Judge Jill Feeney, Case 22STCV04879 2023-04-05 Tentative Ruling

Defendant argues that there is no evidence that a dangerous condition existed at the time of Plaintiff’s trip and fall. Defendant alleges that although Plaintiff thought she tripped on a pallet, she could not remember what the alleged condition looked like and did not know what she tripped on.

Plaintiff argues that a pallet caused Plaintiff’s fall. Plaintiff alleges that the store manager at the time of the incident saw Plaintiff on the floor about four or five feet away from a pallet. The manager also told an investigator for Plaintiff that Plaintiff tripped on a pallet. The manager also stated that the placement of the pallets was a safety hazard. Additionally, it was Defendant’s custom to place pallets in the aisle of the store.

Defendant argues that the store manager’s testimony as to what caused Plaintiff’s fall was speculative because he does not know what caused Plaintiff’s fall. Defendant argues that none of Plaintiff’s evidence raises a triable issue of material fact over whether a dangerous condition on Defendant’s premises caused her fall.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff has no evidence that Plaintiff’s fall was caused by a dangerous condition on its premises and that Defendant had notice of a dangerous condition.

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for [customers’] their use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) The existence and scope of a property owner’s duty are legal questions for the court. (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 36.)

Because the owner is not the insurer of the visitor’s personal safety…, the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206.) “[W]here the plaintiff relies on the failure to correct a dangerous condition to prove the owner’s negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it.” (Ibid.) The party asserting the cause of action has the burden to prove that the owner had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time to correct it.¿ (Ortega, 26 Cal.4th at 1203, 1206.) To establish liability for negligence, “[t]here must be some evidence . . . to support the conclusion that the condition had existed long enough for the proprietor, in the exercise of reasonable care, to have discovered and remedied it.” (Girvetz v. Boys’ Market (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 829; Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206.)

To meet her burden of proof, Plaintiff “must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result.¿ A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.”¿ (Ortega,¿supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1205-1206.)¿¿

Defendant discusses Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and her responses to discovery. Plaintiff testified that all she remembers from the incident is that her foot became stuck on something that she believed was a pallet. (Denny Decl., 24:20-22.) Plaintiff does not remember what the pallet looked like, which area of the store the pallet was in, or what it was made of. (Id., 25:17-26:25.) Plaintiff believes she tripped on a pallet because she had past experience as a business owner who had seen a lot of pallets. (Id., 26:14-18.) Plaintiff does not remember what she tripped on and speculated that it was either a pallet or a stack of something. (Id., 26:19-23.) Plaintiff was not conscious after she fell. (Id., 31:1-10.) Plaintiff’s responses to special interrogatories confirm the same information. (Rai Decl., Exh. B, C.)

Plaintiff provides evidence that would support an inference that Plaintiff tripped over a pallet on Defendant’s premises and that the pallet constituted a dangerous condition due to its placement in the aisle.

Plaintiff provides the testimony of Daniel Leiva, the store manager at the time of the incident, who testified that he discovered Plaintiff on the floor four to five feet away from a pallet that was in the aisle. (Leiva Depo., 30:3-8.) It was customary for 99 Cents Stores to put pallets in the aisles. (Id., 27:17-25.) Leiva himself has almost tripped due to this placement of pallets in the aisle. (Id., 31:11-22.) Leiva believed that placing pallets in the aisles constituted a safety hazard. (Id.) Leiva also identified a picture of the pallet near where Plaintiff fell. (Id., 38:6-16.)

The Court must consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Here, based on the reasonable inferences from the totality of the evidence provided by Plaintiff and Leiva there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff tripped on the pallet and whether the placement of the pallet constituted a dangerous condition.