Judge Jill Feeney, Case 20STCV28530 2023-03-24 Tentative Ruling

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s criminal records are discoverable and that they seek the records to show that Plaintiff’s claimed injuries in this matter are attributable to an altercation with police. Defendants also seek the records to determine whether he manages his pain with marijuana. As for the medical records, Defendants that the subpoenas were reasonably tailored to seek information about injuries Plaintiff is claiming in this case.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a) states, “[i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.¿ In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”¿

Code Civ. Proc., section 1985.3 provides that a party whose records are being sought by a subpoena duces tecum must serve notice of the motion to quash at least five days before the production date. However, the court retains jurisdiction to hear a motion to quash even if it is brought after the production date. (Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1312.)

[E]ven when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy. . . . [I]f an intrusion on the right of privacy is deemed necessary under the circumstances of a particular case, any such intrusion should be the minimum intrusion necessary to achieve its objective . . . [meaning] the least intrusive means to satisfy the interest. Mere convenience of means or cost will not satisfy that test for that would make expediency and not the compelling interest the overriding value. (Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854-1855 [internal quotes and citations omitted].)

When evaluating invasions of the right to privacy in discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865.) A responding party may prevail by negating any of these three elements “or by pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests.” (Id.) “[T]he party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533.) A court then balances these competing considerations. (Id.) As guidance in balancing these competing considerations, it should be noted, “[o]nly obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Id.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.)

Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., section 2017.010.) Relevance in the discovery context is broader than evidence that is admissible at trial. Information is relevant if it might assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or reaching a settlement. (Haniff v Superior Court (2017) 9 CA5th 191, 205.) “Admissibility is not the test and information unless privileged is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Id at p.206.) The scope of discovery is broad and some evidence brought to light in discovery may be unrelated or only tangentially related to the underlying causes of action. (Mercury Interactive Corp. v Klein (2007) 158 CA4th 60.)

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 provides that “the court may in its discretion award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing [a motion to quash], including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 1987.2(a).)

Defendants issued subpoenas to the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, Riverside Police Department Records Division, Orange County Sheriff’s Department Special Services, the Orange County Police Department Records Division, and the California Highway Patrol Records Division. (Wong Decl., ¶2.) The subpoenas seek:

(Wong Decl., Exh. A.) The subpoenas also include records from specific cases. Plaintiff argues that the subpoenas are overbroad, citing cases related to the use of felony convictions as impeachment evidence. However, Defendants argue that they are requesting the records because Plaintiff was “evasive about his criminal past” and his injuries in this case could have been caused by a previous altercation with police. (Barret Decl., ¶17; Opp., p.9.) Defendants also argue that the records would show whether his pain has been mitigated by marijuana use. (Barret Decl., ¶17.)

Although Plaintiff fails to cite legal authority showing that Plaintiff has a protected privacy interest in his criminal records, the Court finds that the subpoenas unreasonably seek information that is not relevant to the subject litigation. Defendants submit Plaintiff’s deposition. However, the testimony does not show that Plaintiff testified to being injured during his past arrests. Plaintiff discusses a 2015 car accident, a felony conviction for possession of marijuana, another felony conviction involving an altercation, and a domestic violence charge. (Edwards Depo., 104:15-20, 119:16-120:2, 120:6-24, 122:19-24.) Nothing in the testimony suggests that Plaintiff was injured during a prior arrest. Even if he was, the relevant information about whether his injuries in the subject accident were attributable to a prior injury would be contained in Plaintiff’s medical records, not his criminal records. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff may have mitigated his pain from injuries sustained in the subject accident. However, nothing in Plaintiff’s deposition transcript shows that he uses marijuana to treat his pain. If he did, the information would be contained in his medical records, perhaps, but not in arrest records. There is no evidence that subpoenaing Plaintiff’s complete criminal record will reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence here.

Defendants also subpoenaed Plaintiff’s medical records from the Brain and Elective Spine Treatment Center, Andrew S. Morris, Chiropractic Health Club, One Source Diagnostics, Inc., Injury Physicians Alliance, and Kim Physical Therapy seeking “All documents, medical records, office records, emergency room records, sign-in sheets, radiological reports, medical tests, inpatient and outpatient charts and records, radiology records, billing records, and communications between Plaintiff and his medical providers.” (Wong Decl., ¶2, Exh. A.)

Plaintiff has a legally protected privacy interest in his medical records. (See Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 832; see, e.g., Heda v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 525, 528.) However, “medical…records relating to the claimed injuries are” generally “discoverable.” (Haning, et al., Cal. Prac. Guide Pers. Inj. (Rutter Group 2021) § 6:36.1-(citing Ev.C. § 996, 1016; Britt v. Sup. Ct. (San Diego Unified Port Dist.) (1978) 20 C3d 844, 862-864, 143 CR 695, 706-708.) Any matter that is relevant to the subject matter and not privileged is discoverable if it is itself admissible or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., section 2017.010.)

Here, Plaintiff placed his medical condition in dispute and specifically claims he injured his lower back, left knee, left ribs, neck, and right shoulder. (Wong Decl., Exhibit F.) Although his medical condition is in dispute, the medical records Defendants seek must be related to the injuries he is claiming. There is no justification for demanding Plaintiff’s entire medical record regardless of date and body parts. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony does reference injuries from a prior car accident in 2015. Therefore, Defendants must limit the subpoenas to records of injuries from after the 2015 accident and records related to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries.