Judge Jill Feeney, Case 19STCV20500 2022-12-20 Tentative Ruling

The parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if there is an agreement to submit.

Regardless of whether there is any such agreement, each party who wishes to submit must send an email to the Court at sscdept30@lacourt.org indicating the party's intention to submit.

Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the case number in the subject line of the email and in the body provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, or non-party.

If a party submits but still intends to appear at the hearing, include the words "SUBMITS BUT WILL APPEAR" in the subject line of the email.

If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Unless all the parties have submitted, the Court will hear argument from any party that appears at the hearing and wishes to argue. The Court may change its tentative as a result of the argument and adopt the changed tentative as the final order at the end of that hearing, even if all the parties are not present.

Be advised that after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of said motion and may adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

On June 12, 2019, Plaintiff Jeffrey David Ryan (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Henkels & McCoy, Inc. and Martin Lopez Martinez. Plaintiff alleges general and motor vehicle negligence in the complaint arising from an automobile collision that occurred on October 12, 2017.

On September 22, 2020, Complainant-in-Intervention Travelers Property Casualty Company of America filed a complaint-in-intervention against Defendant/Cross-Complainant Henkels & McCoy, Inc. and Defendant Martin Lopez Martinez.

Defendants argue that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 are satisfied because the parties signed a written settlement agreement stipulating to the Court’s continued jurisdiction over the matter to enforce a settlement. Defendants contend that they mistakenly issued a check that did not include the name of Plaintiff’s former attorney, Gary Goldberg, due to a clerical error. Plaintiff’s current attorney then cashed the check and failed to pay or sequester the funds necessary to satisfy Goldberg’s attorney’s lien on the settlement funds in violation of the settlement agreement. Goldberg threatened Defendants with further legal action to satisfy his lien. Defendants also request sanctions including contempt, an order of disgorgement of funds necessary to satisfy the lien, and monetary sanctions.

Plaintiff argues that his counsel, Joseph Farzam, is in the process of negotiating Goldberg’s attorney’s lien and requests a continuance of six months to resolve the issue. On October 11, 2022, Farzam sent Goldberg a counteroffer of $9,000 to settle his lien and an offer to arbitrate through the Los Angeles County Bar Association (“LACBA”). Farzam has not heard back from Goldberg.

Defendants request that the Court order Farzam to confirm in writing that all liens have been satisfied or that Farzam and Goldberg have entered into an agreement to arbitrate the fee dispute. Defendants also argue that the proper venue for resolution of the fee dispute is Riverside, not Los Angeles.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, “if parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” “Section 664.6 was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809.)

To be enforceable under Code Civ Proc., section 664.6, any written settlement agreement outside of court must be signed by the parties and their counsel. Although the Court may adjudicate disputes over the terms of the settlement agreement, the Court may not modify terms from what was agreed to by the parties. (Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 797.)

A court may not enter judgment on a settlement agreement if material terms are missing from the agreement, including the amount a defendant is obligated to pay. (Gauss v GAF Corp. (2002) 103 CA4th 1110, 1123.)

Defendants move to enforce settlement on the grounds that Plaintiff’s counsel, Farzam, failed to sequester funds or make necessary efforts to satisfy former counsel Goldberg’s attorney’s lien on the settlement funds. Plaintiff also seeks sanctions, including contempt or monetary sanctions, against Farzam, and an order compelling disgorgement of funds necessary to satisfy Goldberg’s lien.

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine if the settlement agreement is enforceable under Code Civ. Proc., section 664.6. Additionally, the Court must determine whether the parties agreed that the Court retains jurisdiction over this matter to enforce the settlement agreement. Lastly, the Court must determine what the terms of the settlement agreement were to enforce those terms without modifying the terms agreed to by the parties.

Here, the settlement agreement states it “shall be specifically enforceable under the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6. The Los Angeles County Superior Court, State of California, shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Agreement against the nonperforming Party pursuant to this provision.”

Plaintiff hereby represents and warrants that all unsatisfied liens of any kind for which Defendants are responsible or could become responsible, including but not limited to, workers’ compensation liens, Medicare/Medical liens, physician liens, hospital liens, therapists’ liens, chiropractors’ liens, or liens of any other medical treatment provider, including insurance liens, or attorney liens arising from or related to the Incident or the facts, circumstances, or occurrences which are the subject of the Suit, will be satisfied by Plaintiff and that Defendants will and have directed Plaintiff’s counsel to sequester funds necessary to satisfy all liens in a Trust account and to negotiate and satisfy all liens out of said settlement funds paid by Defendants. (Agreement, ¶13.)

The terms of the settlement agreement state that Plaintiff shall satisfy all liens, including attorney’s liens arising from this action. The agreement also indicates that Plaintiff’s counsel is to sequester funds necessary to satisfy all liens and is to negotiate and satisfy all liens out of the settlement funds paid by Defendants.

Based upon the agreed upon terms of the settlement, Plaintiff’s counsel is ordered to sequester in a trust account $35,315.42. This amount is to remain sequestered until such time as the fee dispute with Plaintiff’s former counsel is fully resolved and Plaintiff’s former counsel has received his fees.