Judge Jill Feeney, Case 21STCV24281 2023-02-27 Tentative Ruling

EAN demurs to Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that (1) the Complaint consists of conclusory statements and fails to allege any material facts supporting the allegations, (2) the Graves Amendment bars any claims against companies engaged in the business of renting and leasing motor vehicles, and (3) the Complaint is uncertain as to EAN.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally, and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true”].)

A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 430.41(a).) “The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 430.41(a)(2).) A failure to meet and confer does not constitute grounds to sustain or overrule a demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc., sections 430.41 (a)(4).)

Here, EAN attempted to meet and confer by writing a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel requesting that Plaintiff’s counsel dismiss EAN by January 9, 2023. (Miller Decl., ¶8.) Plaintiff did not dismiss EAN. (Id., ¶9.) Although EAN was required to meet and confer via telephone or in person, failure to meet and confer is not a basis for sustaining or overruling a demurrer.

EAN requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the most recent Statement of Information for EAN filed with the California Secretary of State, (2) the most recent Statement of Information for Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Los Angeles, LLC (“Enterprise,” and together with EAN, the “Enterprise Entities”) filed with the California Secretary of State, (3) the fact stated in EAN’s Statement of Information that EAN is in the business of renting or leasing vehicles, and (4) the fact stated in Enterprise’s Statement of information that Enterprise is in the business of renting or leasing vehicles. These requests are granted.

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917, internal quotations omitted.)

Under the theory of negligent entrustment, liability is imposed on he vehicle owner or permitter because of the owner’s independent negligence and not the negligence of the driver. (Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gilstrap¿(1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 524, 530.) A person who places or entrusts his motor vehicle in the hands of another “whom he knows, or from circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.” (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063.)

The Complaint states that Defendants Danielle Zammit and EAN were owners and operators of the vehicle at issue. (Compl., ¶6.) Plaintiff Julianne Lattner was a pedestrian. (Compl., ¶7.) On July 3, 2019, Defendants negligently entrusted, managed, maintained, drove, and operated the vehicle so that it struck Plaintiff’s vehicle on Montana Ave in Los Angeles, California. (Compl., ¶¶8-9.) As a result of the collision, Plaintiff received severe injuries that caused severe pain and discomfort. (Compl. ¶10.)

With respect to the cause of action for negligence, the Complaint does not allege any specific facts as to who was driving the vehicle. Additionally, EAN is a corporation and could not have been driving the vehicle. There are no facts alleging EAN is vicariously liable for the subject collision.

(a) In general.-- An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—

Here, the Court granted EAN’s request for judicial notice. According to the Statement of Information filed with the secretary of state for EAN and Enterprise, EAN is in the business of renting and leasing vehicles. However, the Complaint does not contain any facts showing EAN rented or leased a vehicle to the driver of the vehicle at issue. It is not clear who was driving the vehicle. Therefore, the Court cannot sustain the demurrer based on the Graves Amendment at this time.

A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. (CCP § 430.10(f).)

The Court also finds that the Complaint is uncertain because it states that Plaintiff was a pedestrian but goes on to state that Defendants’ vehicle struck Plaintiff’s vehicle. It is unclear whether Plaintiff was driving a vehicle or was a pedestrian at the time of the collision. Additionally, there are no facts showing who drove the vehicle. As discussed above, EAN could not have been driving the vehicle because it is a corporate entity. Defendants cannot reasonably respond to the allegations of the Complaint because the details of the collision are conflicting, and it is unclear how the collision occurred.