Judge Jill Feeney, Case Number: 20STCV12016, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Jill Feeney, Case: 20STCV12016, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV12016 Hearing Date: May 11, 2023 Dept: 78

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 78

DENNIS LUNA, et al.;

Plaintiffs,

vs.

FERNANDO GAYTON, et al.;

Defendants. Case No.: 20STCV12016

Hearing Date: May 11, 2023

[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:

DEFENDANT DIANA GAYTAN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION.

Defendant Diana Gaytan’s Motion for Summary Adjudication as to the second cause of action is DENIED.

Defendant Diana Gaytan’s Motion for Summary Adjudication as to the third cause of action is DENIED.

Moving party to provide notice and to file proof of service of such notice within five court days after the date of this order.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is an action for breach of contract. The operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) alleges as follows.

Plaintiff Dennis Luna (“Luna”) was deeded property located at 700 Keenan St., Montebello CA (the “Subject Property”) from his mother in April 2016. (TAC ¶ 1.) The Subject Property became a matter of dispute between Luna and his non-party sisters. (Ibid.) Luna hired non-party attorney Lawrence E. Clark (“Clark”) to settle the dispute. (Ibid.) Clark’s paralegal, defendant Diana Gaytan repeatedly encouraged Luna to sell the Subject Property to her father, defendant Fernando Gaytan (“Fernando” ). (Ibid.)

Luna sold the Subject Property to Fernando and defendant Angie Coello (“Coello”, and together with Diana and Fernando, “Defendants”) for $300,000 with the understanding that Luna’s daughter, plaintiff Vanessa Luna Bishop (“Bishop”) would receive a $150,000 promissory note on the Subject Property with a Deed of Trust and that Luna would have a life estate with respect to the Subject Property. (Ibid; Ex. A, B.)

Upon completion of the transaction, Luna received proceeds in the amount of $29,318.26. (Ibid.) Luna then transferred this amount to Fernando for the purpose of making improvements to the Subject Property to make it handicap accessible for Luna during his life estate. (Ibid.) Those improvements were never made. (TAC ¶ 2.)

On August 13, 2017, Luna was served with a 60 Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy, despite being granted a life estate in the Subject Property. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Diana Gayton abused her fiduciary relationship with Luna to induce Luna to enter into a sales contract of the Subject Property while misleading him about the contract’s contents. (TAC ¶ 21.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 25, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the initial Complaint, alleging five causes of action:

1. Breach of Contract;

2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty;

3. Intentional Misrepresentation;

4. Unjust Enrichment; and

5. Constructive Eviction.

On August 14, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint, adding a Sixth Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code § 3300.

On September 17, 2020, Defendants filed a Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint. That Demurrer was sustained in part and overruled in part. Also on September 17, 2020, Defendants field an Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike, which was denied.

On March 8, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint asserting four causes of action:

1. Breach of Contract;

2. Intentional Misrepresentation;

3. Unjust Enrichment; and

4. Constructive Eviction.

On May 12, 2021, Defendants filed a Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint.

On July 23, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Complaint asserting the same four causes of action.

On July 30, 2021, Defendants filed a Demurrer to the Third Amended Complaint. That Demurrer was sustained without leave to amend as to the First Cause of Action with regard to Defendant Diana Gayton only and as to the Fourth Cause of Action with regard to all Defendants.

On October 4, 2021, Defendants filed a Cross-Complaint for Declaratory Relief.

On August 2, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Lis Pendens.

On December 19, 2022, Coello and Fernando filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was granted on March 6, 2023.

On February 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Substitution of Attorney. Plaintiffs now represent themselves pro per.

On March 20, 2023, Diana filed the instant ex parte application for joinder to co-defendants Fernando and Coello’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 22, 2023, the Court deemed the ex parte application as Diana’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

On April 6, 2023, Plaintiff’s untimely filed their opposition to Diana’s Motion for Summary Judgment by a day.

On April 26, 2023, Defendant Diana Gayton filed her reply papers.

DISCUSSION

I. OBJECTIONS

Defendant Diana Gayton objects to various portions of the Declaration of Dennis Luna, which was submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ opposition to the instant motion. The objections are overruled.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A Defendant moving for summary judgment may meet its initial burden, inter alia, by proving that for each cause of action alleged, Plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).) What this means in practice is that if a cause of action, such as fraud, for example, requires proof of five elements, one of which is reliance, and if Defendant sets forth a prima facie case that reliance cannot be proven (either by citation to plaintiff’s deposition testimony, written discovery responses or other means), then Defendant has met its burden.

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.) The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Defendant Diana Gayton here moves for summary judgment as to the Third Amended Complaint.

A. Second Cause of Action – Intentional Misrepresentation

Defendant moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation on the ground that Plaintiffs are unable to show that she made any written or oral representations to Luna regarding him being entitled to a life estate in the Subject Property. (Motion at pp. 13-14.)

To establish a claim for deceit based on intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove seven essential elements: (1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff. (Manderville v. PCG & S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498.)

Here, the Third Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs “misled Plaintiff Luna by falsely assuring that a life estate existed for Plaintiff Luna in the Property which ultimately induced Plaintiff Luna to enter into the Agreement.” (TAC ¶ 35.)

However, in deposition Luna conceded that Diana did not represent to him that he would be granted a life estate in the Subject Property. (UMF No. 9; Luna Depo pp. 196:25-197:17; Gaytan Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. A.) Furthermore, neither the Ancillary Agreement nor the grant deed that were signed ultimately granted a life estate to Luna. (UMF Nos. 5-6, 10.)

Consequently, Defendant has met her initial burden of showing the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact demonstrating that Defendant made any misrepresentation regarding the Subject Property to Luna. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiffs have met their burden. Plaintiff Luna attests that Defendant Diana Gaytan and he agreed upon a deal to sell Plaintiff Luna’s family home to Gaytan’s father. (Luna Decl. at Paragraph 6.) As part of the deal, Plaintiff Luna would be permitted to live at the property (not exclusively as the Gaytans would live there also) for the rest of his life and Gaytan’s father, in exchange, would defer payment of $150,000 of the purchase price of the home. (Id. at Paragraph 8.)

Plaintiffs have also produced statements made by Defendant Diana Gaytan in a request for a temporary restraining order against Plaintiff Luna’s ex-wife that was filed on August 15, 2017. In this application, Defendant Diana Gaytan stated her father purchased the home at issue here for less than fair market value under the following terms: (1) payment of $300,000; (2) the ability of Plaintiff Luna to reside at the property for an indefinite period of time; and (3) a $150,000 promissory note payable to Plaintiff Luna’s daughter. (Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement, Exhibit 4, at page 20.)

On this record, there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Gaytan intentionally misrepresented the intentions of her family in regard to the deal made with respect to the house.

B. Third Cause of Action – Unjust Enrichment

Defendant Diana Gayton next moves for summary adjudication of the Third Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have been unjustly enriched by deriving “a financial benefit from their failure to comply with the terms of the Agreement. Defendants are under an obligation to pay Plaintiffs forthwith all amounts by which they have been unjustly enriched, which sum is not less than Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars ($300,000).” (TAC ¶ 44.)

On the facts presented here, the Court cannot conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact on the unjust enrichment claim with respect to Defendant Diana Gaytan.

This is because there is no allegation that Defendant Diana Gaytan is the owner of the residence or a signatory on the promissory note at issue here. To the extent that a claim of unjust enrichment lies on this basis, it would lie against the now owners of the property.

DATED: May 11, 2023

________________________________

Hon. Jill Feeney

Judge of the Superior Court