Judge Jill Feeney, Case Number: 22STCV04174, Date: 2023-12-22 Tentative Ruling

The Court remains concerned about the number of defendants in the case and whether Plaintiff has a triable case against all of these defendants. At this stage, Plaintiff may plead inconsistent theories, but the Court does note that the conspiracy theory of liability and the agency theory of liability are at odds with one another. At this stage, the Court also cannot consider disputed facts. However, if there is no factual basis for holding certain defendants liable, the Court hopes that Plaintiff will dismiss these defendants as appropriate. Otherwise, there will be undoubtedly numerous potentially unnecessary motions for summary judgment.

This is an action for fraud, unlawful eviction, negligence, nuisance, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach of implied warranty of habitability, housing discrimination in violation of the FEHA, violations of Civ. Code, sections 1940.2, 789.3, 1942.5, 1954, 52.1, 1159, 51, unlawful business practices, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), bad faith retention of security deposit, violation Los Angeles Municipal Code, Article 5.3, and violation of Los Angeles County Code, section 8.52.130.

Plaintiff alleges that he was a resident of Defendants’ property located at 438 N. Vista Street, Los Angeles, CA 90036. (SAC ¶35.) Plaintiff’s unit was subject to the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance. Plaintiff signed his lease with the property’s previous owners in September 2013. (SAC ¶38.) Plaintiff was disabled and suffered from mental impairment. (SAC ¶43.) The property was jointly owned, operated, controlled, and managed by Defendants who jointly purchased the property. (SAC ¶42.) Defendants created Urban Blox, LLC to remove tenants from rent controlled units and raise rents to market rates. (SAC ¶¶45-46.) Defendants operated under various business names to confuse tenants and to manufacture lease violations for nonpayment of rent. (SAC ¶47.)

Defendant Central Realty Advisors, Inc. (CRA) agreed to and participated in the conspiracy through Rebecca Duel and benefited financially from the scheme. (SAC ¶50.) CRA further assisted the scheme by identifying properties and tenants as appropriate targets for the scheme. (Id.) The SAC alleges that Rebecca Duel was employed as a “real estate professional” for CRA and that Rebecca Deul managed the subject property in the name of CRA. (SAC ¶¶ 18, 50.)

In May 2018, Defendants purchased Plaintiff’s building in the names of Defendants Ilana Yamtoobian and Rebecca Duel. (SAC ¶56.) In June 2018, Defendants transferred the building to Urban Developer, LLC. (Id.) In May 2019, Urban Developer, LLC transferred the property back to Yamtoobian and Duel. (Id.) In June 2018, Defendants entered his unit for reasons unrelated to repairs or services. (SAC ¶57.) Defendants sent Plaintiff a questionnaire Defendants used to identify targets most susceptible to the scheme in order to remove rent-controlled tenants. (SAC ¶58.) In May 2019, Plaintiff began receiving threats from Defendants who demanded that he vacate his unit. (SAC ¶59.) Defendants refused to address habitability issues in Plaintiff’s unit and ignored his requests to repair water damage, mold growth, and plumbing failures. (SAC ¶60.) Defendants refused to accept Plaintiff’s rent checks to manufacture a pretextual lease violation. (SAC ¶62.)

In August 2019, Plaintiff returned from a work trip to discover Defendants entered his unit without providing notice and cut his internet and phone lines and turned off his gas and water heater. (SAC ¶63.) In September 2019, Yamtoobian threatened that she would make Plaintiff’s life very difficult if he did not accept a cash buyout and vacate his unit. (SAC ¶64.) Defendant David Duel pressured Plaintiff to accept the cash buyout, fraudulently representing that Defendants would pay him if he agreed to move out. (SAC ¶65.) Plaintiff continued to send rent because he believed there was no agreement. (SAC ¶67.) In January 2020, Defendants entered Plaintiff’s unit without permission while Plaintiff was on a work trip, performed construction, and turned off all utilities to the entire building. (SAC ¶68.) In February 2020, Plaintiff involuntarily surrendered his unit to Defendants. (SAC ¶69.)

On February 2, 2022, Plaintiff Adam Silver filed his Complaint against Defendants David and Rebecca Duel, Ilana Yamtoobian, Terry Polesie, Kathy Cook, Raffi Shirnian, David Nourafshan, Urban Blox LLC, Urban Blox Criminal Enterprise, Surf Realty Corporation, R&LS Investments, Inc, Kimberly Roberts Stepp, Stepp Commercial, Thornton Property One LLC, RIF Investments-2 LLC, Central Realty Advisors, Inc., Urban Developer LLC, S Bonita One LLC, 351 SB Two LLC, IY EK Partners, LLC, 27 Ozone LLC, and Nourafshan Venice Properties, LLC.

On December 22, 2023, the Court sustained Defendant CRA’s demurrer with leave to amend. At the hearing all the parties, including Plaintiff, discussed the demurrers filed in the case. At that time, the Court informed Plaintiff that because 22 Defendants were named in the FAC, the Second Amended Complaint should have more allegations indicating what the various defendants have done so that the defendants and the Court can understand what conduct is at issue in this case.

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) As is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 (internal citations omitted).)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 430.41(a).) “The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 430.41(a)(2).) A failure to meet and confer does not constitute grounds to sustain or overrule a demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc., sections 430.41 (a)(4).)

The elements of fraud are: “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184.) In California, fraud, including negligent misrepresentation, must be pled with specificity. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) “The particularity demands that a plaintiff plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.)

Here, although Plaintiff added additional facts about the alleged conspiracy, the facts about the events leading to Plaintiff surrendering his unit remain the same. The facts alleged in the SAC show that Defendants refused to sign the buyout agreement and Plaintiff believed no agreement had been reached. Therefore, Plaintiff would not have relied on the buyout agreement when he surrendered possession of the unit.

The demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED. Because this is the second demurrer on this issue, Plaintiff failed to amend the complaint to state a cause of action against CRA, and Plaintiff has not opposed this motion, leave to amend is denied.

The SAC alleges that Defendants concealed their scheme to coerce Plaintiff into voluntarily relinquishing possession of his rent-controlled unit or otherwise unlawfully evict Plaintiff from his unit so that Defendants could raise the market price. (SAC ¶81.) Had Plaintiff known of the scheme, he would not have temporarily vacated the property or would have otherwise behaved differently. (SAC ¶84.)

As before, the facts alleged in the SAC show that Defendants engaged in years of harassment, refusing Plaintiff’s rent, cutting his utilities, entering his unit, and threatening him to vacate his unit. It is reasonable to infer that Plaintiff would have known Defendants were attempting to coerce him into leaving his unit. Additionally, the facts alleged show Plaintiff vacated the unit after it became uninhabitable because the utilities were shut off to the building. Knowing details of Defendants’ scheme to raise the market price on the unit would not have influenced Plaintiff’s decision to surrender the unit. Therefore, the SAC fails to allege facts showing Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendants’ concealment of their scheme to raise rent when he surrendered the unit.

A wrongful eviction occurs when the person recovering the property had no right to dispossess the other party from the property. (Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1149-1150.) “‘[A] person in peaceable possession of real property may recover, in an action sounding in tort, damages for injuries to his person and goods caused by the forcible entry of one who is, or claims to be, the lawful owner or possessor.’ (Daluiso v. Boone (1969) 71 Cal.2d 484, 486; [see Friedman, Garcia & Roy, Cal. Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant, ¶7:37 (Rutter Group Nov. 2022) [describing this claim as an action for “wrongful eviction”]].) As with statutory claims, ‘the forcibly entering defendant’s title or right of possession is no defense to such action.’ (Daluiso, 71 Cal.2d at pg. 486.) ‘The recovery includes all consequential damages occasioned by the wrongful eviction (personal injury, including infliction of emotional distress, and property damage) . . . and upon a proper showing of “malice,” punitive damages.’ (Cal. Practice Guide, at pp. 7–10.3 to 7.10.4.).” (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1039.)

The basic tort alleged . . . was the willful wrongful eviction, that is, the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, accomplished by a series of intentionally annoying acts designed to compel the tenant to vacate. Such a tort (as distinguished from an action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment) is recognized in the law.

Here, the SAC does not change the facts about events leading up to Plaintiff surrendering his unit. The SAC alleges that Plaintiff signed a lease in 2013, Defendants entered Plaintiff’s unit intentionally to perform construction and cut off his utilities, failed to repair defects in the unit, and the lack of utilities caused Plaintiff to surrender possession of the unit to Defendants. The SAC sufficiently alleges facts to support a cause of action for wrongful eviction as to CRA.

CRA argues that the SAC fails to state facts as to CRA’s participation in the alleged misconduct. Specifically, CRA argues the SAC does not state Rebecca Duel participated in the scheme as an agent for CRA, but in her individual capacity. However, the SAC states that CRA participated in the scheme through Rebecca Duel. (SAC ¶50.) Whether Rebecca Duel was in fact acting in her capacity as an employee of CRA is a question of fact that may not be resolved on demurrer. Because Plaintiff was only required to plead ultimate facts, Plaintiff was not required to plead more specific facts showing CRA participated in the alleged conspiracy.

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917, internal quotations omitted.) “The first element, duty, may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” (Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128, internal quotations omitted.) “[T]he existence of a duty is a question of law for the court.” (Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.)

Civ. Code, section 1714(a) provides that everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.

“[W]hile negligence is ordinarily a question of fact, the existence of a duty is generally a question of law that may be addressed by demurrer. (Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1096.) Whether one owes a duty to another must be decided on a case-by-case basis. (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46.) Every case is governed by the rule of general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being harmed as a result of their conduct. (Id.)

Here, as discussed above, the SAC alleges that all Defendants managed, maintained, or controlled the subject property and acted as agents for each other. Because Defendants were the managers or operators of the subject property, Defendants had a duty to manage the property with reasonable care. Defendants breached this duty by refusing to repair Plaintiff’s unit, cutting Plaintiff’s utilities, and entering his unit without permission. The SAC alleges facts sufficient to support a cause of action for negligence.

To state a cause of action for private nuisance, a party must first allege a non-trespassory interference with the private use and enjoyment of property. (Civ. Code, sections 3479 – 3481; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938.) Liability for private nuisance also requires proof of two additional elements: (i) substantial actual damage, which is (ii) unreasonable as to its nature, duration, or amount. (San Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra, 13 Cal.4th at 937-38.)

Here, the SAC alleges that all Defendants, including CRA, were managers or operators of the subject property and that all Defendants were agents of each other. Defendants threatened to make life difficult if Plaintiff did not accept a buyout and cut his utilities. Defendants also cut Plaintiff’s utilities and entered his unit without permission on multiple occasions. It is reasonable to infer that these acts interfered with Plaintiff’s use of the property. Although CRA argues it was never involved in the property or tenancy in any way, this is a dispute of fact which cannot be resolved on demurrer. The SAC statues facts sufficient to support a cause of action for nuisance as to CRA.

6. Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Nineteenth, Twenty-First Causes of action – Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability; Violations of Civ. Code, sections 1940.2, 789.3, 1942.5, and 1954; Bad Faith Retention of Security Deposit (Civ. Code, section 1950.5); and Violation of Los Angeles County Code, section 8.52.130

“[E]very lease includes a covenant of quiet possession and enjoyment.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1299 (citing Civ. Code, § 1927).) “Minor inconveniences and annoyances are not actionable breaches of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.” (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 589.) “To be actionable, the [landlord’s] act or omission must substantially interfere with a [tenant’s] right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy.” (Id.)

A warranty of habitability “is implied by law in residential leases in this state.” (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 637.) This warranty “imposes upon the landlord the obligation to maintain leased dwellings in a habitable condition throughout the term of the lease.” (Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185, 1204 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 899.) Further, the warranty “does not require that a landlord ensure that leased premises are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but it does mean that ‘bare living requirements' must be maintained.” (Green at 637.) A landlord’s “failure to substantially comply with applicable building and housing code standards which materially affect health and safety would constitute a breach of the warranty of habitability.” (Smith v. David (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 101, 109.)

Civ. Codes 1940.2, 789.3, 1942.5, 1950.5, and 1954, all apply only to landlords. Los Angeles County Code, section 8.52.130 also applies only to landlords. Los Angeles County Code, section 8.52.020 includes an owner, lessor, or sublessor who is entitled to receive rent in its definition of “landlord.”

Here, the SAC did not change the fact that the subject property is titled to Yamtoobian and Rebecca Duel, meaning the other Defendants could not be the owners of the subject property. Additionally, the SAC does not state that the other Defendants were successors to Plaintiff’s lease or that they had entered into a new lease with Plaintiff. Because the SAC at most alleges that CRA was a manager or operator of the subject property, CRA cannot be held liable for these causes of action, which are only applicable against a landlord.

CRA’s demurrer as to the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Nineteenth, Twenty-First Causes of action is SUSTAINED. Because this is the second demurrer on these issues, Plaintiff failed to amend the complaint to state a cause of action against CRA, and Plaintiff did not oppose this motion, leave to amend is denied.

Gov. Code, section 12955 provides that it is unlawful for the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against or harass any person because of the race, color, religion, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, ancestry, familial status, source of income, disability, veteran or military status, or genetic information of that person.

Under the Unruh Act, “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, section 51(b).) “No business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against . . . any person in this state on account of any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51 . . . because the person is perceived to have one or more of those characteristics, or because the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any of those characteristics.” Id., section 51.5(a).

Here, the SAC alleges that Plaintiff suffered from a physical or mental impairment. (SAC ¶130.) Plaintiff requested repairs to his unit to accommodate his disability and resulting needs. (SAC ¶131.) Defendants were aware that without these repairs, Plaintiff would not be afforded the opportunity to use and enjoy the property. (SAC ¶121.) Defendants were also aware that failure to repair the unit would have a disparate impact on Plaintiff, a member of a protected class. (SAC ¶121.)

The SAC again made no changes to the facts about events leading to Plaintiff surrendering his unity. Although the SAC alleges facts that Plaintiff had a disability and that Defendants were aware of his disability, there are no facts alleging that Defendants refused to make repairs to the unit because Plaintiff was disabled. Rather, the SAC states Defendants refused to repair the unit to coerce Plaintiff into surrendering the unit. Therefore, the SAC does not allege that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff due to his disability.

CRA’s demurrer to the eighth and fifteenth causes of action are SUSTAINED. Because this is the second demurrer on these issues, Plaintiff failed to amend the complaint to state a cause of action against CRA, and Plaintiff has failed to file an opposition, leave to amend is denied.

Civil Code section 52.1 prohibits any person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, from interfering by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempting to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the state of California.

Here, the SAC alleges that Defendants were all agents of each other and that Defendants Yamtoobian and Duel threatened Plaintiff, promising to refuse his rent and make his life difficult if he did not accept a cash buyout of his unit. These facts are sufficient to constitute that Defendants’ agents threatened Plaintiff to interfere with his right to remain in his apartment for which he signed a lease. The SAC states facts sufficient to support the thirteenth cause of action.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1159 states that, “every person is guilty of forcible entry who… [b]y breaking open doors, windows, or other parts of a house, or by any other kind of violence or circumstance of terror enters upon or into any real property.

Here, the SAC alleges that Defendants are all managers or operators of the subject property, and that Defendants are all agents of each other. The SAC also alleges that Defendants unlawfully entered Plaintiff’s unit by breaking open his front door. (SAC ¶168.) The SAC alleges sufficient facts to show that all Defendants broke Plaintiff’s door in violation of Civ. Code, section 1159.

To successfully plead a UCL claim for unfair business practices, a plaintiff must allege facts justifying relief in the form of protecting the public from unfair business practices or deceptive advertising. (Day v. AT&T Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 325, 331-332.) A plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant engaged in a business practice that was either unlawful (i.e., is forbidden by law) or unfair (i.e., harm to victim outweighs any benefit) or fraudulent (i.e., is likely to deceive members of the public). (Albillo v. Intermodal Container Services, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 190, 206.)

“[T]he ‘practice’ requirement envisions something more than a single transaction . . . ; it contemplates a ‘pattern of conduct’ [citation], ‘on-going . . . conduct’, ‘a pattern of behavior’ [citation], or ‘a course of conduct’ . . . .” (Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 499, 519 (quoting State of California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1169-70).)

Here, the SAC alleges that Defendants committed unlawful practices in violation of Civ. Codes, 1940.2, 1942, 51, 52.1, 789.3, 1159, and the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance. (SAC ¶182.) Additionally, Defendants acts have affected many similarly situated tenants. (SAC ¶184.)

Although the demurrer was sustained as to most of the statutes cited by Plaintiffs in the SAC, the demurrer were overruled as to the claim for violation of Civ. Code, sections 1159. Additionally, the SAC sufficiently alleges that Defendants’ unlawful actions have affected many other tenants, meaning this is a pattern of conduct. The SAC alleges sufficient facts to show that Defendants engaged in an unlawful business practice by violating Civ. Code, section 1159 and repeating this pattern on other tenants.

To plead a cause of action for conversion, one must allege (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of personal property; (2) defendant’s disposition of the property inconsistent with plaintiff’s rights; and (3) resulting damages. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

“‘Conversion is any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein.’” (Enterprise Leasing Corp. v. Shugart Corp. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 737, 747 (quoting Messerall v. Fulwider (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1329).) “‘It is not necessary that there be a manual taking of the property; it is only necessary to show an assumption of control or ownership over the property, or that the alleged converter has applied the property to his own use.’” (Id.)

Here, the SAC alleges that Defendants entered his unit without permission and shut off his utilities and services. (SAC ¶187.) Additionally, as discussed above, Defendants unlawfully entered Plaintiff’s unit to perform construction. Plaintiff surrendered the unit after it became uninhabitable without utilities. Therefore, the SAC alleges that Defendants exerted dominion over Plaintiff’s unit by cutting utilities and performing construction in the unit. The SAC states sufficient facts to support a cause of action for conversion.

The elements for a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) an actual and proximate causal link between the tortious conduct and the emotional distress.¿ (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)¿

“A defendant’s conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 234, 257 (internal citations and quotations omitted).) “Mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.” (Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 597 (internal citations and quotations omitted).) Rather, the requirements for satisfying the element of extreme and outrageous conduct are rigorous and difficult to satisfy. (Okorie, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at 597.) “On the spectrum of offensive conduct, outrageous conduct is that which is the most extremely offensive.” (Id. (quoting Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1129).) “Depending on the idiosyncrasies of the plaintiff, offensive conduct which falls along the remainder of the spectrum may be irritating, insulting or even distressing but it is not actionable and must simply be endured without resort to legal redress.” (Ibid.)

Here, the SAC alleges that Defendants harassed Plaintiff for two years by making threats, pressuring him to sign a buyout agreement, entering his unit without permission, and cutting his utilities. The facts alleged in the SAC constitute outrageous behavior sufficient to support a cause of action for IIED.

Article 5.3 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code is the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance which authorizes civil and criminal remedies to address unlawful harassment practices. The article defines tenant harassment as failing to perform repairs and maintenance, abuse of right of access into a rental unit, threatening a tenant by word, gesture, or physical harm, coercing the tenant to vacate, misrepresenting that a tenant is required to vacate a rental unit, and other acts. (Los Angeles Municipal Code, section 45.33.) A landlord is defined as any owner, lessor, sublessor, manager, or person having any legal or equitable right of ownership, possession, or a right to lease or receive rent for the use and occupancy of a rental unit. (Id., section 45.32.)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)

“Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)

“As amended to include [despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

“[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the ‘officer[s], director[s], or managing agent[s].’” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [citation omitted].) As to ratification, “[a] corporation cannot confirm and accept that which it does not actually know about.’” (Ibid. [citing College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 726 [for ratification sufficient to justify punitive damages against corporation, there must be proof that officers, directors, or managing agents had actual knowledge of the malicious conduct and its outrageous character]].)

Here, as discussed above, the SAC alleges that Defendants refused to repair Plaintiff’s unit, threatened to make life difficult for him if he refused to vacate the unit, cut his utilities, broke his front door, entered his unit without permission, and engaged in this behavior for two years. Additionally, Defendants engaged in this conduct to raise the market price of Plaintiff’s unit.

The facts show that Defendants acted with a conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights because they engaged in harassing conduct to coerce Plaintiff out of the unit. Additionally, the conduct described in the Complaint meets the level of despicable conduct required to support a demand for punitive damages because the facts state Defendants engaged in severe harassing behavior which lasted for years until Plaintiff surrendered the unit.

However, the Complaint fails to name an officer, director, or managing agent of CRA. No opposition has been filed and there is no indication that the SAC can be amended to correct this deficiency. Therefore, the motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend.