Department 30, Spring Street Courthouse

December 21, 2022

21STCV23431

Motion to quash Defendant STG Holdings, LLC’s Deposition subpoena for Production of Documents Issued on 11/07/2022 and for Monetary Sanctions filed by Plaintiff Andrew Rafat Bolous

The motion to quash is granted in part and denied in part.

With respect to employment records, Defendant may only subpoena Plaintiff’s current employer for payroll records reflecting the income and other benefits earned by Plaintiff. 

With respect to medical records, the subpoenas are limited to ten years prior to the accident and to the body parts involved in the instant case. The records requested may include liens, write-offs, and amounts billed

Sanctions are not imposed here.

Moving party to provide notice.

This action for negligence arising from an accident in August 2019 where a car lift fell on Plaintiff after Defendants delivered the lift to Plaintiff. Plaintiff Andrew Rafat Bolous filed his Complaint against Defendants Rodrigo Rederex Rodriguez III dba Roderex Trucking and STG Holdings, LLC on June 24, 2021.

On August 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

On August 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Doe Amendment naming STG Transport Logistics, Inc. and STG Logistics, Inc. as defendants in this action.

On September 13, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed STG Transport Logistics, Inc. from this action.

On November 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to quash Defendant STG Holdings, LLC’s (“STG Holdings”) deposition subpoenas for production of documents.

Plaintiff moves to quash STG Holdings’ subpoenas for the production of business records from Plaintiff’s employer and medical providers on the grounds that the subpoenas are overbroad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Specifically, the subpoenas seeking Plaintiff’s medical history and employment records are not time limited, nor are they limited in scope to the body parts injured as a result of the subject accident. Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks a protective order limiting the scope of the subpoenas. Plaintiff also seeks sanctions.

STG Holdings argues that Plaintiff’s motion is untimely, failed to include a separate statement, and did not state every person against whom the sanctions are sought. Plaintiff did not sufficiently meet and confer before filing this motion.  STG Holdings also argues that Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of arguing why the deposition subpoenas should be quashed.

None.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a) states, “[i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.¿ In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”¿ 

 

“[U]pon motion reasonably made by the party, judges may rule upon motions for quashing, modifying or compelling compliance with, subpoenas.”¿ (Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Ass'n (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 582-583.)¿ 

 

[E]ven when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy.  . . . [I]f an intrusion on the right of privacy is deemed necessary under the circumstances of a particular case, any such intrusion should be the minimum intrusion necessary to achieve its objective . . . [meaning] the least intrusive means to satisfy the interest.  Mere convenience of means or cost will not satisfy that test for that would make expediency and not the compelling interest the overriding value.  (Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854-1855 [internal quotes and citations omitted].)

When evaluating invasions of the right to privacy in discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865.) A responding party may prevail by negating any of these three elements “or by pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests.” (Id.) “[T]he party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533.) A court then balances these competing considerations. (Id.) As guidance in balancing these competing considerations, it should be noted, “[o]nly obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Id.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.)

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 provides that “the court may in its discretion award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing [a motion to quash], including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc. section 1987.2(a).) 

Plaintiff seeks to obtain an order quashing Defendant STG Holdings’ deposition subpoenas seeking production of Plaintiff’s medical and employment records. 

Procedural Considerations

STG Holdings opposes the motion on procedural grounds that the motion is untimely. With respect to timing, the order continuing trial specified that the discovery and motion cutoff dates are to comport with the new trial date of September 26, 2023. Plaintiff’s motion is timely. 

STG Holdings also argues that the motion should be denied because Plaintiff failed to adequately meet and confer. There is no requirement that a party meet and confer before filing a motion to quash a subpoena served on a non-party.  (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1985.3 [requiring an attempt at informal resolution only before the party propounding the subpoena moves to enforce the subpoena over objections].)  Moreover, a discovery motion should not be denied automatically based upon the reason that the moving parties failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 434.)

Here, because there is no requirement that a party meet and confer before filing a motion to quash a subpoena served on a non-party, STG Holdings’ argument is without merit.

STG Holdings also argues that the motion should be denied because Plaintiff failed to include a separate statement. However, because the subpoenas themselves are attached to the motion and the disputed language is isolated in the memorandum of points and authorities, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s motion.

Plaintiff alleges that STG Holdings’ subpoenas issued to his medical providers are unduly burdensome and overbroad because they are not time limited, nor are they limited to Plaintiff’s specific injuries arising from the subject accident.

A person’s inalienable right to privacy, as guaranteed by the California and United States Constitutions, applies to their medical records.  (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 855-856; see also Palay v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 919, 931; John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1198.)  A party’s medical records are also privileged under the patient-physician privilege. (See Hale v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1424.)  “Discovery of constitutionally protected information is on a par with discovery of privileged information.”  (Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1387.)  Where the party filing an action has arguably waived the privacy in their protected or privileged information by filing a lawsuit, the waiver must be narrowly construed such that discovery is only permitted of those matters directly relevant to the party’s claims. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 858-859.)  Notwithstanding, the party still has privacy rights as to physical and mental conditions unrelated to the claimed injury.  (See id. at 864; Heller v. Norcal Mutual Insurance Co. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 30, 44.)  

Here, STG Holdings issued six subpoenas to six of Plaintiff’s medical providers requesting any and all of Plaintiff’s medical records regardless of treatment date. Some subpoenas also included language requesting records of liens, write-offs, and amounts billed. (Motion, Exh. A.) 

The subpoenas are overbroad because they are not time limited and not limited to the injuries Plaintiff sustained in the subject accident. Although Plaintiff has waived patient-physician privilege and his right to privacy as to the injuries he sustained in the subject accident by filing his Complaint and seeking damages for his injuries, he did not waive his rights as to injuries unrelated to his claimed injuries. In Plaintiff’s objection to STG Holdings’ subpoenas, Plaintiff agreed to a limitation of records from within five years prior to the subject accident and pertaining to the body parts injured as a result of the accident. The Court finds that ten years is a reasonable time limitation here. Therefore, STG Holdings must limit its subpoenas to records from within ten years of the subject accident relative to the body parts injured as a result of the accident.

Plaintiff also objected to STG Holdings’ request for liens, write-offs, and amounts billed. However, because this information would be relevant to the issue of damages, STG Holdings may seek these records subject to the limitations described above.

 

California’s Constitutional right to privacy protects against the unwarranted, compelled disclosure of various private or sensitive information regarding one’s personal life.  (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856.)  This includes confidential personnel information.  (Hooser v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 997, 1004; El Dorado Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 342.)

Here, STG Holdings issued a subpoena to Plaintiff’s current employer, T-Mobile. STG Holdings’ subpoenas pertaining to Plaintiff’s employment records read as follows:

“Any and all documents and recordings pertaining to the employee, including but not limited to, any and all payroll records, 1099 forms if applicable, and W-2s; records regarding attendance, including work absence, days taken off sick or on medical or workers’ compensation leave, vacation absences, leaves of absence; copies of time cards; the application for employment and/or resume; employee benefit forms; incident reports, including disciplinary action taken; and any and all medical records ad workers’ compensation records; regardless of date.”

Plaintiff objected to the subpoena on the grounds that the employment are records are irrelevant. (Motion, Exh. B.) At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was self-employed and earned most of his income operating a car workshop which he no longer operates as a result of the accident. (Id.) Defendant argues that since Plaintiff demands $259,353.84 in past economic damages and $942,000 in future economic damages, the records relating to current employment are relevant. (Leach Decl. at Paragraph 4.)

Given Plaintiff’s claims for economic damages, including future economic damages, records relating to Plaintiff’s current employment are relevant. However, those records will be limited to payroll records reflecting the income and other benefits earned by Plaintiff. 

The Court declines to impose sanctions here but urges the parties to meet and confer in the future so as to avoid unnecessary motions. This is a matter that the parties should have been able to work out.