Judge Jill Feeney, Case 20STCV39095 2023-03-20 Tentative Ruling

The Court Sets an OSC Re: Dismissal of Cross-Complaint by Econolite and City of Bell for Failure to File POS/Default Cross-Defendant Rodolofo Secaida and Dismissal of Cross Complaint Filed by Rodolfo Secaida for Failure to File POS/Default Cross-Defendant Cristobal Vasquez for April 12, 2023 at 8:30 a.m.

This is an action for negligence and motor vehicle negligence arising from a vehicle collision which took place in March 2019. Plaintiffs Cristobal Vazquez and Carlos Blandon filed a complaint against Defendants Rodolfo Secaida, Econolite Systems, Inc., Southern California Edison, the City of Bell, and the County of Los Angeles on October 13, 2020.

Moving Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that City and its contractor, Econolite, were not negligent in the way they secured the intersection, inoperable traffic signals do not constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law, City is not liable for Econolite’s acts under Gov. Code, section 815.4, and City has design immunity. Finally, Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiffs filed a late claim against the City of Bell, barring this lawsuit against City.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

Government Code section 835 states:¿“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and either:

The term “dangerous condition” means a “condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor,¿trivial¿or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it¿will be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a).) “A condition is not dangerous within the meaning of the statute ‘unless it creates a hazard to those who foreseeably will use the property . . . with due care. Thus, even though it is foreseeable that persons may use public property without due care, a public entity may not be held liable for failing to take precautions to protect such persons.”¿(Matthews v. City of Cerritos¿(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1384.) “The condition of the property involved should create a ‘substantial risk’ of injury, for an undue burden would be placed upon public entities if they were responsible for the repair of all conditions creating any possibility of injury however remote that possibility might be.”¿(Fredette¿v. City of Long Beach¿(1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 122, 130, fn. 5.) “The existence of a dangerous condition ordinarily is a question of fact, but the issue may be resolved as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion.”¿(Peterson v. San Francisco Comm. College Dist.¿(1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 810.)

Moving Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that the traffic signal that was inoperable on the date of the accident was not in a dangerous condition. City argues that liability does not attach to a government entity if traffic signals are out due to a power outage, citing Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187.

A “dangerous condition”, as defined by Government Code section 830, “means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial, or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a).) “A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830.2.)

“ ‘Public property is in a dangerous condition within the meaning of [Government Code] section 835 if it “is physically damages, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property itself.” ’ [Citation.] ‘But, public property has also been considered to be in a dangerous condition “because of the design or location of the improvement, the interrelationship of its structural or natural features, or the presence of latent hazards associated with its normal use.” ’ [Citation.] ‘A dangerous condition of public property can come in several forms and may be based on an “amalgam” of factors.’ [Citation.]” (Thimon v. City of Newark (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 745, 754.)

Particularly, with respect to public roadways, “ ‘a public entity is only required to provide roads that are safe for reasonably foreseeable careful use. “If…it can be shown that the property is safe when used with due care and that a risk of harm is created only when foreseeable users fail to exercise due care, then such property is not ‘dangerous’ within the meaning of section 830 subdivision (a).”’” (Thimon, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 754-755; see Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1196 [“As one court has observed, any property can be dangerous if used in a sufficiently improper manner. For this reason, a public entity is only required to provide roads that are safe for reasonably foreseeable careful use. ‘If…it can be shown that the property is safe when used with due care and that a risk of harm is created only when foreseeable users fail to exercise due care, then such property is not ‘dangerous’ within the meaning of section 830 subdivision (a).”].)

Although a public entity does not create a dangerous condition on its property merely for failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, liability does attach if the government installs traffic signals and invites the public to justifiably rely on them and if the signals malfunction, confusing or misleading motorists, and causing an accident to occur. (Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1194.) The reasoning behind this rule is that the government creates a dangerous condition and a trap when it operates traffic signals that, for example, direct motorists to “go” in all four directions of an intersection simultaneously, with predictable results. (Bady v. Detwiler (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 321, 325.) Liability does not attach if the government turns off traffic signals entirely to avoid confusion because the defective condition can no longer mislead or misdirect the injured party. (Chowdhury, at p. 1194 (quoting Goodman v. Raposa (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 830, 835.).) The result is the same whether the traffic signals were extinguished by design or accident. (Id.)

Here, Moving Defendants’ evidence shows that on March 18, 2019, Plaintiffs were involved in a vehicle collision at Eastern Avenue and Bandini Boulevard when a traffic signal was not functioning as a result of a power outage. (Alfonso Decl., Exh. B.) Cristobal Vazquez was driving the vehicle with a passenger, Carlos Blandon, while driving northbound on Eastern Avenue and attempting to turn left on Bandini Boulevard. (UMF No. 4.) The traffic signals were not illuminated because of a power outage and the lights at the intersection were powered down while waiting for Southern California Edison to perform repairs. (Alfonso Decl., ¶7.) City and Econolite installed temporary stop signs at the intersection. (Id.) Moving Defendant’s expert, Edward Ruzak, testifies that the stop signs were visible, available for all to see, and exceeded what was needed to secure the intersection. (Ruzak Decl., ¶9.)

When he approached the intersection, Vazquez noticed the traffic signal was blacked out and that there were temporary stop signs in the intersection. (UMF Nos. 5-6.) Cars were stopping one-by-one and Vazquez knew he was supposed to treat the situation as a four-way stop intersection. (UMF Nos. 7-8.) Vazquez saw the stop sign and obeyed it, looking left and right before starting his left hand turn. (UMF Nos. 9-10.) Before he could finish the turn, Defendant Rodolfo Secaida’s vehicle struck Vazquez’s vehicle. (UMF No. 11.) Secaida also saw the stop signs, knew to treat the situation as a four-way stop intersection, and did not see Vazquez’s vehicle when he first entered the intersection. (UMF Nos. 12-18.)

The CAMUTCD and CalDOT manuals do not require Moving Defendants to place devices at intersections while waiting for power to be restored at an intersection. (UMF No. 24.) In ten years preceding the incident, there were no automobile versus automobile accidents in the intersection caused by inoperative traffic signals. (UMF No. 26.)

Moving Defendants’ evidence shows that the traffic signals were blacked out at the intersection where the accident took place due to a power outage. Moving Defendants installed temporary stop signs while the lights were blacked out, exceeding the requirements of CAMUTCD and CalDOT manuals. The evidence is sufficient to show Moving Defendants acted to ensure the intersection was safe for reasonably foreseeable careful use. Moving Defendants meet their burden of showing no issues of material fact exist over whether the intersection was in a dangerous condition. The evidence shows that Econolite, City’s contractor, did not create a dangerous condition by installing stop signs at the intersection, but rather the opposite. Plaintiffs did not oppose this motion and therefore fail to meet their burden.