Judge Jill Feeney, Case 21STCV41656 2023-02-08 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for negligence arising from a vehicle collision that took place in August 2021. Plaintiff Christina Fields filed her Complaint against Defendants Naoki and Seiko Yamagami on November 12, 2021.

Plaintiff seeks to amend her Complaint to add a cause of action for negligent entrustment against Defendant Seiko Yamagami based on new information obtained during the deposition of Naoki Yamagami.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s amendment is improper because Seiko Yamagami cannot be held liable for negligent entrustment because she was married to Naoki Yamagami at the time of the accident. Defendants argue that each spouse has management and control of the community personal property under Cal. Fam. Code, section 1100, subd. (a).

Plaintiff argues that Defendants fail to show that the vehicle at issue is in fact community property. Additionally, Family Code section 1000 states that a spouse may have separate liability for an injury caused by the other spouse. Plaintiff argues that Family Code section 1100 does not address the issue of ownership.

Under California Rules of Court Rule, rule 3.1324, subdivision (a), a motion to amend a pleading shall (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) state what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.

Under California Rule of Court, rule 3.1324, subdivision (b), a separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in relevant part: “[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”

“This discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of amendments, for judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1047.) Ordinarily, the court will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling on a motion for leave since grounds for a demurrer or motion to strike are premature. The court, however, does have discretion to deny leave to amend where a proposed amendment fails to state a valid cause of action as a matter of law and the defect cannot be cured by further amendment. (See California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281 [overruled on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390].)

Even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, a long, unwarranted and unexcused delay in presenting it may be a good reason for denial. In most cases, the factors for timeliness are: (1) lack of diligence in discovering the facts or in offering the amendment after knowledge of them; and (2) the effect of the delay on the adverse party.¿If the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend.¿(Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.)¿Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation such as an increased burden of discovery.¿(Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.)¿

Plaintiff’s counsel testifies that she deposed Defendant Naoki Yamagami on October 5, 2022. (Ameli Decl., ¶6.) During the deposition, counsel discovered that Naoki did not own the vehicle and had the owner’s permission to drive it. (Id., ¶7.) Naoki had two prior DUI convictions and did not have a valid driver’s license. (Id., ¶8.) Naoki also had charges for reckless driving. (Id., ¶9.) Counsel discovered that Seiko Yamagami was the owner of the vehicle. (Id., ¶12.)

Defendants argue that Seiko Yamagami cannot be liable for negligent entrustment because both Seiko and Naoki own the vehicle under Cal. Fam. Code, section 1100, subd. (a), which states each spouse has management and control of community personal property.

Defendants’ argument is not well taken. Negligent entrustment “does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner.” McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565.) The mere fact of co-ownership does not prevent one co-owner from controlling use of the vehicle by the other co-owner. (Ghezavat v. Harris (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 555, 560 (quoting Mettelka v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1245, 1248.).)

Here, Defendants provide a declaration from Naoki Yamagami, who testifies that he and Seiko were married when they obtained the vehicle involved in the subject accident and at the time of the accident. (Naoki Decl., ¶3.) Additionally, Naoki and Seiko did not have a prenuptial agreement. (Id., ¶5.) These facts alone do not establish whether the vehicle was part of the community because there is no information about how the purchase of the vehicle was funded. Even if the vehicle was community property, this fact does not preclude a cause of action for negligent entrustment because co-ownership does not prevent one co-owner from controlling the use of the vehicle by the other co-owner.