Judge Jill Feeney, Case 20STCV36601 2022-10-31 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for general negligence and premises liability arising from a trip and fall incident which took place in September 2018. Plaintiff Maria de la Luz Sanchez filed her Complaint against Defendants Capital Realty Advisors, Inc. and Michael Allyn Chen on September 24, 2020.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that they owed a duty to warn Plaintiff of the condition of the stairs, the condition was open and obvious, the broken light did not cause Plaintiff’s injuries, and Defendants did not have notice of the condition.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants did owe her a duty of care to inspect and repair the stairway, Defendants had constructive notice of the broken light fixture, the dark stairway was the cause of her injuries, and that Defendants are not relieved of their duty because the dark stairway was open and obvious.

Defendants request judicial notice of (1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and (2) facts reflected in the Old Farmer’s Almanac which states that on September 25, 2018, in Norwalk, California, the sun set at 6:46 p.m.

Defendants’ first request is denied as unnecessary. The Court may always refer to the pleadings in the matter at hand. Defendant’s second request is granted because the Old Farmer’s Almanac consists of facts not reasonably subject to dispute which may be immediately and accurately determined. (Evidence Code Section 452(h).)

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for [customers’] their use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) The existence and scope of a property owner’s duty are legal questions for the court. (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 36.)

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Defendants had no duty to warn Plaintiff of the condition of the stairs, (2) the condition of the stairs was open and obvious, (3) Plaintiff’s evidence as to causation is speculative, and (4) Defendants did not have notice of the dangerous condition.

The Court initially notes that Plaintiff’s allegations of premises liability and negligence are duplicative. They are based on the same theory of recovery (negligence) and the same facts (Plaintiff fell down the stairs in her apartment complex). Accordingly, the Court treats both of Plaintiff’s causes of action for premises liability and negligence as one for purposes of this analysis.

Defendants’ evidence shows that Plaintiff lived at the apartment building owned by Defendants for 16 years prior to the accident. (UMF No. 4.) On September 25, 2018, at around 7:00 p.m. Plaintiff fell while descending a stairway to retrieve her mail. (UMF Nos. 11.) Plaintiff lost her balance in the middle of the stairs and fell. (UMF No. 11.) The stairway was dark toward the bottom of the stairs and there was no lighting at the time of the incident. The stairway was dark due to a broken light fixture. (UMF No. 14.) The stairway had a railing that ran from the top to the bottom of the stairs. (UMF No. 10.) The on-site manager received no complaints from tenants regarding dim lighting or lack of lighting on the property. (UMF Nos. 17-18.) The manager did not have knowledge of a broken light fixture on the day of or prior to the incident. (UMF No. 22.) The property owner, Defendant Michael Allyn Chen did not receive any complaints or reports of dim lighting conditions or a broken light fixture prior to the accident. (Chen Decl., ¶¶4-8.)

Defendants first argue that they had not duty to warn Plaintiff of the condition of the stairway. Defendants also argue, as a related issue, that they had no notice of the broken light fixture in the stairway where Plaintiff fell.

“Historically, the public policy of this state generally has precluded a landlord's liability for injuries to his tenant or his tenant's invitees from a dangerous condition on the premises which comes into existence after the tenant has taken possession. This is true even though by the exercise of reasonable diligence the landlord might have discovered the condition.” (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510; Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771, 778.)

“A lessor who leases a portion of his property and retains control of any other part which the lessee is entitled to use as appurtenant to the part leased to him is subject to liability to the lessee for bodily injury caused to the lessee by a dangerous condition on the portion of the property retained under the lessor's control, if the lessor by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the defective condition and could have made the property safe.” (Burks v. Blackman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 715, 718; Yazzolino v. Jones (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 626, 632.) In short “a landlord must take reasonable precautions to prevent injury due to any unsafe condition in an area of the premises under the landlord’s control if the landlord knows or reasonably should have known about it.” (CACI Instruction No. 1006.)

Here, Defendant owed a duty to use reasonable care to discover and make safe the stairway. Defendants’ evidence shows that Plaintiff fell in a stairway which she used to retrieve her mail. Plaintiff alleges that she fell because the stairway was darkened because a light fixture near the bottom of the stairs was not functioning. Defendants’ on-site manager was responsible for receiving and documenting “complaints from any of the tenants relating to the exterior common areas, such as lighting in the stairways.” (Medina Decl., ¶4.) Additionally, the manager replaced bulbs that required replacing in the stairway at issue. (Compendium, Exhibit F, p.3.) The evidence shows that the stairway was a common passageway. That the on-site manager was tasked with fielding complaints about the stairway and maintained the light fixtures there demonstrates that the stairway was under Defendants’ control. Thus, Defendants had a duty of reasonable care to keep the stairway safe.

Defendants’ evidence is insufficient to show that it did not have constructive notice of the broken light fixture. Defendant’s evidence with respect to this issue consists of declarations from Sabina Medina, the on-site manager of the apartment complex, and Defendant Chen. These declarations state that neither Medina nor Chen ever received complaints or reports of dim lighting or the broken light fixture. These declarations address the issue of actual notice, not constructive notice.

Defendants have not produced evidence demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to constructive notice. Defendants do not cite to an inspection routine or any other facts to demonstrate that in the exercise of reasonable care, Defendants could not have discovered the broken light fixture.

Even if Defendants did meet their burden of proof, Plaintiff’s evidence shows the light fixture was broken for at least two days prior to her fall. (Declaration of Plaintiff Maria De La Luz Sanchez at paragraph 4.) This certainly demonstrates the existence of a triable issue of material fact with respect to the issue of constructive notice. (See Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205-06.)

Defendants fail to meet their burden of showing no triable issues of material fact remain over whether they had a duty to warn Plaintiff of or make safe the stairway at issue or should have had notice of the condition. The burden does not shift to Plaintiff.

A property owner owes no further duty to make a condition reasonably safe or give an adequate warning of a condition when the danger of the condition is so obvious that the condition itself serves as a warning. (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 673.) “[I]f the danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty unless harm was foreseeable despite the obvious nature of the danger.” (Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Associates, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 111, 122.) Whether a condition is obvious and whether the obviousness negates a property owner’s duty of care are legal questions for the court. (See Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 446-450 (affirming a trial court’s granting of summary judgment based on a finding that a dangerous condition was obvious.)

The obvious character of the condition does not negate a property owner’s duty of care to remedy a conspicuous danger when it is foreseeable that a person will encounter the danger despite the danger’s obviousness. (Martinez v. Chippeqa Enterprises, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185 (indicating a dangerous condition encountered on a sole access way from the street to the defendant’s building would not negate the defendant’s duty of care owed to the plaintiff; see also Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 123 (finding an employee did not assume the risk of an obvious danger when the employee’s employment required him to encounter a dangerous condition).)

The stairway at issue was a common passageway which tenants, including Plaintiff, used to access their mailbox. It is foreseeable that tenants seeking to access their mailbox would use the stairway regardless of the broken light fixture in order to access their mailbox and become injured due to the darkened condition of the stairway. Thus, Defendants are not relieved of their duty of reasonable care to keep the stairway safe.

Defendants also argue that the stairs were not dangerous because Plaintiff had used the stairs for more than 16 years and Plaintiff chose to descend the stairs when she saw they were darkened. Defendant’s evidence shows that the stairs were dark due to a broken light fixture and that there was a hand railing running from the top to the bottom of the stairs. These facts alone do not show that the stairs were not dangerous as Plaintiff alleges. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony shows that she fell because it was too dark for her to see. Defendants do not dispute that the stairway was dark due to a broken light fixture. Plaintiff’s familiarity with the property and the presence of a handrail alone do not show that the darkened stairway was not in a dangerous condition.

Defendants fail to show that there are no triable issues of material fact remaining over whether they are relieved from their duty of care due to the open and obvious condition of the stairway at issue. The burden does not shift to Plaintiff.

Q: All right. So just so that I understand, the sequence of events, you are going downstairs.· At some point during the middle of the stairs, you trip and you fall. You will call for help and your daughter comes down to help you. Is that accurate so far?

A: Well, I do want to clarify.· What I did want to ·clarify with you -- and this is just because you haven't actually asked me.· In regards to what happened, there wasn't any lighting that would light the stairs, and so it was dark there, and so you cannot see.· But I did not trip.· It is just that I could not see because it was dark.

Q: …Ma'am, my question is very specific. I'm asking you -- trying to reiterate what you had already testified that you slipped or misstepped in the middle of the stairs. You've already testified to that. I simply didn't get to the question that I really wanted to ask you. So at some point in the middle of the stairs, you misstep and you go down; correct?

(Sanchez Depo. 93:19-95:18.) Plaintiff’s deposition is the sole evidence submitted in support of Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff lacks evidence as to causation. However, Plaintiff states in her deposition that she fell because it was dark in the stairway. Additionally, there appears to have been a translation error during deposition that confused both counsel and Plaintiff to the point that the sequence of events surrounding the fall are not clear from the deposition alone. It would not be reasonable to infer from the excerpted deposition testimony provided by Defendants that Plaintiff can produce no other evidence showing causation. Moreover, to the extent that there is any question on this issue, Plaintiff’s Declaration in opposition to this motion clarifies how she fell.

Defendants fail to meet their burden of proof of showing no triable issues of material fact remain over whether Plaintiff’s fall was caused by the darkened condition of the stairway. The burden does not shift to Plaintiff.