Judge Jill Feeney, Case 20STCV47621 2022-09-26 Tentative Ruling

The parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if there is an agreement to submit.

Regardless of whether there is any such agreement, each party who wishes to submit must send an email to the Court at sscdept30@lacourt.org indicating the party's intention to submit.

Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the case number in the subject line of the email and in the body provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, or non-party.

If a party submits but still intends to appear at the hearing, include the words "SUBMITS BUT WILL APPEAR" in the subject line of the email.

If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Unless all the parties have submitted, the Court will hear argument from any party that appears at the hearing and wishes to argue. The Court may change its tentative as a result of the argument and adopt the changed tentative as the final order at the end of that hearing, even if all the parties are not present.

Be advised that after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of said motion and may adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

This is an action for premises liability, medical professional negligence, and premises liability. Plaintiff Elena Borja filed her Complaint against Defendant Temple City Dialysis Facility, Inc. on December 14, 2020 alleging she was injured after tripping on a rug that was negligently propped up to keep the front door open and struck her head after being hit by the door.

Defendant also argues Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to support a cause of action for medical negligence because she failed to articulate the standard of care relative to her medical care and because her injuries were caused by a trip and fall, not any act or omission related to her medical care and treatment.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s cause of action for general negligence has no merit because (1) the door mat was a trivial defect as a matter of law, (2) the door mat did not create a substantial risk of injury since there was no evidence of a history of similar incidents or anyone else ever being injured by the same alleged defect, (3) Defendant had no duty to warn or protect against a condition of which they had no actual or constructive notice, (4) the door mat was an open and obvious condition that Defendant had no duty to warn of, and (5) Plaintiff failed to use due care to look where she was walking while entering the facility.

Plaintiff also argues the present case is distinguishable from Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75 and Defendant does not address whether conduct related to the entryway rug met the standard of care for medical professionals.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is procedurally deficient because Defendant made its motion under the standard for demurrers and not summary judgment. Although Defendant’s memorandum of points and authority states Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to support her causes of action, Defendant’s motion states Plaintiff failed to establish a triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, Defendant moves for summary judgment under the appropriate standard.

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion fails to identify each separate cause of action, claim, and issue that is the subject of the motion. To the contrary, Defendant moves for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s causes of action and sufficiently identifies the grounds upon which it makes a motion for summary judgment.

The Court initially notes that Plaintiff’s allegations of premises liability and negligence are duplicative. They are based on the same theory of recovery (negligence) and the same facts (Plaintiff tripped and fell over a rug). Accordingly, the Court treats both of Plaintiff’s causes of action for premises liability and negligence as one.

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for [customers’] their use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) The existence and scope of a property owner’s duty are legal questions for the court. (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 36.)

Here, Defendant’s evidence shows that Plaintiff had an appointment for dialysis treatment at Temple City Dialysis facility on November 2, 2019 at 9:00 a.m. (UMF No. 8.) Plaintiff tripped on a door mat, which was propped up to keep the door open, while entering Defendant’s facility. (UMF Nos.5-6.) The door mat is dark grey or black in color, measuring 3 feet by 5 feet, with short, low, tightly woven material and a rubberized backing. (UMF No. 15.) The mat or other similar mats have been in on the floor since at least 2002. (UMF Nos. 10, 14.) Aside from Plaintiff’s appointment, there were 18 other appointments scheduled for before 9:00 a.m. (UMF No. 9.)

Defendant also provides the declaration of Consuelo Salvador, the Facilities Administrator at Temple City Dialysis. The front door to the facility is locked at all times and was locked on the morning of the incident. (UMF No. 16; Salvador Decl., ¶11.) The door may only be opened electronically during operating hours via a push button remote. (UMF No. 17; Salvador Decl., ¶11.) Patients seeking to enter the facility would check in with the front office by pressing a button and enter after a charge nurse or dialysis technician pressed a button unlocking the door. (UMF No. 17; Salvador Decl., ¶11.) The door opens outward from the facility and would not have been able to open if there was a mat obstructing it. (UMF No. 18.) There were no reported incidents, complaints, or injuries before Plaintiff fell on the day of the incident. (UMF No. 11.)

Plaintiff is required to show that Defendants owed her a legal duty of care with respect to the condition that caused her injury. As a general matter, the existence of a duty is a question of law to be determined by the court. (Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.)

“Foreseeability of harm is typically absent when a dangerous condition is open and obvious. [Citation.] ‘Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.’ [Citation.] In that situation, owners and possessors of land are entitled to assume others will ‘perceive the obvious’ and take action to avoid the dangerous condition.” (Montes v. Young Men's Christian Association of Glendale, California (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1134, quoting Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447.)

However, there may be a duty of care owed even if a condition is open and obvious when “it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g., when necessity requires persons to encounter it).” (Montes v. Young Men's Christian Association of Glendale, California (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1134, quoting Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 122.)

Defendant fails to show that no triable issue of material fact exists over whether it had a duty to warn of the condition of the propped-up door mat. Defendant’s evidence shows that the door mat was gray or black in color and measured 3 feet by 5 feet. Although Defendant appears to imply in the motion that the door was not propped open, there is no evidence provided that the door was not propped open by the doormat. Nevertheless, given the size of the mat and the fact that every patient used the front door to access the facility, a reasonable person would have been expected to see the door mat wedged in the door opening. However, even if the condition was obvious, Defendant still owed a duty of care with respect to the door mat because it was foreseeable that a patient entering the facility would trip on a propped-up mat. Defendant’s evidence shows that any patient entering the facility would have had to enter through the front door. Because the door mat presented an obstacle to the only patient entrance to a facility with as many as 18 patients per hour, it is foreseeable that a patient would trip and fall on the mat. Thus, Defendant had a duty of care with respect to the mat.

Whether a condition is¿trivial¿as a matter of law, “[t]he legal analysis involves several steps. First, the court reviews evidence regarding the type and size of the defect. If that preliminary analysis reveals a¿trivial¿defect, the court considers evidence of any additional factors such as the weather, lighting and visibility conditions at the time of the accident, the existence of debris or obstructions, and plaintiff’s knowledge of the area. If these additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law. . .”¿(Stathoulis¿v. City of Montebello¿(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 567-568.)

Although Defendant’s evidence describes the size of the door mat, there is no other evidence demonstrating the condition was trivial. Defendant’s evidence does not discuss the size of the door mat as it was propped up, nor does it discuss other factors such as weather, lighting, visibility, conditions at the time of the accident, or any other factors. The Court cannot determine from Defendant’s evidence whether the propped-up door mat was trivial as a matter of law. Defendant fails to mee its burden.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to use due care when entering the facility. This argument speaks to proximate cause. However, aside from a conclusory statement that Plaintiff would have noticed a large 3 feet by 5 feet door mat propped up, Defendant has not provided any evidence that Plaintiff failed to use due care when entering the facility. There is no evidence showing how Plaintiff entered the facility and thus the Court cannot determine if the level of care Plaintiff used was reasonable. Defendant thus fails to meet its burden.

Defendant relies on Ortega v. Kmart Corp to support its argument that its lack of notice relieves it from its duty to Plaintiff. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1202.) An owner owes a duty of ordinary care by making reasonable inspections of the portions of the premises open to customers. (Id at 1205.) Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the jury. (Id at 1207.)

Defendant’s evidence shows that its policy since 2002 was that the front door is kept closed and locked at all times. There were no other incidents involving the door mat the day of the incident and the door could not have opened if the rug was propped up.

These facts alone are not sufficient to prove that there are no issues of material fact over whether Defendant had notice of the door mat. Although the evidence shows Defendant’s policy was to keep the door closed, this is not dispositive of whether the door was actually closed or that Defendant made reasonable inspection which would have revealed a propped open door. Likewise, a lack of prior incidents does not show whether Defendant acted with ordinary care to inspect the premises open to the public. Although the facilities administrator states the policy remained the same on the day of the incident, the declaration does not show that the door was actually closed on the day of the incident. (Salvador Decl., ¶10.)

Additionally, Defendant’s assertion that the door would not move if the mat was propped up does not demonstrate that the door was not being propped open on the date of the incident. To the contrary, the evidence shows that a propped-up door mat would prevent the door from moving or closing. Absent any evidence that the door was not being propped open as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moreover, even if Defendant had evidenced the door was closed on the date of the incident, Plaintiff’s declaration demonstrates that the door was propped open using the door mat. (Borja Depo., 42:14-17.)

The elements of medical malpractice are: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.”¿(Simmons v. West Covina Medical Clinic (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 696, 701-702 (citations omitted).)¿“Both the standard of care and defendants’ breach must normally be established by expert testimony in a medical malpractice case.”¿(Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467.)¿

Whether “negligence in maintaining hospital equipment or premises qualifies as professional negligence depends on the nature of the relationship between the equipment or premises in question and the provision of medical care to the plaintiff.” Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 88. “A hospital's negligent failure to maintain equipment that is necessary or otherwise integrally related to the medical treatment and diagnosis of the patient implicates a duty that the hospital owes to a patient by virtue of being a health care provider.” (Id.)

Here, Defendant’s evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the propped-up door mat. A door mat is not a piece of equipment that is necessary or otherwise integrally related to Plaintiff’s dialysis treatment. Thus, the incident falls under ordinary negligence, not professional negligence.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that the present case is distinguishable from Flores because that case only concerned whether a hospital’s conduct strapping a patient to a gurney fell below the standard of care. Plaintiff argues Defendant’s conduct with the entryway rug failed to meet the standard of care for professionals in the industry. (Opp. p. 7.) Plaintiff has not provided evidence showing Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by any equipment related to Plaintiff’s medical care. Thus, the incident falls under ordinary negligence, not professional negligence. Defendant’s motion is granted as to the cause of action for medical negligence.