Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

 

ANGELA ZAMBRANO,

Plaintiff, 

          vs. 

GENERAL MOTORS, 

Defendant. Case No.: 21STCV37303 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

 

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and costs is GRANTED in the reduced amount as described below.

Moving party to give notice.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND   

This is an action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The Complaint alleges as follows.  

Plaintiff Angela Zambrano purchased a 2021 GMC Canyon with express warranties. The vehicle was delivered to Plaintiffs with serious defects and nonconformities which Defendant General Motors failed to repair after a reasonable number of attempts.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On October 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Complaint.

On August 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement.

On February 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorney fees.

On June 4, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition.

On June 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) the prevailing party in an action that arises out of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entitled to fees that were reasonably incurred:  “If the buyer prevails under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the Court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) 

With respect to attorney fees and costs, unless a statute provides for them, (e.g., Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(Code Civ. Proc., section 1021.)¿ The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿ (Civ. Code, section 1717, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., sections 1032; 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A).)¿ The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿ (Civ. Code, section 1717, subds. (a), (b).)¿ A party moving for attorneys’ fees as an element of costs shall serve and file the notice before or at the same time the party serves and files the memorandum of costs; if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the party shall serve and file the notice within the time specified in the Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700 for filing a memorandum of costs.¿ (Cal. Rules Court. 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.)¿¿¿  ¿¿¿ 

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”¿ (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”¿ (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)¿ “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.”¿ (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.)¿ The court may then adjust the lodestar figure based on consideration of factors specific to the case, to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.¿ (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award].)¿  

 

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because the moving party claimed too many hours of work, the challenging party bears the burden of pointing to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿ (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿ General arguments that the fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.¿ (Ibid.)¿¿ 

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks $77,599.96 in fees for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses because she is the prevailing party in this matter. Plaintiffs also seeks a multiplier of 1.35. The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly rate was reasonable, whether billing was reasonable, whether Plaintiffs’ counsel may be awarded a multiplier, and whether Plaintiffs’ costs are compensable. The fees in this matter were incurred by two firms West Point Legal (WPL), which incurred $26,765 in fees, and Quill & Arrow, LLP (Quill), which incurred $23,038 in fees.

Plaintiff’s Objections

Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Kyle Roybal submitted in opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees. The objections are overruled. However, the Court notes that the material objected to was not the basis for the Court’s decision here. 

Reasonableness of Hourly Rates

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel, Brian Altman’s hourly rate is unreasonably high considering the type of work performed and hourly rates in the community. 

In assessing the reasonableness of hourly billing rates,¿“the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.”  (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.¿(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see¿Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 272 [“a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors . . . [including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case”].)¿

Here, Altman’s hourly rate is $950 and he billed a total of 10.7 hours in this matter.  (Altman Decl., Exh. E.) The bulk of Altman’s entries were for internal meetings and file review. Altman is a managing member of West Point Legal, has completed over 100 jury trials, and over thirty years of experience as an attorney. (Id., ¶¶2-4.) 

The Court finds that an hourly rate of $950 is excessive compared to other rates regularly sought and awarded in these kinds of cases. The rate is particularly excessive in light of the fact that Altman primarily billed for internal meetings and file review. The Court will reduce Altman’s rate to $650 per hour.

Total to be taxed: $3,210

Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hours billed are unreasonable because they could not have reasonably billed the hours stated. 

A prevailing party’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred.  (Hadley v.¿Krepel¿(1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.”  (Lunada¿Biomedical v. Nunez¿(2014) 240 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.) 

Template-Based Work: Defendant alleges that the following entries should be taxed because they are inflated. Defendant alleges that the time spent drafting discovery requests and other items is unreasonable since Plaintiff’s counsel uses templates.

Date Description Rate Biller Time Total Proposed tax

10/11/21 Drafting Complaint $350 Yarowski 0.3 $105 0.2, $70

2/14/2022 Drafting Discovery Responses (five sets) $350 Yarowski 1.3 $487.50 1.2, $412.50

4/25/2023

5/19/2023

5/31/2023 Drafting Deposition Notices $350 Yarowski 0.8 $316 0.8, $316

6/9/2023 Drafting Subpoenas (nine subpoenas) $350 Terzian 1.8 $630 1.8, $630

6/5/2023 Drafting Trial Documents (seven entries) $350 Terzian 3.2 $1,120 3, $1,050

5/15/2023 Drafting Motions in Limine  (twenty motions) $350 Yarowski 4.4 $1,179 3.9, $1,540.50

6/5/2023 Drafting oppositions to Defendant’s Motions in Limine (eight oppositions) $350 Yarowski 2.4 $948 1.9, $750.50

Although it is not disputed that Plaintiff’s counsel uses templates in his work, the use of templates alone does not mean tasks involving template-based work may not be billed. Plaintiff’s counsel’s entries are each very small amounts of time, meaning the time billed for each task is minimal. Although Defendant groups many tasks together to make the entries appear inflated, the time billed for each individual task is reasonable even for a document based upon a template. For example, although Plaintiff’s counsel billed 4.4 hours for drafting motions in limine, counsel drafted twenty motions, spending under 15 minutes for each motion. The small amounts of time billed for these tasks are reasonable. Additionally, these tasks were properly delegated to associates with lower hourly rates.

Accordingly, no time will be taxed for these tasks.

Document Review: Defendant next argues that the time entries billed for review of court notices, client documents, discovery responses, and other documents is unreasonable.

Date Description Rate Biller Time Total Proposed tax

10/13/2023

10/20/2023

11/17/2021

12/3/2021

6/9/2023 Review Court Notices $350 Yowarski 0.9 $333 0.9, $333

2/1/2022 Reviewing Client Documents $350 Yowarski 0.6 $225 0.6, $225 

3/17/2022

3/24/2022 Review Discovery Responses $350 Yowarski 1.7 $637.50 1.2 , $450

6/2/2023 Review Motions in Limine $350 Yowarski 1.6 $632 1.3, $513.50

6/7/2023 Review opposition to Motions in Limine $350 Terzian 4 $1,400 3.5, $1,225

The Court finds these entries are not unreasonable. It is reasonable that Plaintiff’s counsel required time to review notices, documents, and motions to litigate this matter. Again, although Defendant groups many tasks together so that the entries appear inflated, Plaintiff’s counsel in reality spent minimal amounts of time on each task billed. Additionally, these tasks were all properly delegated to associates with lower hourly rates.

No time will be taxed from these entries. 

Travel Time: Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel should not be compensated for all 8.5 hours Kevin Jacobson billed for travel time on June 13, 2023 and July 24, 2023. Defendant also argues that the 4.5 hours Andrew Jung billed for travel to and from the court on July 24, 2023 should be taxed. 

Although travel expenses are not typically allowable under Code Civ. Proc., section 1033.5, this is only the case unless expressly authorized by law. Civ. Code section 1794 allows recovery of fees and costs reasonably incurred by buyers in connection with litigation in lemon law cases. (Civ. Code, section 1794(d); Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 138.)

Here, the entries for Jacobson and Jung were for their attendance at final status conferences, including travel time. Because the travel time and time spent attending these conferences were reasonably necessary for litigation, the Court finds they are reasonable.

No time will be taxed for these entries.

Anticipated fees: Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s fees for this motion should be taxed because the request is unsupported. The Court finds the 3.8 hours billed for this motion are reasonable. No time will be taxed for this entry.

Altman’s Billing: Defendant argues that the 10.7 hours billed by Altman are unreasonable at an hourly rate of $950. The Court has already granted a reduction of Altman’s fees, as discussed above. No further fees will be taxed for Altman’s billing.

Miscellaneous Tasks: Finally, Defendant argues that about 20 hours of miscellaneous tasks were for purely clerical, scheduling, and non-complex tasks. Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s counsel, Jung, should not be compensated for emailing clients or opposing counsel, discussing scheduling with their trial team, reviewing materials, or gathering materials. Defendant fails to specify which entries are unreasonable. Additionally, the Court has examined Jung’s billing and finds that it does not contain purely clerical work. Communicating with clients and opposing counsel, as well as holding strategy meetings with other members of the trial team are not purely clerical tasks. 

No time will be taxed for these entries. 

Costs

Defendant alleges that the costs are not compensable here because Plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide evidence of the costs, including invoices or other documentation.

Under Code Civ. Proc., section 1033.5, subd. (c)(2), allowable costs “shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” Subdivision (3) requires: “Allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount.” If costs are requested through a noticed motion under Code Civ. Proc., section 685.080, the motion must be supported by an affidavit of a person who has knowledge of the facts and must state that, to the person's best knowledge and belief, the costs are correct, reasonable, and necessary, and have not been satisfied. (Code Civ. Proc., section 685.080(b).)

Here, Altman of WPL testifies that WPL incurred $252.53 in costs. (Altman Decl., ¶17.) These costs are reflected in Altman’s billing entries, which Altman testifies he reviewed and audited so that the billing is reasonable. (Altman Decl., ¶17, Exh. E.) The billing entries, each billed to user Irene Reznik, are for filing fees and attorney service. These costs are allowable.

 Jacobson of Quill testifies that it incurred $4,113.38 in costs and expenses. (Jacobson Decl., ¶23.) These costs appear in his billing entries, which Jacobson testifies are true and correct. (Jacobson Decl., ¶22, Exh. 8.) The billing entries, each billed to user Q&A Accounting are for service fees, filing fees, and electronic appearance fees. These costs are allowable.

The Court finds that the declarations submitted by Altman and Jacobson are sufficient to meet the requirements of Code Civ. Proc., section 685.080(b). Although Defendant alleges Plaintiff was required to submit documentation of these costs, there is no requirement that a prevailing party submit further evidence of these costs. Defendant cites no authority in support of this argument. 

Accordingly, costs will not be taxed.

Lodestar Multiplier

Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks a 1.35 multiplier on the grounds that they were exposed to risk in taking this matter on a contingency basis.

After calculating the lodestar amount, the court may increase or decrease the amount “by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier' to take into account a variety of other factors.” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489). Those factors include, but are not  limited to:(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) success or failure, (4) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (5) the contingent nature of the fee award, (6) that an award against the state would ultimately fall upon the taxpayers, (7) that the attorneys in question received public and charitable funding for the purpose of bringing lawsuits of the character here involved, and (8) that the monies awarded would inure not to the individual benefit of the attorneys involved but the organizations by which they are employed. (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 751). Such an approach “anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” (Id.). However, “a trial court should not consider these factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138). “Although the attorney's fee agreement is relevant and may be considered, the agreement does not compel any particular award.” (Glaviano, 22 Cal.App.5th at 757). 

Based on all the factors to be considered, the Court does not find that a multiplier should be applied here given this was a routine case in which a settlement was reached. 

The court awards attorney fees and costs as follows:

Attorney Fees

$23,038 (Quill)

$23,555 (WPL)

Costs

$4,113.38 (Quill)

$252.53 (WPL)

Total

$50,958.91

DATED: June 17, 2024 

________________________

Hon. Jill Feeney 

Judge of the Superior Court