Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

 

DEBORAH RENE SPIVEY, 

Plaintiff,  

vs. 

HARBOR HEALTH CARE, INC., 

Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV29200

MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF EMPLOYMENT RECORDS FILED BY DEBORAH RENE SPIVEY

Plaintiff’s motion to quash subpoena is GRANTED.

Moving party to provide notice.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND   

This is an action for violations of the California Family Rights Act, violations of the FEHA, and wrongful termination. Plaintiff alleges that she began working for Defendant on November 13, 1997 as a member of directed care staff. In April 2021, Plaintiff sought treatment for an injured knee. In July 2021, Plaintiff informed Defendant’s CEO that she would be having knee replacement surgery in both knees and would be off work for about six months. The CEO instructed Plaintiff to inform Human Resources. Defendant granted medical leave from September 19, 2021 to December 19, 2021. Plaintiff underwent surgery in September 2021. In November 2021, Plaintiff’s orthopedic doctor informed her that she was not done healing. HR informed Plaintiff that if she was not going to return by December 19, 2021, she would need a doctor’s note. Plaintiff’s doctor gave her a doctor’s note on December 10, 2021. On December 21, 2021, HR informed Plaintiff she was terminated. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff moves to quash a subpoena issued to the Employment Development Department seeking Plaintiff’s employment records. (Nercess Decl., Exh. B.) 

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a) states, “[i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.¿ In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”¿ 

“[U]pon motion reasonably made by the party, judges may rule upon motions for quashing, modifying or compelling compliance with, subpoenas.”¿ (Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Ass'n (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 582-583.)¿ 

Code Civ. Proc., section 1985.3 provides that a party whose records are being sought by a subpoena duces tecum must serve notice of the motion to quash at least five days before the production date. However, the court retains jurisdiction to hear a motion to quash even if it is brought after the production date. (Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1312.)

[E]ven when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy.  . . . [I]f an intrusion on the right of privacy is deemed necessary under the circumstances of a particular case, any such intrusion should be the minimum intrusion necessary to achieve its objective . . . [meaning] the least intrusive means to satisfy the interest.  Mere convenience of means or cost will not satisfy that test for that would make expediency and not the compelling interest the overriding value.  (Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854-1855 [internal quotes and citations omitted].)

When evaluating invasions of the right to privacy in discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865.) A responding party may prevail by negating any of these three elements “or by pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests.” (Id.) “[T]he party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533.) A court then balances these competing considerations. (Id.) As guidance in balancing these competing considerations, it should be noted, “[o]nly obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Id.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.) 

Any matter that is relevant to the subject matter and not privileged is discoverable if it is itself admissible or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., section 2017.010.)

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 provides that “the court may in its discretion award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing [a motion to quash], including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”  (Code Civ. Proc. section 1987.2(a).) 

DISCUSSION

Here, the deposition subpoena issued to Employment Development Department (“EDD”) request the following:

“Any and all DOCUMENTS contained in any file or other location under YOUR possession, custody, or control in relation to or that reflect any and all services, care and/or treatment to SPIVEY from November 1, 1997 to present including, but not limited to:

1. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all applications benefits submitted to YOU by SPIVEY. 

2. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all current benefits received by SPIVEY through YOU.

3. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all past benefits received by SPIVEY through YOU.

4. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all current disability benefits received by SPIVEY through YOU.

5. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all past disability benefits received by SPIVEY through YOU.

6. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all current monetary compensation paid to SPIVEY by YOU. 

7. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all past monetary compensation paid to SPIVEY by YOU.

8. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all compensation paid to SPIVEY.

9. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all past monetary compensation made to YOU by SPIVEY.

10. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all requests for nonmonetary compensation made to YOU by SPIVEY.

11. All DOCUMENTS related to any and all deferred compensation owed to SPIVEY by YOU.”

Plaintiff argues that the subpoenas are overbroad and violate Plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy because they are not limited in time or type of injury. 

A party has a right of privacy in his or her employment records. (See Alch v. Superior Court¿(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426.)  “The public interest in preserving confidential, personnel information generally outweighs a private litigant’s interest in obtaining that information.  A showing of relevancy may be enough to cause the court to balance the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy.”  (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652)  “[O]bvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.”  (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 557.)  “Even when the balance does weigh in favor of disclosure, the scope of disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed.” (Life Technologies, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 652-653 [emphasis original].)   

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s EDD records from the beginning of her employment in 1997 are necessary because Plaintiff filed a worker’s compensation claim for a cumulative injury she sustained throughout her time employed by Defendant. (Galloway Decl., Exh. A.) Additionally, Plaintiff testified that she suffered specific injuries at work between 2015 and 2019. (Id., Exh. B.) However, whenever Plaintiff signed her annual employee health examination, she claimed to have had no injuries. (Id., Exh. C.) 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s EDD records are relevant to whether she falsified employment records by reporting that she had no injuries during her annual exams when she in fact had suffered injuries at work. Defendant alleges that the evidence will be used to attack Plaintiff’s credibility and the credibility of her claim that her medical condition was work related. However, the cause of Plaintiff’s injury is not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims for violations of the FEHA based on disability, violations of the California Family Rights Act, or Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination because the nature of the injury is not an element of any of these claims.

Defendant also fails to explain how records showing the nature of Plaintiff’s injury would support defenses for estoppel, after acquired evidence, or unclean hands because the nature of the injury is not an element to any of Plaintiff’s claims. Worker’s compensation exclusivity would not bar Plaintiff from recovering in this matter because Plaintiff is seeking damages for violations of the FEHA, the CFRA, and wrongful termination, not for her injury. Although Defendant has an interest in discovering impeachment evidence that would be relevant to Plaintiff’s credibility, Defendant already has access to Plaintiff’s annual exams and Plaintiff’s conflicting deposition testimony admitting to having injuries between 2015 and 2019. Because Defendant appears to already have access to impeachment evidence and the evidence is not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, Defendant fails to provide a compelling need for further discovery of Plaintiff’s EDD records that outweighs her right to privacy.

Plaintiff’s motion to quash subpoena is granted. The subpoena is quashed.

Defendant’s request for sanctions is denied.

DATED: December 27, 2023 

________________________

                                                                          Hon. Jill Feeney 

                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court