Judge Jill Feeney, Case 19STCV46417 2022-10-26 Tentative Ruling

On December 23, 2019, Plaintiffs John Hall Jr., Charles Hall, and Theresa Hall (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Chester Naguit (“Defendant Naguit”) and Mary Cosio (“Defendant Cosio”). Plaintiffs allege motor vehicle negligence in their complaint arising from an automobile collision that caused Decedent John Frederick Hall’s (“Decedent”) death on December 25, 2017.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).)

Under the theory of negligent entrustment, liability is imposed on¿the vehicle¿owner or permitter because of the owner’s independent¿negligence¿and not the¿negligence¿of the driver. (Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gilstrap¿(1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 524, 530(. A person who places or entrusts his motor vehicle in the hands of another “whom he knows, or from circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.” (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co.¿(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063.)

An employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s tort under the doctrine of respondeat superior if the tort was committed within the scope of the employment. (Montague v. AMN Healthcare, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1520.) Respondeat superior may also be based on either actual or ostensible agency. A principal may be vicariously liable for injury committed by an act of its actual agent where: (i) The principal directly authorizes the act to be committed; (ii) The agent commits the act in the scope of his or her employment and in performing service on behalf of the principal; or (iii) The principal ratifies its agent’s conduct after the fact by voluntarily electing to adopt the agent’s conduct. (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 953, 969.)

Here, Cosios’ evidence shows that on December 25, 2017, Defendant Naguit struck Decedent John Frederick Hall. (UMF No. 1.) Cosio is Naguit’s wife and the owner of the Nissan Xterra Naguit was driving when he struck Decedent. (UMF Nos. 2, 10.) On the evening of the collision, Naguit and Cosio had a party with family at their home. (UMF No. 3.) After the party, Cosio and Naguit argued. (UMF No. 4.) Cosio went to sleep and woke up to discover that Naguit was gone and had taken the keys to her Nissan Xterra. (UMF Nos. 4-5.) Cosio and Naguit agreed that Naguit could not drive the Xterra without Cosio’s permission. (UMF No. 8.) Naguit had never driven the vehicle without Cosio’s permission prior to that day. (UMF Nos. 9-13.) After Naguit left, Cosio called and texted Naguit telling him to bring the car back and that he did not have permission to drive it. (UMF Nos. 14-17.) Cosio is employed as a nurse and has never employed Naguit. (UMF Nos 19-23.)

Cosio meets her burden of proof of showing that no triable issue of material fact exists over whether Cosio entrusted her vehicle to Naguit. The evidence shows that Naguit took the vehicle without her permission. Thus, Cosio never entrusted her vehicle to Naguit.

Additionally, Cosio meets her burden of showing there has never been an employment relationship between Cosio and Naguit. Cosio is employed as a nurse and does not operate her own business. The evidence that Naguit took Cosio’s vehicle without her permission also shows that Naguit was not working on Cosio’s behalf. There was no agency relationship between Cosio and Naguit. Thus, Cosio may not be held vicariously liable for Naguit’s conduct.