Judge Jill Feeney, Case 22STCV25220 2023-02-16 Tentative Ruling

This is an action for general negligence and motor vehicle negligence arising from an ATV accident which took place in June 2021. Plaintiff Simone Vaca filed her Complaint against Defendants Isaiah Morales, Russell Lyster, Committed Fellowship, Calvary La Habra, and Hope Ranch Cattle Company on August 4, 2022.

Hope Ranch moves to quash service of summons under Code Civ. Proc., section 418.10 on the grounds that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it because it is an Idaho based limited liability company with no presence in California and the incident at issue took place in Idaho.

Plaintiff opposes the motion on the grounds that Hope Ranch offered the ranch as a destination for Committed Fellowship’s senior trip, inviting high school students in California to visit and stay at the ranch. Hope Ranch also intended to continue offering the use of the ranch to Committed Fellowship and Calvary La Habra. Plaintiff also argues that there is no burden for Hope Ranch to appear in California, California has an interest in adjudicating this controversy, California is the most convenient venue for Plaintiff, and the interests of justice and policy interests weigh in favor a finding of jurisdiction in California.

Hope Ranch argues that Defendant Russell Lyster only offered the use of the ranch to Calvary La Habra and Committed Fellowship in his personal capacity born out of personal religious convictions. Additionally, Hope Ranch never intended to seek economic benefit in California and did not obtain any economic benefit from lending the ranch for Calvary La Habra’s retreat.

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10(a).) “[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) “[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper” but only if it “complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.” (Id. at 1441-1442.) When a defendant moves to quash service of the summons and complaint, the plaintiff has “the burden of proving the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866, 868.)

California’s long-arm statute authorizes California courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of California. (Code Civ. Proc., section 410.10.) Accordingly, a California court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has not been served with process within the State comports with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal Constitution if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the State that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 434, 444-45; International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.)

California recognizes two ways in which the constitutional “minimum contacts” requirement may be satisfied. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are so systematic and so continuous as to make it consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum, even if the cause of action is unrelated to the contacts. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at 445 – 446; International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310; Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 291.) For corporations, forums where a corporation is considered “at home” and therefore subject to general jurisdiction include (1) its place of incorporation and (2) its principal place of business. (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 134.)

If a nonresident defendant’s contacts with California are insufficient for general jurisdiction, the nonresident may be subject to specific jurisdiction if: (1) the nonresident has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the state’s laws; (2) the controversy arises out of the nonresident’s contacts with the state; and (3) it would be fair and just to assert jurisdiction. (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472; Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268.)

“‘When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. [Citation.] Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant's burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.’ ” (Burdick v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 17, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, quoting Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 899, 926 P.2d 1085.)

Hope Ranch requests that the Court take Judicial Notice of the fact that it is not a registered business entity in the state of California pursuant to Evid. Code, sections 452 and 453. The request is granted.

Hope Ranch seeks to quash Plaintiff’s service of summons on the grounds that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it. Hope Ranch argues that it is an Idaho corporation that does not have contact with California and the subject incident took place in Idaho.

“ ‘The purposeful availment inquiry ... focuses on the defendant's intentionality. [Citation.] This prong is only satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs [its] activities toward the forum so that [it] should expect, by virtue of the benefit [it] receives, to be subject to the court's jurisdiction based on’ [its] contacts with the forum. (U.S. v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd.(1st Cir. 2001) 274 F.3d 610, 623 (Swiss American Bank).) Thus, the ‘ “purposeful availment” requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts [citations], or of the “unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” ’ ” (Pavlovich, supra,29 Cal.4th at p. 269, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 58 P.3d 2, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (Burger King).)

“[P]urposeful availment occurs where a nonresident defendant ‘ “purposefully direct[s]” [its] activities at residents of the forum’ (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174), ‘ “purposefully derive[s] benefit” from’ its activities in the forum (id. at p. 473, 105 S.Ct. 2174), ‘create[s] a “substantial connection” with the forum’ (id. at p. 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174), ‘ “deliberately” has engaged in significant activities within’ the forum (id. at pp. 475–476, 105 S.Ct. 2174), or ‘has created “continuing obligations” between [itself] and residents of the forum’ (id. at p. 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174).

Here, Defendant invited California residents to its property in Idaho. It clearly directed its activities to residents of California here as Plaintiff was part of a Church group invited to use Defendant’s property as a retreat. (Lyster Decl. Para. 15.) There is no dispute that the Church itself and the individuals invited to the retreat were all California residents.

Defendant Hope Ranch seems to contend that because it offered the use of its property free of charge that this does not constitute purposeful availment. However, there are no cases provided creating this distinction between a commercial benefit versus a philanthropic benefit.

Here, there is a substantial connection between the cause of action by Plaintiff (a tort cause of action based upon an injury suffered while on retreat) and Defendant’s act of personal solicitation of California residents to participate in the retreat (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1068 (“only when the operative facts of the controversy are not related to the defendant’s contact with the state can it be said that the cause of action does not arise from that [contact]” (citations omitted)).

Here, there is no dispute that Defendant made the invitation to members of a California church and that invitation was extended in California. Defendant itself therefore had jurisdictionally relevant contact with the forum state. (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 286.)

The ATV accident giving rise to this action took place in Idaho. Plaintiff’s opposition also states that Plaintiff was transported to the nearest trauma center, also in Idaho, for treatment. (Opp., p.2.) However, other witnesses, including the ATV driver, others on the trip, and all the other Defendants in the action are California residents. Because there are significant witnesses in California and all the other defendants are in California, this factor does not weigh against a finding of specific jurisdiction.

Because this incident took place in Idaho and involves a corporation incorporated in Idaho, the alternative forum is Idaho. However, in this particular instance, this factor does not heavily way against a finding of specific jurisdiction given that all the rest of the Defendants reside in California, including Defendant Hope Ranch’s managing member who either resides in or regularly visits California.

Plaintiff argues that there is no burden on Hope Ranch to defend the action in California because its manager, Lyster, resides in California or regularly travels to California. (Opp., p. 9.) Plaintiff also argues that California is the most convenient venue for Plaintiff and most of the witnesses in the case. (Id.) This factor also does not weigh against the exercise of specific jurisdiction.

Plaintiff argues that state interests in both Idaho and California weigh in favor of jurisdiction in California. Plaintiff argues that California has an interest in protecting its citizens and its interest is heightened because Plaintiff is a minor. However, Idaho would also have an interest in accidents which took place within the state involving an Idaho corporation. Thus, this factor does not weigh strongly in favor or against a finding of specific jurisdiction.

Plaintiff also argues that the Court has specific jurisdiction over Hope Ranch because it sell directly to consumers through its website and there are no limitations to sales within the State of Idaho. (Eaton Decl., ¶8.) This argument has no merit because Plaintiff fails to show that the incident giving rise to this action arise from Hope Ranch’s online sales of livestock products. Moreover, Russell Lyster testifies that Hope Ranch does not actively sell livestock or livestock products in California. (Lyster Decl., ¶9.)