Judge: James L. Crandall, Case: 22-1258655, Date: 2022-11-03 Tentative Ruling
1. Motion to Strike
Defendant Jane Hyojung An’s (Defendant) Motion to Strike (Motion) Portions of the Complaint is DENIED.
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
Motions to strike are used to challenge defects in the pleadings not subject to demurrer. (Ferraro v. Kamerlingh (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 529 [recognizing that an objection that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is ground for a general demurrer, not a motion to strike.].)
Any party may move to strike the whole or any part of a pleading within the time allotted to respond to the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, sub. (b)(1).)
The allegations of a complaint “must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “read[s] allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume[s] their truth.” (Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)
Defendant moves to strike the following from the Complaint:
1. Page 2, lines 26-28, portions reading “probably hoping to delay detection of her consumption of alcohol or drugs, or hoping that the time delay would allow the alcohol or drugs in her system to dissipate.”
2. Page 3, lines 22-24, portions reading “Defendant JANE HYOJUNG AN is liable for punitive damages based on Civil Code §3294, as interpreted by Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.”
3. Page 4, line 1, in its entirety, reading “3. For punitive damages”
Plaintiff may recover damages “in an action from breach “not arising from contract” if Plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a).)
“Malice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(1).)
“Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(2).)
“Fraud means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)
A plaintiff’s “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, within the meaning of section 3294.” (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864.)
Defendant argues that the Complaint’s punitive damages allegations must be stricken because the Complaint must allege conduct that is “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible” in order to support a request for punitive damages and that merely alleging carelessness or negligence is insufficient for a claim for punitive damges. (Motion, 4-5.)
Defendant cites College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 for this argument. Thus, mere carelessness or negligence is insufficient for punitive damages.
College Hospital states: “However, the statute's reference to “despicable” conduct seems to represent a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards. Used in its ordinary sense, the adjective “despicable” is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” [citation] As amended to include this word, the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, “malice” requires more than a “willful and conscious” disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of “despicable conduct” must be found.” (Id.)
Additionally, Defendant argues that merely alleging driving under the influence is insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. (Motion, 6-9.) Defendant asserts that driving under the influence may support a claim for punitive damages if the complaint also alleges that the defendant acted with conscious disregard of probable dangerous consequences. Defendant cites to Taylor v. Superior Court, (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 892 (Taylor) for this argument.
Taylor states: “[T]he act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at 892.) Additionally, “one who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, “such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.” (Prosser, supra, s 2, at pp. 9-10.)” (Id. at 899.)
Defendant argues that based on the standard in Taylor, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim for punitive damages against Defendant because most of the facts alleged are “pure conjecture” regarding Defendant’s motivation for the actions alleged in paragraph 8. (Motion, 6-9.) In addition, the Complaint’s allegation that Defendant should have known better because she was a nurse is not actionable, as the Complaint does not allege how Defendant’s profession supports the proposition that Defendant acted with malice, oppression or fraud. (Id.)
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Motion must be denied because Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant became intoxicated and knowingly drove a vehicle despite knowing of safety hazards associated with driving under intoxication. (Opposition, 3-7.) This is sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages as defined under the requirements of Taylor and Dawes.
Further, Plaintiff asserts that the demurrer’s arguments about Plaintiff’s profession as a nurse and Plaintiff “probably” staying in the vehicle to cover up her intoxication are without merit. (Opposition, 3-7.) Whether Plaintiff’s occupation factors into her liability for punitive damages and whether Plaintiff stayed in the vehicle to cover up intoxication are both questions of fact for the jury and not to be determined at the pleading stage. (Id.)
Here, paragraph 8 of the Complaint states:
On or before the date/time of the automobile versus pedestrian collision, Defendant JANE HYOJUNG AN, knowing that she intended to operate a motor vehicle, consumed excessive amounts of alcohol and/or drugs. Additionally, she is a nurse, who should have been aware of the negative effects on the human body of consumption of excessive amounts of alcohol and/or drugs prior to operation of an automobile. After the collision, Defendant JANE HYOJUNG AN, knowing that she had just struck a pedestrian with her car, drove away from the victim into the private lot, stayed inside her locked car refusing to exit the car for substantial period of time, probably hoping to delay detection of her consumption of alcohol or drugs, or hoping that the time delay would allow the alcohol or drugs in her system to dissipate. Defendant JANE HYOJUNG AN admitted to the police officers following the collision that she had consumed at least one beer, and she displayed signs and symptoms commonly associated with inebriation, inferring that her admission was only partially true and she instead intended to cover up her bad acts. She at all times knew or should have known that it was unsafe for her to operate an automobile after consuming excessive amounts of alcohol and/or drugs.
Thus, the Complaint alleges that Defendant chose to consume “excessive amounts of alcohol and/or drugs” knowing that she intended to operate a motor vehicle. Pursuant to Taylor, such allegations are sufficient to allege that Defendant acted with a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interest of others. Liberally construing the Complaint, such allegations are sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages.
Therefore, Defendant Jane Hyojung An’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Plaintiff is to give notice.
2. Case Management Conference
Future hearing dates
No future hearing dates