Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

 

RODRIGO SANGUINO,

Plaintiff,  

vs. 

COPART, INC., et al., 

Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV32453

DEFENDANT COPART, INC.’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION. 

   

Defendant Copart, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. 

All further proceedings are stayed pending arbitration. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND   

This Is an employment action brought under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges as follows. 

Plaintiff Rodrigo Sanguino (“Plaintiff”) was hired by Defendant Copart, Inc. (“Copart”) in September, 2000. (FAC ¶ 11.) In the latter part of his employment with Copart, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a debilitating mental disability that required him to take a medical leave. (FAC ¶ 15.) Between 2015 and 2019 Plaintiff would need to take time off under the California Family Rights Act or the Family Medical Leave Act; Plaintiff’s treating physician certified Plaintiff’s absences and wrote a letter to Copart detailing Plaintiff’s treatment. (FAC ¶ 17.) 

In 2019, Defendant Daniel Lamotte (“Lamotte”) began supervising Plaintiff; Lamotte did not want to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability and his necessary days off. (FAC ¶ 18.) Lamotte demoted Plaintiff and threatened him with disciplinary action for any future absences. (FAC ¶ 19.) This treatment aggravated Plaintiff’s condition. (Ibid.)

When Plaintiff returned from leave in late 2019 or early 2020, Lamotte encouraged Plaintiff to go part-time instead of working full-time. (FAC ¶ 20.) Plaintiff declined as he needed the work. (Ibid.) 

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff received his first poor performance evaluation which stated that Plaintiff “lacks commitment to his work schedule and misses work regularly.” (FAC ¶ 21.) 

In or around August 2020, after Plaintiff returned from a protected absence, Copart informed Plaintiff that they would no longer tolerate his absences. (FAC ¶ 23.) Copart asked Plaintiff to sign the write-up or face termination. (Ibid.) When Plaintiff asked if he could consider his options, Copart terminated him one day later. (Ibid.) 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On October 4, 2022, filed a Complaint asserting nine causes of action:

1. FEHA Employment Discrimination;

2. Failure to Accommodate in violation of FEHA;

3. Failure to Engage in a timely & Good-faith Interactive Process in violation of FEHA;

4. FEHA Harassment;

5. FEHA Retaliation; 

6. FEHA Failure to Prevent/Remedy Discrimination, Harassment or Retaliation;

7. Whistleblower Retaliation;

8. Wrongful Discharge in violation of Public Policy; and, 

9. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

On November 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint adding a cause of action for Violation of Labor Code § 230.8.

On December 29, 2022, Copart filed an Answer.

On January 30, 2023, Copart filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration. 

On February 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. 

On February 24, 2023, Copart filed a Reply. 

Also on February 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Request to Present Oral Testimony at Hearing. 

On February 28, 2023, Copart filed an Objection to Plaintiff’s Request to Present Oral Testimony at Hearing. 

On March 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed evidentiary objections to evidence submitted with Copart’s Reply. 

On May 23, 2023, the Court continued this matter to allow the parties to conduct discovery on the issue of the authenticity of the arbitration agreement.

DISCUSSION 

I. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s objection to the supplemental declaration of Ralph Santosuosso is overruled.

II. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

The Court incorporates by reference the tentative decision issued on May 23, 2023 and makes it part of this decision.

Defendant Copart, Inc. moves to compel arbitration pursuant to a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (the “Arbitration Agreement”) allegedly signed by Plaintiff on August 16, 2016. 

California law reflects a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for resolving disputes. To further that policy, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless one of three limited exceptions applies. Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal issues.” (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 967 [citations omitted]; Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) 

In deciding a motion to compel arbitration, trial courts must decide first whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine the second gateway issue whether the claims are covered within the scope of the agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The party seeking arbitration has the “burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, while a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842.) The trial court “sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Id.) General principles of contract law govern whether parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236; see also Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) 

“An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).) “The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a person under subdivision (a) is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the parties' agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided by law.” (Id., subd. (b).) 

Here, the Court previously found that Plaintiff failed to show the electronic signature on the subject agreement was not authentic by a preponderance of the evidence because Plaintiff’s argument is based on speculation and because the security protections detailed by Copart overcome any argument that the signature was invalid. The Court also found that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable. 

In connection with the motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff requested that four individuals be allowed to testify at the hearing on the motion. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to allow Plaintiff to depose the four individuals listed in Plaintiff’s Request to Present Oral Testimony filed on February 24, 2023. At the hearing, the Court ordered that Defendant make available for deposition the one individual of the four who was still employed with Copart and that Defendant provide to Plaintiff the last known addresses of the three other individuals, all of whom are former employees of the company.

On a separate note, the Court requested that Defendant make best efforts to provide contact information for two former employees, Lamotte and Stewart, who are named as defendants in the case but have not been served by Plaintiff. Lamotte and Stewart have nothing to do with this motion.

The Court also permitted supplemental briefing on the issue of authenticity of Plaintiff’s signature and the authenticity of the arbitration agreement. 

Copart produced the last known contact information for the three former employees and arranged for the deposition of Ralph Santosuosso. (Jun Decl., ¶4.) Plaintiff only deposed Santuosso. (Id., ¶7.) 

The transcript of Santosuosso’s deposition shows that Santosuosso could not tell where the document containing the arbitration agreement was signed from the IP address on the final audit report. (Santosuosso Depo., 36:10-13.) The IP address on the audit report matches the IP address for other documents signed by Plaintiff. (Id., 37:14-19.) Santosuosso does not know the internet service provider affiliated with the IP address, whether it is affiliated with a house or business, or whether the IP address was affiliated with Copart. (Id., 79:15-81:7.) Santosuosso was not involved in putting together the audit report. (Id., 38:19-22.) 

Santosuosso did not know Plaintiff requested his personnel files in 2020 or 2022. (Santosuosso Depo., 39:8-11, 45:21-25.) When an employee requests their personnel files, it is Copart’s practice and policy to produce all documents signed by the employee. (Id., 40:19-41:7.) 

Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly asked Santosuosso if it was safe to assume that a document was not signed if it was not included in a personnel file. (Santosuosso Depo., 48:10-49:18.) Plaintiff’s counsel also asked whether a document was more likely to have been unsigned if it was not included in the personnel file. (Id.) Santosuosso repeatedly testified that it is more likely a document not included in the personnel file was misplaced. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s counsel asked a series of questions asking Santosuosso to speculate whether he would generally know if a document was missing or had never been signed:

“Q: Well, you don’t know one way or another if a personnel file is missing the arbitration agreement, whether the case is that that document was misplaced or whether the arbitration agreement was never signed in the first place. You don’t know one way or the other, do you?

A: No –

…

Q: So if you state the arbitration agreement was just misplaced, you’d be guessing because you don’t have personal knowledge one way or the other; isn’t that right?

…

A: Yeah, you would be asking me to make a guess based on an unknown situation.”

(Santosuosso Depo., 52:5-21.)

Santosuosso then stated again that he was not involved in preparing Plaintiff’s personnel file and did not know where the signed arbitration agreement was found or who found it. (Id., 53:1-21.) Santosuosso reviewed his declaration submitted in opposition to this motion and confirmed that he reviewed the arbitration agreement kept within Plaintiff’s personnel file just before signing the declaration. (Id., 61:5-69:20.) Santosuosso was not involved at all in the personnel file until he reviewed it in November 2022 for the preparation of his declaration. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s counsel asked Santosuosso if he could have signed the agreement if he was logged in as Plaintiff. (Id., 77:12-78:17.) Santosuosso responded that he could not have logged in as Plaintiff, but that he could have signed the agreement if he was logged in as Plaintiff. (Id.)

Exhibit 3 to Santosuosso’s original declaration was not the final audit report for the arbitration agreement, but the 2016 employee handbook. (Id., 83:10-22.)

Plaintiff’s counsel also asked Santosuosso to speculate whether it was possible for other employees to access Plaintiff’s account if he left his computer logged in, shared his password, or if another employee changed Plaintiff’s password. (Id., p.86-93.)

Although Santosuosso was not involved in the preparation of the final audit report, he is aware of Copart’s process for generating the report and had no reason to believe it was not generated in the course of Copart’s regular activities. (Id., 108:23-109:8.)

Plaintiff first argues that Santosuosso lacks the personal knowledge necessary to authenticate the arbitration agreement and final audit report. 

A writing is authenticated if there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is. (Evid. Code, section 1400.)

Here, Santosuosso’s deposition testimony shows that he does not have personal knowledge of information such as who created the audit report or when and how Plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement beyond what is in the audit report. However, personal knowledge of a document’s creation is not necessary to authenticate a writing. Rather, there must be evidence to sustain a finding that the writing is what the proponent claims it is. Here, Santosuosso is Copart’s Director of Human Resources and is familiar with Copart’s business organizations and the operations of the human resources department. (Santosuosso Decl., ¶3.) He is a custodian of records and has access to Copart’s personnel records. (Id., ¶6.) Because Santosuosso is familiar with the operations of Copart’s human resources department, is a custodian of Copart’s records, and has access to personnel records, the Court is satisfied that the final audit report and the arbitration agreement are what Copart claims they are. Additionally, as a custodian of records, Santosuosso has personal knowledge of the contents of the records. 

The parties also dispute whether Santosuosso’s declaration is rendered inadmissible because Copart’s counsel attached the wrong audit report to the original declaration. However, Santosuosso testifies that he referred to the correct final audit report when he prepared his original declaration. (Santosuosso Supp. Decl., ¶7.) Copart’s counsel states that he inadvertently attached the wrong exhibit to the original declaration. (Jun Decl., ¶8.) Additionally, Santosuosso’s original declaration references dates and times only found in the correct final audit report. The evidence shows Copart attached the wrong exhibit by mistake. There is no evidence Copart was attempting to conceal the correct audit report.

Plaintiff also argues that Santosuosso’s statement that Plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement is untrue. However, Santosuosso repeatedly maintains during his deposition that Plaintiff did sign the agreement. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the inauthenticity of Plaintiff’s electronic signature. 

Plaintiff also argues that Santosuosso’s statement that the 2016 arbitration agreement was in Plaintiff’s personnel file was untrue. The parties do not dispute that Copart failed to produce the agreement in 2020 and 2022 when Plaintiff requested his personnel file. The parties do not dispute that the agreement should have been produced when Plaintiff requested the file. However, the fact that the agreement was not produced when it should have been in 2020 and 2022 does not show that Santosuosso’s testimony was inaccurate. Rather, Santosuosso maintains that he reviewed the file, and the file contained the agreement by November 2022. 

Plaintiff also argues that Santosuosso did not have knowledge of the EchoSign system necessary to support his declaration. 

The authorities that provide the goalposts for this motion are Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836 and Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047. In Ruiz, the declaration seeking to authenticate the plaintiff’s electronic signature on an arbitration agreement was deemed insufficient where the declarant “summarily asserted” plaintiff electronically signed the agreement and “did not explain how she arrived at that conclusion or inferred [the plaintiff] was the person who electronically signed the agreement” or that the electronic signature “was ‘the act’” of the plaintiff. (Ruiz, supra, 232 CalApp.4th at pp. 844-845.) Thus, the court found the arbitration agreement at issue was unenforceable. (Id. at p. 846.) 

By contrast, in Espejo the “declaration offered the critical factual connection that the declarations in Ruiz lacked,” by detailing “security precautions regarding transmission and use of an applicant’s unique username and password, as well as the steps an applicant [or employee] would have to take to place his or her name on the signature line.” (Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.)

Here, Santosuosso is not required to have knowledge of the mechanics of the EchoSign system itself to prove the validity of an electronic signature. Santosuosso testified that the EchoSign system is merely the application Copart uses to obtain electronic signatures and does not know how Echosign itself authenticates a signature. (Santosuosso Depo., 94:23-95:12.) Santosuosso has personal knowledge of Copart’s electronic signature process, and the security protections used during the process. Santosuosso testified in his declaration that Copart assigns each employee an individual email account and employes log into their emails using a unique username and password only the employee knows. (Santosuosso Decl., ¶¶9-10.) Copart distributed the employee handbook and arbitration agreement through a unique link that would be sent to employees’ unique email addresses. (Id.) Employees were required to use Adobe Sign to electronically sign the document by clicking the link in their email, selecting radio buttons, and electronically signing the document where indicated. (Id.) The unique emails, password protections, unique links, and steps employees take to sign the document are sufficient to show the authenticity of Plaintiff’s signature because it is reasonable to infer from the presence of these security measures and the steps needed to sign the agreement that the signature was an act of Plaintiff. As the Court noted in the May 23, 2023 minute order, the facts here are more akin to those in Espejo, where an electronic signature was attributable to the alleged signer because of the presence of security measures and because the signer was required to follow instructions to complete the electronic signature. 

Plaintiff also argues that Santosuosso did not know how the electronic signature system works and how it is safe. Again, it is not material whether Santosuosso knows of the mechanics of the electronic signature system used to collect Plaintiff’s signature. Santosuosso provided evidence of the facts and circumstances surrounding the signing, including how employees access the agreement, Copart’s security measures, and the steps required to sign the agreement. Santosuosso’s lack of knowledge with respect to the mechanics of how the electronic signature system authenticates a signature does not show that the signature was not an act of Plaintiff. Plaintiff again only speculates that another person could have used Plaintiff’s credentials to sign the agreement. Plaintiff had ample opportunity to complete additional discovery with respect to the authenticity of Plaintiff’s signature and chose to only depose Santosuosso.

Plaintiff also argues that Santosuosso cannot explain how the agreement was signed a 5:56 a.m. when Plaintiff would not have been at work and had no remote access to the agreement. However, Santosuosso was not employed with Copart at the time the agreement was signed and consistently stated during the deposition that he did not have knowledge of Plaintiff’s hours, whether he was working that day, or why the agreement was signed at 5:56 a.m. Santosuosso would not have known these facts because he was not employed with Copart in 2016 when the agreement was signed. Plaintiff argues that Copart could have produced time entries, paystubs, or remote access records to show the authenticity of the signature. However, Copart met its burden by attaching the completed arbitration agreement to the motion. It is Plaintiff’s burden to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the signature is not authentic. Rather than attempt to obtain time entries, paystubs, or remote access records, Plaintiff chose to only depose Santosuosso and repeatedly ask him for information he would not have had. Plaintiff had ample opportunity to complete additional discovery with respect to the time the agreement was signed. 

Despite having an opportunity to complete discovery on the issue the authenticity of Plaintiff’s electronic signature, Plaintiff again fails to provide evidence that the signature is not authentic. Plaintiff again speculates that another person accessed and signed the agreement using his credentials without evidence. Plaintiff repeatedly asked Santosuosso to speculate as to whether another person could have signed the agreement using Plaintiff’s credentials. However, whether a person could have signed the agreement in Plaintiff’s place is speculative and is not evidence that Plaintiff did not sign the agreement. There is no evidence that Plaintiff’s password protected account was breached at the time of the signing or that someone else in fact used Plaintiff’s credentials to sign the agreement. The only evidence Plaintiff advances in support of his argument is that his shift normally begins at 8:00 a.m. As it stands, the fact that the agreement was signed slightly earlier than the start of his shift at 5:56 a.m. alone is insufficient to show Plaintiff’s signature is not authentic. The balance of the facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement’s signing shows that the signature was an act of Plaintiff. 

DATED:  August 25, 2023

___________________________

Hon. Jill Feeney 

Judge of the Superior Court