Judge Jill Feeney, Case 20STCV31319 2023-02-17 Tentative Ruling

The parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if there is an agreement to submit.

Regardless of whether there is any such agreement, each party who wishes to submit must send an email to the Court at SSCdept30@LACourt.org indicating the party's intention to submit.

Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the case number in the subject line of the email and in the body provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, or non-party.

If a party submits but still intends to appear at the hearing, include the words "SUBMITS BUT WILL APPEAR" in the subject line of the email.

If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Unless all the parties have submitted, the Court will hear argument from any party that appears at the hearing and wishes to argue. The Court may change its tentative as a result of the argument and adopt the changed tentative as the final order at the end of that hearing, even if all the parties are not present.

Be advised that after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of said motion and may adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

This is an action for negligence arising from a vehicle collision which took place in September 2018. Plaintiff Deandrae Joseph Woods filed his Complaint against Defendants Santos Martin and Nicacia Castorena on August 18, 2020.

Defendants also seek to strike the exhibit attached to the FAC. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient factual elements to support a claim for punitive damages. Additionally, the attached exhibit is not relevant because the exhibit shows that Defendant Santos Castorena was arrested, but his criminal matter was dismissed or not prosecuted.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the FAC now alleges facts showing Santos Castorena had previously been arrested and convicted for driving under the influence and made the deliberate choice to drink and drive. Additionally, the FAC states Santos Castorena was driving at an excessive speed and zigzagging. These facts show that Santos Castorena acted with a conscious disregard of the safety of others.

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., section 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. section 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, section 3294, subd. (a).)

“Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code, section 3294, subd. (c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)

“As amended to include [despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (footnote omitted).)

Before filing a demurrer and motion to strike, the demurring and moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to and sought to be stricken in person or by telephone for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the issues in argued in the demurrer and motion to strike. (Code of Civ. Proc. sections 430.41; 435.5.)

Defendants attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff via email. (Motion, Exh. B.) This is insufficient because the parties must meet and confer via phone or in person. However, failure to meet and confer is not a basis for denying a motion to strike.

Moving Defendants seek to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages on the grounds that they have not alleged facts to show Moving Defendants acted with conscious disregard for the safety of others or demonstrated despicable conduct.

The California Supreme Court has held that “the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24Cal.3d 890, 892.) Punitive damages may be sought where the allegations lead to the conclusion that “defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Id. at 895-896.) In Taylor, the Supreme Court issued a writ directing the trial court to overrule the defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s punitive damages prayer based on a finding that the plaintiff’s allegations in that case met this standard.

The complaint in Taylor alleged, not only that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident, but also that he “had previously caused a serious accident while driving under the influence of alcohol; that he had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on numerous prior occasions; that at the time of the accident . . . [defendant there had] recently completed a period of probation which followed a drunk driving conviction; that one of his probation conditions was that he refrain from driving for at least six hours after consuming any alcoholic beverage; and that at the time of the accident in question he was presently facing an additional pending criminal drunk driving charge.” (Id. at 893.) What is more, the complaint alleged that defendant was already intoxicated and continuing to drink alcohol in his vehicle at the time of the accident. (Ibid.)

After Taylor, the Legislature amended the “malice” standard interpreted by the Supreme Court in that case to add the requirement that malicious conduct under section 3294 be shown to be “despicable” and “willful.” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211.) As noted above, “[t]he statute’s reference to ‘despicable conduct’ represent[ed] ‘a new substantive limitation on punitive damage award.’” (Ibid. (quoting College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 8Cal.4th at 725).)

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that on September 3, 2018, Defendant Santos Castorena drove Southbound on the 605 Freeway. (FAC, ¶9.) He was driving at 65 mph, failed to slow his vehicle, failed to observe oncoming traffic, and caused a head-on collision with Plaintiff’s vehicle. (FAC, ¶¶10-11.) Immediately prior to the collision, Santos drove at an unsafe speed of 80 mph and made unsafe lane changes. (FAC, ¶¶15. 16.) Santos was also zig-zagging in and out of traffic. (FAC, ¶27f.) Before driving his vehicle, Santos was out partying and drinking alcoholic beverages in West Hollywood. (FAC, ¶21.) Santos knew he would be driving from West Hollywood to the San Gabriel Valley and made the deliberate choice to drink and drive. (Id.) Santos was previously arrested and charged for driving under the influence in 2013. (FAC, ¶24(a).) Santos was then convicted of driving under the influence in 2019 under Veh. Code 23152. (FAC, ¶25.) Santos was subject to penalties, including being imprisoned, having his license suspended, a fine, and probation. (FAC, ¶25.)

The FAC alleges that Santos Castorena was convicted for driving under the influence in 2019, after the subject accident. Because the 2019 conviction took place after the accident, it is not relevant to whether Santos Castorena acted with malice on the date of the subject accident.

The FAC also alleges that Defendant Santos Castorena was driving on a suspended license on the date of the incident, while at the same time alleging that the license was suspended based upon a February 15, 2019 conviction. This is nonsensical.

The facts in support of punitive damages are as follows: (1) in 2013 Santos Castorena was arrested and charged for driving under the influence; (2) on the date of the accident Santos Castorena deliberately became inebriated knowing that he was going to drive home from West Hollywood to the San Gabriel Valley; (3) at the time of the accident Santos Castorena was driving at an excessive rate of speed, specifically 80 mph.; (4) Santos Castorena was zig, zagging through traffic, making unsafe lane changes; and (5) Santos Castorena lied to law enforcement about his intoxication at the time of the accident

Here, Plaintiff’s FAC presents facts that adequately support a demand for punitive damages. These facts demonstrate that Santos Castorena was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of drunk driving, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. Moreover, the conduct also would support a finding that his actions were despicable.

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that Nicacia Castorena negligently allowed Santos Castorena to drive her vehicle because she knew or should have known of his prior DUI arrests and conviction and because she knew or should have known that Santos Castorena was driving to West Hollywood to consume alcohol.. (FAC, ¶30.) The FAC fails to state facts that show Nicacia Castorena was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of allowing Santos Castorena to use the car, and that she willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. Additionally, there are no facts alleged that would show Nicacia Castorena’s conduct was despicable. Merely allowing Santos Castorena to use her car does not show Nicacia Castorena was guilty of malice, fraud, or oppression. Plaintiffs allege that Nicacia Castorena either knew or should have known certain facts. This is not sufficient to allege punitive damages.

Defendants also seek to strike the attachment to the FAC. The attachment consists of screenshots of searches of the Los Angeles County online criminal case database. A court may strike exhibits attached to a complaint that are unnecessary to the pleading. (Mercury Interactive Corp. v Klein (2007) 158 CA4th 60, 104 n35.) Here, Plaintiff already references Santos’ previous arrests and convictions in the body of the FAC. Thus, these attachments are unnecessary. Defendants’ motion to strike is granted as to this attachment.