Department 30, Spring Street Courthouse

August 16, 2022

21STCV29114

-Defendant Lyft’s Motion for a Protective Order

-Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses by Defendant Lyft to Form Interrogatories

-Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses by Defendant Lyft to Special Interrogatories

The motion for a protective order is granted. 

Lyft shall submit the Los Angeles Superior Court Model Protective Order for signature of the court. 

The parties should appear at the hearing to set a date for an OSC Re: Submission of the Protective Order. 

The decision with respect to the protective order renders the motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories moot.

The court orders Lyft to serve further responses to the form interrogatories within 15 days after the protective order is signed by the court.

For the same reason, the motion to compel further responses to the following special interrogatories are also moot: 3, 14, 16, 17, 47, 48.

The court orders Lyft to serve further responses to these special interrogatories within 15 days after the protective order is signed by the court.

Each interrogatory answer must be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party allows. (CCP Section 2030.220(a).)  If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it must be answered to the extent possible. (CCP Section 2030.220(b).)

The duty to answer extends beyond personal knowledge.  If a party lacks personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully, the party must state so.  Additionally, the party must make a reasonable and good-faith effort to obtain the information from other sources, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party. (CCP Section 2030.220(c).)

The motion to compel further is granted with respect to the following special interrogatories: 1, 2, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34,  and 35.

With respect to these interrogatories, the court orders Lyft to serve further responses to these special interrogatories within 15 days after the date of this order.

Lyft should provide code-compliant responses, tracking the language of Section 2030.220(c) for those instances where Lyft lacks knowledge sufficient to respond. 

The Court further notes that prematurity is not a valid reason not to answer an interrogatory.

Special Interrogatories Nos. 36, 37, 39, 41 all relate to insurance. 

California discovery law expressly provides for discovery of information about the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which a carrier may be liable to satisfy all or part of a potential judgment or to indemnify or reimburse payments made to satisfy the judgment. (CCP Section 2017.210,)

To the extent that Defendant Lyft has other policies meeting this definition, other than the one disclosed, such information must be provided subject to the terms of the protective order.

Hence, the motion is granted to this extent.

The court orders Lyft to serve further responses to these special interrogatories within 15 days after the protective order is signed by the court.

The Court declines to impose sanctions on either side at this point as they would essentially cancel each other out.  

On August 6, 2021, Plaintiff Ijeamaka Obodagha (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint alleging causes of action for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence against Defendants Lyft Inc., Ubaldo Molina Bustos, and Haseena Mohabbat.  

On November 4, 2021, Defendant Haseena Mohabbat filed a Cross-Complaint against Lyft, Inc. and Ubaldo Molina Bustos alleging causes of action for indemnification, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief.  

On July 25, 2022, Lyft filed the instant motion for a protective order.

Lyft argues that good cause exists for a protective order because Plaintiff requested documents and information that are confidential, proprietary, and trade secret. Lyft alleges that releasing information including documents regarding its relationship with drivers would cause competitive injury to Lyft by making public its proprietary information. Lyft requests sanctions.

Plaintiff argues that Lyft’s motion should be denied because Lyft failed to meet and confer and because Lyft has not identified the documents and information which it wishes to be covered by a protective order. Plaintiff also argues that a protective order would impair her First Amendment rights to disseminate information to the public. Plaintiff is open to stipulating to a protective order as long as it is properly limited. Plaintiff also requests sanctions.

 

Lyft argues that it sufficiently met and conferred with plaintiff over several occasions, including an IDC. Lyft also argues Lyft is not required to specifically identify within a protective order may be deemed confidential because it would require Lyft to file a new motion for protective orders each time Plaintiff requested confidential, trade secret, or commercially sensitive material. Lyft wishes to its proposed protective order, which is based on LASC’s model protective order provides specific protocol for resolving disputes over confidential documents.

“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (a).) The court, for good cause shown, may make any order “that justice requires” to protect any party from “unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) If “good cause” is shown, the court can exercise its discretionary power to limit discovery.  (See In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 298-99.) 

Defendant brings its Motion only under the claim that the documents requested are trade secrets and therefore protected.  

 

The Code of Civil Procedure section § 2031.060 reads, in relevant part: 

“(a) When an inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of documents, tangible things, places, or electronically stored information has been demanded, the party to whom the demand has been directed, and any other party or affected person, may promptly move for a protective order.  

(b) The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions: 

… 

(5) That a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed, or be disclosed only to specified persons or only in a specified way.” 

 

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 3426.1 subsection (d): 

“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” 

 

The burden of proof is generally on the party seeking the protective order to show¿good cause¿for whatever order is sought.¿¿Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.¿¿The concept of good cause requires a showing of specific facts demonstrating undue burden, etc., and justifying the relief sought.¿¿See¿Goodman v. Citizens Life & Casualty Ins. Co.¿(1967) 253 Cal.App.3d 807, 819.¿¿The facts are normally established in declarations by counsel for the party seeking the protective order.¿¿The declaration must contain competent evidence - i.e., first-hand knowledge of the facts.¿¿Hearsay allegations¿on information and belief¿and conclusory statements that particular relief is¿necessary¿are not enough.¿¿Id. 

According to Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc., the focus of test to determine whether the claimed proprietary information satisfies the independent economic value element, is "whether the information is generally known to or readily ascertainable by business competitors or others to whom the information would have independent value." (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 62.) In other words, the information alleged to be a trade secret "is valuable because it is unknown to others." (DVD Copy Control Assn. v. Banner (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 241, 251.) 

The granting or denial of relief lies within the sound discretion of the judge. (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 379-81 (overruled on other grounds pertaining to attorney work product privilege).) The concept of good cause requires a showing of specific facts demonstrating undue burden, unwarranted embarrassment, oppression, or unwarranted annoyance, and justifying the relief sought. (See Goodman v. Citizens Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (1967) 253 Cal.App.3d 807, 819.) Unlike other discovery orders, a protective order may be granted simply on the court’s determination that justice so requires. (Greyhound Corp., supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 379-81.) 

A court shall impose sanctions against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Pro. section 2030.090, subd. (d).)

Lyft seeks a protective order limiting how Lyft’s trade secrets and other confidential research, development, or commercial information are disclosed to the methods described in the Los Angeles County Superior Court’s model protective order. 

Lyft includes a meet and confer declaration from Counsel Alexander Kharazmi stating Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter demanding further responses to Lyft’s discovery requests, arguing that Lyft’s objections and need for protective order were without merit. (Kharazmi Decl., ¶6.) Lyft responded with a letter stating the protective order was necessary because much of the materials Plaintiff sought were contained within proprietary data systems, production of which would necessitate production of other information within those systems. (Id., ¶7.) On April 27, 2022, Plaintiff sent a proposed stipulation for a protective order. (Id., ¶8.) Lyft alleges the proposed stipulation does not include the Requests for Admissions and did not adequately address Lyft’s concerns. (Id.) Lyft then sent Plaintiff a proposed protective order sufficiently broad to cover confidential materials. (Id., ¶10.) Plaintiff replied stating she would not agree to the order unless it was more limited. (Id., ¶11.) Lyft then proposed the parties conform to LASC’s model protective order, which Plaintiff refused. (Id., ¶¶12-13.) The parties met at an IDC on July 21, 2022 where the parties could not agree to a protective order. (Id., ¶15.) Based on these attempts to meet and confer over the necessity of a protective order, Lyft meets the meet and confer requirements.

Lyft also meets its burden of showing that a protective order is necessary to protect Lyft’s confidential, trade secret, or commercially sensitive material. Lyft supports its motion with a declaration from Lyft’s Strategic Customer Experience Specialist, Paul McCachern. McCachern has sufficient personal knowledge of the material Lyft considers to be confidential. (McCachern Decl., ¶2.) McCachern attests that the documents and information Plaintiff demands includes “confidential information on a private network drive”; “individually identifiable information of Lyft employees and the driver”; and “Lyft's excess insurance policy information, which may also cover non-TNC pa1tnerships.” (Id., ¶¶7-9.) Release of this information to the public would “provide Lyft's competitors with information about Lyft's confidential methods, techniques, programs, and processes that they may be able to copy or use without having to make the same investments of 18 19 time and resources and therefore obtain a competitive advantage at Lyft's expense.” (Id., ¶6.) Lyft keeps documents about its employees and drivers confidential. (Id., ¶8.) Finally, “[r]elease of documents showing Lyft's proprietary systems or excess insurance policy information would cause competitive injury to Lyft by making public information that Lyft 20 expended significant and ongoing resources to develop.” (Id., ¶11.) Lyft’s evidence sufficiently shows that the documents and information Plaintiff seeks would include information that would compromise the privacy of its employees and drivers. Additionally, the documents and information would include information that is not generally known to the public and would have independent value to Lyft’s competitors. 

The parties disagree over the form and content of the protective order. 

Plaintiff proposes in pertinent part that (1) access to the confidential materials will be limited; (2) in the event that any party believes material is not privileged, the party shall inform the other party and schedule an IDC where the parties will submit to the Court’s instructions; (3) confidential materials shall be used only for this proceeding and shall be returned to the party that produced the material; (4) counsel shall keep all materials designated confidential within their exclusive possession and control and take measures to prevent dissemination of the materials; (5) the parties shall take precautions to maintain confidentiality of the materials to prevent unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure; (6) all copies of the material shall be kept confidential; and (7) any party may petition the Court to modify the protective order. (Exhibit D.) Plaintiff’s proposed protective order states the following discovery requests are not confidential: (1) FROGs 12.2 and 12.6, (2) SROGs 3, 14, 16,17, 47, 48, (3) RPDs number 1, 3, 4, 7-11, 41, 44, 46-48, 56, 75, (4) Lyft’s deposition responses regarding the previously listed discovery, (5) correspondence exchanged between counsel regarding the previously listed discovery, (6) details of any conversations referencing the previously listed discovery. 

Lyft contends Plaintiff’s proposed protective order is impractical because it will require new motions for protective orders each time it identifies confidential materials. Additionally, Lyft contends that Plaintiff had no right to self-designate materials as non-confidential. The Court notes that requiring IDCs to resolve disputes over designation would significantly delay discovery. Additionally, as the party in possession of confidential materials, Lyft would be in the best position to designate confidential materials. 

Lyft’s most recent proposed protective order modeled after the LASC model protective order provides in pertinent part that that (1) the designating party shall have the right to designate materials as confidential that the party in good faith believes to contain non-public material; (2) the protective order does not alter, waive, or modify any rights previously available to any party regarding discovery orders; (3) confidential materials shall be clearly marked; (4) inadvertent production shall not waive confidentiality; (5) any party that objects to the confidential designation shall inform the other party and allow 30 days for that party to agree or disagree with the objection; (5) if the parties dispute a designation, the party may file a motion with the Court; (6) if a party objects to a designation and the other party agrees or fails to address the objection, the material is de-designated; (7) access to the materials shall be limited (8) confidential materials produced by a non-party witness shall also be protected under the protective order; (9) if any party receives a subpoena for confidential material, it will inform the other party and allow the party to file a motion to limit or quash the subpoena before producing the documents; (10) if additional protection is required, the parties shall meet and confer. (Exhibit G) 

Plaintiff contends the model protective order is overbroad and impairs Plaintiff’s right to access discovery records and disseminate information to the public. (Opposition, p.6-7.) Plaintiff also contends that not all of the information in its written discovery requests are confidential and that Lyft refused to provide responses that included non-confidential materials. Plaintiff has not provided reasons why that the model proposed order is overbroad. The Court notes that Plaintiff filed motions to compel further discovery responses set for hearing on August 16 and 19, 2022 and September 8 and 27, 2022. The issue of whether Lyft’s responses to discovery were incomplete will be heard with those motions. 

The Court finds good cause exists to enter the Los Angeles Superior Court Model Protective Order.