Judge Jill Feeney, Case Number: 19STCV02947, Date: 2024-05-07 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for violations of the FEHA and the Labor Code. Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Defendants between 1978 and 2018. Despite her good performance in her job functions throughout her employment, Defendants terminated her in 2018. Plaintiff was over 40 years old at the time of her termination and was replaced by someone significantly younger.

On January 28, 2019, Plaintiff Frances Atkins filed her Complaint against Defendants St. Cecilia Catholic School (St. Cecilia) and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (Archbishop).

Defendant St. Cecilia moves for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that it is not an “employer” under the FEHA because it is a religious association or corporation not organized for private profit.

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Citations Omitted).) The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)

“No motion may be made pursuant to this section if a pretrial conference order has been entered pursuant to Section 575, or within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits.”

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, section 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).)

Evidence Code Section 452 provides that judicial notice may be taken for facts and propositions that are “not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, section 452(h).) Further, “a court may take judicial notice of [recorded documents and] the fact of a document's recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document's legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document's authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 745-755.)

1. Internal Review Services Exempt Organizations Business Master File Extract for the State of California, last updated on 04/11/2024, Exempt Organizations Business Master File Extract (EO BMF) | Internal Revenue Service (irs.gov) and

2. Exempt Organizations Business Master File Extract | Internal Revenue Service (irs.gov) File Extract, listing St. Cecilia as an exempt and nonprofit religious organization; Line – 170293, Column A – EIN 95111156, Column B – Saint Cecilia School.

The Court will take not take judicial notice of the results of the searches of the IRS’s website and of the printout from the California Department of Education’s website because information taken from the websites does not constitute a certified record of either entity.

Gov. Code 12926 provides in relevant part that an “Employer” includes “any person regularly employing five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, the state or any political or civil subdivision of the state, and cities, except as follows: ‘Employer’ does not include a religious association or corporation not organized for private profit.”

““Religious corporation” means any corporation formed under, or otherwise subject to, Part 4 (commencing with Section 9110) or Part 6 (commencing with Section 10000) of Division 2 of Title 1 of the Corporations Code, and also includes a corporation that is formed primarily or exclusively for religious purposes under the laws of any other state to administer the affairs of an organized religious group and that is not organized for private profit.” (Gov. Code, section 12962.2.)

A religious corporation not organized for private profit is not an employer under FEHA and thus not subject to its prohibitions. (Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tustin (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1049.) If an organization qualifies as a religious association or corporation not organized for private profit under section 12926(d), it will be exempt from FEHA regardless of the nature of the employee’s job or the type of discrimination it allegedly practiced. (Kelly v. Methodist Hospital of Southern Cal. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1108, 1119.)

Even assuming arguendo that St. Cecilia’s qualifies as a non-profit, Defendant fails to point to any allegation in the pleading or any judicially noticeable fact that it is a religious corporation or association as defined by Gov. Code, section 12962.

The FAC states in relevant part that “ST. CECILIAS SCHOOL is and was a California unincorporated association, whose principal address 4224 S. Normandie Ave. Los Angeles, California 90037 and was plaintiff’s employer.” (FAC ¶2.) Additionally, “THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF LOS ANGELES dba ST. CECILIAS SCHOOL is and was a corporation sole and was plaintiff’s employer” [sic]. (FAC ¶4.)

Although the FAC does allege that St. Cecilia is not a separate entity from the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles because it was a dba of the Archbishop, there are no allegations that Archbishop or St. Cecilia were corporations or associations formed for religious purposes. None of the judicially noticed materials include information that these entities were formed primarily or exclusively for religious purposes. Defendant merely provides the definition of “Catholic School” from Wikipedia. This fact is not judicially noticeable, nor is it part of the FAC. Because this information is extraneous to the FAC, the Court will not consider it.