Judge Jill Feeney, Case 19STCV31094 2022-09-07 Tentative Ruling

The parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if there is an agreement to submit.

Regardless of whether there is any such agreement, each party who wishes to submit must send an email to the Court at sscdept30@lacourt.org indicating the party's intention to submit.

Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the case number in the subject line of the email and in the body provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, or non-party.

If a party submits but still intends to appear at the hearing, include the words "SUBMITS BUT WILL APPEAR" in the subject line of the email.

If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Unless all the parties have submitted, the Court will hear argument from any party that appears at the hearing and wishes to argue. The Court may change its tentative as a result of the argument and adopt the changed tentative as the final order at the end of that hearing, even if all the parties are not present.

Be advised that after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of said motion and may adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

Management seeks leave to file a cross complaint against John Wray, Donna Wray, and Jolene Caughey. Management alleges that Cross-Defendants are primarily responsible for Plaintiff’s alleged damages because they entered into contracts and subcontracts with Management and failed to carry out their respective duties.

(c)¿A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed¿within¿the time¿specified in subdivision (a)¿or¿(b).¿ Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.”

“A party who fails to plead a cause of action subject to the requirements of this article, whether through oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause, may apply to the court for leave to amend his pleading, or to file a cross-complaint, to assert such cause at any time during the course of the action. The court, after notice to the adverse party, shall grant, upon such terms as may be just to the parties, leave to amend the pleading, or to file the cross-complaint, to assert such cause if the party who failed to plead the cause acted in good faith. This subdivision shall be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.50.) (Emphasis added.)

The Court of Appeals has explained: “The legislative mandate is clear. A policy of liberal construction of section 426.50 to avoid forfeiture of causes of action is imposed on the trial¿court. A motion to file a cross-complaint at any time during the course of the action must be granted unless bad faith of the moving party is demonstrated where forfeiture would otherwise result. Factors such as oversight, inadvertence, neglect, mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion unless accompanied by bad faith.” (Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank¿(1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98–99.) “‘‘Bad faith,’ is defined as ‘[t]he opposite of ‘good faith,’ generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake . . ., but by some interested or sinister motive[,] . . . not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather . . . the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. (Id. at 100.)

A cross-complaint is compulsory when a related cause of action existed at the time of serving the defendant’s answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.30, subd. (a); see also Crocker Nat. Bank v. Emerald (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 852, 864.) A related cause of action is “. . . a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.10, subd. (c).) Leave must be granted to file a compulsory cross-complaint when the defendant is acting in good faith. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50.)

Management claims that when it engaged Collins + Collins LLP as its new attorneys, Management’s new Counsel identified individuals who may be liable for the incident alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Britton Decl., ¶¶5-6.) Management’s proposed Cross-Complaint alleges that Cross-Defendants “John Wray, Donna Wray, and Jolene Caughey are primarily responsible for the Plaintiff’s alleged damages [because they] were negligent in carrying out their respective duties.” (Motion, Exh. B, p. 3.) Management “entered into contracts/subcontracts with Cross-Defendants, and each of these contracts/subcontracts contain express indemnity, defense, hold harmless, and attorney’s fees provisions.” (Id., p. 4.) Management is unaware of why its previous counsel did not file a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants. (Motion, p.4.)

It appears that Management is acting in good faith in promptly filing its motion for leave to file a cross-complaint upon discovering potential Cross-Defendants. Plaintiff has not opposed this motion, Considering public policy favoring liberal construction of Code Civ. Pro. section 426.50, Management’s motion is granted.