Judge Jill Feeney, Case 21STCV41292 2022-10-18 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for negligence and motor vehicle negligence arising from a vehicle collision which took place on November 29, 2019. Plaintiffs Rafael Arce, Norma Fuentes, and Rafael Arce Jr. filed their Complaint against Sohan Singh on November 9, 2021.

4. Page 5 – “Defendant Sohan Singh’s actions were willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive given his knowledge that he was involved in a collision and he intentionally left the scene without providing his information in violation of CVC 20002 after he had caused serious injuries & damages to Plaintiffs who were injured and sustained damages as a direct legal cause of Defendants’ negligence.”

Plaintiffs argue that punitive damages are warranted because they allege facts that Defendant knowingly operated his vehicle while intoxicated and knew the dangerous consequences of doing so. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant intentionally and willfully left the scene while Arce and Fuentes were tending to their distraught children, rendering them helpless and unable to move their vehicle and tend to their injuries and forcing them to seek out an attorney for help. Plaintiffs seek leave to amend in the event that the motion is granted.

Defendant points out that Plaintiffs’ argument regarding Defendant’s intoxication is likely a mistake because there was no allegation Defendant was intoxicated in the Complaint. Defendant also argues the only other passenger in Arce’s vehicle was Norma Fuentes. Additionally, there was no intentional tort.

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., section 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. section 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, section 3294, subd. (a).)

“Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code, section 3294, subd. (c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)

“As amended to include [despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. [Citation.]” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (footnote omitted).)

“A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business.” (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 423.) A defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1176.)

Before filing a demurrer and motion to strike, the demurring and moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to and sought to be stricken in person or by telephone for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the issues in argued in the demurrer and motion to strike. (Code of Civ. Proc. sections 430.41; 435.5.)

Defendant states his counsel sent meet and confer correspondence to Plaintiffs’ counsel requesting to meet and confer telephonically or in person. (Morovati Decl., ¶¶7-8.) Plaintiffs did not respond to Defendant’s request. (Id.) Defendant made reasonable attempts to meet and confer before making this motion.

Defendant seeks to strike the “Intentional Tort” check box in Item number 10 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint because this is an action for negligence and motor vehicle negligence. Because negligence is not an intentional tort, Defendant’s motion is granted as to the check box.

Defendant also seeks to strike the demand for punitive damages. Plaintiffs’ demand is based on the allegation that Defendant left the scene of the accident. Fleeing the scene is not enough to establish malice here because Plaintiff does not allege harm as a result of the alleged flight.

The conduct giving rise to punitive damages must be a proximate cause of the harm inflicted upon a plaintiff. See CACI Instruction No. 3940 (“The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff and to discourage similar conduct in the future.”) Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. is instructive. In Brooks, the court held that a hit and run cannot give rise to damages unless the fact that the defendant fled the scene was “a proximate cause of further injury or death” beyond the accident itself. (1953) Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 679.) In Brooks, the Supreme Court found that a hit and run instruction to the jury was warranted because there was no evidence in the record compelling a finding that the decedent died before the defendant drove away from the scene. (Id. at 680.) Brooks did not consider the issue of whether punitive damages can be imposed based on a hit and run. It did, however, hold that such act only constitutes a tort if the act itself causes the plaintiff additional injury above and beyond the damages caused by the collision that precedes fleeing the scene. (Ibid.)

Here, the Complaint states Defendant “intentionally left the scene without providing his information…after he had caused injuries & damages to Plaintiffs who were injured and sustained damages as a direct legal cause of Defendant’s negligence.” (Compl. p.5.) It also states Defendant’s “actions were willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive given his prior knowledge that he was involved in a loss and repeatedly refused to provide his information and drove away” demonstrating his “conscious and deliberate disregard for the interests and safety of others, including that of Plaintiffs.” (Compl. p.6.)

Plaintiffs offer no facts as to how Defendant fleeing the scene caused more damages. Although Plaintiffs argue in opposition to Defendant’s motion that leaving the scene left Plaintiffs unable to move their vehicle or tend to their injuries, these allegations are not included in the Complaint and thus cannot be considered. Even if they were part of the Complaint, these facts do not show how Defendant’s flight caused more damage than the damage already inflicted in the collision. As pled, Defendant’s flight is independent of the initial collision and cannot be the basis for punitive damages.

Plaintiffs allege in their opposition that Defendant was intoxicated. However, this allegation appears to have been made in error because the opposition references a different defendant and there is no allegation of intoxication in the Complaint.