Judge: Jill Feeney, Case: 20STCV29576, Date: 2022-09-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV29576 Hearing Date: September 13, 2022 Dept: 30
Department 30, Spring Street Courthouse
September 13, 2022
20STCV29576
Motion to Consolidate and Continue Trial filed by Plaintiff Ronald Williams
DECISION
The motion is denied.
Moving party is ordered to provide notice.
Background
This is an action for negligence, premises liability, dangerous condition of public property arising from a bus accident which took place in 2019. Plaintiff Ronald Williams filed his Complaint against the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority on August 5, 2020.
Plaintiff filed the instant motion to consolidate on June 6, 2022.
Summary
Moving Arguments
Plaintiff moves to consolidate this matter with the case Ronald Williams v. Tiffany S T Kuo 21STCV23413 (“Kuo Matter”) on the grounds that most of the issues of fact and law are common to both actions and many of the same witnesses will testify in both actions. Specifically, the focus of both trials will be Plaintiff’s damages and how to apportion causation between the two incidents.
Opposing Arguments
Defendants Tiffany Kuo and MTA both opposed the motion.
MTA argues that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied because they do not involve common questions of law or fact, nor do they promote judicial efficiency, prevent confusion, allow economies to the litigants, prevent delay, or otherwise assist in the rational administration of the pending cases. Specifically, MTA argues it will be prejudiced if the two cases are consolidated because MTA’s case is primarily concerned with liability and the triers of fact would be subject to confusion of the issues. Another court has already determined that the two cases are not related. Additionally, discovery has only recently begun on the MTA case, meaning Plaintiff lacks basis to state the witnesses in that case will be called twice. MTA also points out that the two matters are in different departments and cannot be consolidated.
Kuo argues in her opposition that the motion must be denied because (1) cases may not be consolidated unless they are in the same department, (2) the cases have already been found unrelated and are about completely different accidents, (3) trial should not be consolidated since trial in the Kuo matter is imminent, and (4) consolidation would prejudice Kuo.
Reply Arguments
In reply, Plaintiff argues a finding that the matters are not related does not preclude a motion to consolidate. Plaintiff also contends it is not clear how liability will be disputed in the MTA case. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the same witnesses will be called for both cases because both Kuo and MTA intend to point the finger at each other as the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.
Legal Standard
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 states: “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”
Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.350, subdivision (a)(1), a notice of motion to consolidate must: (A) List all named parties in each case, the names of those who have appeared, and the names of their respective attorneys of record; (B) Contain the captions of all the cases sought to be consolidated, with the lowest numbered case shown first; and (C) Be filed in each case sought to be consolidated. (2) The motion to consolidate: (A) Is deemed a single motion for the purpose of determining the appropriate filing fee, but memorandums, declarations, and other supporting papers must be filed only in the lowest numbered case; (B) Must be served on all attorneys of record and all non-represented parties in all of the cases sought to be consolidated; and (C) Must have a proof of service filed as part of the motion.
“Cases may not be consolidated unless they are in the same department. A motion to consolidate two or more cases may be noticed and heard after the cases, initially filed in different department, have been related into a single department, or if the cases were already assigned to that department.” (LASC Local Court Rules, Rule 3.3(g)(1).)
Discussion
Plaintiff requests that the two cases at issue be consolidated for trial in order to preserve judicial resources, avoid unnecessary costs and delays for all parties, and avoid a potential unjust outcome for Plaintiff.
As an initial matter, the two cases cannot be consolidated because they belong to different departments. LASC Local Court Rules, rule 3.3(g)(1) provides that only cases in the same department may be consolidated. Here, 21STCV23413 is in Department 32. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
Even if the cases were in the same department, consolidation would not be appropriate.
First, the motion is not timely because the Kuo matter is close to trial whereas the MTA case is still in the early stages of discovery. (MTA Opp., p. 2; Kuo Opp., p. 3.) Trial in the Kuo case is set for December 2022 while trial in the MTA case is set for March 2023. Because discovery is still underway in the MTA case, it is likely that consolidation would delay trial in the Kuo case.
Second, the two matters do not concern substantially the same facts or questions of law. As Plaintiff notes in his motion, the two vehicle collisions at issue took place a year apart. (Hepuarachy Decl., ¶2.) In the MTA case, Plaintiff was a passenger on a bus that crashed into a vehicle making an unlawful right turn. (MTA Opp., p. 5.) Although Plaintiff suffered some personal injuries, the injuries were minor and Plaintiff did not suffer any property damage. (Id.) In the Kuo matter, Plaintiff was driving his vehicle when it collided with Kuo’s vehicle, resulting in two surgeries for back injuries. (Hapuarachy Decl., ¶4.) The two matters involve completely different sets of facts and parties. The only common question of law is apportionment of damages. Plaintiff’s injuries in both cases appear to be sufficiently distinct such that it is unlikely that he will be left without recovery if Kuo and MTA point fingers at each other for his injuries. Aside from assertions from Plaintiff’s counsel, there is no evidence that Kuo and MTA plan to place the blame for Plaintiff’s injuries on each other.
Additionally, there is no evidence that consolidation would conserve judicial resources or make litigation more convenient for witnesses. There is little evidence that the same witnesses will be required to appear for both cases. As MTA points out, the MTA case is in its early stages of discovery and no witnesses have been identified. (MTA Opp., p.11.) Plaintiff would not know at this stage what witnesses he or MTA intend to use. Additionally, even if some similar witnesses testify as to Plaintiff’s injuries, it is likely that more witnesses involved in completely separate issues of liability would be confused by the substantially different facts and circumstances of the other matter. Because the only similar questions of fact and law have to do with Plaintiff’s injuries, it is likely that the Court would expend more resources to simultaneously handle substantially different facts and issues of law.
Finally, consolidation would prejudice Kuo and MTA. MTA is still in the early stages of discovery while the Kuo matter is already set for mediation, meaning discovery is complete. If the cases are consolidated, Kuo would need to perform additional discovery and MTA would be disadvantaged because that matter is still in an early stage of discovery. Kuo and MTA would be prejudiced if trial is delayed for Kuo or MTA is forced to proceed without completing discovery.