Judge Jill Feeney, Case 20STCV42305 2023-01-27 Tentative Ruling

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no evidence that a dangerous condition existed on the dance floor where Plaintiff fell. Defendant requests judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Complaint. The request is denied as unnecessary. The Court may always refer to the pleadings in the case at hand.

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for [customers’] their use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) The existence and scope of a property owner’s duty are legal questions for the court. (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 36.)

Because the owner is not the insurer of the visitor’s personal safety…, the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206.) “[W]here the plaintiff relies on the failure to correct a dangerous condition to prove the owner’s negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it.” (Ibid.) The party asserting the cause of action has the burden to prove that the owner had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time to correct it.¿ (Ortega, 26 Cal.4th at 1203, 1206.)

Here, Defendant’s evidence shows that on December 14, 2018, Plaintiff was a patron at Defendant’s restaurant, the Liaison Restaurant and Lounge in Los Angeles. (UMF No. 1.) Plaintiff was at the attending her company’s holiday party. (UMF No. 4a.) Plaintiff consumed at least one drink. (UMF No.4c.) Plaintiff was wearing 2-3 inch heels at the time of her fall. (UMF No. 4e.) Plaintiff and a coworker, Grace Courvoisier, danced on the dance floor 1 to 2 minutes before Plaintiff’s fall. (UMF No. 4f.) Plaintiff did not see any liquid or napkins where she fell. (UMF No. 4h.)

Defendant also submits the deposition of Grace Courvoisier in support of its motion for summary judgment. Courvoisier was turned away when Plaintiff fell but heard her fall and helped Plaintiff up. (UMF Nos.5c-d.) Courvoisier did not see any liquid on the floor and testified that Plaintiff’s clothes were not wet. (UMF Nos. 5c-d.)

Wendy Parker and Roberto Hernandez, current and former employees at the Liaison who were present on the night of the event also testify that the lighting was good and that they saw no liquid or debris on the dance floor at the time of Plaintiff’s fall. (UMF Nos. 7-8.) Ms. Parker testifies that she was the person who booked the holiday party. (Parker Decl., ¶2.) She also testifies that the dance floor “had lights around the edge of the dance floor with disco balls overhead” and that “all the spotlights around the venue were on.” (Id.) Additionally, she “saw a woman…on the dance floor after her fall and did not see anything near her like liquids or debris that would have caused her to fall.” (Id.) The declaration of Roberto Hernandez is illegible.

Plaintiff also provides expert testimony showing that the dance floor meets the standard of care level for hard surface flooring such as commercial dance floors. (UMF No.8.) Plaintiff’s expert, Gidon R. Vardi, inspected the subject dance floor twice in Fall 2021 and January 2022. (Vardi Decl., ¶3.) The dance floor by Fall 2021 had been covered by plywood. (Id.) When Vardi returned, a 4 by 4 area of plywood was removed, allowing Vardi to test the tile dance floor that Plaintiff had slipped on. (Id.) Vardi’s tests revealed that the tile floor conformed with published standards and had a coefficient of friction level that exceeded minimum requirements for flooring and walkways. (Id., ¶3b.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the Plaintiff slipped on “a slippery substance on the poorly lit dance floor” and that Defendant “allowed patrons to brink drinks onto the dance floor area.” Defendant’s evidence shows that neither Plaintiff nor any witnesses to the fall and the aftermath of the fall saw any liquid on Plaintiff. Courvoisier, the person who helped Plaintiff up immediately after the fall, testified that her clothes were not wet after the fall. Defendant’s expert’s tests revealed that the floor met safety standards for flooring and walkways. Additionally, the dance floor was well lit by lights lining the dance floor, spotlights, and overhead disco balls. The evidence sufficiently shows that there was no liquid on the dance floor at the time of Plaintiff’s fall. No other conditions such as lighting or tiling made the dance floor more dangerous. Therefore, Defendant’s evidence shows that the dance floor did not pose an unreasonable risk of injury to Plaintiff or the other patrons at the restaurant. Defendant meets its burden of showing there are no triable issues of material fact over whether a dangerous condition of the dance floor existed.