Judge Jill Feeney, Case 20STCV25720 2022-08-10 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for motor vehicle negligence arising from a vehicle accident which took place in August 2018. Plaintiff Randy Sau filed his Complaint against Defendants Keith Christian Famularo and Toni Rae Maeberry on July 8, 2020.

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s previously deemed admissions prove Plaintiff caused the subject accident and Defendants were not at fault for any of Plaintiff’s injuries.

Defendants also move for terminating sanctions. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because he failed to obey the Court’s April 29, 2022 order to provide discovery responses and pay monetary sanctions.

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.]” (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Citations Omitted).) The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).

“[I]n order for judicial notice to support a motion for judgment on the pleadings by negating an express allegation of the pleading, the notice must be of something that cannot reasonably be controverted…The same is true of evidentiary admissions or concessions.” (Columbia Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 468.)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration demonstrating an attempt to meet and confer in person or by telephone, at least five days before the date a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439.) However, a determination that the meet and confer process is insufficient does not constitute grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).)

If a party engages in the misuse of the discovery process, the court may impose monetary, issue, evidence, or terminating sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.) Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010 provides, in relevant part, that “[m]isuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: … (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery . . . (g) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery.”

“The trial court may order a terminating sanction for discovery abuse ‘after considering the totality of the circumstances: [the] conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful; the detriment to the propounding party; and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the discovery.’” (Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 377, 390, quoting Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1246.)

“Generally, ‘[a] decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.’” (Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal. App. 4th at p. 390 [citation omitted].)

“Under this standard, trial courts have properly imposed terminating sanctions when parties have willfully disobeyed one or more discovery orders.” (Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 citing Lang, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1244-1246 [discussing cases]; see, e.g., Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622 [terminating sanctions imposed (by striking the defendant’s Answer and subsequently granting default judgment) after defendants failed to comply with one court order to produce discovery]; Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 481, 491, disapproved on other grounds in Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 478, n. 4 [terminating sanctions imposed against the plaintiff for failing to comply with a discovery order and for violating various discovery statutes].)

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is accompanied by a declaration from Counsel. However, the declaration does not contain evidence that Defendants attempted to meet and confer regarding the defects on the pleadings before making this motion. However, failure to meet and confer does not constitute grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).)

Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof regarding liability in this matter and further admits that his complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Defendants “were negligent, reckless, careless, and unreasonable in their use, operation, control, entrustment, management, maintenance, inspection and repair of a motor vehicle so that it proximately caused or was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff personal injury and damages.” (Compl., p.1) Plaintiff’s only cause of action is motor vehicle negligence.

To sustain a negligence cause of action, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s deemed admissions are judicial admissions that may be used to determine that Plaintiff does not meet his burden of proof regarding liability in this matter. However, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is strictly concerned with defects that may be found on the face of the pleadings. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings may also attack matters that may be judicially noticed, including admissions or concessions that cannot reasonably controverted. (Columbia Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 468.)

Here, whether Plaintiff has met his burden of proof is immaterial to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. To prevail on their motion, Defendants must show that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for motor vehicle negligence. Defendants rely on the Requests for Admissions that were deemed admitted on April 29, 2022. However, Defendants have not requested judicial notice for the discovery requests or the related order. Defendants also cite cases that are concerned with the legal standards for summary judgment, not judgment on the pleadings. (Motion, p.7.) The motion is not accompanied by a meet and confer declaration.

Even if the Court did take judicial notice of the deemed admissions, Defendants are the moving party, and the relevant consideration is whether Plaintiff’s Complaint states sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for motor vehicle negligence. Defendants do not discuss the contents of Plaintiff’s Complaint in their motion. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

Defendants also move for terminating sanctions. Defendants argue that the Court may dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint because he failed to obey the Court’s order compelling discovery responses and to pay sanctions to Defendants.

The Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss because Plaintiff’s failure to obey the Court’s April 29, 2022 order is preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules. Defendants originally propounded Form Interrogatories, Set Two; a Supplemental Demand for Production, Set Two; Supplemental Interrogatories, Set One; and Requests for Admission, Set One on October 25, 2021. Defendants’ counsel sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel in an attempt to meet and confer. Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel was granted on January 7, 2022. Thereafter, Defendants sent another letter to Plaintiff himself. After receiving no response, Defendants filed three motions to compel and one motion to deem requests for admissions admitted.

On April 29, 2022, the Court granted Defendants’ discovery motions and granted sanctions in the amount of $990. Responses to Defendants’ discovery requests were originally due on December 1, 2021. Under the April 29, 2022 order, sanctions and Plaintiff’s responses were due on May 14, 2022. To date, Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants’ requests even after the Court issued an order compelling his responses. (Mueller Decl., ¶2-4.) Plaintiff also failed to pay monetary sanctions to Defendant. (Id., ¶3.)

The facts weigh in favor of granting terminating sanctions because Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants’ or his own counsel’s communications about this matter. Plaintiff did not appear at the hearings on his counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel and Defendants’ motions to compel discovery responses. Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ inquiries about the discovery responses. Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants’ discovery requests or paid sanctions despite the April 29, 2022 order. (Id., ¶4.) Defendants have been unable to obtain basic discovery due to Plaintiff’s refusal to respond to Defendants’ requests. (Id., 4.) Plaintiff’s repeated refusal to respond to any communications about this matter despite being properly served demonstrates a lack of diligence and that his misuse of the discovery process was willful.