Judge Jill Feeney, Case Number: 21STCV24826, Date: 2023-09-26 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for unlawful entry, wrongful eviction, constructive eviction, tenant harassment, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, negligence, false imprisonment, private nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawful retention of security deposit, and unfair competition. Plaintiffs Steven Alexander Littaua and Bryan Martinez allege that in October 2019 and February 2020, they entered into contracts with Defendant Stephen Tristan Copen to rent Unit 305 of an apartment located at 611 Gayley Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90024 (“611 Gayley”). (Compl., ¶¶1, 16, 17.) Their tenancies were set to expire on August 31, 2020. (Compl., ¶¶17-18.) During their tenancies, Defendants’ agents entered their units without notice or consent several times. (Id., ¶19.) On April 24, 2020, when Littaua moved into Martinez’s unit, Defendants’ employees entered into Littaua’s unit without permission dumped his belongings in a large pile, dismantled his bedframe, and moved it into Martinez’s unit. (Compl., ¶¶18, 20.)

In August 2020, Defendant Copen informed Plaintiffs that he would be renting their unit to someone else without providing them with notice. (Compl., ¶21.) Copen also told Littaua that he would be moving to a partitioned room without a bathroom. (Compl., ¶21.) Copen also entered Plaintiffs’ unit without permission or notice to pressure and intimidate Littaua into entering a new rental agreement for an inferior room at a higher rental rate. (Compl., ¶22.) Copen also approached Littaua in the property’s garage to demand that he sign a new rental agreement. (Compl., ¶22.) Littaua declined all of Copen’s demands. (Compl., ¶22.)

On August 30, 2020, Littaua was in the process of moving to his new unit when he permitted a friend, Aidan McNulty, to move items to the old unit. (Compl., ¶23.) Littaua allowed McNulty to stay the night in the new unit. (Compl., ¶24.) Copen called the UCLA Police Department and reported that McNulty was not permitted to be on the property. (Compl., ¶24.) The police determined Plaintiffs were not in violation of their rental agreement and that McNulty was not a trespasser. (Compl., ¶24.) Later that day, Littaua returned to the unit and discovered that the locks had already been changed and Defendants Copen and Makhani were throwing his and McNulty’s belongings into the hallway. (Compl., ¶25.) Littaua and McNulty confronted them and McNulty engaged in an altercation with Copen. (Compl., ¶26.) Makhani blocked Littaua’s path and prevented him from leaving. (Compl., ¶27.) Littaua called the police, who arrested Copen. (Compl., ¶29.) Defendants’ employees locked the unit and prevented Plaintiffs from retrieving their belongings. (Compl., ¶29.) Defendants did not respond to Plaintiffs’ requests for mediation. (Compl., ¶30.)

Pretrial discovery of a defendant’s financial condition is generally not permitted. (Civ. Code, § 3295(c); Jabro v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 754, 756.) However, Civil Code section 3295(c) provides that “[u]pon motion by the plaintiff supported by appropriate affidavits and after a hearing, if the court deems a hearing to be necessary, the court may at any time enter an order permitting the discovery otherwise prohibited by this subdivision if the court finds, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294.” (Civ. Code, § 3295(c).) “Such order shall not be considered to be a determination on the merits of the claim or any defense thereto and shall not be given in evidence or referred to at the trial.” (Id.) “[B]efore a court may enter an order permitting discovery of a defendant’s financial condition, it must (1) weigh the evidence submitted in favor of and in opposition to motion for discovery, and (2) make a finding that it is very likely the plaintiff will prevail on his claim for punitive damages.” (Jabro, supra, 95 Cal. App.4th at 758.)

The court cannot determine the propriety of a punitive damages award “unless the record contains evidence of the defendant's financial condition. … we have repeatedly examined punitive damage awards in light of the defendant's financial condition. … This simple principle is well understood by the bench. The standard jury instruction on punitive damages” requires this evidence. (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 110–111.

“Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)

“As amended to include [despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

“[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the ‘officer[s], director[s], or managing agent[s].’” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [citation omitted].) As to ratification, “[a] corporation cannot confirm and accept that which it does not actually know about.’” (Ibid. [citing College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 726 [for ratification sufficient to justify punitive damages against corporation, there must be proof that officers, directors, or managing agents had actual knowledge of the malicious conduct and its outrageous character]].)

Here, Plaintiffs argue that forcible entry and forcible detainer are prohibited under Civ. Code, section 789.3 ; Code Civ. Proc., sections 1159, 1160 ; and Penal Code, section 418. Plaintiffs also argue that if a tenant is forcibly removed from the premises without judicial process, the tenant may sue for wrongful eviction and obtain damages, including punitive damages.

The forcible entry statute protects a “party in possession.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1159.) “The ‘party in possession’ refers to any person who ‘hires' real property.” (Cal. Practice Guide: Landlord—Tenant, supra, ¶ 7:6, p. 7–3; see Civ.Code, §§ 1925, 1940.)

For occupants in peaceful possession of real property, these statutes offer protection from self-help, without regard to the parties’ legal claims to title or possession. “The statutes ... reflect a policy, with deep roots in English law, barring the use of forceful self-help to enforce a right to possession of real property and requiring instead the use of judicial process to gain possession.” (Glass v. Najafi (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 45, 48–49, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 606.)

As the California Supreme has said: “Both before and after the enactment of the present forcible entry and detainer statutes this court held that ownership or right of possession to the property was not a defense to an action for forcible entry.” (Jordan v. Talbot (1961) 55 Cal.2d 597, 603, 12 Cal.Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20, fn. omitted.) Witkin explains: “A tenant holding over without permission is technically a trespasser. But by statute the owner must use the unlawful detainer procedure, and, if the owner ousts the tenant forcibly, the tenant may regain possession by an action for forcible entry.” (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 421, p. 636.) Landlords thus may enforce their rights “only by judicial process, not by self-help.” (Jordan v. Talbot, at p. 604, 12 Cal.Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20.) “Regardless of who has the right to possession, orderly procedure and preservation of the peace require that the actual possession shall not be disturbed except by legal process.” (Id. at p. 605, 12 Cal.Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20; see also, e.g., Daluiso v. Boone (1969) 71 Cal.2d 484, 493, 78 Cal.Rptr. 707, 455 P.2d 811 [these statutes are “intended to discourage self-help in the settlement of disputes over possession of land and to encourage resort to the courts in all such matters”].)

Plaintiffs provide their own declarations to support their demands for punitive damages. Martinez testifies that during his tenancy at the subject property, he relocated to his grandparents’ home, but left his belongings in the subject unit and intended to return to live there. (Martinez Decl., ¶¶3-4.) Martinez did not notify Copen that he would be vacating the unit and did not give permission to Copen or anyone else to handle or remove his belongings. (Id., ¶5.) After he was evicted, Martinez was unable to retrieve his personal property because Copen had thrown them out and many were lost, damaged, or destroyed. (Id., ¶8.)

Littaua testifies that before he moved to Martinez’s unit, Copen entered his unit without notice and stood over him while he was in bed, telling him he needed to move to Martinez’s unit and become his roommate. (Littaua Decl., ¶4.) On April 24, 2020, Defendants’ employees entered his shared unit with Martinez without notice and dumped his personal property in a large pile. (Id., ¶5.) On three other occasions in August 2020, Copen entered his unit without permission or notice and intimidated him into entering a new rental agreement for an inferior room at a higher rental rate. (Id., ¶7.) Copen also approached Littaua in the building’s garage to intimidate him again. (Id., ¶8.) On August 31, 2020, Littaua discovered he had been locked out from his home and witnessed Copen and Makhani violently throwing his things into the hallway. (Id., ¶10.)

Plaintiffs also provide excerpts from Copen’s deposition. Copen testified that Martinez and his father stated that Copen could move the remaining items in the apartment to the basement and that he would not be returning. (Copen Depo., 103:12-19.) He did not know which items belonged to Martinez. (Id., 132:20-133:4.) Copen also testified that he believed he had an oral contract with Martinez to remove items from the room. (Id., 295:17-296:17.) Copen also believed he had a contract where he could appoint another roommate to the room. (Id., 298:14-19.) Copen testifies that if McNulty remained in the room, he would have implemented his contract right to stay in any room and appointed himself as McNulty’s roommate. (Id., 299:2-19.) Copen then insinuates that that McNulty might not have liked Copen as a roommate and that he would have been pressured to leave. (Id.) After he evicted Plaintiffs, Copen took a shower in Plaintiffs’ apartment because he believed he had a right to appoint himself as roommate. (Id., 410:21-411:7.)

Plaintiffs also provide excerpts from Makhani’s deposition. Makhani testified that Copen was defending their property against squatters. (Makhani Depo., 141:5-8.) On the night of the eviction, Makhani locked Littaua in the bathroom to prevent him from filming the eviction. (Id., 165:11-20.)

Plaintiffs also provide Defendants responses to Special Interrogatories, which state Copen chose to terminate Plaintiffs’ tenancies because he believed they had voluntarily terminated the tenancy by moving out. Additionally, Copen believed they terminated the tenancy by operation of law when they violated the rental agreement. (Yakobian Decl., Exh. G.)

Plaintiffs also provide their lease agreements showing Littaua had a month-to-month tenancy and Martinez’s lease was set to expire on September 1, 2020. (Yakobian Decl., Exhs. H-I.) It also appears no representative of 611 Gayley ever signed Martinez’s lease agreement.

Plaintiffs also included a police report from the date Copen was arrested. (Yakobian Decl., Exh., K.) Sworn statements by police officers are admissible under Evidence code, section 1280 as public employee records to the extent that they report the officers’ firsthand observations. (Jackson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 730, 737-38.) Here, the attached report largely contains observations collected from third parties. These statements are inadmissible hearsay.

The evidence shows that Copen repeatedly entered Littaua’s unit, intimidated him, attempted to evict Littaua by removing his belongings out of the apartment, and finally locked him and Martinez out of the apartment. Although Copen testifies that he believed Littaua had already vacated the premises, footage of the events of the night of the eviction and Littaua’s own declaration show that he attempted to stop Copen from removing his belongings and did not give Copen permission to enter the unit. Martinez likewise provides testimony that he intended to return to the unit and never gave Copen permission to remove his belongings from the unit. Plaintiffs’ lease agreements also show that Littaua had a month-to-month tenancy and Martinez’s tenancy was not set to expire until September 1, 2020.

Copen’s conduct keeping Plaintiffs from accessing their belongings and their home without legal process despite active leases amounts to despicable conduct that disregarded Plaintiffs’ rights under their lease. Plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to show that it is very likely that Plaintiffs will prevail at trial on a claim for punitive damages against Copen. Plaintiffs’ motion is granted with respect to Defendant Copen.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Makhani worked together with Copen to remove Plaintiffs’ belongings from their unit. (Compl., ¶25.) This fact is supported by video recordings of the event and Littaua’s declaration. Additionally, the evidence shows that Makhani locked Littaua in a bathroom during the eviction to prevent him from interfering with the eviction and to prevent him from recording the incident.

Makhani’s conduct constitutes malicious conduct because her actions preventing Littaua from returning to his home and locking him in a bathroom demonstrate a conscious disregard for his rights. The conduct also rises to a level of despicable conduct sufficient to support a demand for punitive damages. Plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to show that it is very likely that Plaintiffs will prevail at trial on a claim for punitive damages against Makhani. Plaintiffs’ motion is granted with respect to Defendant Makhani.

Plaintiffs’ evidence shows that Copen is the owner, manager, and operator of the subject property. As discussed above, Copen’s conduct forcibly evicting Plaintiffs from their unit constitutes malice sufficient to support a demand for punitive damages. Because Plaintiff’s evidence shows that Copen, one of 611 Gayley’s leaders, engaged in malicious conduct, Plaintiffs meet their burden of showing that it is very likely that they will prevail at trial on a claim for punitive damages against 611 Gayley. Plaintiffs’ motion is granted with respect to Defendant 611 Gayley.

Code Civ. Proc., sections 2030.090(b) and 2031.060(b) provide that when a party receives interrogatories or requests for inspection, the court may, for good cause shown, make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other natural person or organization from unwanted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.

If “good cause” is shown, the court can exercise its discretionary power to limit discovery. (See In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 298-99.) The granting or denial of relief lies within the sound discretion of the judge. (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 379-81 (overruled on other grounds pertaining to attorney work product privilege).) The concept of good cause requires a showing of specific facts demonstrating undue burden, unwarranted embarrassment, oppression, or unwarranted annoyance, and justifying the relief sought. (See Goodman v. Citizens Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (1967) 253 Cal.App.3d 807, 819.) Unlike other discovery orders, a protective order may be granted simply on the court’s determination that justice so requires. (Greyhound Corp., 56 Cal.2d at pp. 379-81.)

Sanctions are mandatory against any person who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order under this section, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Pro., sections 2030.090 (d) and 2031.060(h).)

Here, Defendants’ counsel testifies that Plaintiffs propounded requests for written discovery seeking to discovery their financial condition. (Bridwell Decl., ¶¶4-7.) Despite Defendants’ requests that Plaintiffs withdraw the requests, Plaintiffs refused to withdraw the discovery requests. (Id.)

Plaintiffs’ discovery requests seeking financial condition are not permitted until they obtain permission from the Court to conduct the discovery. However, because Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion to permit financial discovery which the Court granted, Defendants’ motion for a protective order is denied.

Sanctions are mandatory because Defendants’ motion was denied. However, because Plaintiff propounded discovery into Defendants’ financial condition before they sought the Court’s permission to propound the discovery, the Court finds Defendants were substantially justified in filing this motion. Sanctions are denied.