Judge Jill Feeney, Case 20STCV42156 2022-10-25 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for negligence and premises liability arising out of a fall caused by a broken railing in March 2020. Plaintiff Maria Wendy Martinez filed her Complaint against Defendants Helen Farzad Family Trust (“Trust”), Helen Farzad as trustee of the Helen Farzad Trust, and Kathy Farzad.

Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of Plaintiff. Specifically, Defendants argue that there are no triable issues of material fact over whether Plaintiff’s fall was caused by the alleged broken gate rail or by a defective sidewalk. Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s version of the accident is so inconsistent with her medical records that no reasonable jury could believe her.

Plaintiff argues that (1) Defendants failed to meet their burden of proof to conclusively establish that Plaintiff’s claim has no merit, (2) Defendants cannot meet their burden of proof to establish the absence of duty and breach of its duty to Plaintiff or causation, (3) Plaintiff has established by admissible evidence that Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff to inspect, maintain, and repair the driveway and rail gate and they were negligent in performing these duties, and (4) summary judgment and adjudication are improper because Plaintiff has established by admissible evidence that triable issues of material fact exist as to duty, breach, and causation.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).)

As a general rule, in reviewing the evidence presented on summary judgment, the moving party’s evidence is strictly construed, and the opposing party’s evidence is liberally construed. (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832; Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591.) The court is to consider all evidence submitted by the parties, direct and circumstantial, except that to which a proper objection has been sustained. (Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).) The court must also consider all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. (Id.) The court’s function on summary judgment is issue-finding, not issue-determination. (Weil & Brown, supra, 10:270-272.10.) The court is not to consider the weight or credibility of the evidence. It should only determine if a triable issue of material fact exists which requires the weighing procedures of trial. (Id.)

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156.)

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff’s version of events is so contradicted by information in her medical records that no reasonable jury would believe her version of events.

Defendants’ evidence shows that on March 1, 2020, Plaintiff fell after exiting her vehicle and walking toward a gate located at the entrance of the cement driveway on the property she leased from Defendants. (UMF Nos. 1-11.) Defendants have leased the property to Plaintiff since March 2015. (UMF No. 2.) Plaintiff alleges she fell when her foot became stuck in a broken gate rail and struck her knee on the cement. (UMF Nos. 11-12.)

Plaintiff testified that her knee did not hit a brick. (UMF No. 13.) Plaintiff also testified that her dogs were not near her. (UMF No. 14.) There were no witnesses to the fall and no video footage of the fall. (UMF Nos. 15-16.) Plaintiff testified that she had never taken insulin for her diabetes prior to the fall except for when she was pregnant. (UMF No. 17.) Plaintiff testified that she did not experience any dizziness on the date of, or in the days leading up to the subject fall. (UMF No. 19.)

Plaintiff’s medical records show Plaintiff told her physician at Northridge Hospital Medical Center that she was injured when she tripped and fell on a brick while walking her dog. (UMF No. 22.) The records also show that Plaintiff had significant medical history of insulin-dependent diabetes and had been off insulin therapy for 2-3 months. (UMF No. 23.) Plaintiff noticed progressively more dizziness in the time she was off insulin therapy. (UMF No. 23.) Plaintiff’s records from the UCLA Medical Center shows that she has declining eyesight and that she may need glasses and cataract surgery for blurred vision. (UMF No. 26.)

Text communications between Plaintiff and Defendant Helen Farzad show that Plaintiff informed Helen Farzad that she had injured her leg by pulling a ligament. (UMF No. 28.) Plaintiff did not inform Helen Farzad that the leg injury was due to a broken gate rail. (UMF No. 35.)

Defendants’ motion turns on whether the discrepancies in Plaintiff’s description of her fall show that there are no issues of material fact as to causation. Defendants’ evidence shows that there are discrepancies between Plaintiff’s description of events in her Complaint, her medical records, and her communications with Helen Farzad. Defendants argue that there can be no triable issue of material fact over whether Defendants’ alleged negligence caused her fall because the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint are discredited by her medical records and her communications with Helen Farzad.

Defendants fail to meet their burden of proof to show that no triable issues of material fact exist with respect to causation because Defendants’ motion depends entirely upon a credibility determination. The Court may not consider the weight or credibility of evidence. Additionally, the varying versions of events surrounding Plaintiff’s fall shows that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to causation. How Plaintiff fell and whether her injuries are attributable to her medical conditions or the conditions of Defendants’ property are factual disputes to be determined at trial.