Judge: James L. Crandall, Case: 22-1261726, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling
Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint
Portions of the Complaint (Motion), filed 6-29-22 under ROA No. 10 is GRANTED.
The court DENIES Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Opposition (see Opposition to Motion, filed 12-1-22 under ROA No.33, p. 18.) as Plaintiff does not demonstrate that the documents in the RJN fall under any portion of Evidence Code section 452.
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 436, “the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
Motions to strike are used to challenge defects in the pleadings not subject to demurrer. (Ferraro v. Kamerlingh (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 529 [recognizing that an objection that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is ground for a general demurrer, not a motion to strike.].) Any party may move to strike the whole or any part of a pleading within the time allotted to respond to the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, sub. (b)(1).) The allegations of a complaint “must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “read[s] allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume[s] their truth.” (Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)
Defendant moves to strike the following from the Complaint:
1. exemplary Damages Attachment, EX-1, EX-2 and EX-3, with attachment "1”
2. item 14.a.(2) of the Prayer which requests "punitive damages"
Plaintiff may recover damages “in an action from breach “not arising from contract” if Plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a).) “Malice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) A plaintiff’s “conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, within the meaning of section 3294.” (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864.)
Defendant contends that the Exemplary Damages Attachment and Prayer for punitive damages (paragraph 14(a)(2)) must be stricken because they constitute conclusions of law. The Complaint does not allege facts demonstrating that Defendant Jeremy Adam Block acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Motion, 3-6.)
Defendant also argues that to request punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident case, the Plaintiff must allege that Defendant engaged in “outrageous and reprehensible” actions such that a jury could infer that Defendant disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others. (Motion, 7-10) Defendants cite to Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 90 (Dawes) for this argument. Defendant argues that while the Complaint alleges that Defendant sped and used a cellphone, this amounts to at most negligence and not outrageous or reprehensible conduct.
Dawes states: “On the other hand, if the facts show that the defendant intentionally drove his vehicle at a high speed into an intersection crowded with pedestrians, or if he drove at a high speed through a crowded residential area where children were playing in the street, a legitimate inference of actual malice perhaps could arise. This would be particularly true if the defendant had not been drinking, or, if drinking, he was not under the influence to the point where he was incapable of being aware of the situation confronting him. Under these circumstances, it reasonably might be said that the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.” [citation]”
In opposition, Plaintiff argues generally that motor vehicle accidents in America have increased and that studies have shown that such accidents are largely due to distracted driving. Plaintiff cites to her request for judicial notice (RJN) for these arguments. Further, Plaintiff asserts that “nonintentional torts” may also form the basis of a prayer for punitive damages. Plaintiff cites to cases, including CRST, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1255, 1261 (CRST) for this argument. (Opposition, 3-4.)
CRST states: “California courts have long held that punitive damages may, under appropriate circumstances, be recoverable for nondeliberate or unintentional torts, including actions in which the theory of recovery for compensatory damages from the defendant is based on strict products liability [citation] or vicarious liability.” (CRST, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at 1261.)
Plaintiff also argues that the Complaint sufficiently alleges facts to support a claim for punitive damages against Defendant Jeremy A. Block. (Opposition, 6-9.) Specifically, the Complaint identifies that Defendant violated Vehicle Code sections 23123 and 23123.5 by using his cellphone while driving, and the Complaint also alleges that Defendant knew his “physical and mental capacities were impaired” by using a cellphone. The Exemplary Damages attachment also alleges that Defendant knew he was operating the vehicle in a “reckless and inattentive manner.”
Further, Plaintiff argues that cases involving drunk driving are analogous because “intentional distracted driving” represents the same kind of willful disregard the courts have found to be sufficient for punitive damages in drunk driving cases. Plaintiff cites to cases, including Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 894 for this argument. (Opposition, 12-13.)
In reply, Defendant argues that case law regarding drunk driving is not applicable because there are no allegations that Defendant was intoxicated or acted reprehensibly or outrageously.
Here, the Complaint alleges that “Defendants JEREMY ADAM BLOCK, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, acted in conscious and deliberate disregard of the rights and safety of Plaintiff, CYNTHIA DIANE PIZZURRO…in that Defendants, and each of them, willfully operated their vehicle in wrongful and willful disregard of the rights and safety of others…including but not limited to operating Defendants’ vehicle in a reckless and inattentive manner at a high rate of speed, well in excess of the posted speed limited while approaching a red traffic light with vehicles stopped for said red light; failing to bring Defendants’ vehicle to a stop prior to striking Plaintiff’s lawfully stopped vehicle; and operating a cellular telephone, by talking without using of a hands free device, and/or texting, and/or sending or receiving data, while operating the motor vehicle in question…” (see EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ATTACHMENT, ex-2 (b).) Each of the Complaint’s other allegations about Defendant’s actions allege that Defendant and Does 1 to 10, inclusive, all engaged in such actions. (see e.g., Complaint, p. 6(f).)
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the Complaint does not sufficiently allege facts against Defendant to support a claim for punitive damages. The Complaint, as phrased, does not sufficiently allege that Defendant was the individual who engaged in conduct that constituted malice, oppression, or fraud toward Plaintiff. Additionally, the court agrees with Defendant that Taylor is not applicable. Taylor requires something more than violation of the law and knowledge of physical or mental impairment. If that were not the case, every accident involving a DUI charge would allow for the recovery of punitive damages, which is simply not the case.
Therefore, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
In summary, Defendant Jeremy Adam Block’s (Defendant) Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint (Motion), filed 6-29-22 under ROA No. 10 is GRANTED, with 30 days leave to amend.
Defendant is to give notice.