Judge Jill Feeney, Case 19STCV38521 2023-01-31 Tentative Ruling

The parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if there is an agreement to submit.

Regardless of whether there is any such agreement, each party who wishes to submit must send an email to the Court at SSCdept30@LACourt.org indicating the party's intention to submit.

Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the case number in the subject line of the email and in the body provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, or non-party.

If a party submits but still intends to appear at the hearing, include the words "SUBMITS BUT WILL APPEAR" in the subject line of the email.

If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Unless all the parties have submitted, the Court will hear argument from any party that appears at the hearing and wishes to argue. The Court may change its tentative as a result of the argument and adopt the changed tentative as the final order at the end of that hearing, even if all the parties are not present.

Be advised that after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of said motion and may adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

Plaintiffs argue that Penunuri Answer fails to raise prior settlement as a defense. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that they were forced to sign a waiver outside the presence of their counsel. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the waivers were not secured by consideration.

Penunuri argues that the Court may grant the motion based on Plaintiffs’ failure to submit a response to his separate statement. Additionally, Penunuri’s Answer adequately raised the settlement defense. Penunuri also alleges that he did not force Plaintiffs to sign waivers. Penunuri also argues that the waivers were secured because a written instrument is presumptive evidence of a consideration. Penunuri also raises equitable estoppel.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).)

Defendants seek judicial notice of (1) Plaintiffs’ Complaint and (2) the Complaint filed in the case Lauri Jacqueline Pulliam, et al. v. Isaac Penunuri, et al. 19STCV36737. The requests are GRANTED.

A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810.)

Here, Penunuri’s evidence shows that on October 28, 2017, the parties were involved in a three-vehicle accident which occurred on the northbound 101 freeway. (UMF No.1.) The vehicle operated by Penunuri and owned by Hertz rear-ended a second vehicle, which in turn rear-ended a third vehicle. (UMF No. 6.) Jacqueline Pulliam, Chanel Blackmon, Kathleen Williams, Bethany Belcher, Mayra Rosa, Dania Osorio, Sinai E. Curiel Arrazola, and Sangario Rapalo Martinez were all passengers in the two vehicles that were rear-ended. (UMF Nos. 2-4.)

On October 15, 2019, Pulliam, Blackmon, Williams, and Belcher filed a lawsuit against Penunuri and Hertz in the matter 19STCV36737. (UMF No. 7.) In the Pulliam matter, Arrazola, Osorio, and Rapalo all signed statements waiving their bodily injury claims against Penunuri and Hertz. (UMF Nos. 10-11.) Pulliam’s counsel gave those agreements to Penunuri’s counsel. (UMF No. 10.) Defendant’s counsel later spoke to Mayra Rosa via telephone on May 31, 2019 during which she represented she was not represented by counsel and confirmed that she was not making a bodily injury claim. (UMF No. 15.) Rosa also signed a waiver of her claims. (UMF No. 12.)

Rosa also signed an affidavit stating that she was involved in an accident on October 28, 2017, did not sustain any injuries, and did not receive any medical treatment following the accident. (Motion, Exh. J.) Email communications between Penunuri’s counsel and Rosa also show that she advised counsel she was not represented and that she did not intend to make a claim for bodily injury concerning the accident which took place on October 28, 2017. (Motion, Exh. H.)

The claims representative for Hertz testifies that Hertz’s insurance carrier and third party administrator agreed to tender the policy limits in reliance of the representations made by Rosa, Osorio, and the other claimants involved in the accident. (Harris Decl., ¶6.)

“[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. The Americana at Brand, LLC (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1244.) “The first element—the existence of a contract—requires parties capable of contracting, their consent, a lawful object, and a sufficient cause of consideration.” (J.B.B. Investment Partners Ltd. v. Fair (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1, 9 (citing Civ. Code § 1550).)

The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) the party to be estopped must be appraised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon or act so that the party asserting the estoppel had the right to believe that it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury. (Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles, (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305.) Ordinarily, the existence of an estoppel is a question of fact but becomes a question of law if the facts are not disputed and only one reasonable conclusion or inference can be drawn from the evidence. (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson, 6 Cal. 4th 307, 24 (1993).)

Here, Rosa’s and Osorio’s waivers are not contracts because they are only statements that they will not file claims of bodily injury against Hertz and Penunuri. There is no consideration because the waivers do not require any promise or performance from Hertz or Penunuri. Nor is any other admissible evidence produced indicating that there was any such agreement.

Penunuri next argues that Plaintiffs should be estopped from bringing this action under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Penunuri’s evidence shows that after Plaintiffs signed and submitted their waivers, Hertz exhausted its insurance limits in order to resolve this matter and close the file on this collision. However, Penunuri submitted no evidence that Plaintiffs knew Hertz would exhaust its insurance policy limits upon receiving their waivers. The communications between Penunuri’s counsel and Plaintiffs only show that they agreed to sign waivers:

“This will confirm that you have advised that you will not be making any kind of bodily injury, property damage or any other claim for the above referenced accident.” (Motion, Exh. I.)

“To memorialize our discussion, I represent the Hertz Corporation, insurer for the other party involved in the vehicle collision incident that you were similarly involved in on 10.28.17. In our discussion, you advised that you are not represented by counsel, you were not injured as result of the accident, you have not sought medical treatment, and you do not intend to make a claim.” (Motion, Exh. H.)

ESIS’s claims representative’s declaration also states that after receiving the waivers, the decision was made to tender the policy limits in reliance of the representations made by the claimants involved in the collision. However, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs were aware ESIS would tender the policy limit, or that ESIS or Hertz represented they would exhaust the policy limit.

“I received correspondence from defendant Isaac Penunuri’s defense counsel on February 6, 2020 that a resolution had been reached between the four plaintiffs in the related case for the policy limits from Hertz. The correspondence also included four waivers of claims from the remaining potential claimants including waivers signed by Mayra Rosa and Dania Osornio…ESIS agreed to tender the policy limits to the four claimants in the related cases. The decision was made to tender the policy limits in reliance of the representations made by the other four claimants that they were waiving any claims that they potentially had against defendant Isaac Penunuri and the Hertz Corporation. This included the waivers ESIS received that were signed by Mayra Rosa and Dania Osornio.” (Harris Decl., ¶¶5-6. )

There are no further facts showing that Plaintiffs knew Hertz would exhaust its limits or acted in a way that Hertz had a right to believe that they intended to induce Hertz to act. Without these facts, equitable estoppel does not apply.