Judge: Jill Feeney, Case: 20STCV42446, Date: 2022-09-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV42446 Hearing Date: September 9, 2022 Dept: 30
Department 30, Spring Street Courthouse
September 9, 2022
20STCV42446
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Compton Community College District
DECISION
Defendant’s motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s cause of action for Dangerous Condition of Public Property.
Defendant’s motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence
Moving party is ordered to provide notice.
Background
On November 5, 2020, Plaintiff Marion Kaye Armstard commenced this action against Compton Community College District and Does 1 through 100. Plaintiff’s cause of action is premises liability based on Plaintiff slipping and falling due to a liquid substance on the floor of a building.
Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on March 21, 2022.
Plaintiff filed a stipulation to continue the hearing on May 31, 2022 so that Plaintiff could receive written discovery responses and file a proper opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
On May 31, 2022, the Court granted the parties’ request to continue the hearing on this motion.
Summary
Moving Arguments
Defendant argues that (1) the location of the incident was not a dangerous condition of public property as defined by Gov. Code Section 835 and (2) Plaintiff is precluded from bringing a cause of action for negligence in addition to her claim for dangerous condition of public property.
Opposing Arguments
Plaintiff did not file an opposition. Although this motion was previously continued to allow Plaintiff to complete discovery and file an opposition, nothing has been filed.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., section 437c(c).)
Discussion
Dangerous Condition of Public Property
Government Code § 811.2 broadly defines the term “public entity” to include “the state, the Regents of the University of California, the Trustees of the California State University and the California State University, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State.”¿¿
Government Code section 835 states:¿“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and either:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or¿
(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”¿
Here, Defendant’s evidence shows that on October 8, 2019, Plaintiff slipped and fell on a clear liquid in Compton Community College’s Administrative Building. (UMF Nos. 3-4; Armstard Depo. p. 50:4-25.) Plaintiff entered the building through the south entrance, left, then returned to attend a meeting with her EOP&S program. (UMF Nos. 4, 7.) When Plaintiff entered the building the second time, she walked north, then turned left and slipped 2-3 minutes after entering the building. (UMF Nos. 7-8; Armstard Depo. p. 70-71.) Plaintiff could not see the liquid, did not know the liquid’s origin, how far the liquid spread, and did not see any trail from the liquid. (UMF Nos. 9-14; Armstard Depo. p. 73-74.)
Defendant does not meet its burden of showing there is no triable issue of material fact over whether either Plaintiff’s injury was caused by Defendant’s employee or Defendant should have known of the dangerous condition. Defendant’s evidence shows that Plaintiff could not see the liquid she slipped on and that the liquid was not dirty. These facts are not dispositive of how the liquid came to be there or whether Defendant knew or should have known of the liquid. Rather, it is still unclear where the liquid came from and how long it was there. Defendant relies solely on Plaintiff’s deposition, meaning Defendant’s evidence depends solely on Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the facts surrounding her fall. Defendant fails to meet its burden.
Defendant argues Plaintiff has no evidence that the liquid came to be there because of Defendant’s employee’s actions or that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition.
Despite Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986) 477 U.S. 317, in California summary adjudication remains a “drastic” remedy, and as such the movant “is held to strict compliance with the procedural requisites.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 949, quoting Department of General Services v. Superior Court (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 273, 284.) A party moving for summary judgment may not simply argue there is an absence of facts supporting the opposing party’s case. (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 81.) Rather, courts shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence. (Id.) A defendant must support its motion with discovery admissions or other admissible evidence showing that “plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 854.) A defendant may not simply show that a plaintiff has no evidence on a particular point, a defendant must also produce evidence showing that a plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain such evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2002) 108 Cal.4th 884, 891.)
Here, Defendant relies exclusively on Plaintiff’s deposition testimony to support its argument that no issues of material fact exist over whether the liquid Plaintiff slipped on came to be there because of its employee’s actions or that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition. As discussed above, Plaintiff was questioned about where the liquid was, where Plaintiff was going on the date of the incident, whether the liquid was dirty, and whether Plaintiff knew where the liquid came from. Plaintiff would not have knowledge as to the actions of Defendant’s employees or whether Defendant should have known of the dangerous condition. Plaintiff herself is not Defendant’s employee and consistently testified that she did not see the liquid before falling and did know where the liquid came from:
“Q: Before you – before your foot made contact with the liquid, did you see it?
A: No, I didn’t.
Q: Did you recall what color the liquid was?
A: No.
Q: Was it clear? Did it have some sort of like discoloration? Did it look dirty?
A: No. You couldn’t see it on the floor. Whatever it was, you couldn’t see it.
Mr. Kohanarieh: Could not or could see it?
A: Could not see it.”
(Armstard Depo.: 73:7-17.)
“Q: Okay. Do you have any idea where the liquid came from? Like did it – was it leaking from the air conditioning on the ceiling? Do you know one way or the other where it came from?
A: No, I don’t.”
(Armstard Depo., 74:3-7.) Again, Plaintiff’s own lack of knowledge of where the liquid came from is not dispositive of whether Defendant’s employees caused the dangerous condition or if Defendant had notice of the condition. It would be unreasonable to infer from this record alone that Plaintiff can produce no other evidence to support her case.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied on this ground.
Negligence
Defendants also move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s negligence claim on the grounds that Plaintiff is precluded from bringing a claim for negligence in addition to a claim for dangerous condition of public property.
There is no common law tort liability for public entities in California, including negligence. (McCarty v. State of California Dept. of Transp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 955, 975.)
Here, Plaintiff’s claim for negligence cannot be sustained because Defendant is a public entity and there is no common law negligence liability for public entities in California. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence.
