Judge Jill Feeney, Case 19STCV28264 2022-10-26 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff filed identical opposition papers with respect to each motion. Plaintiff argues he has adequately stated a claim for punitive damages based on malice or oppression and that Defendants’ state of mind is a factor for a jury to assess.

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)

“Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)

After Taylor, the Legislature amended the “malice” standard interpreted by the Supreme Court in that case to add the requirement that malicious conduct under section 3294 be shown to be “despicable” and “willful.” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211.) As noted above, “[t]he statute’s reference to ‘despicable conduct’ represent[ed] ‘a new substantive limitation on punitive damage award.’” (Ibid. (quoting College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725).) Consequently, punitive damages must be supported by facts that show both a willful disregard for the probable consequences of one’s actions and despicable conduct.

Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages. (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.) The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

Conduct worse than gross negligence is needed for the imposition of punitive damages. Gross negligence is defined as “the lack of any care or an extreme departure from what a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation to prevent harm to oneself or others.” (CACI No. 425.)

“[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the ‘officer[s], director[s], or managing agent[s].’” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [citation omitted].) As to ratification, “[a] corporation cannot confirm and accept that which it does not actually know about.’” (Ibid. [citing College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 726 [for ratification sufficient to justify punitive damages against corporation, there must be proof that officers, directors, or managing agents had actual knowledge of the malicious conduct and its outrageous character]].)

Before filing a demurrer and motion to strike, the demurring and moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to and sought to be stricken in person or by telephone for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the issues in argued in the demurrer and motion to strike. (Code of Civ. Proc. Sections 430.41, 435.5.)

Defendants each filed meet and confer declarations stating they met and conferred via email or mail. Although these methods are not the methods prescribed by Code Civ. Pro. Section 430.41, failure to meet and confer is not a basis for denying the motions.

The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Athletic Association (“Athletic Association”) and the California Police Athletic Federation (“CPAF”) both seek to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages and references to punitive damages throughout the TAC.

The TAC states that on August 11, 2017, Decedent was competing in a cycling competition in Castaic, California. (TAC, ¶ 27.) Because of negligent and improper organization, operation, procedure, management, and maintenance, and other conduct, Decedent was removed from his bike and sustained serious fatal injuries. (TAC, ¶29.) Plaintiff’s TAC adds that the mountain bike pathway “was not free of hazards, as there were huge rocks, holes, and trees along the course’ it was not equipped or provided with safety personnel or with proper safety measures; and was not safeguarded for participants of the event. (TAC, ¶81.) The TAC also states there was a delay in Decedent’s medical care. (TAC, ¶81.) Athletic Association and CPAF were allegedly aware of the lack of safety personnel and proper safety measures and still allowed the event to proceed because they desired to preserve the prestige of the event. (TAC, ¶81.)

The TAC alleges that the “officers, directors, and/or managing agents” of the Athletic Association and the CPAF had knowledge of malicious conduct and ratified the conduct by being aware that the mountain bike pathway was not free from hazards, such as huge rocks, holes and trees along the course and being aware that there was a lack of safety personnel and proper safety measures.

Here, the alleged basis for the imposition of punitive damages rests on the existence of malice. (TAC ¶81.) Here, there is no allegation that Defendants the Athletic Association and the CPAF intended to injure Plaintiff. Rather, Plaintiff contends that Defendants acted with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of Plaintiff and that this conduct was despicable. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that (1) the mountain bike pathway included hazards that could cause substantial injury and death such as large rocks, holes and trees; (2) there were no safety personnel on the pathway; and (3) there were no proper safety measures employed with respect to the pathway. (Id.) For the purposes of a motion to strike, the Court assumes that these allegations are true.

Plaintiff further alleges that officers, directors or managing agents had actual knowledge of these safety deficiencies and ratified the conduct described by allowing the event to proceed while knowing that some percentage of course participants would suffer substantial injury, including death. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants proceeded with the event despite knowing of the dangers for monetary gain and to protect the “prestige of the even.” (Id.)

Under these circumstances, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged punitive damages at to Defendants the Athletic Association and the CPAF. This is not a ruling that Plaintiff will ultimately prevail on punitive damages, but rather an assessment of the factual allegations in the pleadings.

As to Defendants Bell Sports and Vista, the TAC alleges that Decedent was wearing the helmet designed and manufactured by Bell Sports and Vista. (TAC, ¶28.) Due to the dangerous design, manufacturing, assembly, and installation of the helmet, the helmet was ineffective and an ultimate death trap to cyclists. (TAC, ¶30.) As before, Plaintiff alleges the measures not taken include warnings of the risk for product failure, proper use and maintenance of the product, and proper inspection of the product for potential hazards and/or defects. Plaintiff alleges Bell and Vista’s conduct in not providing suitable and adequate warnings concerning its safe and proper use was so intentional, dangerous, careless, and wantonly reckless that it justifies an award of punitive damages. (TAC, ¶¶ 36-42.) Plaintiff’s TAC adds that Bell Sports and Vista required Decedent to wear their helmet. (TAC, ¶81.)

The TAC also alleges that Defendants had the helmet safety tested, received the results of the test, and despite knowing as a result of the testing performed that the helmet did not meet the safety standards of the helmet industry sold the helmet to Plaintiff and others. (TAC, ¶ 36.) The TAC further alleges that Defendants’ officers, directors, or managing agents knew of the testing results and ratified the conduct by approving that the sale of the helmet. (Id.) The TAC further contends that Defendants prioritized monetary gain by selling the helmet despite knowing that substantial physical damage, including death would occur to some percentage of consumers. For purposes of the motion to strike, the Court must assume that all these allegations are true.

Under these circumstances, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged punitive damages at to Defendants Bell Sports and Visa. This is not a ruling that Plaintiff will ultimately prevail on punitive damages, but rather an assessment of the factual allegations in the pleadings.