Judge Jill Feeney, Case 21STCV19991 2022-09-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Jill Feeney, Case: 21STCV19991, Date: 2022-09-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV19991 Hearing Date: September 14, 2022 Dept: 30

Department 30, Spring Street Courthouse

September 14, 2022

21STCV19991

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles City Department of Parks and Recreation

DECISION

The motion is granted.

Defendants are ordered to file a proposed judgment within 20 days after the date of this order.

Moving party is ordered to provide notice and to file proof of service of such notice within five court days after the date of this order.

Background

This is an action for premises liability and negligence arising from a trip and fall incident which took place at the Balboa Sports Center in January 2021. Plaintiff Dina Katorza-Buzaglo filed her Complaint against Defendants City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles City Department of Parks and Recreation on May 27, 2021.

On June 29, 2022, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment.

Summary

Moving Arguments

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) City is immune from any liability pursuant to Government Code section 831.4(b) and (2) general negligence does not apply to public entities.

Opposing Arguments

Plaintiff argues that Defendants fail to establish that the sandbox she tripped on should be deemed a trail. Additionally, Plaintiff argues Defendants fail to counter her second cause of action for dangerous condition on public property,

Reply Arguments

Defendant on reply argues Plaintiff fails to dispute material facts. Additionally, regardless of what the paved concrete way is called, the concrete way Plaintiff fell on is a trail and therefore recreational trail immunity applies. Defendant contends that the perimeter of the sandbox is still part of the concrete trail and that expert testimony is not required to determine whether the path is a trail.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

Evidentiary Objections

Defendants filed evidentiary objections.

The following objections are sustained: 2, 3 and 5

The following objections are overruled: 1, 4 and 6

It is noted that even if all the evidence were considered (including the items to which objections have been sustained), the result would be the same.

Discussion

Trail Immunity: Government Code 831.4(b)

Defendants first argue that they are immune from liability pursuant to Gov. Code section 831.4(b).

Gov. Code § 831.4 gives immunity to public entities for injuries caused by the condition of walkways if they constitute a “trail” within the meaning of the statute. Gov. Code § 831.4 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

A public entity . . . is not liable for an injury caused by a condition of:

(a) Any unpaved road which provides access to fishing, hunting, camping, hiking, riding, including animal and all types of vehicular riding, water sports, recreational or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city street or highway or (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) public street or highway of a joint highway district, boulevard district, bridge and highway district or similar district formed for the improvement or building of public streets or highways.

(b) Any trail used for the above purposes.

(c) Any paved trail, walkway, path, or sidewalk on a easement of way which has been granted to a public entity, which easement provides access to any improved property, so long as such public entity shall reasonably attempt to provide adequate warnings of the existence of any condition of the paved trail, walkway, path, or sidewalk which constitutes a hazard to health or safety. . . .”

Trail immunity “extends to trails that are used for the activities listed in subdivision (a), and to trails that are used solely for access to such activities . . . whether or not the trail is paved.” (Amberger-Warren v. City of Piedmont (2006) 143 Cal. App. 4th 1074, 1078.) In considering whether trail immunity applies, the Court must consider (1) whether the alleged accident occurred on a trail under the accepted definitions of a trail and (2) whether the injury was caused by conditions of the trail. See id. at 1078, 1083. “Where property qualifies for immunity ‘depends on a number of considerations, including accepted definitions of [the word trail], the purpose for which the property is designed and used, and the purpose of the immunity statute.” (Garcia v. American Golf Corp. (2017) 11 Cal. App. 5th 532, 540 (citing Amberger-Warren).)

“[I]t is well established that trail immunity covers negligent maintenance of a trail, so the defendant could not be liable for the debris on the trail.” (Arvizu v. City of Pasadena (2018) 21 Cal. App. 5th 760, 768. See also Leyva v. Crockett & Co, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal. App. 5th 1105, 1110-1111 (holding that trail immunity must extend to claims arising from the design of the trail, as well as its maintenance, and that location, no less than design must be immunized for the same reasons); Reed v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 979.)

Trail immunity extends to “a paved pathway in an urban park setting.” (Amberger-Warren, 143 Cal.App.4th at 1078-79.) Pathed paths in public parks are trails as distinguished from sidewalks if the paths are not located on or adjacent to a street or highway. (Id. at 1078.)

“The purpose for which a trail is used is ordinarily viewed as a factual issue, but it becomes a question of a law if only one conclusion is possible.” (Armenio v. County of San Mateo (1994) 28 Cal. App. 4th 413, 418.)

Here, Defendants’ evidence shows that Plaintiff tripped and fell at the Children’s Playground in Balboa Park in Encino. (UMF Nos. 12, 14; Buzaglo Depo., 36:6-17; Neal Decl., ¶¶1,7.) Plaintiff was visiting the park with her daughter and grandsons. (UMF No. 9.) Plaintiff watched her grandsons go to the playground structure and sandbox. (Id.) Plaintiff went into the sandbox to help her grandsons. (UMF No. 11.) As Plaintiff walked out of the sandbox and stepped onto the path, her right foot was caught in the corner edge of the broken pathway, causing her to trip and fall. (UMF No. 12.) Plaintiff did not see the broken corner because it was covered in sand. (UMF No. 13.) The Children’s Playground is a fenced area containing play structures, swings, slides, picnic tables and benches, rope climbing apparatus, and shade structures. (UMF No. 18; Lee Decl., Exh. G; Buzaglo Depo., 33:6-9.) Adults and children use the playground to play, enjoy playground equipment, play in the sand, eat food, and play on the swings. (UMF No. 20; Lee Decl., Exh. G; Buzaglo Depo, 36:6-17, 45:4-46:20.) The concrete pathway provides access to the tables and equipment in the playground. (UMF No. 19.) Some of the equipment in the playground is located within large, contained sandboxes. (UMF No. 19.)

Defendants meet their burden with respect to each of the factors considered when determining if trial immunity applies.

The area in question which is a paved path that is part of a playground within a park clearly qualifies as a trail under established caselaw. Defendants have submitted the declaration of Wayne Neal, the Principal Grounds Maintenance Supervisor for the City of Los Angeles, Department of Recreation and Parks, Valley Region. Attached to the declaration are authenticated photographs demonstrating that the area where Plaintiff fell is a path within a playground area surrounded by a larger park area. (Neal Decl. Exhibits A, B,C, D-1, D-2, E-1 and E-2.)

With respect to the purpose of the area as designed and used, Defendant have provided the Neal Declaration. The Declaration explains in detail that the Children’s Playground is part of the larger Balboa Sports Complex. The Declaration further states that the Balboa Sports Complex “is a public indoor and outdoor sports facility, featuring a recreation center, the Children’s Playground, baseball fields, tennis courts, soccer fields, basketball courts, handball courts and fitness equipment, to name a few.” (Neal Decl. Para. 7.) The Declaration explains that the Children’s Playground “is a fenced area containing various play structures swings, slides, picnic tables and benches, rope climbing apparatus and shade structures.” (Neal Decl. Para. 8.) “Within the playground is a concrete pathway that provides access to the play structures, swings, picnic tables and benches, rope climbing apparatus and grass area. Some of the play structures and rope climbing apparatus are located within large contained sandboxes. (Id.) Neal also states that the area is used by children and others to play and relax. (Decl. at Para. 9.)

Defendants have clearly established that the Children’s Playground is primarily used as a recreational area and that the concrete path where Plaintiff fell is primarily used to access the area.

Finally, with respect to the third factor, the purpose of the immunity statute, the area at issue here is clearly the type of recreational area statutory immunity was designed to cover.

Thus, Defendants meet their burden of showing there are no issues of material fact over whether the concrete path qualifies as a trial. Defendants are thus immune from liability under Gov. Code section 831.4. The burden shifts to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff argues that the playground is not used for the activities listed in Gov. Code section 831.4. However, the statute also includes “recreational or scenic areas.” Plaintiff does not dispute that the Children’s Playground is a recreational area containing recreational facilities. Although Plaintiff disputes whether the concrete surrounding the playground equipment in the area is a “pathway” or a “perimeter,” the name used to describe the concrete is irrelevant. Rather, the relevant consideration is the concrete’s usage. The playground is a fenced-in area containing picnic tables and playground equipment located in large, isolated sandboxes surrounded by concrete. The concrete is solely used to access the playground equipment and picnic tables. Thus, the concrete where Plaintiff fell is a “trail” under Gov. Code section 831.4.

Plaintiff cites to Farnham v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1097, 1103, arguing the concrete perimeter does not become a trail or path by simply calling it a trail. Farnham concerns a bike trail which the plaintiff argued was a highway. The plaintiff’s argument there failed because the bike trail’s intended use was to allow bikes to pass, meaning the trail was a trail, not a highway as the plaintiff there contended. Here, Plaintiff borrows language from Farnham to analogize the concrete around the Children’s Playground with a parking lot, which does not become a trail simply because it is labeled as one. However, a parking lot is primarily used as a parking lot to park cars, not as a walkway to recreational activities. By contrast the concrete around the Children’s Playground serves no other purpose than to allow access to the recreational equipment inside the playground. Plaintiff offers no evidence showing the concrete’s intended and actual use is anything else. Thus, the concrete is a trail for purposes of Gov. Code section 831.4.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to premises liability, including dangerous condition of public property.

Negligence

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for general negligence cannot survive because general negligence does not apply to public entities.

There is no common law tort liability for public entities in California, including negligence. (McCarty v. State of California Dept. of Transp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 955, 975.)

Here, Plaintiff’s claim for negligence cannot be sustained because Defendants are public entities and there is no common law negligence liability for public entities in California. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence.