Judge Jill Feeney, Case 20STCV45897 2022-09-07 Tentative Ruling

Under California Evidence Code section 453, the Court shall take judicial notice of any matter specified in section 452 if a party requests it and (a) gives each adverse party sufficient notice of the request to enable such adverse party to prepare to meet the request and (b) furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. Under California Evidence Code section 452, the Court may take judicial notice, among other things, of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States and facts, court records, and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (§ 452(c), (d), (h).) The Court can take judicial notice of the official acts of a state including records, orders, and reports of its administrative agencies. (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal. App. 4th 513, 518.) However, the court may only judicially notice the existence of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156.)

“Historically, the public policy of this state generally has precluded a landlord's liability for injuries to his tenant or his tenant's invitees from a dangerous condition on the premises which comes into existence after the tenant has taken possession. This is true even though by the exercise of reasonable diligence the landlord might have discovered the condition.” (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510; Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771, 778.) “[B]efore liability may be thrust on a landlord for a third party's injury due to a dangerous condition on the land, the plaintiff must show that the landlord had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition in question, plus the right and ability to cure the condition.’” (Stone v. Center Trost Retail Properties, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 608, 612.)

“A written release may exculpate a tortfeasor from future negligence or misconduct.” (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356. “To be effective, such a release ‘must be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent of the subscribing parties.” (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356.) “In the absence of extrinsic evidence, the scope of a release is determined by the express language of the release.” (Id at p. 1357.)

However, “a commercial landowner cannot totally abrogate its landowner responsibilities merely by signing a lease… At the time the lease is executed and upon renewal…a landlord has a right to reenter the property, has control of the property, and must inspect the premises to make the premises reasonably safe from dangerous conditions.” (Mora, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d 771 at p. 781.) “[T]he landlord’s responsibility to inspect is limited. Like a residential landlord, the duty to inspect charges the lessor only with those matters would have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection.” (Id. at p. 782.) “Even if the commercial landlord executes a contract which requires the tenant to maintain the property in a certain condition, the landlord is obligated at the time the lease is executed to take reasonable precautions to avoid unnecessary danger.” (Id at p.781.)

“The burden of reducing or avoiding the risk and the likelihood of injury will affect the determination of what constitutes a reasonable inspection. The landlord’s obligation is only to do what is reasonably under the circumstances. The landlord need not take extraordinary measures or make unreasonable expenditures of time and money in trying to discover hazards unless the circumstances so warrant. When there is a potential serious danger, which is foreseeable, a landlord should anticipate the danger and conduct a reasonable inspection before passing possession to the tenant. However, if no such inspection is warranted, the landlord has no such obligation.” (Id. at p. 782.)

Defendant’s evidence shows that Plaintiff’s employer, Bridges to Recovery (“BTR”), operated a residential healthcare facility at a property located at 10201 Charing Cross Road, Los Angeles, CA, 90024 which Defendant leased to BTR. (UMF No. 21; Neman Decl., ¶21.) Defendant first leased the property to BTR on December 5, 2012. (UMF No. 21; Neman Decl., ¶9.) BTR exercised its option to lease the property for two additional years through December 2015. (UMF No. 22-23; Neman Decl., ¶11.) BTR again extended its lease for another two years through December 2017 and again through December 2019. (UMF No. 24.)

“Tenant shall properly use, operate, and safeguard Premises, including if applicable, any landscaping, furniture, furnishings and appliances, and all mechanical, electrical, gas and plumbing fixtures, and keep them and the Premises clean, sanitary and well ventilated…Tenant shall immediately notify Landlord, in writing, of any problem, malfunction, or damage.”

(UMF No. 27; Appendix, Exh. A, ¶11.) Defendant was never responsible for the maintenance or repair of any aspect of the motion sensor light or any other lighting at the back steps on the property. (UMF No. 28; Neman Decl., ¶18.) During walkthroughs of the premises, Defendant was never apprised of problems with the back steps or any other conditions with the back light or any sensor light. (UMF No. 31; Neman Decl., ¶21.) Since BTR took possession of the premises in 2015, BTR maintained the back steps and the motion sensor light. (UMF No. 32; Neman Decl., ¶22.)

On June 22, 2019, Plaintiff slipped while descending three steps at the back of the premises, where a sensor light had broken and where the bottom step had an indentation or gouge. (UMF Nos. 38-39.) As Plaintiff descended the steps, she noticed the sensor light that was usually there did not turn on and hesitated. (UMF Nos. 48-49, Mitchell Decl., 86:7-14.) Plaintiff’s foot was halfway off the first step when she lost her balance. (Id., 86:20-87:19.) Her left foot went to the side, propelling her right foot to the bottom step. (Id.,98:11-16.) Her right foot skipped the bottom step and hit the ground where she heard her bone pop. (Id., 100:10-15.)

Here, although Defendant’s lease with BTR is labeled and described as a residential lease, BTR operates a residential healthcare facility from the property, a commercial activity. Regardless of whether the lease is residential or commercial, the defect appears to have arisen around the time of the incident because Plaintiff descended the steps expecting the light to turn on. (Mitchell Decl., 96:9-11.)

If the lease was residential, Defendant may only be liable if Plaintiff can show Defendant had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition in question, plus the right and ability to cure the condition. If the lease was commercial, Defendant had a duty to inspect the property upon renewal of the lease and make safe any dangerous conditions on the property. Regardless, even if Defendant had a duty to inspect the premises and make it reasonably safe, the sensor light became defective sometime in June 2019, when BTR’s latest lease extension was near its end. Even if Defendant had a duty to inspect the premises when the lease was renewed in 2017, Defendant would not have discovered the defect that arose in June 2019.

Defendant’s evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff’s fall was caused by a defective sensor light which did not turn on the night of the fall, causing Plaintiff to lose balance on the three steps leading out of the back of the property. Defendant was not responsible for maintaining the lights and was never apprised of the defective condition of the lights. Thus, Defendant meets its burden of showing no triable issue of material fact exists over whether Defendant had a duty to inspect or repair the sensor lights.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant’s motion and thus fails to meet her burden of showing issues of material fact exist over whether Defendant had a duty to inspect or repair the sensor lights. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.