Judge Jill Feeney, Case 21STCV16176 2022-12-07 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for negligence and motor vehicle negligence arising from a vehicle collision which took place in August 2020. Plaintiffs Juan and Monica Macias filed their Complaint on April 29, 2021.

Plaintiffs argue in opposition that they never brought a claim for negligent entrustment and never requested punitive damages. Plaintiffs allege that the vehicle’s owner, Pevehouse, is liable under Vehicle Code, section 17150, which provides that liability arises solely from the status as owner of the vehicle, not from any independent fault or wrongdoing on the owner’s part.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).)

“Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.” (Vehicle Code, section 17150.) “Liability arises solely from the owner’s status as owner of the vehicle, not from any independent fault or wrongdoing on the owner’s part.” (Galvis v. Petito (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 551, 555 (emphasis in original).) For purposes of permissive use liability, the owner and driver are treated as a single tortfeasor and whatever noneconomic damages are properly charged to the operator are likewise the burden of the owner. (Id at 568.)

Under the theory of negligent entrustment, liability is imposed on¿the vehicle¿owner or permitter because of the owner’s independent¿negligence¿and not the¿negligence¿of the driver. (Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gilstrap¿(1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 524, 530(. A person who places or entrusts his motor vehicle in the hands of another “whom he knows, or from circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.” (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co.¿(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063.)

Here, Defendant’s evidence shows that on August 23, 2020, Defendant Burkholder was driving a vehicle owned by Defendant Pevehouse when the subject collision took place. (UMF Nos. 1-3.) Pevehouse allowed Burkholder to drive his vehicle to work for at least two years before the collision. (UMF Nos. 4-5.) Pevehouse previously rode as a passenger in another vehicle driven by Burkholder and believed him to be a competent driver. (UMF No. 6.) Burkholder had no previous collisions or criminal convictions and had never driven under the influence of drugs or alcohol before the subject collision. (UMF Nos. 7-9.)

The parties do not dispute that Pevehouse is liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from Burkholder’s negligent act in the operation of his vehicle under Vehicle Code, section 17150. The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs ever had a cause of action for negligent entrustment in their Complaint or First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Although the FAC states that Defendants “negligently, carelessly, recklessly and maliciously owned, entrusted, managed and operated” the vehicle, there are no facts in the Complaint that would suggest Plaintiffs sought liability under a theory of negligent entrustment. (FAC, p.5.)

Assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs did have a cause of action for negligent entrustment, Defendants’ evidence shows that Pevehouse believed Burkholder to be a competent driver and did not know he was unfit to drive. Defendant thus meets his burden of showing there are no triable issues of material fact over whether Pevehouse knew Burkholder was unfit to drive. Plaintiffs do not dispute Defendant’s evidence and state that they are not pursuing this theory of liability. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is granted as to negligent entrustment.

“Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code, section 3294, subd. (c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)

Here, Defendant’s evidence shows that Pevehouse merely allowed Burkholder to drive his vehicle to work. There are no facts showing that Pevehouse engaged in conduct constituting oppression, fraud, or malice. Defendant thus meet his burden of proving there are no triable issues of material fact over whether he was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. Plaintiffs again do not dispute Defendant’s evidence. Rather, they argue that their FAC does not contain a demand for punitive damages. However, page 3 of the FAC shows that Plaintiffs checked the box marked “Other” and filled wrote “Punitive Damages” in Item number 10(f). Assuming there is a demand for punitive damages in Plaintiffs’ FAC as to this defendant, Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of proof that there are triable issues over material fact over whether Pevehouse is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. Defendant’s motion is granted with respect to the demand for punitive damages.