Judge Jill Feeney, Case 19STCV27135 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling

On August 2, 2019, Plaintiff Edgar R. Virula filed his complaint against Defendant CALTRANS and Does 1-20 alleging causes of action for negligence arising from a vehicle accident which took place on March 25, 2018. Plaintiff alleges that Doe 1, later named Defendant Jesus Durazo, was an employee of Defendant CALTRANS who caused Plaintiff to lose control of his motorcycle when making an unsafe left turn, causing him to be thrown against a brick wall and suffer severe injuries.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages should be adjudicated in favor of Defendants because Plaintiff’s claim is based on the allegation the Defendant Durazo left the scene of the accident. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to establish the requisite elements to recover punitive damages because Defendant Durazo did not leave the scene of the accident and Plaintiff has not provided evidence demonstrating otherwise.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., section 437c, subd. (c).)

A motion for summary judgment with respect to punitive damages must be adjudicated under the clear and convincing evidence standard. (Reader's Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 252) Summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages is proper only when no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff’s evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud, or oppression. (Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 762)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)¿These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, section 3294, subd. (a).)¿

“Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code section 3294, subd. (c)(1)].)¿“A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code.¿In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.”¿(Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)¿

An employer shall not be liable for punitive damages unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him with conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. Code Civ. Proc. section 3294, subd. (b) Punitive damages may not be imposed upon corporations vicariously by virtue of the fault of others unless there is proof of malice among corporate leaders because corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.)

Defendants argue that summary adjudication should be granted because Defendant Durazo did not leave the scene of the accident. Defendant produces evidence that (1) Defendant Durazo’s vehicle did not make contact with Plaintiff’s motorcycle; (2) Defendant Durazo stopped to check on Plaintiff, calm him, and call 911; and (3) Defendant Durazo left the scene to park his vehicle at a nearby maintenance yard after paramedics arrived.

Defendant Durazo stated in his deposition that his vehicle did not make contact with Plaintiff’s motorcycle. (Compendium of Evidence, p. 34.) Once he saw Plaintiff by the wall, he “stopped, turned on [his] rotator, looked at [his] window to make sure there was no cars coming…climbed off…[and] went to assist the motorcycle that was down.” (Id., p. 31.) Additionally, Defendant Durazo stated he was “trying to tell him to calm down, not to move” and that he was “trying to get 911.” (Ibid.) Defendant Durazo further testified that he left the scene “when the paramedics were coming out” to move his vehicle to the Las Flores Canyon maintenance yard. (Id., p. 32.)

Taylor testified that Defendant Durazo’s vehicle “did not” make contact with Plaintiff’s motorcycle. (Compendium of Evidence, p. 17.) Nevertheless, Durazo stopped his truck, “got out and came over to see if [Plaintiff] was okay,” and stayed for a few minutes before leaving to move his vehicle. (Id., pp. 18-21.)

On March 25, 2018 at approximately 12-1.00 noon I was traveling southbound on Las Flores Canyon Road on my motorcycle when I approached two vehicles. The first vehicle leading was a big plow truck of some sort. The second vehicle was a regular sedan following the truck. I was behind the sedan. I was just starting my ride of the day. I waited behind both vehicles because it was only a two-way road and there was traffic in both directions I followed for about ¼ of a mile when suddenly the lead truck turn on right turn signal. I continued following them, when suddenly the truck started to merge right and continued to merge right onto the right shoulder giving me more than enough room in our lane to continue moving forward and pass safely. The car behind the truck also followed or did the same actions as the truck. So the truck moved into the shoulder to the right with his right turn signal on. I continued passing on the left side of the lane with more than enough distance between us, when all of a sudden the truck decided to turn left (with still his turn signal indicating right turn) right until my path. I tried to avoid him by going left once, but the truck continued going more left into my path. The truck was directly into my path and was going to cause me to ride right into the truck, so I braked to stop and that’s all I remembered.”

“the truck moved into the shoulder to the right with his right turn signal on. I continued passing on the left side of the lane with more than enough distance between us, when all of a sudden the truck decided to turn left (with still his turn signal indicating right turn) right into my path. I tried to avoid him by going left once, but the truck continued going more left into my path. The truck was directly into my path and was going to cause me to ride right into the truck, so I braked to stop and that’s all I remembered.”

(UMF, No. 5.) Plaintiff’s responses to special interrogatories state there are no writings to support Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Durazo left the scene of the accident and confirm that Mr. Taylor has knowledge of the facts in Plaintiff’s discovery responses. (UMF, Nos. 6-7.)

In light of Defendants’ evidence as well as the lack of contradictory evidence in Plaintiff’s discovery responses, the Court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden of making a prima facie showing that Durazo’s conduct and state of mind were not malicious. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Durazo remained at the scene of the accident to check on Plaintiff and call 911, only leaving after paramedics arrived.