a probability of prevailing on the merits.

City of Pasadena v. Cohen (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1466–1467, states:

““It is settled that an action for declaratory relief is not appropriate to review an administrative decision.” (State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 249, 115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 524 P.2d 1281; accord, Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 149, 154–155, 166 Cal.Rptr.3d 837 [declaratory relief proper only to declare statute unconstitutional on face, and not as applied to plaintiff by an administrative agency].) Declaratory relief also cannot be joined with a writ of mandate reviewing an administrative determination. (Guilbert v. Regents of University of California (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 233, 244, 155 Cal.Rptr. 583.)9 It is therefore not material, as the City argues, that declaratory relief is otherwise available generally as a vehicle for interpreting statutes. The City admits in its brief that the “many” other Great Dissolution cases “presently pending at the superior court level are traditional writ of mandate cases.”

The trial court did not address this body of case law. It focused only on the lack of any express requirement under chapter 5X to seek relief in mandate. This absence of an express requirement, however, does not have any significance in light of the generally available remedy of traditional mandate and the generally applicable prohibition against declaratory “review” of agency actions.

The trial court therefore should not have granted a preliminary injunction pending a ruling on the merits of a claim for declaratory relief to which the City was not entitled as a matter of law. Instead, it should have taken one of two courses. Either it could have simply denied injunctive relief and dismissed the action on this ground (with or without leave to amend), or it could have construed the City's pleading as one seeking traditional mandate and (if it has adequately stated the City's entitlement to such relief) ruled on the merits of the challenge to the administrative determination (Hostetter v. Alderson (1952) 38 Cal.2d 499, 500, 241 P.2d 230; Boren v. State Personnel Bd. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 637–638, 234 P.2d 981), and issued the writ or denied the petition.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 1094(g) provides in part “the court. . . may stay the operation of the administrative order or decision pending the judgment of the court, or until the filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment or until the expiration of the time for filing the notice, whichever occurs first. However, no such stay shall be imposed or continued if the court is satisfied that it is against the public interest.”

Regardless of whether the Court construes the motion as a motion for preliminary injunction under Code of Civil Procedure sections 525 and 526 or a motion for discretionary relief under section 1094(g), Petitioner has not shown that preliminary relief is appropriate in this case.

The only evidence submitted by Petitioner in support of this motion is Petitioner’s declaration. In the declaration, Petitioner states that State Parties have wrongfully denied benefits under the CARES Act. Petitioner also cites the appendix to his Second Amended Verified Petition in support of the motion.

Neither Petitioner’s declaration nor the Second Amended Verified Petition and appendix demonstrates that Petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits at trial. Petitioner’s declaration is conclusory and insufficient to show that State Parties have violated his right to receive benefits. Petitioner’s appendix shows that State Parties’ decision was based on evidence including Petitioner’s tax documents which rendered him ineligible to receive increased benefits under the CARES Act.

Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that monetary damages would be an insufficient remedy. Rather, Petitioner’s alleged damages based on the difference between the benefits requested and the benefits paid could be readily calculated, thereby providing an adequate remedy at law.

Therefore, the motion is denied.

Defendant to give notice.