Judge: Jill Feeney, Case: 19STCV04354, Date: 2023-10-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV04354 Hearing Date: October 24, 2023 Dept: 78
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 78
CRECENCIO RODRIGUEZ and NEYLA RODRIGUEZ
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants. Case No.: 19STCV04354
Hearing Date: October 24, 2023
[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.
Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees and costs is GRANTED in the reduced amount as described below.
Moving party to give notice.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is an action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The Complaint alleges as follows.
Plaintiffs Crecencio Rodriguez (“Crecencio”) and Neyla Rodriguez (“Neyla,” together with Crecencio, “Plaintiffs”) purchased a new 2016 Ford Explorer (the “Subject Vehicle”) manufactured by Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”). (Compl. ¶ 9.)
The vehicle was sold with an express warranty. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs repeatedly brought the vehicle to Defendant Galpin Ford (“Galpin”) for repair, but Galpin was unable to fix the Subject Vehicle. (Compl. ¶¶ 57-58.)
Despite the numerous defects, Ford refused to either repair or repurchase the Subject Vehicle. (Compl. ¶ 25.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 8, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint asserting four causes of action:
1. Violation of Song-Beverly Act (Breach of Express Warranty);
2. Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty;
3. Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2; and
4. Negligent Repair
On March 18, 2019, Defendants filed an Answer.
On June 21, 2022, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the fourth cause of action for negligent repair.
On January 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement.
On July 25, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for attorney fees.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
With respect to attorney fees and costs, unless a statute provides for them, (e.g., Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.)¿ The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿ (Civ. Code § 1717, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc, §§ 1032; 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A).)¿ The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿ (Civ. Code § 1717, subds. (a), (b).)¿ A party moving for attorneys’ fees as an element of costs shall serve and file the notice before or at the same time the party serves and files the memorandum of costs; if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the party shall serve and file the notice within the time specified in the Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700 for filing a memorandum of costs.¿ (Cal. Rules Court. 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.)¿¿¿
Under the Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) the prevailing party in an action that arises out of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entitled to fees that were reasonably incurred: “If the buyer prevails under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the Court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) ¿¿¿
“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”¿ (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”¿ (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)¿ “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.”¿ (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.)¿ The court may then adjust the lodestar figure based on consideration of factors specific to the case, to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.¿ (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].)¿
In challenging attorney fees as excessive because the moving party claimed too many hours of work, the challenging party bears the burden of pointing to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿ (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿ General arguments that the fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.¿ (Ibid.)¿¿
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek $113,366.50 in sanctions for Knight Law Group, LLP (“KLG”) and $10,170 for Boucher LLP (“Boucher”) with a 0.5 enhancement for a total of $212,198.79. Plaintiffs argue that they are the prevailing party under Civ. Code, section 1032 and 1794.)
The Court notes that Plaintiffs object to Defendants’ evidence submitted in support of their opposition to the motion for attorneys’ fees. These objections are overruled.
The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees is reasonable and what an appropriate award for fees is.
Plaintiffs argue that the nature and complexity of the instant litigation supports the attorneys’ fees requested because lemon law cases require specialized knowledge and because Defendants refused to buy back Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Additionally, the firms’ skill justifies the attorneys’ fees sought. Plaintiffs also seek a 0.5 multiplier on the grounds that the firms took a risk by taking Plaintiffs’ case on a contingency basis.
Plaintiffs’ counsel provides a summary of the litigation. KLG propounded and responded to discovery, participated in IDC, filed discovery motions, took depositions, participated in depositions of Plaintiffs and their expert, opposed Ford’s motion for summary judgment, opposed Ford’s motion for reconsideration, and participated in mediation. (Kirnos Decl., ¶¶12-22.) Boucher prepared motions in limine, jury instructions, verdict forms, witness and exhibit lists, and briefings, identified and organized trial exhibits, and created trial examination outlines. (Boucher Decl., ¶13.)
Reasonableness of Hourly Rates
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ counsels’ hourly rates are excessive and unsupported by evidence. Defendants allege that Plaintiffs’ counsels’ rates are higher than rates for partners at their firms and that both the attorney and paralegal rates are higher than reasonable rates for lemon law litigation. Defendants argue that other courts have ruled that rates of $325-$450 were unreasonable for associates and partners. Defendants cite several unpublished cases in support of this argument.
In assessing the reasonableness of hourly billing rates,¿“the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.¿(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see¿Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 272 [“a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors . . . [including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case”].)¿
Here, KLG’s hourly rates range between $200 and $595. The highest rate is attributed to Scot Wilson, a partner at KLG. (Kirnos Decl., ¶43.) Plaintiffs’ counsel testifies that these rates were previously approved by other courts and are consistent with rates charged by attorneys with comparable experience in consumer rights law. (Kirnos Decl., ¶¶48-68.) KLG does not charge for work performed by paralegals and support staff. (Id., ¶47.) Kirnos testifies that each attorney on this case has between two and around twenty years of experience. (Id., ¶¶29-45.)
The Court finds that KLG’s hourly rates are reasonable based on KLG’s evidence, involvement in this litigation, the lack of billing for support staff time, its attorneys’ experience in the field based on the papers filed in this case, and the court’s “own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market”.¿ Although Plaintiff argues that the use of 18 time keepers was unreasonable, the number of attorneys working on one case does not necessarily make the attorneys’ hourly rates unreasonable.
With respect to Boucher, Boucher seeks attorney’s fees at a rate of $450 and paralegal fees at a rate of $250. Plaintiff’s’ counsel Boucher provides examples where other courts have approved this rate and that the rates are within acceptable rates as set forth in the National Law Review Journal’s 2015 billing survey. (Boucher Decl., ¶17.) Counsel Tracy L. Eggitt is an attorney who earned her juris doctor in 2004, worked for national law firms in Los Angeles for several years, and has been working with Boucher since 2019. (Boucher Decl., Exh. 1.)
The Court finds that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiffs are excessive with respect to Boucher LLP because this case was a straightforward lemon law case and Boucher largely performed clerical work preparing and organizing materials in preparation for trial. Because Boucher’s involvement in the litigation was not nearly as extensive as KLG’s involvement, the Court reduces its fee rates to $225 for Eggit and $125 for paralegals.
Reasonableness of Hours Billed
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ counsel billed unreasonable and unnecessary time because the firms billed excessively for template-based and unreasonable work. Additionally, the firms billed unnecessarily for internal tasks, block bills, and duplicative tasks. Specifically, Defendants argue that (1) block billed entries, (2) internal tasks, and (3) clerical tasks were unreasonable.
A prevailing party’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v.¿Krepel¿(1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Lunada¿Biomedical v. Nunez¿(2014) 240 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)
KLG provides a detailed account of its billing. (Kirnos Decl., Exh. A.) Defendants provide a chart of tasks which they believe were unreasonably billed.
The Court finds that the following tasks were unreasonable:
• Clerical work such as updating and reviewing internal files, preparing and reading internal summaries, and preparing and reading internal reports
• Drafting of a motion for judicial termination that was not filed
• Work duplicative of that done by the second law firm on the case
Date Biller Description Hrs/Rate Reduction Amount Reason
4/15/2019 MC Review Notice of Removal; update file 0.3, $300/hr $90 Clerical
5/6/2019 DK Prepare post-hearing report 0.3, $250/hr $75 Internal communication
5/13/2019 ALM Confer with DM re preparing proposed stipulation to remand case back to state court 0.2, $250/hr $50 Internal communication
3/30//2020 SW Review updated case file and trial memo and discuss action items with C. Kelly and D. Folia 0.3, $595/hr $178.50 Internal communication
4/14/2020 SW Review updated case file and trial memo and discuss action items with C. Kelly and D. Folia 0.3, $595/hr $178.50 Internal communication
4/20/2020 ALM Review email from opposing counsel re issue re Plaintiff’s MTC deposition of Defendant’s PMK and discuss with staff. 0.2, $350/hr $14 Internal communication
4/29/2020 ALM Meeting with Natalee/RK to discuss opposing counsel request for trial continuance 0.2, $350/hr $70 Internal communication
5/18/2020 SW Update case memo and discuss current calendar and action items with D. Folia and C. Kelly 0.3, $595/hr $178.50 Internal communication
6/24/2020 SW Analyze and discuss case status, projects, discovery, and action items with D. Folia and C. Kelly 0.2, $595/hr $119 Internal communication
7/1/2020 SW Review memo and discuss exhibit list with D. Folia 0.1, $595/hr $59.50 Internal Communication
7/17/2020 SW Review case status and prepare memo re action items for next two weeks 0.1, $595/hr $59.50 Internal Communication
7/22/2020 SW Telephone conference call with D. Folia and C. Kelly re case status and action items 0.2, $595/hr $119 Internal communication
8/10/2020 ALM Meeting with Conor to discuss opposing counsel refusal to appear at remote deposition of Defendant’s dealership personnel 0.2, $350/hr $70 Internal communication
8/13/2020 CK Draft strategic memo re discovery status for trial 0.4, $415/hr $166 Internal communication
9/17/2020 SW Meeting with C. Kelly and D. Folia re case status and issues 0.1, $595/hr $59.50 Internal communication
10/5/2020 ALM Review email from opposing counsel re scheduling deposition of Defendant’s dealership personnel and discuss with staff 0.2, $350/hr $70 Internal communication
10/20/2020 ALM Review email from opposing counsel requesting technology to be used in connection with deposition of Defendant’s dealership personnel and discuss with staff 0.2, $350/hr $14 Internal communication
11/30/2020 DK Confer with HA re preparing Plaintiffs’ position re joint report in advance of IDC 0.2, $250/hr $50 Internal communication
12/1/2020 DK Prepare post-hearing report re informal discovery conference including appearances, arguments made, guidance from Court and steps and strategy moving forward 0.6, $250/hr $150 Internal communication
12/14/2020 KE Discuss trial with S. Wilson 0.4, $450/hr $180 Internal communication
3/8/2021 ALM Meeting with Armando to discuss whether agreeable to trial continuance 0.2, $400/hr $40 Internal communication
3/10/2021 ALM Meeting with Armando to discuss trial continued 0.1, $400/hr $40 Internal communication
3/22/2021 DK Confer with CS and AL re preparing discovery requests re Ford’s pre-litigation attempts to settle case and deficiencies 0.2, $295/hr $59 Internal communication
4/14/2021 CS Call with Daniel K. re discovery revisions 0.3, $425/hr $127.50 Internal communication
5/19/2021 DK Confer with AL re stipulating to continue Ford’s MSJ hearing in light of outstanding discovery 0.1,$295/hr $29.50 Internal communication
9/21/2021 DK Confer with AL re Ford’s recent responses to Plaintiffs’ written discover set two, deficient responses and objections, and moving to compel 0.6, $295/hr $177 Internal communication
11/2/2021 MC Review and sign Notice of Taking Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel RFP; RFA; Special ROGs off calendar 0.1, $345/hr $34.50 Clerical
11/2/2021 MC Review and sign Notice of Taking Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery off calendar 0.1, $345/hr $34.50 Clerical, duplicative
12/1/2021 AL In anticipation of drafting motion pursuant to CCP 2035.285: research re Defendant’s clawback letter; research re: 2035.285, trade secret privilege, and waiver of privilege 0.4, $275/hr $110 Motion was never filed
12/1/2021 AL Begin drafting Plaintiffs’ motion for judicial determination of Defendant’s claim of privilege under section 2035.285 0.8, $275/hr $220 Motion was never filed
12/3/2021 AL Draft Plaintiffs’ motion for judicial determination of claim of privilege, declaration, proposed order, notice of filing conditionally under seal 2.2, $275/hr $605 Motion was never filed
12/7/2021 DK Conduct partial review of certain Ford’s document production re presuit offers/letters to determine whether it is appropriate to include in group or global deposition as proposed by defense and confer with CS and RK re the same 0.1, $295/hr $5.90 Internal communication
2/2/2022 AL Review Defendant’s proposed SPO and internal discussion re strategy 0.4, $325/hr $26 Internal communication
4/18/2022 HA Review file re status of written discovery paperwork 0.1, $350/hr $35 Clerical
4/20/2022 KE Draft statement of the case 0.5, $450/hr $225 Internal communication
4/21/2022 KE Draft request for mini opening 0.5, $450/hr $225 Duplicative of hours billed by Eggit of Boucher.
4/21/2022 KE Draft request for juror questionnaire 0.5, $450/hr $225 Duplicative of hours billed by Eggit of Boucher.
4/21/2022 KE Draft voir dire questionnaire brief 0.5, $450/hr $225 Duplicative of hours billed by Eggit of Boucher.
4/21/2022 KE Draft jury instruction 0.5, $450/hr $405 Duplicative of hours billed by Eggit of Boucher.
4/21/2022 KE Draft witness list 0.5, $450/hr $405 Duplicative of hours billed by Eggit of Boucher.
4/25/2022 DD Draft and revise jury instructions 0.2, $375/hr $75 Duplicative of hours billed by Eggit of Boucher and KE of KLG.
4/25/2022 DD Draft and revise verdict form 0.2, $375/hr $112.50 Duplicative of hours billed by Eggit of Boucher and KE of KLG.
4/25/2022 DD Draft and revise witness list 0.2, $375/hr $150 Duplicative of hours billed by Eggit of Boucher and KE of KLG.
4/25/2022 DD Draft statement of the case 0.2, $375/hr $75 Duplicative of hours billed by Eggit of Boucher and KE of KLG.
4/25/2022 DD Review Ford Opps to Plt MILs to determine need for Replies 0.7, $375/hr $262.50 Duplicative of hours billed by Eggit of Boucher and KE of KLG.
4/21/2022 ALM Read and review summary re results of hearing on Plaintiff’s MTC further discovery responses from Defendant 0.2, $425/hr $85 Internal communication
5/1/2022 ALM Read and review summary re results of deposition of Defendant’s expert 0.1, $425/hr $42.50 Clerical
5/2/2022 ALM Read and review summary of results re results of deposition of Plaintiff’s expert 0.1, $425/hr $42.50 Clerical
6/21/2022 ALM Review summary re results of hearing on MSJ/MSA; IDC re MTC Further RFP; MTC Further SROG; TSC 0.1, $425/hr $42.50 Clerical
8/23/2022 AL Confer with DK re status of MSJ and deposition topics 0.2, $325/hr $65 Internal communication
8/24/2022 ALM Meeting with Armando to discuss whether filing MTC further deposition of Defendant’s PMK 0.1,$425/hr $42.50 Internal communication
TOTAL: $6,199.90
The remaining tasks were reasonable:
• Reviewing and signing motions, objections, responses to discovery, communications from opposing counsel, notices
• Preparation for hearings
• Appearing at hearings
• Appearing for deposition
• Communication with Plaintiffs, experts, and opposing counsel
• Performing legal research
• Limited travel expenses
• Drafting discovery motions that were reasonably filed and later taken off calendar. Although Defendants argue this was excessive, the motions were properly filed because Defendant failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s written discovery requests.
The Court does not find that the amount of time spent on the instant motion was excessive. This motion included extensive time logs and declarations from counsel. Additionally, because this motion was opposed, Plaintiffs’ billing anticipating time spent on a reply was reasonable.
Lodestar Multiplier
After calculating the lodestar amount, the court may increase or decrease the amount “by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier' to take into account a variety of other factors.” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489). Those factors include, but are not limited to:(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) success or failure, (4) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (5) the contingent nature of the fee award, (6) that an award against the state would ultimately fall upon the taxpayers, (7) that the attorneys in question received public and charitable funding for the purpose of bringing lawsuits of the character here involved, and (8) that the monies awarded would inure not to the individual benefit of the attorneys involved but the organizations by which they are employed. (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 751). Such an approach “anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” (Id.). However, “a trial court should not consider these factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138).
Plaintiffs request a .5 positive multiplier. Plaintiffs contend that such a multiplier is warranted due to the contingent nature of this action.
“Although the attorney's fee agreement is relevant and may be considered, the agreement does not compel any particular award.” (Glaviano, 22 Cal.App.5th at 757).
The court finds that here the lodestar amount calculated above already accounts for the contingency risk and delay in receiving payment, as well as the public interest in these cases. That is because the substantial hourly rates allowed for by the court are hourly rates for lemon law cases done on a contingency basis. Furthermore, consideration of other factors such as the lack of novelty and complexity in this case do not support awarding a positive multiplier.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request that the lodestar amount be adjusted upward is denied.
Costs
Defendants allege that Plaintiffs’ request for costs is excessive. Specifically, Defendants allege that the costs for service of process, witness fees, expert witness fees, attorney services fees, court filing and service fees, and court call fees are unreasonable.
Within 10 days after service of the memorandum of costs, the judgment debtor may file with the court, and serve on the judgment creditor a noticed motion to tax costs. (Code Civ. Proc., section 685.070(c).) If no motion to tax costs is made within the time provided in subdivision (c), the costs claimed in the memorandum are allowed. (Code Civ. Proc., section 685.070(d). Section 685.070 does not apply where a judgment has not been entered and a court does not lose jurisdiction to rule on a motion to tax costs even if no motion to tax costs was filed within the 10-day period. (Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. v. Lee (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 125, 146.)
Here, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ request to tax costs is not timely because it was not filed within 10 days of service of the memorandum of costs. However, because no judgment has been entered here, the 10-day deadline in Code Civ. Proc., section 685.070 does not apply. Defendants’ request to tax costs is not time-barred.
Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’ request to tax costs is procedurally defective because Defendants were required to file a motion to tax costs. However, Plaintiffs are claiming costs through a noticed motion as permitted under Code Civ. Proc., sections 685.040 and 685.080. Because Plaintiffs claimed the costs on a noticed motion, Defendants are permitted to challenge the costs in opposition.
Under Code Civ. Proc., section 1033.5, subd. (c)(2), allowable costs “shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” Subdivision (3) requires: “Allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount.” If costs are requested through a noticed motion under Code Civ. Proc., section 685.080, the motion must be supported by an affidavit of a person who has knowledge of the facts and must state that, to the person's best knowledge and belief, the costs are correct, reasonable, and necessary, and have not been satisfied. (Code Civ. Proc., section 685.080(b).)
Service of Process: These costs are expressly allowable under Code Civ. Proc. section 1033.5 (a)(4)(B) and do not appear to be unreasonable. Although Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to provide evidence of these fees, Plaintiffs were not required to submit evidence of costs other than an affidavit of a person who has knowledge of the costs. Here, KLG provided the declaration of Roger Kirnos in support of the fees. (Kirnos Decl., ¶3.)
Defendants argue that service on Defendants after the initial service fee is unreasonable because Plaintiffs knew Defendants were all represented by the same counsel. The memorandum of costs shows that Plaintiffs incurred $30 and $60 in “other” fees for Galpin Ford. Plaintiffs did not specify what this additional $90 was for. The costs are also not consistent with Plaintiffs’ counsel’s records. (Devabose Decl., Exh. B.) These costs are unreasonable and will be taxed. Additionally, there are many duplicate payments for service fees on Sunrise Ford, all for the same date, noticing deposition subpoenas. (Devabose Decl., Exh. B.) These fees will be reduced to one single service fee. The last four entries under the service of process category appear to be for service on different people on different dates. Thus, these fees are not unreasonable. The total to be taxed is $475.
Filing and motion fees: Filing and motion fees are expressly allowable under Code Civ. Proc., section 1033.5, subd. (a)(1). The Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles implemented mandatory electronic filing for parties represented by attorneys. Because electronic filing is mandatory, these fees are allowable under Code Civ. Proc. section 1033.5 subd. (a)(14). As for the court call fees, the court finds these fees are reasonably necessary for Plaintiffs’ counsel to appear via Court Call.
Expert witness fees: These fees are allowable because, as Plaintiffs point out, Civ. Code section 1794 expressly allows an award of costs and expenses to cover costs and expenses including expert witness fees. (Civ. Code, section 1794(d); Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 138.) Although Code Civ. Proc., section 1033.5 ordinarily does not allow fees for experts not ordered by the court, this is only the case unless expressly authorized by law. Because the expert fees are expressly authorized under Civ. Code, section 1794(d), the fees are allowable.
Regular witness fees: These fees are expressly allowable under Code Civ. Proc., section 1033.5, subd. (a)(8). These fees will not be taxed.
Other fees: Defendants argue that nothing within California law authorizes courier service. The memorandum of costs includes $964.59 in attorney services and messenger and court filings service. These fees appear to be for courtesy copy deliveries. Defendants also argue that the fees for copies and postage are not allowable. The Court finds that these fees are reasonably incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with this litigation and are allowable under Civ. Code, section 1794 and Code Civ. Proc., section 1033.5.
The costs to be taxed total $475.
The court awards attorney fees and costs as follows.
Attorney Fees
KLG $107,166.60
Boucher $5,085
Costs
KLG $26,419.04
DATED: October 24, 2023
________________________
Hon. Jill Feeney
Judge of the Superior Court