Judge Jill Feeney, Case 21STCV46328 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Jill Feeney, Case: 21STCV46328, Date: 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV46328 Hearing Date: September 8, 2022 Dept: 30

Department 30, Spring Street Courthouse

September 8, 2022

21STCV46328

Motion for Terminating Sanctions filed by Defendants Eric Anthony Abramian and Irene Abramian

DECISION

The motion is denied.

Moving party is ordered to provide notice.

Background

This is an action for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence arising from a vehicle collision which took place in May 2021. Plaintiff Avi Hakim filed his Complaint against Defendants Eric Anthony Abramian (“Eric”) and Irene Abramian (“Irene”) on December 20, 2021.

Defendants filed their motion for terminating sanctions on August 5, 2022.

Summary

Moving Arguments

Defendants argue their motion for terminating sanctions should be granted because Plaintiff failed to dismiss Irene Abramian (“Irene”), who was not the owner or driver of any vehicle involved in the accident at issue.

Opposing Arguments

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ motion was filed in violation of Code Civ. Pro. section 128.7. Additionally, Defendants failed to submit admissible or adequate evidence in support of their motion.

Reply Arguments

None.

Legal Standard

Code Civ. Pro. section 128.7 states that a court may impose sanctions on a party or attorney that presents a pleading, petition, motion, or other similar papers in the following circumstances:

1) the document is presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.

3) the allegations and other factual contentions have no evidentiary support;

4) the denials of factual contentions are not warranted on the evidence.

Code Civ. Pro. section 128.7 permits the Court to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney or an unrepresented party that violates any one of these requirements. (Eichenbaum v. Alon (2003) 106 Cal App 4th 967, 976.) In addition, section 128.7 does not require a finding of subjective bad faith; instead it requires only that the Court find that the conduct be objectively unreasonable. (In re Marriage of Reese & Guy (1999) 73 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 1221.)

Under section 128.7, a court may impose sanctions if it concludes a pleading was filed for an improper purpose or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually. (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189–190.) A claim is factually frivolous if it is “not well grounded in fact” and is legally frivolous if it is “not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” (Ibid.) In either case, to obtain sanctions, the moving party must show the party's conduct in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. (Ibid.) A claim is objectively unreasonable if “any reasonable attorney would agree that [it] is totally and completely without merit.” (Ibid.) However, “section 128.7 sanctions should be ‘made with restraint’ [Citation], and are not mandatory even if a claim is frivolous.” (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428. at 448.)

Code Civ. Pro. section 128.7(c)(1) requires that a motion for sanctions under Code Civ. Pro. section 128.7 be “made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). Notice of motion shall be served as provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, or any other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged paper, claim defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” This 21-day time period is known as a "safe harbor" period and its purpose is to permit an offending party to avoid sanctions by withdrawing the improper pleading during the safe harbor period. (Li v. Majestic Industry Hills LLC (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 585, 591.) This permits a party to withdraw a questionable pleading without penalty, thus saving the court and the parties time and money litigating the pleading as well as the sanctions request. (Ibid.) A formal noticed motion is required to begin the 21-day period. (Galleria Plus, Inc. v. Hanmi Bank (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 535, 538.)

Discussion

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ motion was filed in violation of the safe harbor provision of Code Civ. Pro. section 128.7, subd. (c)(1), which provides that notice of the motion must be served and not filed unless 21 days have passed since service of the motion.

Here, Defendants’ proof of service shows the motion was served on Plaintiff on August 5, 2022. The motion was filed on the same day. Defendants failed to wait 21-day notice period required by 128.7. Although Defendants’ show their counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel in an attempt to meet and confer, a formal noticed motion is required for the notice period to begin tolling.

Even if Defendants had followed procedural requirements, their motion must be denied because they have not shown that Plaintiff’s complaint is objectively unreasonable. In support of their motion, Defendants filed a copy of the Traffic Collision Report about the accident, a copy of Eric’s vehicle registration, and a declaration from counsel. (Motion, Exh. B, C.)

The Traffic Collision Report is inadmissible evidence. Vehicle Code section 20013 specifically precludes accident reports from being used as evidence in any civil action. (Veh. Code, § 20013.) Furthermore, accident reports are not admissible as public records under Evidence Code section 1280. (See People v. Flaxman (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16, 20 (finding that an auto accident report compiled by the police, which is based on the statements of third parties, is inadmissible).)

As Plaintiff points out, Eric’s vehicle registration is not dispositive of ownership. Ownership of title to a vehicle may be held by two (or more) co-owners as provided in Section 682 of the Civil Code. (Veh. Code section 4150.5.) Moreover, ownership may exist without a vehicle being registered to that individual. Defendants have not supplied a declaration by Irene in support of her contention that she is neither an owner nor operator of the vehicle at issue. (Opp., p. 2.)

Under these circumstances, Plaintiff’s Complaint including Irene Abramian as a Defendant was not objectively unreasonable.